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ABSTRACT (IN ENGLISH) 
The central focus of this thesis is the identification of theory-consistent economic determinants 
of aggregate and sectoral domestic investment in the context of the oil-rich and oil-based 
economy of Iran within the theoretical framework of modified neoclassical-accelerator type 
investment models. This thesis further attempts to extend this theoretically consistent framework 
by incorporating oil-driven financial constraint measures such as specified by cash flow models. 
The latter is justified on the basis of the presence of imperfect capital markets in Iran and the 
inherent uncertainty associated with the availability of oil-driven finance for investment due to 
the unpredictable nature of oil prices. A CVAR method is being employed to determine the 
theory-consistent long-run relationships between the variables of interest during 1974-2011.  
 
Motivated by the existing gaps in the investment and natural resource curse literature, the main 
objectives of the thesis include investigating: (i) the extent to which the theoretical framework is 
able to explain investment in the Iranian context and the underlying reasons for the (expected) 
partial applicability of such a framework; (ii) the relation between oil and investment patterns; 
and (iii) sectoral shifts during the process of capital accumulation and the role of the state in this 
process. Hence, the findings of this thesis contribute to current debates in the literature on the 
economics of natural resources and on investment, as well as to the application of the 
investment literature in the context of oil-abundant and -dependent economies like Iran.  
 
The empirical results, interestingly, showed that aggregate investment largely corresponds to 
factors which lie within the above theoretical framework. Notably, such a framework made it 
possible to make inferences and to draw policy implications based on the theoretically motivated 
long-run relationships between economic determinants of investment. It further allowed 
exploring how well such a framework, in the context of partial-market oil-driven economies like 
Iran, was applicable with some modifications that were needed to make the framework more 
appropriate for such economies.  
 
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, at large, investment was strongly and positively 
related to output and the growth rate of capital in the long-run. Also, as expected by the theory, 
investment was negatively related to inflation, which was used as a proxy for the user cost of 
capital. However, investment and the user cost of capital were not associated in the long-run 
when the expected rates of return on facilities were used in the calculation of the user cost of 
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capital. This was explained on the grounds that the expected rates of return on facilities are 
centrally-set, making them quite non-responsive to changes in the economy’s inflationary 
pressures. The empirical evidence further supported that the coefficients associated with the oil 
income variable carried a positive sign, suggestive of the importance of oil windfalls for 
investment spending in the Iranian economy. Employing impulse response functions (IRFs), the 
findings revealed that the effects of shocks to various measures of oil on investment and output 
were insignificant in most cases.  
 
Contributory to the resource curse literature, the empirical findings based on the sector-level 
analysis revealed a pattern of structural shifts which only partly correspond to the Dutch Disease 
theory. This pattern was characterized by the expansion of investment and output in the sectors 
of services and manufacturing, yet by the contraction of output in the oil and gas sectors. This 
thesis refers to this phenomenon as the ‘Iranian Disease’, which was mainly developed through 
state-led oil-driven investment spillovers not only for services but also for manufacturing due to 
the promotion of industrialization in the country which began in the early 1950s and continued 
throughout the study period. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggested an upward level 
shift in investment and output of the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and mining as well as 
services associated with the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Remarkably, both at aggregate and 
at sectoral levels, the trivial long-run importance of the regime shift and various macroeconomic 
policies on investment signified the most characteristic feature of the Iranian economy in the 
pre- and post-revolutionary era, that is, its oil-dependency. 
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ABSTRACT (IN DANISH) 
Det centrale fokus for denne afhandling er at identificere teorikonsistente økonomiske 
determinanter for samlede og sektorspecifikke indenlandske investeringer i kontekst af Irans 
olierige og oliebaserede økonomi inden for den teoretiske ramme bestående af tilpassede, 
neoklassiske accelerator-investeringsmodeller. Afhandlingen forsøger desuden at udvide denne 
teoretisk konsistente ramme ved at indarbejde finansielle begrænsninger forårsaget af 
oliemarkedet, f.eks. som angivet af cashflow-modeller. Denne fremgangsmåde retfærdiggøres af 
ufuldkomne kapitalmarkeder i Iran og den usikkerhed, der på grund af olieprisernes 
uforudsigelighed altid vil være forbundet med adgangen til oliedrevet finansiering af 
investeringer. Der anvendes en CVAR-metode til at bestemme de teorikonsistente, langsigtede 
forhold mellem de interessante variabler i perioden 1974-2011.  
 
Som bidrag til afhjælpningen af nuværende mangler i litteraturen om investering og 
naturressourceforbandelse er hovedformålene med denne afhandling at undersøge: (i) i hvilken 
udstrækning den teoretiske ramme kan forklare investering i den iranske kontekst samt de 
underliggende årsager til denne rammes (forventede) delvise anvendelighed, (ii) relationen 
mellem olien og investeringsmønstrene og (iii) sektorspecifikke forskydninger under 
kapitalakkumuleringsprocessen og statens rolle i denne proces. Denne afhandlings resultater 
bidrager således til aktuelle debatter i litteraturen om naturressourceøkonomi og investering, 
samt om anvendelsen af investeringslitteraturen i konteksten af olierige og -afhængige 
økonomier som Iran.  
 
De empiriske resultater viste nok så interessant, at de samlede investeringer i stor udstrækning 
afhænger af faktorer, som ligger inden for den ovennævnte teoretiske ramme. En sådan ramme 
gav navnlig mulighed for at drage slutninger og pege på politiske tiltag ud fra de teoretisk 
motiverede langsigtede relationer mellem økonomiske determinanter for investeringer. Det gav 
desuden mulighed for at undersøge, hvor anvendelig den teoretiske ramme var for oliedrevne, 
delvise markedsøkonomier som Iran, hvilket medførte nogle ændringer, som var nødvendige for 
at gøre rammen mere relevant for sådanne økonomier.  
 
I overensstemmelse med teoriens forudsigelser var der generelt set et stærkt og positivt forhold 
mellem investeringer, produktion og kapitalens vækstrate på langt sigt. Samtidig var 
investeringerne, i overensstemmelse med de teoribaserede forventninger, negativt forbundet 
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med inflationen, hvilket blev brugt som en fuldmagt til brugernes kapitalomkostninger. 
Imidlertid var der ikke nogen langsigtet sammenhæng mellem investeringerne og brugernes 
kapitalomkostninger, når de forventede rentesatser blev brugt i beregningen af brugernes 
kapitalomkostninger. Dette blev forklaret med, at rentesatserne bestemmes fra centralt hold, 
hvilket gør, at de ikke påvirkes af ændringer i økonomiens inflationspres. De empiriske realiteter 
understøttede yderligere, at de med olieindtægten forbundne koefficienter havde positivt 
fortegn, hvilket tydede på, at de uventede oliegevinster havde betydning for investeringslysten i 
den iranske økonomi.  Ved brug af IRF'er (impulse response functions) viste resultaterne, at 
oliechokkenes indvirkning på investeringer og produktion i varierende omfang var ikke-lineær.  
 
Som et bidrag til litteraturen om ressourceforbandelse viste de empiriske resultater baseret på 
analysen på sektorniveau et mønster af strukturelle forandringer, som kun delvis stemte overens 
med teorien om hollandsk syge. Dette mønster var karakteriseret ved en udvidelse af 
investeringerne og produktionen i servicesektoren og forarbejdningsindustrien, dog med en 
tilbagegang inden for olie- og gassektoren. I denne afhandling kaldes dette fænomen "den 
iranske syge", som primært blev skabt via statslige, oliedrevne investeringers afsmittende effekt, 
ikke blot på servicesektoren, men også på forarbejdningsindustrien som følge af de 
industrialiseringsfremmende foranstaltninger i landet, der blev påbegyndt tidligt i 1950'erne og 
fortsat i hele undersøgelsesperioden. Desuden viste erfaringerne, at investeringer og produktion 
var steget såvel inden for landbruget, forarbejdningsindustrien og minedriften som inden for 
servicesektoren efter afslutningen af krigen mellem Iran og Irak i 1988. Bemærkelsesværdigt var 
det, at på langt sigt var den ubetydelige indvirkning på investeringerne af regimeskiftet og de 
forskellige makroøkonomiske politikker, både samlet set og for de enkelte sektorer, kendetegnet 
ved olieafhængighed både før og efter revolutionen.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
The central focus of this thesis is the identification of aggregate and sectoral economic 
determinants of domestic investment in the context of the oil-rich and oil-based economy of Iran 
within the theoretical framework of modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. 
A cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) method is employed to determine the theory-
consistent long-run relationships between the variables of interest. The analysis is organized 
around three interconnected themes which underpin the development of investment patterns in 
the country during the years spanning from 1974-2011. These include: (i) the theory-based long-
run macroeconomic determinants of investment; (ii) the impact of oil in financing investment; 
and (iii) the sectoral and structural shifts during the process of capital accumulation in the 
Iranian economy. With regards to the latter, the thesis refers to the problematic nature of these 
shifts as the ‘Iranian Disease’, a special case of the Dutch Disease. In particular, the use of 
sector-level data allows the recognition of sectoral heterogeneity in investment behavior in the 
presence of resource windfalls. An attempt is further made to go beyond the specifications of 
these themes by highlighting the interactions between economy- and sector-level investment, 
growth and institutional changes with an emphasis on the role of the state in this setting.  
 
The standard (Jorgensonian-type) neoclassical model of investment assumes that the current 
level of investment is influenced by current and expected changes in the demand for output, 
taxation imposed on business income and relative factor prices. These are all important 
investment determinants of profit maximizing firms in competitive open-market economies. 
Therefore the neoclassical model of investment has been frequently used in empirical work. 
However, this model is based on some restrictive assumptions such as certainty about the future 
profitability and perfect capital markets. Hence, future expectations are expected not to affect 
the present since the stock of capital can be instantaneously and costlessly adjusted in the future. 
Yet, these assumptions do not fully hold if firms are uncertain or have different expectations 
regarding the future values of determining factors of investment. Particularly, in the context of 
partial-market and oil-rich exporting economies like Iran, uncertainty associated with the 
unpredictable nature of international oil prices and oil revenues could be expected to influence 
the availability of funds for investment activities in these economies.  
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In Iran, as in most developing economies, the state is involved in market regulation for instance 
through setting deposit and lending rates of return in the banking system, imposing protective 
tariffs or granting subsidies. Before the Islamic revolution in 1979, the government’s direct 
investment in different productive sectors of the economy was noticeable. However, in the post-
revolutionary era, direct investment by the government has been considerably reduced. This, for 
example, can be seen in Figure 2.3 (Chapter Two) illustrating the share of public investment 
compared to that of the private sector, or in Tables 6M3 and 6M4 (Appendix 6M) depicting 
government development expenditures in manufacturing and the share of credit facilities 
extended to public enterprises, respectively. Although, at the time of the revolution, a great 
share of the economy’s large scale private sector was nationalized, these enterprises are 
independent of the central government and organized in large conglomerates called foundations. 
Moreover, since the early 2000s, due to the implementation of the privatization program, the 
government has divested of a large part of the public enterprises under its direct control.  
 
The CBI is officially responsible for the supervision of all banks and credit institutions, and 
since the 1980s for the design and the conduct of monetary policies in the context of the Islamic 
Banking. Each year, after the government’s approval of the annual budgets, the CBI presents its 
monetary and credit policy to the MCC for approval, and major elements of these policies are 
then incorporated in the development plans. The CBI implements monetary policies, both 
directly with no reliance on market conditions (through determining banking profit rates and 
credit ceilings) and indirectly or market-based (through deciding on reserve requirement ratios, 
issuing participation papers and regulating open deposit accounts). Appendix 2B provides the 
expected rates of profit on facilities by the specialized banks during 1973-2010.  
 
Also, based on the Monetary and Banking Law, the CBI further intervenes in the monetary and 
banking affairs by restricting banks through setting sector-level ceilings for loans and credits. In 
this setting, the state-owned specialized banks provide loans and financial services to corporate 
sectors. They lend at subsidized rates, and their lending is rationed and concentrated on a small 
number of large companies or priority sectors. Although these banks take deposits, a greater part 
of their loanable funds comes from the commercial banks, other public sources including the 
central government and the CBI. Before the 4th FYDP, the MCC annually set the share of 
economic sectors from the outstanding loans and facilities extended by public banks to the non-
public sector. Since the execution of the 4th FYDP, the sectoral allocation of the banking 
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facilities has been encouraged to be done through the use of cash subsidy and administered 
funds in the banking sector. Appendices 6L1, 6M4 and 6O8 report the extended facilities by 
banks and credit institutions to the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and mining, and 
construction and housing, respectively. 
 
Even though the Central Bank of Iran is formally an independent institution, its economic 
independence is in practice undermined due to its limited ability to control the quantity of credit 
it lends and to set the expected rates of return on facilities that is charged on (Jafari-Samimi, 
2010). Also, rather than being dependent on the banks’ profitability according to the Usury-Free 
Islamic Banking Law of Iran, deposit rates have become pre-set and the depositors have never 
gained higher returns than the pre-determined provisional rates or lost their savings (Hassani, 
2010; Jafari-Samimi, 2010). Further, interestingly, the commercial risks of banks’ are curtailed 
since the principal amount together with the late fees and the expected rates of return on 
facilities are collected by possessing and or selling of secured high value collateral items at the 
time of defaults (Hassani, 2010).  
 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the government pursued a policy of financial assistance to the 
private sector particularly through two banks, namely the Industrial and Mining Development 
Bank and Industrial Credit Bank (Karshenas, 1990). Following the revolution, however, 
substantial structural changes took place in the country’s credit market and the banking system. 
For instance, in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitution, any fundamental market-
oriented reforms such as privatization became highly constrained in the early 1980s and the 
Islamic Usury-Free Banking Law was introduced. Further, all the large-scale industries and 
commercial banks were nationalized. At large, during 1979-1988, the private sector activities 
were limited to small-scale mining and manufacturing, agriculture, and domestic trade and 
services (Jalali-Naini and Khalatbari, 2002). During the first plan, the Tehran Stock Exchange 
(TSE) was re-opened by the government. This, coupled with favorable oil prices, increased the 
financial resources of the banking sector and gradually relaxed the limits on sectoral credit 
allocations. Furthermore, participation shares were introduced as securities for medium-term 
investment financing of projects (Jalili-Naini and Toloo, 2001). During the implementation of 
the fourth plan, the government further imposed different rates and conditions on public banks 
to give high priority in their lending practices to technology-driven projects, small and medium 
enterprises, and to housing projects for low income earners (Amuzegar, 2010).  
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Therefore, the Iranian economy is characterized by a mixed-market economy nature. 
Nonetheless, it is not clear how and the extent to which a market-based theory would function in 
the context of a partial market economy since prices may provide incomplete signals to 
participants. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that the partial market economy of Iran could not 
fully perform like a neoclassical economy due to the peculiarities of the country, ranging from 
oil dependence to the Islamic revolution and state involvement in the economy of the country. 
The Jorgenson model, for instance, assumes perfect capital markets, constant returns to scale, 
price takers, which may not even be justified for Western economies.  
 
Accordingly, the question is what might be relevant. The answer, in part, depends on how the 
allocation mechanism works. For instance, if outputs are fixed according to a plan, they cease to 
be endogenous and then firms may try to meet these targets in the most efficient way. This may 
motivate investment decision making as cost minimization rather than profit maximization. That 
is, firms minimize their production costs and the demand for capital becomes a derived function. 
Consequently, firms first specify the production function and then attempt to minimize costs of 
production so as to produce desired output. This will work provided that the prices of inputs 
provide (relatively) appropriate signals for substitution at the margin between, e.g., capital and 
labor, and these conditions will be of the same nature as if the firms were profit maximizing.  
 
Against this background and given the desired properties of the neoclassical investment theory 
and its extensive use in the literature, it is of interest for this thesis to study how well such 
theoretical framework can explain investment in the context of the mixed-market economy of 
Iran.1 In modelling domestic investment behavior, nevertheless, this thesis modifies the standard 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment models by augmenting them with oil-driven measures 
of financial constraints as specified by the principles of cash flow models. Also, it must be born 
in mind that although Jorgenson’s investment model takes dynamics into account, it can be 
reduced to a static optimization problem as its optimality conditions only include variables in 
                                                          
1 A complement to the analyses would have been to address the nature of investment decisions by separating private 
and public investment at the aggregate level so as to better justify the choice of the theoretical framework by 
shedding light on the extent to which the aggregate model could have performed better for the private investment 
data. However, even though the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistical Centre of Iran provide data on public and 
private investment, the data on private and public output is limited to the construction sector, and the data on capital 
stock is not available at disaggregate level for the public and private sectors. Therefore, it was not possible to 
conduct such a complementary analysis. See Chapter Three for the survey of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on investment. 
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the current period due to the absence of adjustment costs. Hence, it is important to employ a 
suitable methodology which could help examine the dynamic nature of the data. For that reason, 
a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is employed to capture dynamic adjustment processes 
to the long-run equilibrium.2  
 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the rationale 
and objectives of this study. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
Section 1.4 specifies the methodology employed in this study. Section 1.5 identifies the 
contributions and the limitations of the thesis, and finally, Section 1.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
1.2. RATIONAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
Iran owns about 11% of the global proven oil reserves and 15% of the world’s natural gas 
reserves, and it is OPEC’s second largest oil exporter (IEA, 2014). The country’s economy is 
dominated by the oil sector, representing about 90% of total export earnings and over 50% of 
government revenues (CBI, 2014). The availability of oil revenues as the main source of 
financing Iran’s economic development plans and investment is influenced by oil price 
volatility, hence oil shocks can influence the investment patterns of the country and its economic 
policy-making (Mehrara, et al., 2010). The paramount role of the oil sector within the Iranian 
economy is the outcome of state-led economic policies stretching back at least half a century. 
 
While the state always played a major role within the modern Iranian economy, a relatively 
balanced share of activities between the public and the private sector had been gradually created 
by the 1960s. During that decade, the private sector became more active in services, finance, 
                                                          
2 Several comments on earlier drafts of the thesis have in fact questioned the choice to apply a neo-classical model 
for the Iranian economy. Some of the very critical choices that I had to make with regards to the theoretical 
framework adopted in this thesis are as follows. The Iranian economy is a mixed market economy where both 
private and public actors drive investment spending. Undeniably, relative to market economies, it may not be easy 
to define the private sector in the context of the mixed market economy of Iran. Nevertheless, the semi-SOEs could 
still be categorized as private entities in investment analysis. This is because they are commercial entities producing 
for the market; hence follow the same logic as private businesses. Thus, a model of investment based on profit 
maximization may be relevant, but of course prices may not be as responsive as under less regulated market 
economies. Since the prices may provide incomplete signals to participants, it is not clear how and the extent to 
which a market-based theory would function in a mixed market economy. The answer, in part, depends on how the 
allocation mechanism works. For instance, if outputs are fixed according to a plan, then firms may try to meet these 
targets in the most efficient way. This could motivate investment decision-making as cost minimization rather than 
profit maximization. This will work provided that the prices of inputs offer (relatively) appropriate signals for 
substitution at the margin between, e.g., capital and labor, and these conditions will be of the same nature as if the 
firms were profit maximizing. 
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manufacturing, construction and trade. This, in return, provided the environment for the 
development of market forces in the country.3 During the last four decades, however, Iran 
experienced several important events in its economic and political system and underwent 
institutional changes that affected the balance of activities between the public and the private 
sector and hence the functioning of the market forces in the country. These included various oil 
shocks in 1973, 1979, and 1986; the Iranian revolution in 1979 followed by the state ownership 
of major economic sectors; the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988); and a range of economic reforms 
which were implemented throughout the study period.  
 
In the early 1970s, substantial windfalls of oil flooded the state’s finance and gave rise to 
government (capital) spending. This was followed by sizeable amounts of foreign and local 
private investment in the country. After the revolution, however, the state sector’s influence on 
the economy strengthened as the Islamic Constitution defined the role of the private sector only 
as complementary to the state sector and provided a legal basis for the dominance of the state in 
the Iranian economy. In addition, the war with Iraq increased more strict state controls on 
economic activities in general. As a result, during the 1980s, the role of the private sector and of 
market mechanisms weakened. After the war, the government gradually promoted privatization 
policies in order to strengthen domestic market forces by promoting investment activities of the 
private sector. Yet, due to the existence of semi state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in form of 
various foundations, the border between the public and the private sector became unclear.4 
Therefore, although market forces existed in the country throughout the period under study, the 
private sector in the post-revolutionary era did not become fully vibrant because of institutional, 
political and economic setup of the country in that time.5  
 
Similar to many other developing countries, Iran faced a combination of high and variable 
inflation, slow growth and severe balance of payment problems. In the post-revolutionary years, 
budget deficits were largely financed by printing money as external borrowing and bond 
financing were constrained, and tax income marginally contributed to government total 
 
                                                          
3 For instance, see Karshenas (1990) for an in depth analysis of the restructuring of industrial capital and capital 
accumulation during the pre-revolutionary years. 
4 Some of these foundations owned about 20% of the assets in the country with a GDP contribution of about 10% 
(Khajehpour, 2000). See also Chapter Two Section 2.2 for a discussion on the role of the state and semi-SOEs. 
5 See Chapter Two Section 2.3.2 for a discussion on public and private capital formation during the study period.  
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revenues. The conversion of foreign currency into the Iranian currency (Rials) coupled with the 
monetization of budget deficits brought about a close association between fiscal and monetary 
policies in the Iranian economy. In particular, increases in government expenditures due to the 
abundance of oil windfalls were often followed by the expansion of money supply and higher 
inflationary pressures in the country. These special characteristics of the Iranian economy had 
major implications for the process of economic growth and capital formation during the study 
years.  
 
Several studies on the macroeconomic structure of Iran have been conducted. Among others, 
these include investigating the impact of oil revenues on economic activities (Amuzegar, 1997; 
Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009; Mehrara, et al., 2010) and the effects of oil price shocks on 
economic growth (Karshenas and Hakimian, 2005; Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007; Farzanegan and 
Markwardt, 2009). However, little is known about the institutional and macroeconomic 
consequences of the availability of oil for the process of capital accumulation, and particularly 
for aggregate and sector-level domestic investment determinants in the Iranian economy.  
 
In fact, investment is a central issue in macroeconomic theory and plays an important role in 
economic growth of a country. Keynes (1936) first called attention to the existence of an 
independent investment function in the economy. In Keynesian theory, the rate of interest is 
considered as the price of investment, thus the cost of finance should be kept low to stimulate 
investment (Keynes, 1936). The accelerator theory, based on the assumption of a fixed capital-
output ratio, implies that prices, wages, taxes and interest rates have no direct impact on capital 
spending, but they may have indirect impacts. The restrictive assumptions behind the accelerator 
theory, which are explained in detail in Chapter Three, led Jorgenson (1963) to formulate the 
neoclassical investment model. According to this theory, the cost of capital transforms the 
acquisition price of an asset into an appropriate rental price which depends on the rates of return 
and depreciation.  
 
Some early neoclassical models argued that uncertainty has a positive impact on investment 
(Abel, 1983; Hartman, 1972). However, the focus of the more recent investment literature 
following the work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is on the negative effects of uncertainty on 
investment. Some empirical contributions investigate the role of macroeconomic variables such 
as exchange rate distortions, the cost of capital, debt and inflation in depressing private 
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investment (Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995), the associations between income distribution, 
political instability and investment (Perotti, 1994; Campos and Nugent, 2005) and the role of 
political and financial institutions in shaping investment behavior (Poirson, 1998). At large, 
however, the link between uncertainty and investment is subject to debate. Also, the literature on 
investment has largely ignored the question as to what role a country’s deeper characteristics 
such as endowments or its institutional political system may play in shaping investment patterns 
in resource-rich and -dependent economies (Bond and Malik, 2007). There has been little 
research investigating how investment behavior and policies in such countries actually respond 
to oil price shocks or oil income fluctuations.  
 
The latter is particularly important because, surprisingly, resource-rich economies like Iran often 
underperform in comparison to resource-poor economies in terms of economic growth. 
Numerous studies have shown a link between natural resource abundance and poor economic 
performance (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1997). Many resource-dependent countries are in fact 
affected by ‘the natural resource curse’ which is also known as ‘the paradox of plenty’. The 
resource curse thesis, introduced by Auty in 1993, attempts to explain the paradox that countries 
with an abundance of natural resources, specifically non-renewable ones such as minerals and 
fuels, tend to do worse in terms of economic growth and development outcomes than resource-
poor countries (Auty, 1993).  
 
This negative relationship between resource abundance and economic growth undoubtedly 
creates a theoretical dilemma as natural resources are expected to raise wealth and purchasing 
power of resource-rich economies, hence enabling them to invest and grow. Resource wealth 
can move economic growth forward, if combined with innovation, significant levels of human 
capital, industrial development, institutional reforms and open trade policies (Mehlum, Moene 
and Torvik, 2006; Blomstrom and Kokko, 2007; Lederman and Maloney; 2007; van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke, 2010). Higher oil revenues may facilitate the import of capital and intermediate 
goods needed by industries, increase the entry of new technology and thus induce economic 
growth (Mehrara, et al., 2010).  
 
A body of literature focuses on the ‘Dutch Disease’ theory to provide an explanation for the 
resource curse thesis. This theory attempts to describe the association between the exploitation 
of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector. The term Dutch Disease 
 9 
 
originally refers to the decline of the Dutch manufacturing sector due to the discovery of large 
natural gas fields in 1959, which subsequently led to the appreciation of the Dutch real exchange 
rate (Humphreys, et al., 2007). In the Dutch Disease model, there is a non-tradable good sector 
(e.g., services), a booming tradable sector (e.g., oil or natural gas) and a lagging tradable sector 
(e.g., manufacturing). An existence of a boom in a large natural resource sector will lead to the 
‘resource movement effect’ and the ‘spending effect’ (Cordon and Neary, 1982). The former 
happens when the resource boom leads to an increase in the demand for labor in the booming 
sector, which will shift the direction of the production away from the lagging sector and toward 
the booming sector. This effect is also called ‘direct de-industrialization’. The latter takes place 
due to excessive revenues created by the resource boom, which results in a higher demand for 
labor in the non-tradable sector and takes the labor away from the lagging sector. This is also 
called ‘indirect de-industrialization’. 
 
A further approach in line with the concept of the natural resource curse lies in the area of 
political economy. In resource-independent economies, governments tax citizens in order to be 
efficient and responsive. This bargain establishes a political relationship between rulers and 
citizens. However, in resource-dependent economies, governments do not need to tax their 
citizens as the source of income is guaranteed from natural resource rents. As a result, the 
relationship between governments and citizens collapses, citizens are often poorly served by 
their rulers and these countries are prone to be more repressive and corrupt (Moore and 
Unsworth, 2007). This is known as ‘the paradigm of the rentier state’. Economists differentiate 
profit-seeking from rent-seeking. The former leads to the creation of wealth, whilst the latter 
explains the use of the state’s power to redistribute wealth in the society. In fact, rentier states do 
not need to tax or may tax lightly as their primary function is the distribution of resources 
accruing from abroad. These resources enter domestic circulation and have an impact on their 
domestic economies only to the extent that they are domestically spent by the state. Spending is 
therefore the essential function of the rentier state and generosity the essential virtue of their 
rulers (Mahdavy, 1970).  
 
Early empirical studies explained the inverse linear relationship between oil price increases and 
aggregate economic activities in oil-importing economies (Darby, 1982; Gisser and Goodwin, 
1986). The oil price collapse of the early 1980s spurred research efforts to derive new 
specifications that could produce a more responsive oil-GDP relationship, one of which was the 
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notion of asymmetry in the economy’s responses to positive and negative oil price changes 
(Mork, 1989; Lee, et al., 1995; Hamilton, 1996). In this picture, in oil-exporting economies, oil 
price increases can have greater positive impact on economic growth than the adverse effects of 
oil price decreases. As a result of oil price increases, government revenues increase which in 
turn can lead to faster growth in government spending (El-Anshasy and Bradly, 2009). An 
additional line of argument is associated with the volatility impact of natural resources. 
Resource-producing countries may gain massive influence and strength when prices of natural 
resources increase, whereas they can undergo major economic agony when prices fall. Countries 
that specialize in commodities with unstable prices are more volatile in their terms of trade, 
benefit less from foreign direct investment and will have lower growth rates in comparison with 
countries that are industrial leaders or those that specialize in commodities with more stable 
prices (see, for instance, van der Ploeg (2011a)).  
 
The above discussion indicates that while many scholars attempt to explain the link between 
natural resource wealth and economic performance, this relationship remains open to disputes. 
Although some scholars find evidence in support of the natural resource curse thesis, others try 
to establish that the curse can be converted into a blessing if the quality of institutions is high 
enough to exploit the natural resource boom, for example through savings, investment, and the 
use of rents in innovation, knowledge and human capital development (Mehlum, et al., 2006). 
Some scholars argue that natural resources are ‘neither curse nor destiny’ (Lederman and 
Maloney, 2007) and that resource abundance is not the only determinant of growth (Caselli and 
Cunningham, 2009). This thesis thus attempts to answer a number of relevant research questions 
in the context of the oil-rich and oil-reliant economy of Iran as follows:  
 
1. What are the economic determinants of aggregate and sector-level domestic investment 
in Iran?  
2. To what degree is the modified neoclassical-accelerator type model of investment, 
augmented with oil-based financial constraint measures, applicable and effective in its 
empirical implementations to unravel the determinants of investment in the Iranian 
context? 
3. What are the underlying explanations for (probable) partial applicability of such 
theoretical framework for the case of Iran if the empirical results do not provide a 
consistent degree of support for these models?  
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4. Does a long-run relationship exist between sector-level investment and the availability of 
oil windfalls? (ii) Are there sectoral differences? (iii) Do the empirical findings suggest 
the presence of a mechanism, in line with the Dutch Disease theory, through resource 
movement and in particular spending effects?  
5. (i) What has been the role of the state in the process of economic development and 
capital accumulation in the pre- and post-revolutionary Iran? (ii) How has the presence 
of oil altered the institutional structure of the economy of Iran and how has it affected 
sectoral capital formation and balances in the country? 
 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this thesis are to:  
 
i. examine the theory-driven economic determinants of aggregate and sector-level 
domestic investment over the years under consideration and the significance of oil-
driven uncertainty in shaping investment behavior in Iran; 
ii. investigate the extent to which the modified neoclassical-accelerator type model of 
investment, augmented with oil-based constraint measures, can explain investment 
determinants in the Iranian context;  
iii. study the underlying reasons for (likely) partial applicability of the theoretical 
framework for the case of Iran;  
iv. explore if a mechanism, in line with the Dutch Disease theory, exists through resource 
movement and spending effects in the Iranian economy; 
v. study the role of the Iranian state in the process of growth, capital accumulation and 
structural shifts during the study period; and research how and the extent to which the 
presence of oil has altered the path of institutional structure in the Iranian economy 
during the years under investigation. 
 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter investigates 
different stages of economic development, capital formation and institutional changes in the 
Iranian economy. Particular emphasis is given to the role of the state and oil income, and on 
how over-reliance on oil revenues has structured Iran’s economic policy-making and capital 
accumulation process. What at first appears as the use of oil income for development and capital 
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spending may in the final examination turn out to be the utilization of oil chiefly for financing 
government current expenditures. Also, the availability of oil income could significantly affect 
monetary and fiscal policies with bearing on the allocation of resources at economy- and sector-
levels. Hence, the role of the state in utilization of oil income for formulating revenue and 
expenditure policies along with the special characteristics of the Iranian economy have to be 
investigated. This, in depth, is done in Chapter Two.   
 
Chapter Three surveys the literature on the concept of the resource curse and the Dutch Disease 
theory. Further, this chapter discusses theories which try to explain investment determinants in 
market, partial-market and resource-rich economies and studies their associated methods and 
empirical findings. Although investment is a major determinant of growth in the long-run, a 
general agreement on its determinants does not exist. In the presence of market imperfections, 
investment funds may only be available in external capital markets or may not be available at 
all, which in turn could constrain the availability of credit in financing investment. Not only has 
the post-revolutionary Iran’s ability to borrow from international capital markets been 
constrained, but the availability of oil income as a key source of financing investment has also 
been subject to uncertainty and affected by the volatility of oil prices throughout the study 
period. Chapter Four, hence, provides an overview of major issues related to the modeling of 
investment behavior, particularly in the context of the oil-based partial-market economy of Iran. 
It then theorizes the model of investment related to this study based on the neoclassical-
accelerator type investment models. Finally, it describes the empirical methodology used in this 
study in detail. 
 
Chapters Five and Six investigate theory-consistent economic determinants of aggregate and 
sector-level domestic investment in Iran, respectively, and the extent to which the modified 
neoclassical-accelerator type model of investment provide an explanation for investment 
patterns in the Iranian economy. Furthermore, measures of oil-driven uncertainty are 
incorporated into the investment modelling to examine the role of oil in shaping investment 
patterns in the country. Subsequently, the chapters identify long-run economic determinants of 
aggregate and sectoral investment and shed light on how well the theoretical framework could 
explain investment behavior in the Iranian context. The economic sectors under study in Chapter 
Six are the resource sectors of oil and gas, the non-resource tradable sectors of agriculture and 
manufacturing, and the non-tradable sector of services. This is in line with the sectoral 
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classification of the Dutch Disease theory and allows to study whether the persistent 
accessibility of oil windfalls by the government results in structural shifts in the Iranian 
economy over the study period. Chapter Seven presents an overview of the main findings and 
contributions of the thesis, and concludes with a discussion on a set of policy implications 
motivated by the empirical findings.  
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis is a macroeconomic rather than a microeconomic study, and a country-specific rather 
than a cross-country study. It is situated within the theoretical frameworks of investment and 
natural resource economics. It is a conceptual rather than a policy-oriented study as the 
emphasis is on theoretical concepts and their empirical applications rather than an examination 
of policy-oriented variables. However, this study is useful in drawing policy implications and 
therefore various policies are recommended and discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. The 
period of study is limited by the availability of data. From Chapter Two, the year 1965 may be 
considered as the initial year of this study and the study period is extended to 2011 since the 
latter is the most recent year for which the relevant data are available. However, the empirical 
analyses of investment, presented in Chapters Five and Six, cover the years between 1974 and 
2011. Data are collected from Iranian official databases such as the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), 
the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The data are 
further cross-checked with international databases such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Bank, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and British Petroleum (BP). The variables and their data sources for Chapters 
Five and Six are detailed in Appendices 5A and 6A, respectively.   
 
Chapter Two takes a narrative approach to carefully describe different phases of economic 
development, capital formation and institutional changes with an emphasis on the role of the 
state and oil in (re-)structuring economic policy-making, investment and sectoral balances in the 
country. This narrative approach is then complemented by employing an econometric approach 
for the analysis of time-series macroeconomic data in Chapters Five and Six, the theoretical 
basis for which is outlined in Chapter Four. This is because, in comparison to the narrative 
approach, the econometric approach involves less subjective judgement by the researcher, hence 
lowering the likelihood of biased conclusion and increasing the verifiability of the findings. One 
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of the weaknesses of the econometric approach, however, is its reliance on identifying 
assumptions that are commonly open to dispute. More recently, a body of literature advocated 
analyzing time-series data by allowing ‘the data to speak for itself freely’ and assessing 
theoretically consistent relationships through employing general-to-specific modelling 
techniques (for instance, see Juselius, 2006).  
 
Several econometric modelling methods have been alternatively used in the literature to estimate 
the determinants of and the effects of uncertainty on investment. The most commonly used 
approaches include unrestricted Vector Autoregressive (VARs), structural VARs, Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and Cointegrated VARs (CVARs). The unrestricted 
VAR methodology models a relatively small set of stationary macroeconomic variables with a 
main focus on the statistical fit of the model to the data. To achieve stationarity, this approach 
requires a careful transformation of data so that statistically significant and economically 
justifiable relationships are not excluded from the analysis. A VAR model in first differences of 
the I(1) variables, however, is misspecified if there exists cointegrating relations between two or 
more of the I(1) variables (Garratt, et al., 2006). The structural VAR approach aims at providing 
some economic rationale through imposing theory-based restrictions on the covariance structure 
of various types of shocks. Thus, it avoids the arbitrary or implicit identification of 
orthogonalized impulse responses as it is the case in unrestricted VARs. Such restrictions, 
however, do not allow identifying long-run relationships between the variables (Garratt, et al., 
2006). The CVAR approach developed by Johansen (1996) and Juselius (2006) makes minimal 
use of economic prior knowledge and is based on the view that economic theory is more 
informative on the long-run relations than it is on the short-run dynamics (Garratt, et al., 2006).  
 
Based on optimizing decisions made by households and firms, the DSGE methodology provides 
an explicit intertemporal general equilibrium model of the economy using stochastic 
intertemporal optimization techniques. As argued by Garratt, et al., (2006), the main difference 
between the DSGE and the CVAR approaches is their treatment of short-run dynamics and their 
empirical validation of the long-run relations. The DSGE methodology emphasizes the use of 
theory in the modelling of both short- and long-run relations. Concerning the long-run relations, 
the CVAR approach is in line with the DSGE model, but it is silent on short-run dynamics. Both 
methodologies combine theory and evidence to obtain models which are useful and relevant for 
policy-making decisions. However, the advantage of the CVAR methodology is that the 
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identification and validation of long-run relations are tested and therefore supported by the 
evidence rather than by imposing them as a priori. Therefore, the present study follows the 
CVAR approach developed by Johansen and Juselius to identify theory-consistent long-run 
relationships between the variables of interest. Further, the CVAR model as the empirical 
methodology is a rather flexible approach to the empirical investigation as it allows producing 
new insights based on the available data through examining economic phenomena and testing of 
more than one economic theory.  
  
1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
This thesis examines the theory-consistent economic determinants of aggregate and sectoral 
domestic investment in the context of the oil-rich and -based Iranian economy within the 
modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment model, into which uncertainty-driven oil 
measures are incorporated. The thesis thus adds new sets of data and knowledge to these fields 
particularly based on the empirical analyses conducted in Chapters Five and Six. To the author’s 
knowledge, long-run economic determinants of domestic aggregate and sector-level investment 
have not been estimated for Iran and therefore the findings of the thesis may be of interest for 
scholars in Iranian Studies and policy-makers in Iran. Furthermore, the findings of this study 
contribute to current debates on the economics of natural resources and on investment as well as 
the application of the investment literature in the context of partial-market, oil-abundant, and 
exporting economies like Iran.  
 
The thesis further studies the role of the Iranian state in the process of capital formation and 
structural shifts, and the means through which these have been affected by the availability of oil 
income during the pre- and post-revolutionary years. Hence, this thesis provides an analytical 
basis for studying how economic and political institutions as well as the role of the state have 
evolved in an oil-based economy context. From a policy-making perspective, therefore, it guides 
policy-makers in their decision-making processes which can lead to greater long-run and 
sustainable growth and stability. To be contributory to policy studies that go beyond short-term 
forecasting requirements, particular attention is given to long-run equilibrium properties and 
stability of the models. 
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Importantly, the neoclassical-accelerator type theories of investment, such as the ones employed 
in this thesis, proved relevant and important as a tool to assess the effectiveness of economic 
determinants of domestic investment in semi-market oil-dependent economies and the 
underlying reasons for their partial applicability for such economies. This was despite the 
restrictive assumptions inherent in the standard investment models which are (partly) at variance 
with the structure of the financial systems and markets of these economies. In addition, a theory-
consistent neoclassical-accelerator type identification of a CVAR model, such as the one applied 
here, was found useful to investigate the theoretically motivated long-run relationships between 
market-based economic determinants of investment in such economies, its outcome depends on 
the peculiarities of individual countries under study. 
 
Contributing to the natural resource curse literature, this thesis identified the presence of the 
‘Iranian Disease’, as a special case of the Dutch Disease, based on the empirical results related 
to the sector-level analysis presented in Chapter Six. According to the Dutch Disease theory, it 
was expected that the relation between investment and oil windfalls in sectors of manufacturing 
and agriculture to be negative, and that relation in oil and services sectors to be positive. 
However, the Iranian-type Dutch Disease was characterized by the expansion of investment and 
output in the sectors of services and manufacturing, yet by the contraction of output in the oil 
and gas sectors. The findings suggested that, primarily through state-directed investment for the 
promotion of industrialization in the country, oil income was continuously invested in the 
manufacturing sector during the pre- and post-revolutionary era. Therefore, it is plausible to 
believe that, in a mixed-market economy like Iran, the state’s ambitions to achieve industrial 
development could dominate the Dutch Disease effects.  
 
One of the limitations of this study concerns the reliability of macroeconomic and oil data. Since 
most of the world’s natural resources are state-owned, there is considerable evidence that 
nationally reported statistics may be politically biased (Davis, 2006). Thus, data necessary to 
examine the described hypotheses are collected from several national and international sources 
and cross-checking is conducted.  
 
Another constraint is the modest extension of the research sample, since the analysis in this 
study focuses on Iran because of the unique institutional set-up of its economic and political 
system. An extension, however, could take into consideration other oil-based and oil-rich 
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countries at a regional level (e.g., the Gulf region or the Caspian region), or a cross-country 
analysis framework which includes a large number of countries endowed with (various) natural 
resources (e.g., as classified by Collier and Goderis, 2007) to test the generalizability of the 
results at regional and cross-country levels. This study does not focus on actual versus optimal 
investment and saving rates. Such an approach may require a more general model which is 
beyond the scope of this study. Even though the current study concerns an oil-rich and oil-
dependent economy, it does not intend to examine the issue of ‘exhaustible resources’ as the 
latter belongs to a different area of research.  
 
At sector-level analysis, this study applies individual time-series cointegration tests to separately 
study domestic investment determinants for each of the four major economic sectors in Iran.  
A possible yet important extension of this work could be to account for cross sector dependence 
by employing panel time-series techniques including panel unit root and panel cointegration 
tests to investigate whether and the extent to which sectoral dependence affects inferences.6  
 
Another limit of this study concerns the scope of this thesis as it chiefly focuses on the macro 
determinants, rather than the micro foundations, of investment decision-making in the country. 
The latter is beyond the scope of this thesis, given the limited availability of (firm-level) data 
and detailed studies on this topic which could allow for an in-depth analysis of the nuances of 
investment decision-making processes at the micro level in the country. An important extension 
of this study hence would be an investigation of how investments are decided at micro-level in 
the country which gives a particular emphasis on the role of the political actors and institutional 
factors in the process of investment decision-making in the context of the Iranian economy.  
 
Lastly, this study is only partially applicable to other resource-rich and -based countries. This is 
because these countries are not necessarily similar in their type of government, economic 
policies, international relations and their political institutional economic system. Thus, it is 
likely that the modified mainstream investment models, including the ones followed in this 
thesis, may not be sufficient in unravelling the determinants of investment in (oil-based) 
economies with imperfect financial markets. This calls for new theoretical framework and 
                                                          
6 Panel unit-root tests, among others, include Levin, Lin and Chu test, Im, Pesaran and Shin test and residual-based 
LM test. Panel cointegration tests, among others, include residual-based DF and ADF tests, residual-based LM 
tests, Pedroni tests and likelihood-based cointegration test (for details, see Baltagi (2008, pp.273-300)).  
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techniques for investigating investment determinants in economies whose conditions do not 
fully correspond to the assumptions of the existing investment models in the literature. 
 
1.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The scope of this thesis has necessitated a narrowing down of the emphasis of investigation to 
selected features of growth and capital accumulation processes which have been especially 
important in the Iranian economic development, and could be so for other resource-rich and  
-reliant economies. Although the emphasis of the study varies over different periods, depending 
on data availability and its aggregate or sectoral orientation, its focus remains within three major 
areas. These comprise investigating: (i) economic determinants of investment within the 
theoretical framework of neoclassical-accelerator type investment models; (ii) the role of the 
state, oil and institutions in the process of capital accumulation; and (iii) the consequent sectoral 
shifts in the country. In fact, the study of the changing patterns of institutional evolution in Iran 
helps highlighting the challenges that the over-reliance on oil income posed on the state and the 
mechanisms through which they were dealt with within such an institutional setting over the 
study years. The following chapter studies these transformations and attempts to shed light on 
the origins of the backwardness of the Iranian economy.  
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2. STATE, OIL, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN IRAN  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter studies various stages of economic development, capital formation and institutional 
changes, as well as structural shifts in the oil-based economy of Iran, with an emphasis on the 
role of the state and oil income during 1965-2010. Because of extensive government 
intervention in Iran’s economic life, the state has played a central role in economic development 
and investment growth in the country. In particular, since the nationalization of the oil industry 
in 1951, an essential part of the income generated by the oil sector has accrued to the 
government. Oil income, therefore, is considered as a major source of development plans and 
financing investment with an influential impact on investment patterns of the country and its 
economic policy-making (Mehrara, et al., 2010). Against this background, this chapter attempts 
to investigate the following research questions:  
 
1. What role did the state play in the process of economic development, capital formation 
and structural changes in the Iranian economy over the years under study? 
2. How did the oil sector, through its income-generating effect, influence growth, 
investment patterns and sectoral shifts in the country? 
3. What were the policy mechanisms through which oil windfalls may have affected the 
process of growth, investment and sectoral balances in the Iranian economy? 
 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
role of the state in the Iranian economy. Section 2.3 studies the development of investment 
institutions in the country. Section 2.4 examines the performance of the main macroeconomic 
indicators and Section 2.5 sheds light on various policy mechanisms through which the presence 
of oil may have influenced the Iranian economy. Finally, Section 2.6 sums up the chapter. 
 
2.2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE  
The state played a major role in Iran over the years under study, and the Iranian economy 
experienced profound state-led economic and institutional reforms to achieve self-sufficiency 
and economic independence during these years. After the nationalization of the Iranian oil 
industry in the early 1950s, the economy of the country entered a new stage of growth and 
development. The most notable feature of these years was the considerable inflows of oil 
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windfalls as an important source of financing investment. The role of the state, which until that 
time was mobilizing resources for investment activities in the economy, changed into a 
distributor and an allocator of oil rents in the country. This in turn transformed the role of the 
state into an autocratic regime and brought about institutional changes with important bearing on 
the process of capital accumulation. Consequently, new institutions of capital formation came 
into existence, which included a planning system administrated by the Plan Organization (PO) 
(established in 1949) and specialized banks.7  
 
In particular, the development plans in Iran were the practical manifestations of the state’s 
inclination to formulate and implement national development strategies for the whole economic 
system of the country from a central point with the primary goal of self-sufficiency. Unlike in 
market-based economies, where market mechanisms allocate resources and finished products 
among their various uses and users, in partial-market economies like Iran, market systems can 
no longer function freely. Therefore, a need for an alternative mechanism arises which is 
provided by economic planning (Heilperin, 1960). The essential aspect of a planned economy is 
the domination of the state sector that institutes the incentive structure through which economic 
policies are formulated and implemented.  
 
During the pre-revolutionary years, the parliament (Majlis) approved a total of five economic 
development plans. The first (1948-1955) and second (1956-1962) plans were chiefly concerned 
with the formulation and implementation of the PO’s own investment projects independent of 
ministries and agencies affiliated with the government. During 1954-1960, Iran became 
integrated into the western military and political system and Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, the Shah 
of that time, asserted his authority over the institutions while heavily relying on American 
financial and technical aid to strengthen his two pillars of political power, namely the state’s 
bureaucracy and the army. This era of power consolidation relied upon the support of traditional 
merchants of the bazaar, the landlords, and the high clergy. Due to a higher unification degree of 
governmental administration since 1963, the PO handed over the formulation and 
implementation of its investment projects to various governmental agencies and ministries 
during the implementation of the third (1963-1998), fourth (1968-1972) and fifth (1973-1977) 
                                                          
7 See Chapters Four and Seven in Karshenas (1990) for a detailed discussion on state, oil and institutions of 
accumulation during 1953-1977. 
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plans (Karshenas, 1990, p.93).8 At large, this period was characterized by changes in the 
structure of the markets (regulated by the state) to strengthen the presence of the private sector 
in the economy, particularly in industry and the agriculture sector. Accordingly, various 
measures were introduced including credit rationing, subsidizing private capital and the 
establishment of specialized banks and agencies, such as the Industrial Credit Bank, the 
Industrial and Mining Development Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank.9  
 
Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, and with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Iranian state increased its intervention in many aspects of the economy such as 
controlling prices, the expected rates of return on facilities, foreign exchange and allocation of 
bank credits. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic was adopted in 1979 under Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Article 44 of this Constitution pronounced that the economy of the country consists 
of three sectors: the state, the cooperative and the private sector. The Constitution assigned all 
large-scale industries to the state and required that the private sector supplements the economic 
activities of the state and the cooperative sectors. After the Iran-Iraq war, lasting from 1980 to 
1988, the government formulated and executed a total of four Five-Year Economic Plans 
(FYDPs) during 1989-2010 to promote a more equitable and fair society.10 The first post-
revolutionary plan started in 1990 and ended in 1994. The plan’s main focus was on 
reconstructing damaged infrastructure as well as dealing with the inefficient public sector and 
the dis-incentivized private sector, both of which were adversely affected by the changes in the 
economic system and the uncertainty associated with it.  In comparison with the country’s 
capacity, the first plan consisted of ambitious targets.  
 
The second plan (1995-1999) did not start until 1995, as the policy makers spent time in 
evaluating the plan, and was aimed at executing basic free-market principles and promoting 
privatization. During the second plan, the government implemented various reforms to increase 
financial savings and the banking system’s lending capacity. In 1991, the Council of Ministers 
ordered the privatization of some of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through three methods: 
the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), open auctions, and negotiations with potential buyers. The 
                                                          
8 In 2000, the PO, merging with the Administrative and State Recruitment Organization, was replaced by the 
Management and Planning Organization (MPO). See Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion on the development of 
institutions of investment in Iran. 
9 See Chapters Four in Karshenas (1990) for a detailed discussion on institutions of accumulation during 1953-
1977. 
10 The Fifth Five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan covers the years between 2010 and 2015. 
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second plan mandate based on a special Majlis law limited the transfer of the SOEs only to 
workers and war veterans on special terms. During the third plan, three organizations were 
founded: the Privatization Organization of Iran (POI) with rights to dispose of the SOEs; the 
High Council on Shares Distribution to decide which SOEs to be privatized; and a number of 
conglomerates or holding corporations to take over individual SOEs in specific fields and put 
them together in a basket destined for privatization (Amuzegar, 2007). However, the plan 
largely remained impracticable and was only partly implemented. The third plan, covering the 
years between 2000 and 2004, was mainly concerned with the promotion of the private sector, 
including private banks and insurance companies. The fourth plan (2005-2010) consisted of 
plentiful quantitative projections and similar to the third plan considered a smaller role for the 
government by stressing greater reliance on market forces.  
 
While being implemented, the economic development plans were amended by the government 
in various ways. For instance, one of the revisions during the first post-revolutionary plan was 
associated with the introduction of rapid privatization to lessen the government’s burdens 
through incentivizing the private sector to invest in the productive sectors of the economy. Table 
2.1 presents selected macroeconomic indicators based on the post-revolutionary period FYDPs 
and their actual performance during 1989-2010. For most of the period under study, the realized 
figures were lower than their projections. 
 
Table 2.1 Macroeconomic figures (average annual growth in %) 
 
Note: Data are calculated based on real figures in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of 
Iran (CBI). 
 
 
 
 
 
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual
GDP 8.1 7.5 5.1 3 6 5.1 8.1 7.1
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation
11.6 10.7 6.2 4.4 7.1 10 12.2 5.9
Inflation 8.9 20.6 12.4 26.7 15.9 14.2 8.6 15.8
Liquidity (M2) 8.2 27 12.5 25.9 16.4 28.9 20 28
1st Plan (1989/90-
1994/95)
2nd Plan (1994/95-
1999/2000)
3rd Plan (1999/2000-
2004/05)
4th Plan (2004/05-
2009/10)
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From the 1980s onwards, the state interventions in the Iranian economy ensured the survival of 
enterprises through giving substantial financial subsidies to inefficient or preferred economic 
sectors in order to avoid various problems such as unemployment. During the last three decades 
after the revolution, state-owned banks took on the role of satisfying the credit requirements of 
loss-making SOEs and semi-state owned institutions that had access to rationed bank credits 
with substantial interest subsidies (Karshenas and Hakimian, 2008, p.202). In practice, in the 
post-revolutionary Iran, because the SOEs and semi-SOEs have been increasingly in control of 
the majority of production units and activities, the government has provided them with financial 
support to keep production intact and planning consistent. 
 
During the war years in the 1980s, as the public sector grew so did the semi-state organizations, 
of which the most influential ones were the Bonyads and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC). Bonyads are semi-public organizations who initially were to control and manage seized 
assets of the important players in the Shah’s regime and then to allocate profits among the poor. 
The IRGC were founded to protect the Islamic revolution from enemies inside and outside the 
country. The role of the IRGC started growing mainly after the Iran-Iraq war. After the war  
ended in 1988, the ‘pragmatist’ president Rafsanjani (1989-1997) was the first who  
publicly proposed the issue of privatization of the SOEs. Rafsanjani’s first plan intended to 
reduce the state control in the economy through marketizing the distribution of  
consumer goods and by borrowing foreign capital. However, the parliament in the late 1980s 
accused the government of pursuing Western capitalism, favoring industry over agriculture, and 
being dependent on foreign debt. 
 
During the early 1990s, the struggle over the SOEs’ privatization continued. In line 
with the Constitution, from 770 public companies, merely 391 were identified by the 
government that could be privatized. Yet, the sales of the SOEs became even more protracted 
and often took place through negotiations with buyers rather than public auctioning (Harris, 
2013). In 1994, transaction units were established in order to sell the SOEs’ shares to large 
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foundations whose beneficiaries consisted of mainly Basiji militia (the key subordinates of the 
IRGC) and war veterans. Over the years between 1989 and 1994, a total of 331 companies were 
fully or partially privatized, half of the shares of which went to the semi-state organizations. 
Some other buyers of privatized assets were subsidiaries of the state’s banks and insurance 
companies and others semi-SOEs (Moradi, 2005). Also, a large number of privatized shares 
were transferred to the Social Security Fund and the Government Employee’s Pension Fund as 
part of the treasury’s contributions to these funds (Amuzegar, 2007).  
 
During 1997-2005, the ‘reformist’ president Khatami focused on privatization and economic 
liberalization. Justified by Article 44 of the Constitution, the government began to grant licenses 
for establishing private companies in various economic sectors. The plan specified that public 
ownership would be transferred except where the government had a monopoly. First taking 
place in the banking and insurance sector, licenses were then extended to the subsidiary oil, 
airlines, telecommunications, construction, power plant and postal sectors. This resulted in the 
emergence of new enterprises in sectors which were previously controlled by quasi-monopolies 
(Harris, 2013). Accordingly, the government required only 128 companies out of 724 SOEs to 
remain state-owned, and proposed that more than a thousand semi-SOEs to be privatized 
(Khajepour, 2000). After the financial reforms in 2001, private banking system was re-
introduced and flexibility was given to the banks in setting deposit and lending rates of return. 
Another major structural reform during the implementation of the third plan was the 
establishment of the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in 2000 to mitigate the impact of oil price 
volatility on government expenditures and to make public finances less reliant on oil rents.11 
Table 2.2 reports the accruals to the OSF’s during 2000-2008.12 Based on the published rules by 
the government, in excess of the amount allocated to the national budget, 85.5% of the earnings 
from oil and gas were to be allocated to the OSF (IMF, 2011, p.8).13  
 
                                                          
11 In theory, the channeling of revenues into a stabilization fund is intended to smooth future income projections, 
hence government revenues and public spending. This in return enables industrial diversification and reduces 
commodity dependency (Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard, 2008). 
12 In 2009, the government replaced the OSF by the National Development Fund (NDF). Since then, public data on 
inflows and outflows to the NDF have not been available. 
13 In practice, however, the funds are being used to finance the budget deficits rather than loans to the private and 
public sectors (Mahdavi, 2012). 
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Table 2.2 Oil Stabilization Fund accruals (current prices - billion US $) 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
After Ahmadinejad was elected as a ‘principalist’ president in 2005, the conservatives’ stance 
on the issue of privatization significantly changed. Privatization of SOEs continued, yet the 
benefits of it were to be distributed to the people. In 2006 and during the implementation of the 
fourth plan, Article 44 of the Constitution was finally amended. Consequently, the Article 
authorized the state to divest some of its major possessions including downstream oil and gas. 
Furthermore, Justice Shares were introduced to distribute ownership and to grant stock rights to 
the lowest-income families. According to the privatization plan, 40% share of the assets were to 
be distributed under the Justice-Shares scheme, 35% to be offered to private investors through 
the TSE or auctioning, 5% to be allocated to the workers and managers of the privatizing 
entities, and the state was to maintain 20% of the shares (Amuzegar, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Inflows 5.9 1.8 5.9 5.8 10.4 13 21.6 34.3
Outflows 0 0.8 5.1 5.4 9.4 11.5 23 24.7
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Overall, since the early 1950s until 1979, the development plans concentrated on structural 
reforms, interactions between the public and the private sector, their investment needs as well as 
stabilization policies to support investment and development in the Iranian economy. However, 
following the revolution and particularly during the 1980s, the role of the state  
sector strengthened, the activities of the private sector weakened. 
After the war, the government gradually promoted privatization so as to strengthen market 
mechanisms in the economy. Nevertheless, because of the presence of a large number of semi-
SOEs and SOEs in the country, the boundaries between the public and the private sector became 
vague. Therefore, because of the institutional, political and economic setup in Iran, market 
forces became only partially effective. In this setting, banks played a crucial role in facilitating 
investment in Iran and, as largely determined by the government, they channelled financial 
resources to various economic sectors (Taghipour, 2009). The next section, therefore, provides 
an overview of the role of the banking system and investment institutions in the country. 
 
2.3. INSTITUTIONS OF INVESTMENT  
The Iranian banks are categorized into three major groups: state-owned banks, private banks and 
investment banks (see Appendix 2A for a list of banks in Iran). All private and investment banks 
are commercial banks, whereas the state-owned banks consist of commercial banks and 
specialized banks. State-owned specialized banks provide loans and financial services to 
corporate sectors. These banks include agriculture (Keshavarzi), housing (Maskan), industry and 
mining (Sanat-o-Madan), export development (Toseye-o-Saderat) and cooperatives (Toseye-
Taavon). The specialized banks lend at subsidized rates, and their lending is rationed and highly 
concentrated on a small number of large companies or priority sectors. These banks also take 
deposits, but a greater part of their loanable funds comes from the commercial banks, the 
Central Bank of Iran (CBI), and other public sources including the central government.  
 
The CBI, established in 1960, is officially responsible for the supervision of all banks and credit 
institutions, and since the 1980s for the design and the conduct of monetary policies in the 
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context of the Islamic Constitution and the Monetary and Banking Act. Each year, after the 
government’s approval of the annual budgets, the CBI presents its monetary and credit policy to 
the Money and Credit Council (MCC) for approval.14 Major elements of these policies are then 
incorporated in the development plans. The sectoral credit allocation is set by the MCC which is 
the highest banking policy-making body of the CBI. Since the 1990s, the MCC also sets annual 
targets for credit allocation to the private sector (CBI, 2002). The CBI implements monetary 
policies, both directly through its regulating power and indirectly through its effects on money 
market conditions (CBI, 2002). Direct instruments include banking profit rates and the setting of 
credit ceilings. The MCC determines the profit rates (the expected rates) of return on banking 
facilities and the minimum and maximum profit rates of return within the framework of the 
Usury-Free (interest-free) Banking Law. Based on the Usury-Free Banking Act (passed in 
1983), the provisional rates paid to depositors or received from borrowers should reflect the 
profits or losses of a business (Jalali-Naini and Khalatbari, 2002). The CBI can intervene in 
determining these rates both for investment projects or partnership and for other facilities 
extended by the banks. In accordance with the Monetary and Banking Law of Iran, the CBI can 
further intervene in monetary and banking affairs for instance by restricting banks via setting 
sector-level ceilings for loans and credits (CBI, 2002).  
 
The CBI’s indirect instruments consist of the reserve requirement ratio, issuing participation 
papers (bonds) and opening deposit accounts. The CBI determines the reserve ratio for all the 
banks, and on this basis, the banks are required to deposit part of their liabilities in the form of 
deposits with the CBI. According to the Islamic Sharia, the use of bonds is illegal because of 
their fixed rates nature. Instead, the utilization of participation papers or payment of profit is 
encouraged. Since the implementation of the third post-revolutionary plan, the CBI has been 
authorized to issue participation papers as an instrument to affect the level of broad money (M2) 
and to control the inflation rate. Additionally, since the late-1990s, within the framework of the 
Usury-Free Banking Law, the banks have been allowed to open a special deposit account with 
the CBI to control liquidity through absorption of their excess resources (CBI, 2002). 
 
                                                          
14 The MCC’s permanent members include the governor of the CBI, the Head of the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Finance and Economy Minister and some members of the parliament. [Online]. Available at: http://www.icccoop.ir 
[Accessed 30 July 2014].  
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In theory, the economic independence of the Central Bank depends on its ability to control the 
quantity of credit it lends, and its freedom to set the expected rates of return on facilities that is 
charged on credits (Grilli, et al., 1991). It has been argued that higher levels of Central Bank 
independence have positive effects on investment (Pastor and Maxfield, 2000). This 
independence can further enhance investment efficiency of the financial sector by mobilizing 
savings to finance capital accumulation (Shaw, 1973). Iran’s Central Bank is formally an 
independent institution. In practice, however, the CBI is not able to formulate or implement 
proactive monetary policies and has no power over fiscal policies. It is the government that has 
direct control over the lending and investment activities of commercial banks (Jafari-Samimi, 
2010).  
 
According to the Islamic Banking Law, liabilities incurred by the banks are of two types, (i) 
current and saving Gharz-al-hassanh deposits, and (ii) short- and long-term investment deposits. 
In using current Gharz al-hassanh accounts, similar to demand deposits in conventional banks, 
customers make transactions and payments. For the saving Gharz al-hassanh accounts, non-
fixed bonuses and prizes as well as priorities in using bank facilities are given to depositors. For 
short-term deposits, the minimum time limit is three months and for long-term deposits time 
limits vary between 1 and 5 years. In theory, no fixed rate of return can be guaranteed to the 
depositors in advance and the term ‘provisional’ rates are officially used to reflect that the rates 
that are paid indicate the profits or losses of a business. Yet, in practice, deposit rates or 
‘dividends’ have become pre-determined (rather than being dependent on the banks’ 
profitability) and the depositors have never lost their savings or gained higher returns than the 
pre-set provisional rates. 
 
Moreover, various modes of contact financing include (i) Mudarabah (profit sharing); (ii) 
Musharakah (partnership); (iii) Direct Investment; (iv)  Murabahah (differed payment sale); (v) 
Salaf (purchase with differed delivery); (vi) Ijrah be shart-e-tamlik (lease purchase); (vii) Jualah 
(transaction based on commission); and (viii) Gharz-al-hassanh (benevolent loan).15 Since, in 
                                                          
15 (i) Mudarabah: banks provide credits to the commercial sector, and business profits are shared based upon 
previous agreement; (ii) Musharakah: this is of two forms of ‘civil’ and ‘legal’ partnership. The former is project-
specific for short and medium periods. Capital is provided both by banks and their partners on a joint-ownership 
basis for the conduct of a specific job. The latter is a joint venture concerning longer term projects and banks 
provide a portion of total equity of a newly established firm or purchases part of the shares of the existing 
companies; (iii) Direct Investment: banks can invest directly in any long-term economic activity in the public sector 
except for projects involved in the production of luxury products; (iv) Murabahah: banks are permitted to purchase 
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these practices, the lenders and the borrowers are to share the profits and risks of projects based 
on previous agreement, the actual size of the profits to the lender could be known only after the 
completion of the projects. Such a risk sharing approach has encouraged borrowers to take on 
riskier projects, which in turn has made the loan portfolios of the banks riskier. As a result, 
banks have rationed their credits more strictly and have diverted a large share of their assets to 
commercial and short-term investments (Hassani, 2010).  
 
In theory, interests charged on loans are considered as fees or shares of business profits and the 
transactions are operated through the modes of financing contracts as mentioned above. In 
practice, however, banks charge fixed pre-set amounts at rates that are approved by the CBI at 
least once a year. During the last two decades, for instance, from the above eight most 
commonly used methods of contract financing by commercial banks, on average about 40% of 
the contracts have been under the installment sale category, the closest to interest-rates based 
conventional banking (Hassani, 2010). Also, banks’ commercial risks are minimized as at the 
time of defaults, the principal amount, the expected rates of return on facilities and the late fees 
are collected through possession and or sale of secured high value collateral items such as real 
estate or machinery.  
 
During the first two pre-revolutionary plans (1949-1962), the Plan Organization (PO) 
formulated and executed its investment projects independent of the government. However, since 
the formulation of the third pre-revolutionary plan in 1963, and with the establishment of the 
Supreme Council, the Prime Minister became in charge of the PO as a means to coordinate the 
government’s economic policies. Accordingly, the responsibilities of the PO were revised and 
since then it became responsible for national planning, execution of governmental projects, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
raw materials, machinery, equipment, spare parts and other needs of businesses in industry, agriculture, mining and 
services. Banks can then resell these items based on short-term installments. Prices in these transactions are 
expected to cover costs as well as profits (under certain regulations); (v) Salaf: banks can purchase goods from 
productive businesses to provide them with capital. Therefore, banks do not lend money; instead they buy parts of 
the future products at an agreed-upon price which must not surpass the market price of the product at the time of the 
contract; (vi) Ijarah be shart-e-tamlik: banks buy real property or other assets required by businesses (or 
individuals) and lease the assets to them. The price of the asset is set on a cost-plus basis and its ownership is 
transferred to the lessees at the end of the contract; (vii) Jualah: projects related to the expansion of production, 
commercial and service activities are undertaken by banks or customers on a short-term basis to pay a specific sum 
in return for a service and the fee to be charged must be set at the time of contract formation; (viii) Gharz al-
hassanh: it is a non-commercial facility without any expectation of profits. The loans are financed by Gharz al-
hassanh saving deposits and are often given to small producers, farmers and small-scale businesses. In the 
agriculture sector, there are also other financing methods such as Muzarah and Masaqat which are employed when 
the other financing methods cannot be used (see the Law for Usury (Interest) Free Banking. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.cbi.ir [Accessed 1 May 2015]; see also Hassani (2010).  
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financing of investment schemes via the plans’ budget. During 1956-1972, about 71% of total 
oil income was allocated to the PO and its role in the process of capital accumulation became 
central.  
 
With the implementation of the fifth pre-revolutionary plan (1973-1977), the current and 
development expenditures of the government were combined and the PO lost its financial 
independence. During these years, the oil income-bred substantial liquidity expansion in the 
economy resulted in a rapid growth of investment. Following the oil boom of 1973, and due to 
the consequent oil-financed expansionary monetary effects, Iran’s monetary base and domestic 
liquidity rose considerably. Coupled with a rapid rise in deposits and the expansion of financial 
resources, all the banks increased their credits, which intensified inflationary pressures in the 
economy. As a result of a high inflation rate, the real expected rates of return on facilities 
became negative and the real cost of capital decreased which in turn stimulated the demand for 
credits in all sectors of the economy. With increased lending capacity and low costs of debt, 
companies borrowed extensively, and consequently the ratio of bank-financed capital 
investment including private investment rose significantly (Jalali-Naini, 1985). During this 
period, the government revised the sectoral loan rates in its development plan, and based on the 
revised plan, the share of credits in low productive sectors such as agriculture declined, whereas 
sectors with higher productivity such as industry and construction enjoyed a greater share of 
credits.    
 
The Iranian banking system consisted of six banks in 1950, four of which were state-owned. The 
number of banks increased to twenty-six by 1960, of which seventeen were private banks and 
four were specialized banks. By 1976, the number of banks rose even further to thirty-five, of 
which ten were specialized banks (Karshenas, 1990, p.98). Over the 1960s and the 1970s period, 
the government in particular pursued a policy of financial aid to the private sector through two 
banks, the Industrial Credit Bank and Industrial and Mining Development Bank.  
 
In the post-revolutionary era, the banking system and the credit market underwent substantial 
structural changes. Soon after the revolution, all the commercial banks and insurance companies 
were nationalized and consolidated, and banking regulations changed with the approval of the 
Islamic Banking Law of Iran. The formulation of guidelines for monetary and credit policies 
remained in control of the MCC. In 1979, any fundamental market-oriented reforms, such as 
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privatization and market-liberalization, became greatly constrained because of Article 44 of the 
Constitution. Following the war, the role of the state and the scope of government operations 
increased significantly. The state nationalized large-scale industries and the entire banking 
system. By the end of the war, the SOEs and Bonyads (semi-state-owned charitable foundations) 
were the major players in the economy of the country and in charge of all the large scale 
economic activities in the energy and strategic sectors. The role of the private sector during this 
period was limited to small-scale agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and domestic trade and 
services. By 1982, in line with the Banking Nationalisation Act, the number of banks decreased 
to six commercial and three specialised banks (Jalali-Naini and Khalatbari, 2002).  
 
Consistent with the Islamic banking practices, after the revolution, the Iranian government 
played an important role in converting the banking system, which until 1979 was dominated by 
conventional banking practices, into Islamic banking. The law of Usury-Free banking was 
passed by the Majlis (the parliament) in 1983, and started being implemented by the banks in 
1984. Under the Usury-Free Banking Act, the charging of interests on all borrowing and lending 
activities was banned and banks were obliged to engage only in interest-free Islamic transactions 
and commercial transactions that involved the exchange of goods and services in return for a 
share of the expected profit.  
 
Overall, the years from 1979 to 1988 were characterized by the complete state ownership of the 
banking sector, strict government restrictions on banks’ deposit and lending ceilings, high 
reserve ratio requirements, extensive control of capital flows, and state-led credit allocation 
programs. In 1989 and during the first plan, the government re-opened the Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE) in order to find new domestic and foreign investors in the capital market. 
Fueled by favorable oil prices, financial resources of the banking sector increased during this 
period. Since the financial sector was state-owned, most of investment funds were channeled to 
the public sector.  
 
Limits on sectoral credit allocation and control of the return rates of state-owned banks were 
gradually relaxed. Participation shares were introduced as securities for medium-term financing 
of investment projects, and deposits and lending rates in the banking sector were further  
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adjusted (Jalili-Naini and Toloo, 2001). Sector-level lending rates, which had been kept 
significantly below inflation, were revised upwards and deposit rates were increased. Initially, as 
a result of these policies, deposits relative to cash holding increased (Jalali-Naini and Khalatbari, 
2002). However, with the significant rise in inflation during the early to mid-1990s, deposit and 
lending rates in real terms began to fall again.  
 
During the fourth plan, the government obliged all the banks to reduce deposit and lending rates 
of return (CBI, 2003). The government further imposed different rates and conditions on public 
banks to give high priority in their lending operations to technology-driven projects, small and 
medium enterprises, and to housing projects for low income earners (Amuzegar, 2010). 
Consequently, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) of state-owned banks increased 
dramatically after 2006. According to the CBI (2006), the annual growth rate of state-owned 
banks’ NPLs was less than 30% before 2005, while it significantly increased to 129% in 2006. 
CBI (2006) also stated that the highest share of the NPLs belonged to the manufacturing and 
mining (20.1%), and the construction (19.5%) sectors.  
 
In brief, with the establishment of the Central Bank and the Credit and Currency Council in 
1960, the government exerted a tight control over the amount and distribution of funds in the 
country’s formal credit market. This was mainly realized through different forms of credit 
controls and a policy of differential rates. The system of differentiated rates was set up to 
encourage investment in the state’s favored sectors. For instance, over the period 1973-2010, the 
lending rates for the agriculture sector were the lowest in comparison to other major sectors of 
the economy, whereas this rate was the highest in the services and commercial sectors. 
Appendix 2B reports the expected rates of profit on facilities provided by the specialized bank 
during 1973-2010. Seemingly, the expected rates of return on facilities instruments were not 
used to combat inflationary pressures in the Iranian economy since this would have required the 
government to set higher rates, which in return would have had adverse effects on investment 
and growth. On the deposit side, the rates paid on investment deposits were lower than the 
inflation rate. Hence, the real expected rates of return on facilities were negative. This adversely 
affected the economy partly because considerable resources were invested in financial assets, 
like foreign currencies, or in durable goods such as gold, houses and cars, rather than in savings 
with the banking system. Appendix 2C illustrates the term-investment deposit rates over the 
period under investigation.  
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Overall, during the years under consideration, the government determined the official rates of 
return in the banking system. To stimulate economic growth, the official rates in real terms were 
set at a low or even negative level. Because of the low costs of official loans, the demand for 
credits always surpassed the banking system’s supply. In addition to the control of rates of 
return, the government regulated the quantities of credits allocated to the economy through 
different methods. Firstly, the government determined the credits that were to be directly 
distributed in its annual budgets. Secondly, the government controlled the supply of credits 
made by banks through a system of quotas (CBI, 2002). Similarly, the government determined 
the quantity of credits allocated for the major economic sectors including agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, exports, and services in order to give priority to its preferred 
sectors.  
 
Hence, the Iranian government played an interventionist role in the size of real investment and 
in the allocation of oil-driven financial resources to various sectors of the economy. Under the 
state’s interventionist stance, the Iranian banking sector became the core domestic vehicle for 
financing the country’s development projects and its growing public sector.  
 
Yet, interestingly, the private banking system was re-introduced in 2001 and since then private 
banks’ ratio of deposits to total banking deposits has been on increase. Also, rather than being 
dependent on the banks’ profitability according to the Usury-Free Islamic Banking Law of Iran, 
deposit rates have become pre-set and the depositors have never gained higher returns than the 
pre-determined provisional rates or lost their savings (Hassani, 2010; Jafari-Samimi, 2010). 
Hence, as discussed above, it appears that the Iranian Usury-Free Banking Law  
has established a context within which the Iranian banking system 
functions similar to other systems in developing or planned economies with non-Islamic 
banking systems. Therefore, it is of interest for this thesis to investigate the extent to which 
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aggregate and sectoral investment patterns in the context of the Iranian economy are consistent 
with neoclassical-accelerator type investment models which were developed for competitive 
open-market economies. 
 
2.4. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND OIL DEPENDENCY   
2.4.1. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
During 1960-2010, Iran’s economy registered an average real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate of 4.9% p.a. However, a more detailed study of the country’s economy at different 
sub-periods reveals a rather volatile economic picture. The panel on the top left in Figure 2.1 
plots the evolution of real GDP during these years. In general, the trend of output seems to 
change in slope, and more visibly illustrates three stages: a rapid growth period prior to the 
revolution; a slow growth and contraction period during the 1980s; and a growth recovery 
period since the 1990s. After having enjoyed considerably increased output from 1960 to 1978, 
the expansion of the Iranian economy deteriorated during the mid-1980s. This was the result of 
the revolutionary upheavals, the destructive war with Iraq and the collapse of international oil 
prices during the 1980s. Economic activities weakened noticeably during this period and 
declined on average by 1.05% p.a., although with the cessation of the war in 1988, the country 
experienced some growth towards the end of the decade.  
 
Not only had the costly war with Iraq caused the destruction of property and infrastructure, it 
also increasingly drained resources away from investment in productive activities. After the war 
and in the early 1990s, the economy grew significantly on average by 7.5% p.a. during the 
implementation of the first post-revolutionary economic development plan. This period of 
growth, nevertheless, soon came to its end in the wake of the debt crisis of 1993 during the 
implementation of the second plan. Having emerged from the crisis of 1993, growth picked up 
at a steady level since 1994, although during these years the realized annual rates of GDP 
growth were less than their targets as projected in the FYDPs (see Table 2.1). Figure 2.1 (the 
panel on the top right) plots the real per capita GDP of Iran, Turkey and Malaysia during 1955-
2010. On a comparative basis, the development of real GDP per capita in Iran demonstrated a 
remarkable increasing trend until 1977. But the country’s economic performance 
underperformed that of Malaysia and Turkey who started from similar per capita GDP during 
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the mid-1950s and grew consistently ever since.16 Malaysia, also an oil economy, performed 
considerably better than Iran since 1955. Turkey likewise illustrated steady economic growth 
during this period.17 
 
Figure 2-1 Growth performance 
Real gross domestic product (billion Rials) 
 
GDP per capita 
 
GDP and oil sector value-added growth rates 
 
GDP and oil export growth rates 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI; International Monetary 
Fund (International Financial Statistics). 
 
Furthermore, the development of the changes in real GDP appears to be associated with the 
evolution of the oil sector in Iran. The panel on the bottom left in Figure 2.1 plots the rate of 
growth in real GDP and in value-added by the oil sector during 1960-2010, demonstrating a 
rather similar pattern between the growth rates of these two variables during this period. In a 
similar vein, annual growth rates of real GDP and real oil exports suggest an association 
                                                          
16 See also Hakimian and Karshenas (2000) for a comparison of per capita GDP trends of Iran, Korea and Turkey 
during 1950-1995. 
17 The main reason for Turkey’s sustained economic performance was its major structural economic reforms 
initiated in the early 1980s. Among others, see Ersel (1991) for Turkey’s structural adjustments in the 1980s.
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between both variables’ boom and bust cycles during these years as shown in the panel on the 
bottom right in Figure 2.1. For instance, Iran’s strong economic recovery during the revolution 
was aided by strong recovery in oil exports. On the other hand, the country’s poor economic 
performance in the mid-1980s was associated with the collapse of international oil prices during 
that period. 
 
The effects of variations in oil prices have been profound on the economy of Iran as a whole and 
particularly on the country’s total income. During the study period, international oil prices 
behaved with wide fluctuations in response to war and conflicts in the Middle East and as a 
result of changes in global demand and supply. The panel on the left in Figure 2.2 shows the 
evolution of nominal and real international oil prices over the years under study. The latter 
refers to Brent dated crude oil prices (in 2010 US $). Since the 1970s, the trend in oil prices can 
be divided into four sub-periods. Following the first oil boom in 1973, there was an upward 
trend in international oil prices until 1980. Nominal oil prices increased from $1.4 per barrel in 
1972 to $3.3 per barrel in 1973 and to $12 in 1974. Bred by the second oil boom, nominal oil 
prices further exhibited a dramatic increase from $14 per barrel in 1978 to $32 per barrel in 
1979 and to $37 per barrel in 1980. In the next sub-period from 1981-1986, nominal oil prices 
had a declining trend until the collapse of international oil prices, the so called the third oil 
shock, in 1986. During this period, nominal oil prices dropped to $14 per barrel, their lowest 
level since 1979.  
 
During 1987-2001, oil prices fluctuated around a seemingly constant mean. In 1990, nominal 
prices of oil spiked to $24 per barrel following the lower production of crude oil and uncertainty 
stemming from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the ensuing Gulf War. After the Gulf War, 
nominal oil prices dropped steadily until 1994, when oil prices fed by the booming Asian Pacific 
region and the US economy slightly increased to $20 per barrel in 1996. Stemming from the 
East Asian crisis and a combination of lower consumption and higher OPEC production, oil 
prices declined to as low as $12 per barrel in 1998. Nominal oil prices started to increase from 
1999 reaching to $28 per barrel in 2000, until 2001 when the prices fell again to $24 in the wake 
of September 11 terrorists attack in 2001. During 2001-2008, oil prices showed an upward trend 
for most of the period, chiefly fueled by the weak Dollar, growth in emerging markets, and 
increasing petroleum demand and consumption. In 2008, nominal international oil prices 
averaged $97 per barrel.  
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Figure 2-2 Oil prices and oil income 
Crude oil prices 
 
Growth rates of oil prices and oil income
 
Source: See Appendix 5A for detailed references of the data. 
 
Figure 2.2 (the panel on the right) displays the changes in nominal values of oil prices, oil 
revenues, and government total revenues. From this figure, it can be seen that the changes in oil 
revenues and government’s total revenues appeared to be associated for most of the years under 
study. Following the second oil shock, government revenues rose, although the start of the war 
with Iraq mitigated this increasing trend. As a result of the collapse of oil prices in 1986, both 
government revenues and oil revenues dropped considerably. Afterwards, revenues again started 
rising steadily. This rise particularly became sharp in the early 1990s due to an increase in oil 
prices caused by the Gulf War and because of the substantial devaluation of the Iranian currency 
in 1993. Since the mid-1990s, both government revenues and oil revenues displayed 
associations with changes in international oil prices. This demonstrated the extent to which the 
government’s income was oil-dependent.  
 
2.4.2. CONSUMPTION, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND NATIONAL 
SAVINGS 
Real consumption and investment growth averaged 5.6% p.a. and 6.7% p.a. during 1965-2010, 
respectively (Table 2.3). In essence, the use of oil income for financing investment as well as the 
imports of capital goods resulted in the growth of consumption in the Iranian economy. 
Particularly, during 1965-1978, the high growth rate of total consumption (over 11%) in the 
domestic economy was in line with the fast growth rate of investment which was greater than 
13% p.a. during that period. This pattern of domestic expenditure was feasible due to an 
increasing reliance on external sources of finance in that time, namely foreign borrowing and oil 
income (Karshenas, 1990). The development patterns of public and private consumption during 
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1965-2010, are illustrated in the panel on the top left in Figure 2.3. During 1965-1978, 
government consumption in real terms increased on average by over 16% p.a., with private 
consumption registering annual average growth rate of over 9% p.a. throughout these years.  
 
Table 2.3 Composition of gross national expenditure 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
By contrast, during 1979-1988, both consumption and investment growth initially levelled off 
and then fell respectively by just less than 1% p.a. following the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq 
war and the period of precipitous decline of global oil prices. Real consumption and investment 
recovered after the war and during the implementation of the first plan (1989-1994), although 
started declining towards the end of the period when the Iranian economy was hit by the deficit 
crisis. Despite the fact that the growth rate of real investment rebounded after the debt crisis 
during 1995-1999, lower oil prices and foreign debt repayment did not leave sufficient foreign 
exchange resources to drive domestic consumption during that time. Thus, real consumption 
increased slightly during the years of the second plan. From 2000 to 2004, real consumption and 
investment rose again bred by the recovery of international oil prices. 
 
The centrality of oil in Iran’s economy can further be understood by assessing the degree to 
which investment patterns have been affected by oil price changes over time. The panel on the 
bottom left in Figure 2.3 illustrates the annual variations in real investment and in real oil prices. 
As for real GDP, the rate of growth in real investment followed a similar pattern to the 
movements of real oil prices for most of the years under consideration. This pattern of co-
movement was only interrupted by the revolutionary upheavals of the late 1970s.  
 
The annual growth rates of public and private investment and their shares in total gross fixed 
capital formation during the period under study are presented in Table 2.3. Investment by the 
public sector registered a higher growth compared to that of the private sector with respective 
1965-1970 1971-1978 1979-1988 1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1965-2010
Real final consumption expenditure
Private 8.5 10.6 1.2 4.8 5.2 7.1 4.7 5.8
Public 17.8 14.7 -4.3 4.1 1.3 4.9 -0.77 5.1
Total 11.1 11.8 -0.7 4.4 4.2 6.5 3.6 5.6
Real gross fixed capital formation
Total 13.1 8.6 -0.96 4.6 10.1 11.6 5.2 6.7
Annual average growth rates
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rates of 10% p.a. and 7% p.a. on average over the period 1965-2010. The share of public 
investment averaged 34.3% p.a. during 1965-2010. More than 64% of the public sector 
investment throughout this period was spent on construction and the remaining on machinery.  
 
Figure 2-3 Consumption and investment 
Consumption expenditure  
 
Public and private investment 
 
 
Investment and oil prices growth rates 
 
Consumption and oil prices growth rates 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI; BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2010. 
 
Interestingly, during 1965-2010, real public and private investment demonstrated an association 
for most of the years under study (see the panel on the top right in Figure 2.3). In fact, the 
common view that government investment crowds out private investment was not applicable to 
the case of the Iranian economy. In the pre-revolutionary years, due to the abundance of external 
finance in the country, the significant growth rate of investment by the public sector did not 
have a bearing on the interests of the private sector and its investment activities during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. In contrast, the support of the government for both domestic and private 
enterprises, coupled with the rapid growth of domestic demand following the available external 
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finance during that time, resulted in the growth of investment by the private sector (Karshenas, 
1990). Over the post-revolutionary period, likewise, the private sector grew along with the 
public sector as the Iranian government earmarked a greater amount of oil income for capital 
expenditure to stimulate growth and investment in that sector (Valadkhani, 2001). 
 
Relative to the post-revolutionary period, investment by the public sector enjoyed a higher 
growth rate over the years 1965-1978. This was because investment activities of various 
ministries were merged into the expenditure plan during that time and the government imposed 
a greater degree of control over the public sector’s investment activities. Also, the availability of 
new external sources of investment funds, namely foreign capital and oil revenues, was 
translated into higher government expenditure with highly expansionary effects on the economy. 
The role of the state, therefore, became that of a key producer in heavy and basic industries 
which resulted in the acceleration of investment by the public sector over that period 
(Karshenas, 1990).  
 
The data on national savings and investment during the years under consideration are reported in 
Appendix 2D. Overall, real investment and national savings appeared to move together (see the 
panel on the left in Figure 2.4). The dramatic improvements in national savings as well as 
investment in the mid-1970s were associated with the significantly higher oil prices in that time. 
During 1971-1978, the annual average growth rate and share of real gross national savings in 
total GDP registered 16% and 56.8%, respectively. However, the revolutionary instabilities, the 
war years and the sharp decline in oil prices contributed to the sharp decline in national savings 
and investment in the late-1970s and the 1980s. The fall in national savings maintained the high 
levels of consumption while the economy was experiencing high inflationary pressures and 
over-valued exchange rates during that period. Since the mid-1990s, despite some variations, the 
favorable growth of oil prices played an important role in the positive development of national 
savings in the Iranian economy. Over the years between 1989 and 1994, national savings growth 
recovered. However, during 1995-2010, savings grew at a slower pace (about 7% p.a.) than that 
of during 1965-2010. At large, similar to GDP and investment, the growth of national savings 
followed that of oil prices during most of the study period, signifying the importance of oil in 
shaping the development pattern of national savings in the country.   
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Figure 2-4 National savings and external debt 
National savings and investment 
 
External debt and oil  prices growth rates 
 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI; BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2010. 
 
Iran’s total external debt fluctuated considerably during the study period between zero during 
1970-1979 and 23.5 billion US $ in 1993, and was inversely related to the changes in real oil 
prices for most of these years (see the panel on the right in Figure 2.4).18 External debt rose in 
constant prices on average by 8% p.a. from 1979 to 1988 and by 29% p.a. during 1989-1994. 
After the war and due to Iran’s reconstruction program reflected in the first plan coupled with its 
increased interaction with the rest of the world, the country’s appetite for foreign loans to 
finance its post-war reconstruction was significant. This resulted in the flow of foreign capital 
(mostly bank loans) into the country. However, the foreign debt had been unsustainably 
accumulated by 1992, which led to the debt crisis of 1993. In fact, the first plan’s 
implementation was considerably blemished by an increasing external debt crisis which, in 
particular towards the end of the plan, resulted in severe discrepancies in the country’s external 
accounts. The debt crisis in that period was further worsened due to the declining oil income.  
 
In this setting, a matter of concern was the composition of the foreign debt, of which a great 
share was related to short-term debt. This was because debts of less than one-year maturity 
averaged 80% of the total debt over the years of the first plan’s implementation due to Iran’s 
isolationist stance and its inability to raise long-term credits. As a result, short-term finance was 
used on a large scale for medium and long-term investment projects with longer gestation 
periods. Consequently, austerity measures were introduced in 1994 to tackle external debt 
imbalances which were done mainly through import restriction policies. During the second plan, 
                                                          
18 External debts were financed by the World Bank, IMF and a number of private and commercial creditors (World 
Bank International Debt Statistics, 2013, pp.160-161). 
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external debt decreased due to increasing oil prices and oil exports. During the implementation 
of the second plan between 1994 and 1999, the external debt contracted from 21 billion US $ in 
1995 to 9 billion US $ in 1999, and the economy moved towards gradual recovery. External 
debt rose again (on average by 22% p.a.) during the third plan, however, benefited from 
favorable oil prices, it contracted during the implementation of the fourth plan.  
 
Table 2.4 Real government consumption expenditure by function 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. ‘Others’ include disciplinary services, 
cultural and recreational services and municipalities. Economic affairs include urban and rural development, public 
utilities, manufacturing and mining, agriculture, transport, communication and commerce. Source: CBI. 
                
Due to its size, government consumption expenditure exerted an important influence on income 
distribution during the period under consideration. The impact of the government’s development 
expenditure worked through the long-run structural changes it created in the Iranian economy. 
At large, two types of government consumption expenditure can be identified namely general 
and productive expenditures.19 The former is related to general administration and military 
expenditure, while the latter is related to the expenditures on education, health, social as well as 
economic affairs. As presented in Table 2.4, a substantial share of total government 
consumption expenditure during 1965-2007 was absorbed by the general expenditure category, 
of which a great deal was spent on defense. For instance, the share of defense expenditure in 
total government expenditure averaged as high as 45% p.a. over the years 2005-2007. The share 
of education expenditure was the greatest among the productive expenditures followed by that 
of the economic affairs and housing. In total government expenditures, the share of education 
expenditure averaged 15.5% p.a. during 1965-2007, while that of economic affairs recorded an 
annual average rate of 9.5% over the same period.  
                                                          
19 See Karshenas (1990, p.195) for a similar classification of government consumption expenditures during 1963-
1977. 
1965-1970 1971-1978 1979-1988 1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2007
General expenditure 45.0 39.2 39.5 23.6 23.7 32.9 48.4
     General services      8.9 4.0 2.7 3.4 3.8 3.8 2.7
     Defense                    36.1 35.3 36.9 20.2 19.9 29.1 45.7
Productive expenditure 38.4 40.4 40.9 59.0 58.3 50.9 37.2
     Education                18.2 11.0 19.1 24.7 20.9 21.5 15.5
     Health and medical services  4.6 3.9 6.0 8.1 5.5 4.5 3.2
     Social affairs and security   3.6 5.4 6.3 9.1 11.7 12.0 8.9
     Economic affairs and housing 12.0 20.1 9.4 17.1 20.2 13.0 9.5
Others 16.6 20.4 19.6 17.4 18.0 16.2 14.4
Annual average %  share in total government consumption expenditure
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Table 2.5 Growth and structural changes in capital formation 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the growth rates of sectoral real investment during the study period. Over 
these years, the economy of Iran witnessed a structural shift from agriculture to the 
manufacturing and the service sectors. During 1965-1979, real investment in all of the major 
economic sectors increased. Notably, real investment in the oil sector averaged over 32% p.a., 
whereas it was 9% p.a. in agriculture. After the revolution and during the war period, 
redistributive conflicts undermined investment incentives in the country. The fluctuations in 
oil prices and particularly the sharp collapse of oil prices in 1986 further contributed to the 
deterioration of real investment at both aggregate and sector-levels. As oil revenues shrank, so 
did the rate of growth in capital formation. Compared to the pre-revolutionary era, the real 
growth rate of investment contracted in all sectors, with the exception of the construction sector, 
which grew on average about 7% p.a. because of a high demand for new construction projects 
driven by the destructive consequences of the war. 
 
Overall, various policies adopted by the governments of pre- and post-revolutionary periods 
together with the increased state control of resources altered the distribution of wealth 
particularly in favor of services and to a smaller degree manufacturing. This was an indication 
1965-1970 1971-1978 1979-1988 1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1965-2010
Total 15,5 14,9 -4,7 6,6 8,4 10,7 5,8 7,3
Agriculture sector 5,7 13,5 -1,2 8 16,1 10,3 12,9 8,4
Manufacturing and mining sector 21,6 16,2 -2,1 10,2 18,1 18,1 -0,32 10,4
Oil sector 34,4 30,4 -10,8 23,8 28,1 -2,6 -0,05 13,3
Services sector 16,3 14,3 -4,05 5,02 4,02 13,7 6,5 7,1
Private sector 11,5 11,9 1,9 2,4 14,8 13 4,7 7,6
Machinery 11,3 12,6 19,7 6,2 26,8 14,4 2,7 13,4
Construction 12,4 15,2 -1,7 -0,36 0,91 9,5 10,8 5,6
Public sector 31,6 24 -10,3 18,5 1,6 6,3 9,3 9,9
Machinery 51,6 29,7 -10,1 17 0,28 8,1 7,3 13,3
Construction 26,8 22,9 -9,5 19,5 2,4 5,8 10,4 9,5
Agriculture sector 4 4 3,7 4,6 4,3 4,7 6,2 1,4
Manufacturing and mining secor 10,8 12,8 7,8 12,4 13 19,1 18,9 12,8
Oil sector 7,9 6,8 4,3 2,6 6,2 4,1 2,6 5
Services sector 53,04 48,5 56,8 50,4 44,5 45,5 47,4 50,3
Private sector 71,7 65 64,5 64,5 59,6 67 66,1 65,6
Public sector 28,2 34,9 35,4 35,4 40,4 32,9 33,8 34,3
Private sector
Machinery 61,8 65,4 39,7 56,2 62,7 71,8 72,8 58,7
Construction 38,1 34,5 60,2 43,7 37,2 28,1 27,2 41,3
Public sector
Machinery 26,3 32,6 45,8 38,2 33,6 33,3 34,7 35,7
Construction 73,6 67,3 54,1 61,7 66,3 66,6 65,2 64,2
Gross fixed capital formation - Annual average growth rates (% )
Gross fixed capital formation as %  share in total investment (annual average)
Gross fixed capital formation as %  share in private sector investment (annual average)
Gross fixed capital formation as %  share in public sector investment (annual average)
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of structural shifts in the actual investment picture of the economy away from agriculture and 
even the oil sector towards services and manufacturing. This, in line with the empirical findings 
presented in Chapter Six, could suggest the presence of an ‘Iranian Disease’, which is a special 
case of the Dutch Disease. According to the Dutch Disease theory, one could expect that the 
relationship between oil revenues and investment in the sectors of oil and services to be positive, 
and that relation in manufacturing and agriculture sectors to be negative. Yet, the Iranian-type 
Dutch Disease is characterized by the expansion of capital formation as well as output in the 
sectors of services and manufacturing, but by their respective contractions in oil and agriculture 
sectors. In fact, these observations suggest that, chiefly through state-led investment 
expenditures for the promotion of industrialization in Iran which began in the early 1950s, oil 
income were invested in the sectors of services and manufacturing throughout the study period. 
 
2.5. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND OIL DEPENDENCY 
2.5.1. INCOME GENERATION BY THE STATE AND FISCAL REGIME 
The main characteristic of Iran’s fiscal system during the study period was the substantial and 
increasing proportion of revenues from oil exports compared to that of taxes in financing 
government expenditure (see Figure 2.5). This significant feature of public finances in the 
country particularly came into existence when the share of oil revenues in total revenues 
increased. This share rose to about 50% during the third pre-revolutionary plan, then to over 
70% during the 1970s, and for most of the post-revolutionary period it remained over 55% p.a. 
The share of domestic taxes in total revenues, however, recorded as low as 13% during the pre-
revolutionary years and about 20% over the post-revolutionary period.  
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Figure 2-5 Components of government income 
Components of revenues 
 
Income share 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Table 2.6 presents the figures related to government revenue components and a breakdown of 
income taxes by main groups during the years between 1970 and 2010. The share of taxes in 
total revenues remained low, and tax income played an insignificant role in financing 
expenditure and in income distribution in the economy over the study period. During 1970-
2010, taxes accounted for only about 30% of total income, of which domestic taxes registering 
about 20% of real tax revenues. A notable feature of the tax structure in the Iranian economy 
was the considerably low share of wealth taxes and income taxes, compared to that of corporate 
and import taxes, over these years. The declining growth rate of taxes during the years 1979-
1988 was due to the decrease in total imports, tariffs on which comprised a considerable part of 
the state’s tax income. In fact, the decline of oil prices in the mid-1980s reduced both oil 
revenues and tariff revenues. This was because the volume of imports was largely determined by 
the amount of foreign exchange made available by income from oil.  
 
Table 2.6 Revenue components of the state 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
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1971-1978 1979-1988 1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1971-2010
Real total government revenues 13,51 -10,4 21,8 3,8 2,3 6,7 4,9
Real oil revenues 19,7 -9,6 39,9 -1,2 6,6 14,5 10,1
Real tax  revenues 10,4 -6 5,2 22,05 -2,2 8,2 4,9
Real corporate tax 27,6 15,2 7,5 8,9 1 19,7 14,3
Real income tax 8,1 -4 7,11 11,7 -1,5 7,6 4
Real wealth tax  1,9 6 -1,5 4,4 8,2 4,5 3,9
Real import tax 4,9 -10,6 20,5 16,7 17,8 0,94 5,8
Real sales and consumption tax 3,3 0,66 -8,2 101,5 -19,1 14,1 12,2
Real payments 13,3 -8,6 7,8 2,7 6,3 5,1 3,3
Real oil revenues 70,7 53 59,4 57,1 59,3 40,5 56,9
Real tax revenues 23,8 35,8 30,7 31,4 32,6 39,1 32,2
Real corporate tax 7 12 9,9 10,8 10,2 19,3 11,4
Real income tax 3,2 5,5 5,4 5,6 5,4 4,9 4,9
Real wealth tax  0,83 1,7 1,8 1,2 1,4 1,3 1,4
Real import tax 9,6 10,1 9,3 5,9 10,1 9,7 9,3
Real sales and consumption tax 3,2 6,4 4,1 7,7 5,3 3,7 5
Annual growth rates (% )
%  Share of total government revenues (annual average)
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During the study years, total revenues of the Iranian government were affected by fluctuations in 
oil prices and oil revenues, both directly and indirectly. At the time of increased oil revenues, 
the windfalls went to the government and directly affected its revenues. Subsequently, through 
its expenditures, the government tried to stimulate domestic activities and to accumulate more 
tax revenues. Tax revenues from imports increased as long as the imports of final and 
intermediate goods increased. The rise in tax revenues thus indicated the indirect effects of oil 
on government revenues, making them even more reliant on oil income.  
 
Figure 2-6 Revenues and budget deficits 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: SCI. 
 
Figure 2.6 depicts the changes in real government revenues, government payments and budget 
deficit over the study period. The rate of growth in government payments averaged 5.4% p.a. 
The two spikes in the series reflect the impacts of the oil boom of 1973 and the big devaluation 
of the Iranian currency in 1993. Since the revolution until 1988, long-term projects particularly 
in the productive sectors were sacrificed and state payments declined on average by more than 
8% p.a. After the war, and due to the war-driven shrinkage of infrastructure and domestic 
output, government payments rose by 7.8% p.a. during 1989-1994, most of which were 
channeled to finance reconstruction projects and state subsidies. Since the execution of the 
second plan, however, government payments depicted an average growth rate of 4% p.a. over 
the years between 1995 and 2010. This was mainly due to the government’s attempts to restore 
the country’s balance of payment and a gradual removal of subsidies on non-basic goods. On the 
whole, increases in government payments, stemming from the influx of oil income, influenced 
the government’s fiscal policy in an expansionary direction. However, as the government’s 
income was largely oil-driven, its size remained beyond the control of the authorities due to the 
unpredictable nature of oil prices and thus oil revenues.  
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2.5.2. MONETARY POLICY, MONEY SUPPLY AND INFLATION 
The way that monetary policy has been implemented explains the responses of the Central Bank 
of Iran (CBI) to international oil price variations. The development of money supply, showing 
the growth rate of M2, is plotted in the panel on the left in Figure 2.7. In 1974, following the 
first oil boom, the growth rate of money supply reached a peak of 56%. As part of its anti-
inflationary policy, the government pursued a tighter monetary policy. This restrictive policy 
continued during the early years of the war until 1984. At the same time, demand for investment 
declined and the economy experienced a deep recession.  
 
Following the collapse of oil prices in 1986, government revenues dropped to less than one-third 
of the level of the preceding year. Consequently, the government financed its budget deficit 
through borrowing from the CBI. This policy resulted in an increase in the money supply which 
persisted in the succeeding years, mainly because of the monetization of the budget deficit and 
converting foreign loans to the Iranian currency to implement the first plan. Although the first 
plan formulated certain monetary guidelines to curb the government’s injection of cash into the 
economy, bred by favorable oil prices in the early 1990s, money supply expanded during 1989-
1994. When the debt crisis hit the economy in the mid-1990s, money supply grew further and 
monetary policy became even more expansionary. Similarly, during the implementation of the 
third plan, as oil prices rose, so did money supply. The fourth plan further aimed at limiting 
liquidity expansion in order to curb inflation. Nevertheless, during 2005 to 2010, thanks to 
higher than expected oil-revenues, money supply grew and the government pursued 
expansionary monetary policies once again. 
 
Figure 2-7 Money and inflation 
Nominal money and quasi-money growth (%) 
 
CPI growth (%) 
 
Source: CBI. 
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The growth rate of inflation (measured by the changes in Consumer Price Index (CPI)) is shown 
in the panel on the right in Figure 2.7. Overall, inflation revealed a fluctuating pattern over the 
years under consideration. During the years 1960-1972, CPI inflation was in single figures and 
averaged below 3% p.a. Following the first oil shock and the increase in the quantity of oil 
exports, this rate grew sharply and averaged over 14% p.a. during 1973-1978, and about 19% 
p.a. during 1979-1993. However, it reached a peak of about 50% a year after the big currency 
devaluation of 1994 in response to the debt crisis and then remained mostly over 25% p.a. on 
average throughout the rest of the period under study.20 Oil prices affected inflation in the 
country through various channels. One channel was the conversion of foreign currencies earned 
from increased oil exports to domestic currency by the CBI, which in turn increased the supply 
of money, government spending and consequently the demand for goods. (Higher) oil prices 
further affected inflation via imports and the rise in the cost of foreign inputs used by national 
producers.  
 
For most of the years under study, the government attempted to tighten its monetary policy in 
order to curb inflation. In practice, however, expansionary policies were conducted particularly 
at the time of higher oil prices and budget deficits. In fact, the conversion of foreign exchange 
mainly from oil rents into the Iranian currency created a close connection between monetary and 
fiscal policies and led to the expansion of government spending, money supply and inflationary 
pressures. This was because the growth of oil income relaxed the constraints on government 
expenditure to distribute oil rents in the economy, most of which was utilized to finance the 
government’s current spending. Coupled with low tax income, this logic negatively affected the 
government’s budget deficits to the degree that they were funded by converting foreign 
exchange from the export of oil into the Iranian currency. This in turn linked fiscal and 
monetary policies and resulted in the expansion of money supply and inflation in the Iranian 
economy.  
 
Overall, high rate of inflation affected investment negatively in various ways. Under inflationary 
pressures, the Iranian currency constantly lost its value. Combined with mostly negative profit 
rates on term deposits, the public was left with low incentives to deposit their money in the 
                                                          
20 An exception was related to the period during the implementation of the third plan as, according to the official 
data from CBI, the inflation rate declined to on average 14% p.a. over that time. Esfehani (2006) argues that this 
low rate of inflation could be plausible if one takes into account the relative stability of the Rial and the rising real 
rates of return during that period. 
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banking system. Alternatively, investment in durable goods like gold coins, cars, foreign 
currencies and real estate became common due to their expected higher future returns. Thus, 
saving declined and so the availability of funds for domestic investment activities.  
 
2.5.3. TRADE POLICY 
Figure 2.8 depicts the evolution of the balance of trade during 1970-2010. Generally, real 
exports and imports moved together during these years. This suggests the reliance of imports on 
oil exports as the import of goods was largely financed by the income generated from oil 
exports. During these years, oil exports and non-oil exports accounted for about 78% and 22% 
of total exports, respectively.  
 
Figure 2-8 Trade balance 
 
Note: Data are in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices.  
Source: CBI; BP; Statistical Review of World Energy 2010. 
 
During the period under study, Iran’s state-led trade policies were characterized by several 
switches between liberalization and restriction policies. Following the first oil boom, Iran’s oil 
exports registered a strong positive trend, making the country even more dependent on oil 
resources. The government pursued liberalization policies that stimulated imports through 
reductions in custom duties and through financial supports. Consequently, imports rose by 23% 
p.a. on average during 1973-1979, and reached its peak of 80% growth after the first oil shock in 
1974. The costly war with Iraq together with the shrinking of oil revenues and the country’s 
increasing international isolation resulted in foreign exchange shortages, and consequently led to 
import restrictions by means of tariffs and quotas, and strict foreign exchange controls. For 
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example, by the end of the war, an extensive network of controls that covered over 300 products 
subject to official price controls had appeared (Hakimian and Karshenas, 2000).  
 
During this period, total imports shrank on average by 6.1% p.a., whereas oil exports and total 
exports rose by 37% p.a. and 2% p.a., respectively. During the post-revolutionary first plan, the 
government formulated a liberalization program which involved foreign exchange devaluation 
with the intention of improving non-oil exports and restricting imports. As a result, total exports 
and imports increased on average by 14% p.a. and 11% p.a., respectively. The growth rate of 
non-oil exports, however, stayed below the plan’s projections, although the share of non-oil 
exports in total exports averaged about 22% p.a. Also, non-oil exports were still reliant on 
imported goods for production and thus a considerable part of their earnings was absorbed by 
production processes.  
 
The government imposed more restrictions on trade during the implementation 
of the second plan. This plan sought to enhance the competitiveness 
 of domestic production and technology in the international market. To promote domestic 
production and to achieve self-sufficiently, the government assigned tariffs for the imported 
goods, prohibited imports of goods and services that could be produced domestically, and lifted 
bureaucratic procedures on non-oil exports to facilitate the export of domestically produced 
products. Consequently, during 1994-1999, total imports shrank on average by 5% p.a. Oil 
exports and total exports also contracted on average about 1% p.a. During the third plan (2000-
2005), the government adopted open trade policies; thus, total imports and exports showed a 
steady growth and, on average, increased by about 12% p.a. and 4% p.a., respectively. 
Furthermore, oil exports and non-oil exports rose on average by 5% p.a. and 8% p.a. During the 
implementation of the fourth plan, because of Iran’s relatively cheap foreign exchange, imports 
increased over 2.5% compared to the third plan.  
 
Iran’s trade policies also influenced the level of foreign direct investment in the country. During 
1956-1978, over 1600 Iranian companies with foreign private stockholders were registered in 
the country. However, after the Islamic revolution until the early 1990s, foreign investment 
slowed down significantly. Article 81 of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution forbade the 
establishment of foreign companies or organizations in the sectors of industry, mining, 
agriculture, commerce and services. Article 82 of the Constitution prohibited the employment of 
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‘foreign experts except in cases of necessity’, still subject to governmental approval. Similarly, 
Article 83 forbade property transferal to foreigners, unless approved by the government. In a 
similar vein, Article 153 of the Constitution prohibited agreement conclusions related to the 
foreign control of natural and economic resources and military affairs. As a result, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in the country reduced from 6 billion US $ in 1979 to as little as 2 
billion US $ in 1981 and then became negative during most of the 1980s. After the war and with 
the improvement of the country’s interaction with the rest of the world, foreign investment 
started to improve gradually since the mid-1990s and amounted to 395.6 million US $ in the 
1990s. The country further attracted 10.3 and 10.9 billion US $ during 2000-2004 and 2005-
2010, respectively. At large, however, Iran’s inability to attract FDI both in absolute size and 
given its share in total GDP, has been a notable weakness in the economy. 
 
On the whole, the government played a central role in Iran’s international trade during the study 
period and had a direct impact on the trade balance, for instance, by exporting oil, importing 
goods and services, and through employing quantity- and price-based measures. Particularly, as 
the main exporter, the government received most of the foreign exchange earned by the country. 
Since the Iranian oil industry is nationalized, the government had an allocative power over the 
supply of foreign exchange from oil income and in setting its value (Sadeghi, et al., 2007). Next 
section, thus, describes important aspects of foreign exchange policies in the country during the 
years under consideration. 
 
2.5.4. FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICY   
For most of the period under study, the exchange rate regime in Iran was characterized by 
multiple exchange rate practices as a means to control imports and to pursue its nationalistic 
economic objectives. Also, a parallel market for foreign currencies operated along with the 
official market. In 2002, the exchange rate was unified and determined based on a market-based 
managed floating system. Figure 2.9 shows the trends of exchange rates in the official and 
parallel markets during the study period. 
 
During 1960-1973, the real exchange rate (the number of Rials per US $) did not change much 
thanks to the high level of economic growth and the low level of inflation in the Iranian 
economy (Pesaran and Mohaddes, 2013). After the first oil shock, however, the real exchange 
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rate started to appreciate. Over the period 1979-89, the official and the market rates diverged 
broadly and the premium (the ratio of the parallel market for the US $ over the official rate) 
increased on average by 42.1% p.a. This was because, since 1979, the demand for foreign 
exchange rose due to the increased budget deficit, military imports and high capital flight. This, 
together with the decline in oil revenues and foreign exchange constraints resulting from the 
freezing of Iran’s foreign assets in the West, led to the escalation of capital controls and the 
introduction of a multiple exchange rate system. The government introduced a variety of official 
exchange rates according to the nature of transactions. For instance, during the war, the number 
of exchange rates applicable to imports surpassed seven (Pesaran, 1992). 
 
Figure 2-9 Official and parallel markets exchange rates 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
In 1990, the parallel market rate for the Dollar reached its peak of over 20 times the official rate 
(Pesaran, 1992). In 1991, the number of official exchange rates was reduced to three: the basic 
official rate (Rls.65.7 per US $); the competitive rate (Rls.600 per US $), and the floating rate 
(Rls.1459 per US $) (Farzin, 1995). There was only a minor difference between this floating 
rate, at which commercial banks sold foreign exchange supplied by the CBI, and the free rate at 
which foreign exchange was sold on the free market (Farzin, 1995). The official exchange rate 
was applied to the public sector, while the competitive rate was introduced mainly for private 
sector imports, and the floating rate was used for final goods, education, travel, and medical 
services. Additionally, the parallel rate (Rls.1498 per US $) was active outside the banking 
system.  
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In 1993, the government attempted to unify the exchange rate regime. This policy aimed at 
removing the duality in the foreign exchange market and implied the devaluation of the official 
rates towards the level of the parallel rate. Creating a unified exchange rate system was further 
motivated by the balance of payment problem and was expected to reduce imports while 
encouraging exports. In theory, the immediate impact of the devaluation was to make imports 
more expensive in Rial terms and non-oil exports cheaper in Dollar (Rezazadeh, et al., 2011). 
With oil exports as Iran’s main source of foreign exchange, this system failed to achieve its 
objectives. Instead of creating more competitiveness for the domestically produced goods in the 
international markets, it boosted their cost of production due to the enhanced cost of the import 
of raw and intermediate materials for the use in their production process. Consequently, 
wholesale prices increased through the rise in input costs, and expected future price increases 
were passed onto retail prices, adding to higher inflationary pressures in the Iranian economy 
(Sadeghi, et. al., 2007).  
 
Failure of the unification policy forced the government to introduce two exchange rates: an 
official exchange rate (Rls.1749 per US $) in 1993 and an export exchange rate (Rls.2345 per 
US $) in 1994. The aim was to curb the demand for non-essential imports and to promote 
exports (Celasun, 2003). Because of high inflation and the anticipation of tightened trade 
sanctions by the US against Iran, the premium of the parallel market exchange rate over the 
official rate increased steadily. In 1997, a third exchange rate regime was introduced through the 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and a significant amount of imports was shifted to this market. 
During 1999-2000, the authorities took initial steps in stabilizing the foreign exchange system 
through a more sustainable reform policy. In May 1999, an open deposit account facility was set 
up and a substantial proportion of commercial banks’ excess reserves were absorbed by the CBI. 
The TSE rate was considerably depreciated in line with the parallel market rate.  
 
Consequently, the premium on the parallel market exchange rate over the TSE rate steadily 
declined from about 17% to less than 2% by early 2000 (Celasun, 2003). The export rate was 
removed in 2000 and the TSE exchange rate became the major market-determined rate applied 
to official current account transactions. The official rate (Rls.1750 per US $) was applied to the 
import of subsidized essential commodities and debt service payments. In 2002, the exchange 
rate was unified and its rate was Rls.8614 per US $. During 2003-2004, the entire foreign 
exchange transactions that were formerly conducted in the TSE market were moved to a newly 
 54 
 
introduced interbank market. Since then, the CBI used a managed floating exchange rate regime 
and the unified exchange rate gradually rose to about Rls.1000 per US $ in late 2010.  
 
At large, in the oil-based economy of Iran, real exchange rate fluctuations were pegged against 
the oil prices and the exchange rate regime was heavily controlled by the government. This was 
because foreign exchange from oil rents financed a great deal of government current as well as 
investment spending. This in turn increased the government’s intervention in the Iranian 
economy and its controlling power in deciding the pace and pattern of the capital accumulation 
process in the country. 
 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS   
This chapter provided a description of the development of Iran’s real economy, the evolution of 
the political structure in the country and the major institutions of capital accumulation since the 
1960s. Particular attention was given to the high degree of the autonomy of the state and its key 
role in distributing a substantial proportion of oil income in the Iranian economy. At large, the 
size of government expenditure for capital formation in the development plans was determined 
by the projected oil revenues. In practice, it was the availability of mainly oil income-driven 
external finance, rather than taxation or other forms of the state’s intervention, which 
determined the size of government development expenditure during the years under study. 
Furthermore, with the availability of external funds for investment, the interaction between 
public and private investment appeared to be complementary. Nevertheless, the government 
budget presented a tendency towards deficit and the method of financing investment was 
through fiscal and monetary expansionary policies for most of the study period.  
 
Since the first oil shock, Iran’s oil-driven economy has undergone various institutional and 
economic reforms. The impacts of oil shocks on investment, growth and macroeconomic 
policies were particularly profound. In particular, government current expenditure 
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increased rapidly during the years under investigation and attracted a lion share of oil income. 
The expansionary macroeconomic policies of the government further fueled inflationary 
pressures in the economy throughout these years with severe implications for growth and 
investment processes in the Iranian economy.   
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3.  SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON 
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR AND NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the current debates in the literature on investment 
and the natural resource curse thesis, as well as the relevance of the investment literature in the 
context of resource-rich and resource-based economies. This chapter, therefore, critically 
surveys the most important aspects of the development of the literature on investment and on 
natural resource curse theories along with their empirical applications. At large, the review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on investment indicates that investment models have 
been principally developed and employed for advanced and market-oriented economies. In 
particular, the investment literature has largely disregarded the impact of a country’s deeper 
characteristics such as natural resources or its institutional political economy setup on the 
evolution of investment patterns in resource-abundant and resource-dependent economies.  
 
Also, only little attention is given to study how investment behavior reacts to uncertainty 
associated with resource price or resource revenue volatility in resource-abundant and -
dependent economies. The latter issue is particularly important because the literature on the 
resource curse thesis shows that resource-rich economies tend to underperform compared to 
resource-poor economies in terms of economic performance and development. While many 
researchers try to explain this paradox, this relationship is still subject to debate. This study 
attempts to address this relationship from the perspective of investment behavior in the context 
of such resource-driven economies.  
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to shed light on how the extant literature on 
investment and on resource curse theories addresses the following questions:  
 
1. What are the determinants of investment in market and partial-market economies? 
2. How does the presence of natural resources or resource windfalls affect economic 
performance and investment patterns of resource-rich developing economies?  
 
It is reasonable to expect that some of the predictions of the conventional investment models 
may only be partly relevant in the context of resource-rich and -dependent economies like Iran. 
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In these economies, investment behavior could be distorted as the availability of oil windfalls as 
a major source of financing investment is subject to uncertainty stemming from the volatile 
nature of oil prices. Besides, the ability of these economies to borrow from the international 
capital markets is often limited. Also, as a result of the dominant role of the state, the allocation 
of financial resources to various economic sectors could be only partially driven by market 
mechanisms and consequently some non-market determinants of investment could emerge in 
these countries. Therefore, it is of theoretical and empirical interest to find out the extent to 
which the conventional investment theories are applicable in the context of these economies and 
then to investigate the underlying reasons for (likely) partial applicability of these theories in 
such a context. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 surveys the conventional investment theories. 
Section 3.3 reviews the literature on investment and uncertainty. Section 3.4 presents the 
theoretical and empirical evidence that is presented in the literature on investment behavior in 
partial-market and resource-rich economies. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2. CONVENTIONAL INVESTMENT THEORIES 
3.2.1. DEFINITIONS  
Net capital stock K at the end of a time period t, assuming a constant exponential depreciation 
rate δ, is defined as: 
 
(3.1) Kt = It + (1 – δ)Kt-1, 
 
where It refers to gross. From equation (3.1) it follows that net investment, referring to the net 
increment to capital stock since the preceding time period (Kt – Kt-1), equals  gross  investment, 
It, minus replacement investment, δKt-1. Accordingly, gross investment is the sum of 
replacement investment and net investment. Denoting the actual level of capital by Kt and the 
desired or optimal level by Kt
∗, then according to most investment theories, the demand for new 
plants and equipment is related to the gap between Kt and Kt
∗. These aspects of capital stock 
raise the following related questions:  
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1. What factors determine Kt and Kt
∗, and how can these determinants be modelled? 
2. Why does a gap exist between Kt and Kt
∗, and what is the speed at which Kt adjust 
towards Kt
∗?   
 
Denoting the speed of adjustment between Kt and Kt
∗ by λt, then by definition, net investment 
during time period t equals λt(Kt
∗ – Kt). As gross investment It equals replacement investment 
plus net investment, then gross investment can be shown as: 
 
(3.2) I = λt(Kt
∗ – Kt) + δKt-1. 
 
The gap between Kt and Kt
∗ would be closed within one time period if λt is one, whereas if λt is 
zero then there would be no net investment to reduce this gap. 
 
3.2.2. THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE OF INVESTMENT 
In 1917, Clark introduced the acceleration principle in an attempt to study the formulation of the 
link between the demand for products and the demand for the means of production both in 
quantity and in time. He stated that the demand for expanding the means of production depends 
on the acceleration of the demand and not on the volume of the demand for the finished product; 
therefore, the demand for equipment may decline, even though the demand for the finished 
product might be still increasing. In its simplest form, ‘the principle states that percentage 
changes in the production of consumers’ goods are equal to percentage changes in the stock of 
capital goods’ (Tinbergen, 1938, p.165). Thus, actual capital is equal to desired capital, Kt – Kt-1 
= Kt
∗ – Kt−1
∗ , and the optimal capital stock is a fixed proportion of output (Jorgenson, 1971, 
p.1111). This can be represented as follows: 
 
(3.3) Kt
∗ = μYt 
 
where Yt is output at time t and μ is the fixed capital-output ratio. Consequently, net investment 
denoted by Int equals: 
 
(3.4) Int = Kt – Kt-1 = μ(Yt – Yt-1). 
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The acceleration principle can answer the question of how much additional capacity will be 
needed when output increases.21 But it assumes that total capacity is always optimal for the 
current output, and that there is an immediate adjustment of the stock of fixed capital goods to 
current output (Koyck, 1954, p.46). This assumption is the major limit of the principle in 
explaining short-run fluctuations in investment as in reality there is sometimes too much or too 
little capacity.  
 
Tinbergen (1938) argues that there are further limiting conditions for the validity of the 
acceleration principle. Firstly, ‘very strong decreases in consumers’ goods production (i.e. 
output) must not occur’ (ibid, p.165). This is because further to the principle this would result in 
a corresponding disinvestment which can only occur to the extent of the replacement 
investment. To put it simply, once machines are made, they cannot be unmade at will. When 
output decreases, excess capacity may arise. An increase in demand and in output later on will 
not lead to an expansion of capacity needed if there is excess capacity available. Secondly, 
‘there should be no abrupt changes in technique leading to a sudden increase in the amount of 
capital goods necessary to the production of one unit of consumers’ goods’ (ibid, p.165).  
 
The acceleration principle has two aspects: the correlation aspect and the regression aspect. The 
former states that new investments in durable capital goods and in consumers’ goods production 
are correlated. The latter states that percentage changes in consumers’ goods production and in 
the stock of capital goods are equal. Tinbergen (ibid) proposes amendments to the accelerator 
model. He states that instead of the assumption of equality between percentage changes in the 
production of consumers’ goods and the stock of capital goods, there may only be a proportional 
or linear relationship between them, implying that there will still be correlation but the 
regression coefficient would be smaller than one. This is because during a period of increasing 
production, not all firms reach the point of full capacity simultaneously. Even if idle capacity 
exists, a firm would increase its plant proportionally (but not equally) to the increase in 
consumers' goods production. This implies that there would not be an immediate need for 
investment; but, investment would mainly depend on the rate of increase in the production of 
consumers’ goods. The accelerator theory was later on developed by Chenery (1952) and Koyck 
(1954) who originated the flexible accelerator theory as an alternative to Clark’s model. This 
                                                          
21 Here, finished products, consumers’ goods, and output are used interchangeably.  
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model focused on the time pattern of investment behavior (Jorgenson and Siebert, 1968, p.681). 
Chenery (1952, p.13) and Koyck (1954, p.74) analyzed the structure of the investment process 
and argued that the desired level of capital is determined by long-run considerations, so that 
changes in desired capital are transformed into actual investment expenditures by a geometric 
distributed lag function. In their model, capital is adjusted toward its desired level by a constant 
proportion of the gap between desired and actual capital in each period. By setting the partial 
adjustment coefficient λt equal to λ for all t (λt = λ), net investment can be specified as follows:  
 
(3.5) Int = λ(Kt
∗ – Kt). 
 
Accordingly, substitution of equation (3.3) into equation (3.5) gives:  
 
(3.6) Int = (Kt – Kt-1) = μλ(Yt – Yt-1). 
 
Then, based on the assumption of a constant rate of depreciation (δ), gross investment can be 
defined as: 
 
(3.7) It = Kt – (1 – δ)Kt-1 = μλYt + (δ – λ)Kt-1. 
 
In Koyck’s (1954, pp.48-73) investment model, the supply of capital to a firm is constrained in a 
given time and has consequences for the capacity-output problem. Also, the number of finance 
opportunities that a firm is confronted with is quantitatively limited. The rising supply of funds 
makes long-run marginal unit costs, beyond a certain point, an increasing function of the 
number of new machines purchased in a given time. When output increases to a sufficiently 
high level, the scarcity of funds would reduce the purchase of new machines and also the 
scrapping of old machines, to make the rising part of the long-run marginal cost effective. So, 
the capacity-output ratio will be lower than would be the case if the supply of funds were 
perfectly elastic.  
 
Koyck further argues that the response of capacity to output during favorable and unfavorable 
conditions is asymmetric due to the cyclical fluctuations in demand since firms’ expectations, 
and thus their investment planning, are affected by uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty with respect to 
the firm’s future sales). If available capacity is optimal for the current output, an increase in 
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sales would be followed by a lagged adjustment of capacity due to the uncertainty associated 
with the possibility that the increase in sales can be temporary. The incentive to adjust capacity 
would become stronger if high levels of sales continue. At the beginning of the fall in output, 
there will generally be firms for which the available capacity is still below the optimum level for 
the current output due to the lagged adjustment in the boom. When the decrease in output 
continues, capacity expansion will decline. Thus, excess capacity arises with available capacity 
being higher than optimal for the current output.  
 
The flexible accelerator theory addresses the limiting assumption of the naïve accelerator theory 
(i.e. capital stock is always optimally adjusted) by assuming that the level of desired capital is 
proportional to output. Problematically, although the flexible accelerator models relate 
investment to a fixed capital-output ratio, they do not take into consideration other determinants 
of investment such as factor prices. Therefore, they are not adequate to study the effects of other 
(market-based) economic determinants of investment as it is one of the objectives of this study. 
This drawback is taken care of in the neoclassical theory of investment which is the subject of 
Section 3.2.5.   
 
3.2.3. CASH FLOW MODEL OF INVESTMENT  
As discussed earlier, in the empirical studies of Chenery and Koyck, the level of desired capital 
is assumed to be proportional to output. An alternative theory of investment is that investment 
depends on the level of profits. This theory of investment was first proposed by Tinbergen 
(1938) who argued that actual profits measure expected profits, and that investment is driven by 
profits expectations. Cash flows, often measured by profits after taxes plus depreciation 
allowances less dividend payments to shareholders, is a variable commonly used to measure 
available funds and may account for a substantial portion of firms’ sources of funding for fixed 
investment. The cash flow model states that investment is proportional to internal cash flows. 
Since the supply of internal funds is affected by the current levels of profits, the desired capital 
stock Kt
∗ should be made dependent not on the level of output, but on variables which capture 
the level of profits or expected profits. The use of profits as a determinant of desired capital, 
however, has been challenged by Grunfeld (1960), who added lagged profits into a flexible 
accelerator model and found that, given capital stock, the partial correlation of profits and 
investment is not significant (ibid, p.219). He argued that this is because profits are just another 
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measure for the capital stock of a firm. Grunfeld (ibid) proposed that discounted future earnings 
less the costs of future additions to capital offer a more suitable measure of expected profits than 
current realized profits. In his model, desired capital is proportional to the market value of the 
firm's outstanding securities as follows:  
 
(3.8) Kt
∗ = α + βVt, 
 
where Vt is the market value of the firm and β is its associated coefficient. In his empirical 
studies, Grunfeld found that the partial correlation between the value of the firm and investment 
is significant (ibid, p.233).  
 
Similar to the accelerator models of investment, the cash flow models are restrictive as they do 
not allow for substitution of production factors to play a role. This shortcoming has been 
overcome in the neoclassical investment theory. However, the cash flow models allow 
controlling for the importance of capital market imperfections and financial constraints for 
investment. In practice, often investment models are augmented with various measures that may 
proxy for financial constraints. Therefore, the principles of the cash flow models appear relevant 
for the case of oil-rich and -based economies. This is because, in these economies, capital 
markets are imperfect and investment practices are expected to be constrained to the extent that 
oil income, as a key source of finance for investment, is available.  
 
3.2.4. TOBIN’S q MODEL OF INVESTMENT 
Tobin (1969) generalizes the cash flow model and provides a framework for an investment 
model in which net investment is an increasing function of marginal q, which is the ratio of the 
market value of an additional unit of capital to its replacement cost. Tobin’s q theory formalizes 
a notion of Keynes (1936, p.151) that the incentive to construct new capital depends on the 
market value of the capital in relation to the cost of building the capital. If an additional unit of 
installed capital adds to the market value of the firm by more than the cost of obtaining and 
placing the capital, a profit maximizing firm will obtain and put it in place.22 In empirical work, 
however, average q (the ratio of the market value of existing capital to its replacement cost) is 
                                                          
22 Yoshikawa (1980) emphasizes the importance of adjustment costs in the q theory and argues that the effective 
price, which is the price after taking into account the adjustment costs, increases as investment increases. 
 63 
 
often used as an instrumental variable for marginal q. However, average q and marginal q may 
differ.23 Abel (1990) distinguishes the marginal q from the average q. If qt
A is defined to be the 
ratio of the average value of the existing capital stock (V/K)t to the fixed price of a unit of 
capital ct, average q at time t is as follows:  
 
(3.9) qt
A = (V/K)t/ct, 
 
where Vt is the market value of the firm. Marginal q, however, is the ratio of the marginal value 
of an additional unit of installed capital dV/dK to the price of a unit of capital ct as follows: 
 
(3.10) qt
M = (dV/dK)t/ct,  
 
where qt
M is the marginal q. Hayashi (1982, p. 214) states that marginal q and average q are 
equal if a firm is price-taker with constant returns to scale in production and installation. 
Besides, the empirical measurement of average q requires data on prices and outstanding shares 
and thus prevents the inclusion of private and smaller firms in the sample (Perfect and Wiles, 
1994). If a firm is price-maker, then average q will be greater than marginal q by monopoly rent.  
 
Blanchard, et al., (1993, p.116) identified three reasons for the potential different movements in 
marginal and average q: i) managers may have more information than the market; ii) even if 
information sets are the same, the market valuation may consist of a speculative bubble due to 
future price expectations; and iii) the market can be subject to fads leading to the deviation of 
the market valuation from fundamentals for long periods of time.24 The theory underlying 
Tobin’s q is closely related to the neoclassical investment model. Managers determine the price 
they are willing to pay for an investment project (i.e. the demand price for an asset) on the basis 
of expected profitability. The demand price for an entire firm is the market value of all of its 
                                                          
23 ‘For example, consider a firm that has a large amount of energy-intensive capital. If the price of energy rises 
dramatically, then the value of the firm would fall as the quasi-rents available on existing energy-intensive capital 
would fall. However, the firm may undertake substantial investment in energy-saving capital. Therefore, an 
observer of this firm would see a drop in average q coinciding with an increase in investment. This example makes 
clear that heterogeneity of capital can potentially destroy the relation between average q and investment. As for 
marginal q, it is important to distinguish the marginal q, or shadow price, for the different types of capital. In the 
example above, the marginal q of energy-intensive capital is reduced and the marginal q of energy-saving capital is 
increased by the rise in the price of energy’ (Abel, 1990, p. 766). 
24 Fads are mean-reverting deviations from intrinsic value caused by psychological or social forces (Camerer, 
1989). 
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securities. The cost of producing all new capital goods is the supply price and is typically 
measured by assessing the replacement costs of a firm’s assets. In equilibrium, the demand and 
supply prices for fixed investment must be equal. If the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the replacement value of its assets is unity, then there would be no incentive for the firm to 
invest. 
  
In practice, investment equations based on Tobin’s q have shortcomings. Generally, ‘estimated 
equations relating investment to Tobin’s q leave a large unexplained serially correlated residual’ 
(Abel, 1990, p.766). There are also measurement problems associated with these models such as 
valuation of the outstanding debt obligations of the firms (the nominator of q) and measuring the 
replacement value of the firm’s assets (the denominator of q). Also, what can usually be 
observed is average q, and consequently in empirical work, the average q rather than marginal q 
is often used. These measurement problems make the use of the q models particularly unsuitable 
for estimating investment behavior at aggregate level, and therefore these models are not 
explored any further.  
 
3.2.5. THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL: THE JORGENSONIAN APPROACH 
Under conditions of perfect certainty, which is the assumption based on which most of the 
classical theories have been developed, the cost of capital is the market rate of interest. Keynes 
(1936) explains a theory of investment which involves the construction of the marginal 
efficiency of capital (MEK). In his theory, Keynes defines the prospective yield of investment as 
a series of annual returns which are expected to be gained from selling output minus the running 
costs of obtaining that output during the asset’s life time of t years. Keynes calls the relation 
between the prospective yield of one more unit of capital and the cost of producing that unit (or 
the supply price), the marginal efficiency of capital. The MEK is ‘equal to that rate of discount 
which would make the present value of the series of annuities, given by the returns expected 
from the capital-asset during its life, just equal to its supply price’ (ibid, p.135).  
 
Keynes’ theory of investment has been criticized on the basis of the differences between the 
theory of capital and the theory of investment. The former seeks to explain the determinants of 
desired capital stock, whereas the latter seeks to explain the rate of adjustment when capital 
stock differs from its optimal level. The accelerator model of investment is also limiting because 
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it assumes a fixed capital-output ratio, implying that the substitution between factors of 
production such as capital and labor are constrained to zero. Likewise, in the cash flow models, 
no role for substitution of production factors is allowed and optimal capital stock is only 
affected by internal cash flows. In contrast, the Jorgensonian neoclassical model of investment 
allows for input substitution as a key element of cost and production, and therefore is commonly 
referenced in the area of neoclassical theory of domestic investment.  
 
The basis of Jorgenson’s approach (1963, p.248) is the neoclassical theory of desired capital 
accumulation and is based on an explicit model of optimization behavior, relating the desired 
level of capital stock to output, interest rates, capital prices and tax policies. Jorgenson defines 
the user cost of capital as the cost which a firm incurs as a consequence of owning an asset and 
the user cost of capital transforms the acquisition price of an asset into an appropriate rental 
price, which depends on the rate of return and depreciation. The rate of return is the opportunity 
cost of holding capital goods rather than financial assets. Depreciation arises from the decline in 
the price of capital goods with age. In Jorgenson’s model, the demand for capital stock follows 
from maximizing net worth, which is the amount that a buyer is willing to pay for the firm and 
is defined as the sum of the net present value of the future streams of profits from time zero. 
Constrained by a neoclassical production function, Yt = f(K, L)t, the optimization problem is: 
 
(3.11) maxK,L,I = ∫ exp
∞
0
(-Rt)[ptf(K, L)t – wtLt – qtIt]dt, with Rt = ∫ r
1
0 s
ds, 
 
where rs is the real rate of interest at time s, Rt is the discount rate at itme t, It is gross investment 
at time t, pt is the price of output at time t, and wt and qt are the prices of input factors at time t. 
All prices, including the interest rate, are taken as fixed and the firm is a price-taker as 
Jorgenson assumes a perfectly competitive market. At each point in time, the firm must choose 
Kt, Lt and It to maximize the net worth of the firm (equation 3.9). In this setting, It and Kt are 
related through capital accumulation identity presented in equation (3.1). Under certainty 
assumption regarding input and output prices, this model reduces to its static form and 
postulates that the firm aims at maximizing its profits at each period within the following one-
period-optimization problem (Nickell, 1978):  
 
(3.12) maxK,L = πt (Yt, Kt, Lt, pt, ct, wt) = ptYt – [wtLt + ctKt], 
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where ct is the user cost of capital at time t and is introduced by Jorgenson as an implicit rental 
price for capital services supplied by the firm to itself as:  
 
(3.13) ct = pt[(1 – hv/1 – h)δ]t + [(1 – hm/1 – h)r]t,  
 
where ht is the rate of taxation of net income, vt is the proportion of replacement investment 
chargeable against income for tax purposes and mt is the proportion of interest deductible from 
income. Under the profit-maximization condition stated above, the necessary conditions for 
optimality of capital can be obtained by employing the Lagrangian multiplier procedures as 
follows: 
 
(3.14) pt . 
∂Yt
∂Kt
 = ct   
∂Yt
∂Kt
 = MPKt = 
ct
pt
, and for labor as: 
 
 (3.15) pt . 
∂Yt
∂Lt
 = wt   
∂Yt
∂Lt
 = MPLt = 
wt
pt
,  
 
where MPKt and MPLt respectively denote the marginal productivities of capital and labor. 
Equation (3.14) forms the basis of the neoclassical theory of investment. Based on the 
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function with elasticity of output with respect to 
capital α, the desired capital stock Kt
∗ resulting from the optimization problem is:  
 
(3.16) Kt
∗ = αYt(p/c)t. 
 
This shows that there is an inverse relationship between the desired capital stock and the user 
cost of capital; consequently, investment is inversely related to the rate of interest for any given 
change in desired capital stock depending on the rate at which the adjustment process develops.  
 
It must be noted that, the Jorgensonian model is not a dynamic model since its optimality 
conditions only include variables in the current period due to the absence of adjustment costs. 
This implies that capital stock can be adjusted without incurring costs at each point in time. A 
drawback of disregarding adjustment costs for capital is that firms can jump immediately to the 
desired capital stock. To address the latter short-coming, Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) 
employed a distributed lag function to study the time structure of investment behavior, taking 
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the flexible accelerator model as a point of departure. They incorporated a model of 
replacement, where net investment is equal to total investment minus replacement, to derive the 
following investment function:   
 
(3.17) It = ∑ αω∞τ=0 t(Yp/c)t-τ + δKt-τ,  
 
where ωt denotes the share of the orders that takes t periods to be delivered. In this model, they 
assumed that replacement is proportional to capital stock and the time pattern of investment 
behavior is the average lags between the changes in desired capital and actual expenditure.  
 
Table 3.1 surveys the empirical studies on investment motivated by the conventional theories of 
investment reviewed above. At large, models of investment behavior differ in terms of their 
determinants and can be categorized as: i) capacity utilization, represented by the level of and 
changes in real output, the output-capacity ratio, and changes in sales; ii) internal funds, 
measured by cash flows (or profits); and iii) external finance measured by interest rates, the 
market value of firms and stock prices. Changes in desired capital are then translated into 
investment expenditure to provide an explanation for net investment. The time structure of the 
investment process also matters. In earlier studies, distributed lag functions were used to account 
for the time needed for the completion of investment projects. One ambiguity that arises from 
the above discussion concerns whether cash flow has an impact on the desired level of capital 
stock or whether it operates through influencing the speed at which actual capital adjusts 
towards its desired level. If cash flow affects the adjustment speed, then λ becomes endogenous 
and varies with time. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of alternative investment models 
Authors Data and Time Period Econometric Model of Investment Findings 
Eisner 
(1962) 
Quarterly data on US total 
durables and total non-durables 
manufacturing industries during 
1948-1960 
It = β0 + β1ΔSALt-1 + β2ΔSALt-2 + β3Δπt-1 + 
β4Δπt-2 + β5It-1 + εt 
The results, employing a modified Koyck distributed lag model, 
indicate that investment is mainly determined by expected profits, 
and that expected profits are explained by past sales changes 
Bourneuf 
(1964) 
Annual data on US total 
manufacturing and thirteen 
individual industries during 1950-
1961 
It = β0 + β1(uAt-1 – Yt-1) + β2ub,t + β3ΔYt + εt1 
 
The results show that for total manufacturing, investment in current 
year is explained by excess capacity in the last year, total capacity 
at the beginning of the year and the changes in output in the current 
year; for individual industries, the fluctuating output growth rates 
lower investment and investment-output ratios25 
Evan 
(1967) 
Quarterly data on thirteen US 
industries in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sectors during 
1949-1963 
It = β0 + β1ut-1 + β2SALt-5 + β3Kt-5 + β4CFt-5 + 
β5 rt-5 
 
The results show that interest rates and cash flows are important 
determinants of investment for non-manufacturing and 
manufacturing sectors, respectively26 
Jorgenson 
and 
Stephenson 
(1969) 
Quarterly data on US 
manufacturing industry and sub-
groups of total durables, total non-
durables and total manufacturing 
during 1949-1960 
It = β0 + β1Δ(PY/c)t-4 + β2Δ(PY/c)t-5 + 
β3Δ(PY/c)t-6 + β4Δ(PY/c)t-7 + β5(I – δK)t-1 + 
β6(I – δK)t-2 + β7Kt + εt 
The results, based on a distributed lag function, support a 
relationship between investment expenditures and economic 
policies, namely taxation and the cost of capital27 
Blanchard, 
et al., 
(1993) 
Aggregate US firm-level data 
during 1900-1990 
(1) Δln(I/K)t = β0 + β1(L)Δln(qt
A) + 
β2(L)Δln(qt
M) + εt; (2) Δln(I/K)t = β3 + β4 
(L)Δln(qt
A) + β5(L)Δln(πt) + εt  
The results suggest that both qA and qM are significant determinants 
of investment, but the elasticity of investment with respect to qM is 
greater 
Notes: I is gross investment; K is the actual level of capital; P is the price of output; c is the price of a unit of capital; Y is output; qA is the average q and qM is the marginal q; r is 
the rate of real interest; and SAL is real sales. uA and ub are the average capacity and the capacity at the beginning of the year, respectively; CF is cash flows; π is profits; and (L) 
is the lag polynomial. Subscript t represents the time period, and subscripts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 indicate that variables are lagged for one, two, four, five, six and seven periods. βs 
are unknown parameters; Δ and ln indicate changes and natural logarithm, respectively; and ε is an independently and identically distributed error term. 
                                                          
25 Weight of first value of output is arbitrary and the remaining weights decline geometrically. 
26 The lag structure follows the actual planning periods and various financial variables based on industry differences. 
27 The distributed lag function is: It – δKt = β0(K*t – K*t-1) + β1(K*t-1 – K*t-2) + … + βm(K*t-m – K*t-m-1) – θ1(It-1 – δKt-1) – … – θn(It-n – δKt-n) + εt, where δ is the depreciation rate. 
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For the case of firm level investment behavior, as proposed by Jorgenson, it is sensible to 
assume that firms are profit maximizers, and that relative factor prices, current and expected 
levels of demand as well as taxation imposed on business income influence the current level of 
investment. These are all important determinants of a firm’s investment and therefore the 
Jorgenson’s model has been regularly referred to in empirical work. However, some of the 
assumptions of the neoclassical theory of investment are restrictive. For instance, the theory 
assumes a perfect capital market, perfect certainty regarding the future profitability, and that 
demands for capital and labor are functions of current prices. Hence, it is assumed that future 
expectations do not influence the present since capital stock can be costlessly and 
instantaneously adjusted in the future. Yet, these assumptions do not hold completely if the 
firms have different expectations or are uncertain about the future values of investment 
determinants. This poses a question as how well the Jorgensonian neoclassical theory of 
investment holds in the context of imperfect, partial-market or resource-based economies, which 
is of interest for this study.  
 
3.2.6. INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTION 
This section reviews the literature on the sources of capital market imperfections and explains 
how they may affect investment. This body of literature is of relevance for the case of resource-
rich and resource-dependent economies like Iran as markets in these economies tend to be 
imperfect. This is because, often due to the central role the state in these economies, the 
allocation of financial resources to various economic sectors could be preferential and 
determined by some non-market factors. Hence, it could be expected that some of the market-
based determinants of investment not to be fully relevant in the context of partial-market, 
resource-abundant and -reliant economies like Iran. It is therefore of interest for this thesis to 
investigate the extent of applicability of the conventional investment theories in such context.  
 
At large, investment can be financed with external funds or internal funds. In the neoclassical 
models of investment, no wedge exists between these costs of funds. However, from a 
microeconomic standpoint, due to information asymmetry or agency problems, the use of 
external funds may generate additional costs. Asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders thus results in the creation of a gap between the cost of internal and external financing. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, cyclical movements in investment appear too large to be 
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explained by market indicators of expected future profitability of the user cost of capital. 
Therefore, a body of literature identifies financial factors in intensification of initial shocks by 
financial market imperfections in the economy (Bernanke, et al., 1996).  
 
Neoclassical models assume that agents have full information on the characteristics of goods 
and services. In practice, however, asymmetric information often exists where one agent has 
better information on the characteristics of a good or an investment project than the other agent. 
This problem is particularly important to credit relationships since it can lead to adverse 
selection and moral hazard.28 In credit markets, the former refers to a situation in which an 
increase in interest rates may result in a less favorable composition of loan applicants. This is 
because those borrowers who are willing to pay higher interest rates are usually risk lovers. The 
latter states a situation in which two parties agree on a contract, but one party takes hidden 
actions afterwards to enhance its welfare at the expense of the uninformed agent. Information 
asymmetries may lead to credit rationing, implying that a borrower’s demand for credit may be 
turned down. The literature identifies two types of credit rationing (Keeton, 1979). The first 
type, known as redlining, explains a situation in which an agent cannot borrow the amount he 
wants to borrow at the existing interest rate, and therefore is entirely or partially excluded from 
borrowing. The second type takes place when only some agents from an identical group are able 
to borrow.29  
 
In his Separation Theorem, Fisher (1930) states that in an economy without uncertainty, a firm 
should determine its production plan in such a way as to maximize the present discounted value 
of its profit stream. This implies that a firm’s objective function is independent of the 
preferences of the owner and his financing decision. Modigliani and Miller (1958) extend the 
Separation Theorem to a setting with uncertainty and show that the market value of a firm 
depends only on its profit streams and is invariant to its financial policy and capital structure. 
Their basic argument is that when the profit flow is given, a change in a firm’s financial policy 
                                                          
28 Moral hazard is also known as adverse incentive and the principal agent problem. 
29 A firm can finance its investment by issuing either equity or debt. The former refers to ownership in a firm and 
an equity-holder receives an uncertain share of the future profit stream of the firm, while the latter refers to a fixed 
payment to the lender. A debt contract has limited liability, such that if the earnings of a firm are not sufficient to 
cover the debt payments, debt will not be fully repaid. Since the return characteristics of equity and debt are 
different, one would expect an optimal level of the leverage ratio (i.e. debt to equity ratio) which would maximize 
the value of the firm. However, the literature on neoclassical models shows that this is not necessarily the case. 
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remains unchanged due to arbitrage.30 Overall, the theoretical models of capital market 
imperfections commonly argue that the risky nature of borrowers’ investment projects results in 
a gap between the cost of internal and external financing, and that for many firms, external 
financing is more costly than internal financing. There are two main types of empirical models 
on the investment-capital market imperfection relationship including reduced form accelerator 
type or q investment models and structural investment models based on the Euler equation.  
 
Most of the empirical studies on capital market imperfections and corporate investment employ 
the reduced form investment models (i.e. by identifying particular relationships between 
variables) including the accelerator type investment models, the q model of investment, or a 
combination of these models. The basic determinant of investment behavior in the accelerator 
type models is the changes in total expected sales. A positive relationship between investment 
and the sales variables implies that investment decisions are based on observed patterns of past 
demand for final output. The q theory of investment states that all variations in investment are 
related to q and that an increase in q should affect investment positively. To study the effects of 
capital market imperfections on investment, the variables that may represent financial 
constraints are added to the reduced form investment models. The commonly included variables 
are internal funds based on the notion that investments are sensitive to internal funds only if 
there are financial constraints. Since most firms are prone to be financially constrained, 
investment is expected to be sensitive to cash flows for most firms. Following Fazzari, et al., 
(1988), firms are often divided into sub-samples for which the extent of financial constraints is 
expected to be different. Then, the investment-cash flow sensitivity of the different sub-samples 
is compared to examine whether different types of firms face more financial constraints. A 
greater investment-cash flow sensitivity indicates a more severe capital market constraint. The 
investment equation estimated frequently in the accelerator type models of investment is as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
30 In the modern neoclassical theory of finance, three pillars of arbitrage, optimality and equilibrium are usually 
mentioned. Arbitrage explains that, in the absence of any restrictions, the same good or asset has to have the same 
price in each period. Optimality states that rational investors strive for optimal returns. Equilibrium refers to the 
neoclassical notion that markets clear by price adjustment at each moment in time. If markets are complete, the 
present value of investment projects is well-defined, and all shareholders agree that the firm should take the 
investment decision that maximizes the value of the firm. However, where markets are incomplete, the present 
value prices are not unique and the market alone does not offer a well-defied signal for the value of investment 
(Lensink, et al., 2001, p.8). 
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(3.18) (I/K)t = β0 + β1(ΔSAL/K)t + β2(CF/K)t + εt, 
 
where SALt is real sales and CFt is internal cash flow. To avoid heteroskedasticity, the variables 
are usually scaled by capital stock Kt, where the investment part of the process involves the term 
β0Kt. In the absence of capital market imperfections, parameter β2 is zero and a higher value for 
β2 indicates that firms are more financially constrained. The above relationship is, nevertheless, 
criticized because the measures of internal funds may also proxy for the profitability of 
investment and accordingly a positive relationship between internal funds and investment can be 
expected (Hoshi, et al., 1991, p.43). This may cause problems particularly when the cash flow 
coefficients are being interpreted in terms of the extent to which they reflect capital market 
imperfections. Due to this criticism, Fazzari, et al., (1988) estimated the following alternative 
Tobin’s q model, employing an a priori classification of firms based on their dividend pay-out 
for a panel of 421 US firms during 1970-1984 and found significant estimates of β2, indicating 
high investment-cash flow sensitivity: 
 
 (3.19) (I/K)t = β0 + β1qt + β2(CF/K)t + εt. 
 
A number of issues require attention in reduced form investment models. Firstly, a priori 
classification of firms in different sub-samples appears to be important in obtaining external 
funds. For instance, firms that belong to a business conglomerate generally have less difficulty 
in obtaining external funds because a close relationship often exists between firms and banks 
within their conglomerates. Also, younger firms tend to face more capital market constraints 
because they are less able to communicate information with private banks. This is because banks 
may not have enough time to learn about the younger firms’ creditworthiness (Chirinko and 
Schaller, 1995). Moreover, it is often assumed that smaller firms confront more capital market 
imperfections since information gathering by banks has the characteristics of a fixed cost. Also 
because the volume of lending to small firms is generally lower than that to large firms, the 
relative costs of monitoring and screening are higher per unit of capital.31 Table 3.2 gives an 
overview of a selected number of key empirical studies of the investment-capital market 
imperfections relationship. 
                                                          
31 The use of the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints is challenged by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) who argue that comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivities across sub-samples of firms 
corresponds to looking at differences in dI/dF; thus this approach is only useful if the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow (dI/dF) decreases when a firm’s availability of internal liquidity increases, i.e. d2I/dF2 should be negative. 
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Table 3.2 Empirical Euler equation models 
Author(s) Data and Time Period Econometric Model of 
Investment 
Findings 
Whited 
(1992) 
Annual data on 325 US 
manufacturing firms 
during 1972-1986 
Shadow value of investment = 
β0 + β1DARit + β2DAR2it + 
β3COVit + β4COV2it 
The results, employing GMM, indicate that the mean and median values of the debt-
assets ratio and the interest coverage ratio are higher for the firms without bond ratings; 
debt growth is negative for the firms without bond ratings and positive for the firms with 
bond ratings; smaller firms are more credit rationed 
Bond and 
Meghir 
(1994) 
Annual data on 626 UK 
manufacturing firms 
during 1968-1986 
(I/K)it = β1(I/K)i,t-1 + β2(I/K)2i,t-1 
+ β3(CF/K)i,t-1 + β4(Y/K)i,t-1 + 
β5(D/K)2i,t-1 + ηi + υt + εit 
Their findings, employing GMM, show that investment is sensitive to the measure of 
cash flows when the investment model is estimated using the full sample of companies; 
measures of dividend payments and new share issues are significant when added to the 
basic specification  
Hubbard, et 
al., (1995) 
Data on 428 US 
manufacturing firms 
during 1976-1987 
(Iit/Ki,t-1) = β0  + β1(CFit/Ki,t-1) + 
β2(Yit/Ki,t-1)  + β3DARit + 
β4COVit +  ηi + υt + εit 
The findings, using GMM, indicate that capital market imperfections significantly and 
negatively affect firms’ investment decisions for firms with low dividend pay-outs 
Love (2001) Data on 7,000 firms in a 
total of 40 developed-and 
less-developed countries 
during 1988-1998 
(I/K)it = β1(I/K)i,t+1 + β2(I/K)i,t-1 
+ β3(SAL/K)it + β4CFi,t-1 + 
β5CFi,t-1FD + ηi + υt + εit (K is 
the capital stock at the 
beginning of the period) 
The results, using GMM, indicate that financing constraints, measured by the sensitivity 
of investment to the availability of internal funds, are significantly and negatively related 
to financial development even after controlling for firms’ size and the country’s business 
cycles; small firms are disproportionately more disadvantaged in less financially 
developed countries than large firms 
Harrison, et 
al., (2004) 
Data on 7,000 large 
publicly-traded firms in 38 
developed- and less-
developed countries during 
1988-1998 
(I/K)it = β1(I/K)i,t+1 + β2(I/K)i,t-1 
+ β3(SAL/K)it + β4CFi,t-1 + 
β5CFi,t-1FDIc+ β6FDIct + ηi + υt + 
εit (K here is the beginning 
period capital) 
The findings, employing GMM, indicate that FDI is associated with a reduction in 
financing constraints and less sensitivity of investment to cash flows for firms without 
foreign assets and for domestically-owned enterprises; restrictions on capital account 
transactions, which is one type of capital control, negatively affect firms’ financing 
constraints; these effects are stronger in low-income countries 
Poncet, et al., 
(2010) 
Data on contact 
information, activities, and 
ownership of 20,000 
Chinese firms during 
1998-2005 
(I/K)it = β1(I/K)i,t-1 + β2(L/K)it + 
β3(ΔREV/K)it + β4(CF/K)i,t-1 + 
ηi + εit 
The results, using OLS-IV, indicate that Chinese private firms are credit constrained 
while state-owned firms and foreign-owned firms in China are not; the geographical and 
sectoral presence of foreign capital alleviates credit constraints faced by the Chinese 
private firms 
Notes: Cash refers to cash plus equivalents scaled by total assets; CF is cash flows; COV is the ratio of the firm's interest expense to the sum of interest expense plus cash flow or 
the interest coverage ratio; D is debt; DAR is the ratio of the market value of a firm's debt to the market value of its total assets; FD is a country-level index of financial 
development and is equal to the sum of the standardized indices of the stock market and financial intermediaries development; FDI is foreign direct investment; I is gross 
investment; L is the number of employees; Y is output; SAL is real sales; and REV is revenues. Subscript t, c and i represent the time period, the country, and the firm, 
respectively. η is fixed effects; υ is time effects; and ε is an independently and identically distributed error term. GMM, IV and OLS stand for Generalized Method of 
Movements, Instrumental Variables, and Ordinary Least Squares, respectively. 
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The issues related to the reduced form models of investment can to some extent be avoided by 
employing a structural model approach and by directly estimating the Euler equation. The Euler 
approach is often used in intertemporal investment modelling. The intuition behind this 
approach is that intertemporal optimization yields optimality conditions for adjacent periods, so 
that the marginal cost of investing in the current period is equal to the discounted marginal cost 
of postponing investment until the next period. The Euler approach has advantages and 
disadvantages. For instance, this model explicitly takes into account dynamics, and since 
investment models are dynamic models, this is a desired property. Like the q models, the sample 
can be divided into sub-samples of firms using several criteria. The model is a structural model, 
in which structural parameters, i.e. the policy variant parameters, are estimated directly. 
However, similar to the q models, Euler equation models are restrictive as they require 
assumptions concerning adjustment costs and technology. Also, Euler model estimates are 
sensitive to specifications and tend to be poor for small samples. Therefore, this approach is not 
considered any further for the current study.  
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3.3. INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Investment behavior in resource-rich and -based economies such as Iran could be distorted as 
the availability of oil income as an important source of financing investment is subject to 
uncertainty due to the unpredictable nature of oil prices and thus oil revenues. Therefore, the 
predictions of the conventional investment theories, which assume certainty, may be only partly 
relevant for the case of these economies.  
 
A growing theoretical literature focuses attention on the impact of uncertainty on investment and 
suggests that the impact may be large. This is because conventional investment models failed to 
consider three major issues in determining most investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, 
p.3). Firstly, most investment decisions face inherent uncertainty about future benefits and costs 
from investing. Secondly, investors can control the timing of their investment, thereby waiting 
for relevant information that may reduce uncertainty. Thirdly, investment is partially or 
completely irreversible, implying that the initial cost of investment is at least partially sunk and 
cannot be recovered if market conditions turn out to be worse than expected.  
 
The basic intuition behind the effects of uncertainty on investment stems from the option 
characteristics of an investment project, suggesting that greater uncertainty raises the value of 
the option to wait due to the existence of irreversibility effects. The general finding is that 
heightened uncertainty lowers investment rates, both at aggregate and disaggregates levels 
(Bernanke, 1983; Caballero, 1991; McDonald and Siegel, 1986, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For 
instance, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) examine how option theory helps to understand investment 
behavior when investors face uncertainty about future prices and returns, and when their 
investment decisions are irreversible. They argue that there exists an option value to postpone 
investment decisions in order to wait for the arrival of new information about market conditions. 
The existence of this option to wait drives a wedge between the conventional net present value 
calculation of the current value of an investment project and the current value of the project to 
the investor. For an investment to be made at a given point in time, its net present value must be 
adequately larger than zero to keep the investment option alive. This contrasts with the views of 
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) who show that, under certain conditions, an increase in 
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uncertainty may also give rise to the value of a marginal unit of capital and hence the incentives 
to invest.32  
 
A number of problems, nevertheless, arise in the literature. For example, the option-based 
models of irreversible investment under uncertainty attempt to identify the factors which might 
affect the threshold at or above which investment is undertaken and not the investment level per 
se. Moreover, Bloom (2000) and Bloom, et al., (2007) argue that the real option effects of 
uncertainty affect investment in the short-run, but it does not have any impact on investment in 
the long-run because these effects on the rate of investment and the rate of disinvestment exactly 
cancel out in the long-run. Consequently, the option theory seems unsuitable for investigating 
the relationship between investment and uncertainty in the long-run and therefore this approach 
is not explored any further in this thesis.  
 
Another point concerns aggregation. Uncertainty elements affecting firms’ investment decision-
making may be submerged in the dynamic specification (timing of investment) in aggregate 
time-series empirical studies. Therefore, the quest to find good measures of aggregate 
uncertainty may be an elusive one. In other words, uncertainty may well be an important 
determinant of investment. But in aggregate empirical models, attempts to find a role for explicit 
proxies may be fruitless because the effects of uncertainty may already be embedded in the 
modelling of investment dynamics. Bernanke (1983), however, makes two arguments for why 
the effects of uncertainty would not disappear at the aggregate level. Firstly, macroeconomic 
factors, such as uncertainty about future interest, exchange and inflation rates or shocks in 
monetary, fiscal or regulatory policy regimes, may be important in determining firm-level 
decisions. Secondly, if a firm is uncertain about whether a shock is transitory or permanent, it 
may delay investment decisions in order to learn more about its degree of permanence. 
                                                          
32 Abel-Hartman models assume a perfectly competitive risk neutral firm with constant returns to scale production 
function and convex adjustment costs. Abel (1983) assumes that there is only future uncertainty and that all current 
variables are known. He further assumes that the stochastic variable follows a Wiener process. In line with Hartman 
(1972), Abel considers a risk neutral competitive firm that is confronted with price and demand uncertainty, and 
shows that an increase in price uncertainty leads to an increase in the rate of investment where adjustment costs are 
convex. ‘This result differs completely from the Hartman (1972) result. Hartman shows that an increase in price 
uncertainty will increase the investment rate if the production function is linearly homogenous and therefore the 
marginal revenue product of capital is a strictly convex function of the price of output, irrespective of the 
adjustment function. However, Abel (1983) assumes that the firm optimizes the present value of cash flows, subject 
to the capital accumulation equation and the stochastic process of the price of output’ (Lensink, et al., 2001, p.68). 
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Table 3.3 Empirical survey on investment-uncertainty relationship 
Author(s) Data and Time 
Period 
Uncertainty Measures Econometric Model of 
Investment 
Findings 
Campa and 
Goldberg 
(1993) 
Data on US 
manufacturing 
sectors during 
1972-1986 
The volatility of exchange rate 
is measured as: i) the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean 
of the exchange rate index; and 
ii) the standard deviation of the 
first differences of the log of the 
exchange rate over the previous 
twelve quarters 
Iit/Ii,t-1 = β0 + β1(SALit -
1/SALi,t -2) + (β2 + 
β3κit)et-1/et-2 + (β4 + 
β5κit)σet-1/σet-2 + β6rt-1/rt-2 
+ εit 
The results, employing 2SLS33 and fixed effect regressions, 
illustrate that for a given export share, the depreciation of the 
home currency adversely affects those industries with a higher 
share of imported inputs and lowers profit margin, whereas it 
improves the external competitiveness of the home industry to 
the degree that it sells to foreign markets; the latter gives rise 
to investment  
Leahy and 
Whited 
(1995)34 
Annual data on 
US 
manufacturing 
sector during 
1949-1987 
The variance of the firm’s daily 
stock return for each year, 
scaled by the variance of the 
firm’s debt-equity ratio 
Δ(I/K)it = 
∑  Nn=0 γnΔσ*i,t+n + 
∑  Nn=0 ΔDISi,t+n + Δεit 
The results, employing VAR and GMM, suggest that an 
increase in uncertainty has a negative impact on investment; 
no evidence is found in support of the positive impact of 
uncertainty through the convexity channel, nor in support of 
the CAPM-based impact of risk 
Price (1995) Data on US 
firms during 
1961-1992 
Natural logarithm of GDP as a 
proxy for uncertainty35  
It = ∆Kt + δKt-1, where 
∆Kt = β1(L)∆Kt-1 + 
β2(L)Zt-136 – β3(K – K*)t-1 
The findings, employing GARCH model to measure 
uncertainty and using OLS, ECM and SUR estimates, show 
that the level of aggregate uncertainty has a significant and 
negative impact on manufacturing investment decisions 
Carruth, et al., 
(1997) 
Quarterly data 
on UK 
industrial and 
commercial 
company (ICC) 
Quarterly averaged international 
gold prices deflated by the UK 
GDP deflator and converted to 
Sterling 
β1(L)ΔIt = β0+ 
β2(L)ΔGDPt + β3(L)ΔCt 
+ β4(L)Δψt + β5(L)Δπt + 
β6It-j + β7GDPt-j + β8rt-j + 
β9ψt-j + β10πt-j + εt 
The findings, employing ECM, show that real profits and the 
real gold prices are the main determinants of investment 
spending by the ICC sector 
 
                                                          
33 The current interest rate influences investment both in total manufacturing and in individual industry level. Thus, the authors implement two-stage least squares regressions 
(2SLS) using as instruments for the other exogenous variables in addition to the lagged values of the interest rates variable to take care of the endogeneity of interest rates. 
34 At microeconomic level, Leahy and Whited (1995) examine the channels through which uncertainty affects investment, namely convexity and concavity of the marginal 
product of capital. They also investigate if there is any Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)-related impact of risk on investment. In order to test for the convex return theories, 
they split the sample at the median based on the industry variances of the labor-capital ratio. A greater ratio indicates a greater ability to substitute labor for capital and thus a 
smaller negative impact of uncertainty on investment. To evaluate the CAPM, they obtain the covariance of the firm’s daily stock return with a value weighted index as a 
measure of risk. Based on the CAPM model, the required rate of return on investment is positively linked to the risk in investment.  
35 Because ‘it serves as an index for aggregate demand, which will affect demand in the manufacturing sector as well as the wage and other prices’ (ibid, p.148). 
36 Zt-1 is a set of I(0) variables including terms in real raw material price changes, real labor costs changes, real interest rate measured by the US Treasury Bill Rate less producer 
price inflation, and the uncertainty measure. 
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sector during  
1963-1995 
Fielding 
(1999) 
Quarterly data 
on South 
African 
manufacturing 
industry during 
1946-1993 
Indexes of volatility for the real 
user cost of capital, for the 
average product of capital, and 
for the rate of capital goods 
price inflation 
lnKMt = ∑  i βiln(K
M
t-i) + 
∑  j β1jDUM + 
β2ln(CN/PM)t + 
β3ln(wN/PM)t + β4ln(KG)t 
+ β5ln(QM/J)t + β6S(1)t + 
β7S(2)t + β8S(3)t + β9INSt 
+ εt 
The findings, based on time-series estimates, suggest that 
capital stock only partially lies within the neoclassical 
framework; investment is very sensitive to the current level of 
manufacturing output and its elasticity is greater than that of 
the user cost of capital; decreases in the volatility of the 
opportunity cost of capital (i.e. the return to financial 
investments) have a significantly negative impact on the stock 
of physical capital 
Bond, et al., 
(2005)37 
Data on a panel 
of 655 non-
financial UK 
firms during 
1987-2000 
Within-year volatility of the 
firm’s share price and of the 
average forecasts of the firm’s 
future earnings; and dispersion 
across individual analysts in 
their forecasts of the firm’s 
future earnings 
It/Kt = A1 + 1/A2(qMt-1) + 
β1σt + β2σt-1 + εt 
The findings, employing the q-model of investment 
augmented with uncertainty measures, illustrate that 
investment is negatively affected by each of these uncertainty 
measures individually and jointly, and that higher volatility 
lowers investment rates in the short-run; also, permanent 
increases in uncertainty are linked to the lower levels of 
capital stock in the long-run 
Bloom, et al., 
(2007) 
Data on a 
sample of 672 
publicly-traded 
UK 
manufacturing 
firms during 
1972-1991 
A forward looking measure of 
uncertainty measured by the 
standard deviation of daily stock 
returns for firm i in year t 
Iit/Ki,t-1 = β1∆lnSALit + 
β2(∆lnSALit-1) + 
β3(σ*it∆lnSALit) + 
β4(lnSALi,t-1 – lnKi,t-1) + 
β5σit + β6∆σit + ηi + δi + 
εit 
 
The, findings based on GMM and allowing for time-varying 
uncertainty and temporal aggregation,38 indicate that 
cautionary effects of uncertainty are significant in the short-
run investment dynamics of firms i.e. greater uncertainty 
lowers the impact of demand shocks on investment and makes 
the reaction of the firms to any given policy weaker at the 
time of higher uncertainty; and temporary effects of higher 
uncertainty on capital-sales ratio represent a weaker impact of 
sales growth at higher levels of uncertainty 
Diallo (2008) Data on 23 low-
income and 28 
middle-income 
countries during 
1975-2004 
evj/i = ∑  10j=1 (ej/i CPIiCPIj)ωj Iit/Kit-1 = β1e
v
it + βEXPit + 
ηi + υt + εit 
The findings, employing GARCH for volatility measures and 
based on panel data cointegration techniques, indicate that the 
exchange rate volatility has a significant and negative impact 
on investment, and that this impact is higher in low-income 
countries 
                                                          
37 Since marginal q is unobservable, following Hayashi (1982), the authors set qM equal to qA and add the stock of debt to Hayashi’s model to obtain an observable proxy for qM 
as qA = qM = NPV(t) + Dt/pIt(1 – δ)Kt-1, where qA is average q, and NPV is a firm’s maximized net present value of expected future profits (adjusted for debt and taxes). The 
denominator is the replacement cost of capital. The authors further calculate a proxy for expected profitability to control for average q as E(π)it = πit + ρt+1πi,t+1/pt (1 – δ)Ki,t-1, 
where E(π) is expected profitability and provides an ex ante measure of discounted expected profitability of the firm in the current and the following year.  
38 This explains that the frequency of shocks and investment decisions tend to be considerably higher than that of the (annual) data (Bloom, et al., 2007, p.394). 
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Henriques and 
Sadorsky 
(2011) 
Data on a panel 
of 1000 non-
financial, 
publicly-traded 
US firms during 
1990-2007 
OPVt = 
√(1/n) − 1∑  (r°t − E(r°t))
2
.nt=1  
√n 
where r°t is the daily oil price 
return r°t = 100 ln (p
o
t/pot-1)), n 
is the number of trading days in 
the year, and pot is daily oil 
prices  
(I/K)it = β0 + β1(I/K)i,t-1 + 
β2(1-q)it + β3(1-q)i,t-1 + 
β4Xit + β5Xi, t-1 + β6OPVt 
+ β7OPVt-1 + β8po2t + 
β9(OPV)2,t-1 + (1 – ρ)ηi + 
υt – ρυt-1 + εit 
The results, employing GMM, indicate that there is a U-shape 
relationship between firm’s investment and oil price volatility, 
meaning that an increase in uncertainty increases the value of 
option to wait and postpones investment; however, after some 
point, a greater increase in uncertainty increases investment 
because, compared to the option value of waiting to invest, the 
value of the preemptive strategic effects start rising 
Notes: C and CN are the real and the nominal user costs of capital; DIS is the discrepancy between the observable volatility and its expectation; e and ev are the real exchange rate 
and the exchange rate volatility. GDP is gross domestic product; I is gross investment; K is capital stock; K* is the desired capital stock; KM is real capital stock in the 
manufacturing sector; KG is public capital stock; qM is the marginal q; and r is the rate of real interest. SAL is real sales; CF is cash flows; PM is the aggregate price of 
manufacturing output; QM is real output of the manufacturing sector; wN is the nominal wage rate in the manufacturing sector; and OPV is oil price volatility. S(1), S(2), and S(3) 
are indexes of volatility for the real user cost of capital, the average product of capital, and the rate of capital goods price inflation, respectively. CPI is the consumer price index; 
ωj is trade partner j’s weight; and EXP indicates explanatory variables and here includes GDP over lagged capital stock, real interest rate, the user cost of capital. INS is an index 
for macroeconomic instability. A1 and A2 are parameters of adjustment cost function; π is real profits; σ is volatility measure; δ is the depreciation rate; and ψ is the wedge 
between the user cost of an extra unit of capital and its present value arising from the option value of waiting. DUM is a set of quarterly dummies. βs are unknown parameters; Δ 
and ln indicate changes and natural logarithm, respectively; and (L) is the lag polynomial. Subscripts t represents the time period; and j refers to the number of firms in the 
manufacturing sector. η is fixed effects; υ is time effects; and ε is an independently and identically distributed error term. ECM, GARCH, GMM, IV, OLS, SUR, VAR and 2SLS 
stand for Error Correction Model, General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Generalized Method of Movements, Instrumental Variables, Ordinary Least Squares, 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, Vector Auto-regression, and two-stage least-squares,  respectively. 
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Furthermore, while a majority of literature provides evidence in support of a negative linear 
relationship between investment and uncertainty, some researchers suggest asymmetric effects 
of uncertainty on investment (Baum, et al., 2001; Darby, et al., 1999; 2002). There is also the 
issue of which variables to choose for measuring uncertainty. Byrne and Davis (2002) assess a 
range of uncertainty measures in the G7 countries, including measures based on the volatility of 
exchange rates, long-term interest rates, inflation, share prices and industrial production. Only 
uncertainty measures related to exchange rates and, to a lesser extent, interest rates were found 
to be significant. Other scholars use some other measures of uncertainty such as volatility of 
government consumption expenditures or government budget deficits as a share of GDP 
(Aizenman and Marion, 1995, 1999), terms of trade (Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001) and 
nominal money growth, finding significant negative correlations between these measures and 
(private) investment. Table 3.3 illustrates the findings of a selected empirical work on the 
investment-uncertainty relationship and their measures of uncertainty. At large, the empirical 
evidence for the effect of uncertainty on investment is mixed, but it tends to imply adverse 
effects of various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty on aggregate investment (Pindyck, 
1986; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Asteriou and Price, 2000; 
Carruth, et al., 2000; Byrne and Davis, 2003; du Toit and Moolman, 2004; Demir, 2009). 
 
The investment literature uses different methods to measure uncertainty. These methods include: 
i) the variance of the normal distribution of a variable (Pindyck, 1986; Bell and Campa, 1997); 
ii) the variance of the unpredictable part of a stochastic process (Aizenman and Marion, 1999); 
iii) the variance of geometric Brownian motion (Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; Caballero and 
Leahy, 1996); iv) the GARCH model of volatility (Engle, 1982; Price, 1996); and v) the 
variance derived from survey data (Ferderer, 1993; Pattillo, 1998).  
 
To measure the variance of the unpredictable part of a stochastic process, the process that 
generates the predictable part of the stochastic process needs to be selected before computing 
the variance of the unpredictable part of a stochastic process and its distribution.39 Furthermore, 
in the theoretical models of investment under uncertainty, it is often assumed that the future 
development of an uncertain investment-related variable can be modelled by a geometric 
                                                          
39 More precisely, this method of volatility measurement can be summarized as follows: i) first setting up a 
forecasting equation for the uncertainty model; ii) then estimate the forecasting equation to obtain the residuals i.e. 
the unpredictable part of the fluctuations of the variable; and iii) lastly calculating the conditional standard 
deviations of the residuals as the uncertainty measure. 
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Brownian motion. In the empirical applications of the geometric Brownian motion in the field of 
investment, volatility is often assumed to be constant. Since continuous data are needed for the 
modelling of volatility, using this method it is less popular than the GARCH-approach. GARCH 
modelling of volatility allows for the time dependence of the second moment of the random 
variables, hence is an appealing measure of uncertainty. In particular, the GARCH models 
assume that the error terms have variance which is a function of the actual size of the error terms 
in the previous periods and thus the variance is related to the squares of the previous error terms. 
Although attractive, the application of GARCH-type models for volatility measurements 
requires longer time-series and high frequency observations. This limits the application of this 
method in the field of investment and macroeconomics where the frequency of observations is 
relatively low. Moreover, GARCH modelling is often criticised on the basis that the estimated 
conditional variance may be biased due to possible misspecification of the equation defining the 
conditional mean. Survey data directly contains information on agents’ expectations of future 
variables. The main advantage of using survey data is its forward-looking property. This 
approach, however, requires a large number of respondents to obtain reliable measures of 
uncertainty.  
 
Notably, investment theories do not explicitly identify a role for oil prices and focus on output 
and factor costs. In addition, the literature pays little attention to investigating how investment 
behavior reacts to uncertainty stemming from the volatility of resource prices or resource 
revenues in resource-rich and -based economies. The latter issue is of importance since, 
according to the literature on the resource curse thesis, resource-abundant economies often lag 
behind resource-poor economies in terms of economic performance. In the context of resource-
rich economies, the literature on natural resources identifies symmetric and asymmetric 
measures to capture uncertainty associated with resource price movements. Following Hamilton 
(1983), linear effects of resource price uncertainty are commonly measured by calculating the 
changes in international oil prices: 
 
(3.20) dpot = pot – pot-1,  
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where pot is the price of oil per barrel in the US $. Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013) use the 
changes in monthly international oil prices to calculate the realized annual volatility of oil prices 
as follows:40  
 
(3.21) volot = √ ∑ (12τ=1 g
o
tτ – g̅ot)2, 
 
where gotτ denotes the rate of change in oil prices potτ during months τ and t (gotτ = d(potτ)) and 
g̅ot = 1/12∑ (12τ=1 g
o
tτ).  
 
Moreover, the literature commonly uses three major methods for non-linear transformation of 
resource prices: (i) asymmetric specification (Mork, 1989); (ii) scaled specification (Lee, Ni and 
Ratti, 1995); and (iii) net specification (Hamilton, 1996). Mork (1989) allows for asymmetric 
responses to oil price changes by specifying increase and decrease in the real price of oil as 
separate variables as: 
 
(3.22) dpoit = max (0, (pot – pot-1)), and 
         dpodt = min (0, (pot – pot-1)),  
 
where dpoit and dpodt are real oil price increase and real oil price decrease, respectively. Lee, et 
al., (1995) focus on volatility, proposing that ‘an oil shock is likely to have greater impact in an 
environment where oil prices have been stable than in an environment where oil price 
movement has been frequent and erratic’, because price changes in a volatile environment are 
likely to be soon reversed. They utilize a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH (1, 1)) model to construct the conditional variation of oil price 
changes and to normalize unexpected movements in real oil prices. Scaled oil price accounts for 
the fact that oil price increases after a long period of price stability have more dramatic 
macroeconomic consequences than those that are merely corrections to greater oil price 
decreases during the previous quarter.41 Hamilton (1996) suggests another form of asymmetric 
transformation of real oil prices and states that most of the oil price increases are simply 
                                                          
40 Anderson and Bollerslev (2003) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002, 2004) use intra-daily data to 
compute the daily realized volatility of asset returns. Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013) apply the same method to 
calculate the annual volatility using the monthly changes in international oil prices. They expect the results not to 
be much affected when weekly or daily observations are used instead of the monthly data.  
41 For details on asymmetric GARCH models, among others, see Section 16.7 in Patterson (2000). 
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corrections of earlier declines. He argues that it seems more appropriate to compare the current 
price of oil with that during the previous year rather than during the previous quarter alone. 
Accordingly, he proposes using the percentage change over the previous year's maximum if the 
oil price of the current quarter exceeds the value of the preceding four quarters' maximum. If the 
price of oil in time t is lower than in the previous year, the net oil price increase is defined to be 
zero in quarter t. In this case, no positive oil price shocks have occurred.  
 
3.4. INVESTMENT IN PARTIAL-MARKET AND RESOURCE-RICH 
ECONOMIES 
Investment models have been principally developed for market-based and developed economies. 
Therefore, the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed thus far is mostly related to the 
studies of investment behavior in such economies. However, these models may be only partly 
applicable for economies which are partially market-based, planned, in transition or resource-
dependent. In these economies, the SOEs or semi-SOEs are commonly in control of the majority 
of production units and activities, and the state provides them with financial support to keep 
production intact and to gain some return on investment even if they do not achieve their 
planned targets (Maskin and Xu, 2001). These economies are often subject to soft budget 
constraints, arising from a state’s political considerations or a poorly defined profit drives of a 
rescuing institution, manifested through occasional or regular state fiscal subsidies to loss-
making firms, soft taxation or soft bank credits.42 
 
                                                          
42 This includes: i) tax rates may vary across the sectors or firms (i.e. they may be lower for preferred sectors and 
firms); taxing regulation may be un-uniform, leaving legal ways open to make exceptions; or firms may not pay 
taxes.  
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Table 3.4 Investment in partial-market economies 
Author(s) Data and Time Period Econometric Model of 
Investment 
Findings 
Budina, et 
al., (2000) 
Data on Bulgarian firms 
during 1993-1995 
(I/K)i = β0 + 
β1(∆SAL)/Ki + 
β2(CF/Ki) + εi 
The results, employing an accelerator-cash flow type model of investment, show that 
large firms’ investment practices are not liquidity constrained, whereas the opposite 
is true for the smaller firms; also firms with small long- and short-run debts are those 
with positive cash flows and are liquidity constrained, whereas heavily indebted 
firms have negative cash flows and are not liquidity constrained 
Lizal and 
Svejnar 
(2001) 
Data on Czech 
Republican firms during 
the transition 
phase1992-1998 
Iit/Kit = β0 + β1(Ii,t-1/Ki,t-
1) + β2(Ii,t-1/Ki,t-1)2 + 
β3(Yi,t-1-wi,t-1Li,t-1/Ki,t-1) 
+ DUM + εit 
The findings, motivated by the neoclassical-accelerator and cash-flow models and 
based on OLS estimates, show that lagged output is positively related to investment, 
but there is no relationship between profits (i.e. cash flows) and investment 
Rizov 
(2004) 
Data on Romanian 
manufacturing firms 
during 1995-1999 
(I/K)it = β0 + β1(I/K)i,t-1 
– β2(I/K)2i,t-1 – 
β3(CF/K)i,t-1 + 
β4(Y/K)i,t-1 + 
β5(D/K)2i,t-1+ ηi + δi + 
εit 
The findings, using GMM-IV and based on Euler approach, confirm the SBC 
hypothesis and indicate that firms with unconstrained credit access reveal a weaker 
CF sensitivity of investment decisions 
Gugler and 
Peev 
(2010) 
Data on thirteen 
transition economies 
during 1993-2003 
 
(Iit/Kit) = β0 + β1(CFi,t-
1/Ki,t-1) + β2(SALi,t-
1/Ki,t-1) + β3(SALi,t-
1/Ki,t-1) + εit  
The results, based on GMM and OLS estimates, illustrate that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities have decreased over the transition period; also investment-cash flow 
sensitivities are negative for state-owned firms in early period of transition, whereas 
privatized firms are found to be more effective in their investment practices 
Notes: I is gross investment; K is capital stock; Y is output; L is labor; SAL is real sales; w is wages; CF is cash flows; π is profits; and DUM is a set of quarterly dummies. βs 
are unknown parameters; Δ and ln indicate changes and natural logarithm, respectively. Subscript t and i represent the time period and the firm, respectively. η is fixed effects; υ 
is time effects; and ε is an independently and identically distributed error term. GMM, IV, and OLS stand for Generalized Method of Movements, Instrumental Variables, and 
Ordinary Least Squares, respectively. 
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Consequently, the operation of market competition may be weakened by failing to eradicate 
inefficient loss-making businesses, and may be adversely affected by the credit markets since 
firms may become irresponsible in their borrowing practices. This could undermine the adaptive 
capability of firms as well as the productivity and competitiveness of an economy. For example, 
Allen (2001) argues that the main objectives of firms in the Soviet Union were to meet their 
ambitious output targets and not to maximize profits during 1928-1940. In Allen’s view, this 
setting made it possible for these firms to pursue higher output by increasing the number of their 
employees beyond the point where the value of the marginal product of labor was equal to their 
real wages (unlike the capitalist firms who employ workers until it equals their wages). Allen 
identifies planning and the formulation of ambitious output targets to lead business activities 
and as the main driver for the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union during this period.  
 
Table 3.4 illustrates the literature on investment determinants in partial-market economies. At 
large, the empirical literature predicts that investment behavior in such economies could be 
distorted because it can lead to over-investment in loss-making firms or under-investment in 
potentially profit-making firms due to inefficient allocation of credits by the authorities. Often, 
state-owned firms or large firms’ investment practices are not liquidity constrained, whereas the 
opposite is true for the smaller firms. In the context of the transition economies, for instance, 
Lizal and Svejnar (2002) examine the relationship between sales, profits and investment for the 
case of Czech Republic during 1993-1998. The authors (ibid, p.361) suggest that a positive 
coefficient between lagged output and investment indicates that firms are credit-rationed. In 
contrast, a zero coefficient indicates that firms have access to bank credits for investment 
independent of their profitability, implying the presence of soft budget constraints. According to 
the authors, a negative coefficient then suggests a stronger form of soft budget constraints as 
unsuccessful firms have greater access to credits.  
 
In the context of the resource-rich and resource-based economies, however, the findings should 
be interpreted differently if the measures of financial constraints are oil income-based. In this 
case, a positive coefficient between the oil income proxy and investment could suggest that 
firms are state- or semi state-owned or they belong to preferred sectors of the economy, hence 
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their investment practices are not (or less) liquidity constrained.43 That is, the availability of oil 
income could alleviate credit constraints faced by certain prioritized firms and economic sectors 
compared to others in such economies. 
 
Zarmouh (1998) investigates the determinants of investment behavior for the oil-based economy 
of Libya during 1962-1992. In his model, the explanatory variables motivated by the 
neoclassical model of investment are: i) changes in real output, because an increase in demand 
for consumer and producer goods output can give rise to producers’ demand for capital goods 
and induce them to invest more through the accelerator effect; ii) a real interest rate measured by 
nominal interest rate minus inflation rate; iii) a real wage rate measured by the nominal wage 
rate deflated by producer price index (PPI); iv) an investment price index measured by the 
market or selling price of capital goods deflated by PPI; v) the value of oil export as well as total 
government expenditure to capture the effects of the availability of finance for public 
investment; and vi) lagged dependent variables. Since investment is mainly determined by the 
Libyan government during the period of study in the government’s annual budgets (and not by 
market mechanism), the author expects the real interest rate to have very little impact only on 
private sector investment. Employing an Error Correction Model (ECM), he finds that 
investment is mostly oil-driven. He then estimates investment functions for public and private 
sectors and finds that investment is chiefly public sector-driven and is determined by the real 
value of oil exports, though there is some evidence for the influence of some market-oriented 
variables such as the cost of capital (i.e. real selling price of capital goods or real interest rate) 
on private investment. 
 
Intuitively, natural resources are expected to increase wealth and purchasing power of resource-
driven countries that are endowed with natural resources, enabling them to invest and grow, as 
many of these economies benefit from substantial resource windfalls. This, however, brings 
about challenges as how to utilize rents from their exhaustible resources in order to accelerate 
capital accumulation process, structural transformation and economic growth. Often, investment 
decisions made by the governments of these countries fail to result in productive investment, 
which in turn undermines investment efficiency in these economies (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). 
Many oil-rich countries have intended to utilize their enormous oil revenues to fund diversified 
                                                          
43 The latter interpretation is not limited to resource-rich economies; for instance it could be applicable for the 
economies where the preferred sectors are economically prioritized. 
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investment projects and industrial development. Venezuelans called this ‘sowing the seeds of oil 
revenues’ (Larrain, Sachs and Warner, 2000, p.51). Nonetheless, due to the fact that economic 
diversification is extremely complicated, time consuming and hard to achieve, often resource-
abundant governments neglect or adjourn formulating appropriate investment and industrial 
policies with a tendency to invest in non-tradable sectors of the economy. As a result, 
diversifying away from the natural resource sector towards manufacturing or other productive 
sectors of the economy may be misled or misconducted. Furthermore, although the resource 
sectors are prone to produce massive revenues, they typically offer rather few jobs and operate 
with the rest of the economy in a very restricted way.  
 
Accordingly, ‘the natural resource curse’ thesis attempts to explain the paradox that resource-
rich countries often underperform resource-poor countries in terms of economic growth and 
development (Auty, 1993). The literature suggests various explanations for the causes of the 
resource curse phenomenon. The most regularly discussed explanations of the resource curse 
thesis include the structuralists argument, the Dutch Disease theory, the rentier state paradigm, 
the voracity effects, resource prices and revenues volatility and inadequate institutions and 
policies (see Table 3.5). Early explanations of the resource curse thesis were within the 
structuralist theoretical framework of the 1950s that focused on the decline of terms of trade of 
primary commodities, the price volatility of such commodities and the poor linkages between 
the natural resource sector and the rest of the economy (Prebish, 1950; Hirschman, 1958). 
However, the explanatory power of the structuralist arguments was weakened by the results of 
empirical investigations (for instance, among others see Lutz, 1994; Dawe, 1996). A number of 
alternative theoretical approaches were developed to address the question as to why resource-
rich economies experienced a slower economic growth compared to resource-poor economies.  
 
One economic explanation emphasized the Dutch Disease phenomenon (Corden and Neary, 
1982; Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986; Krugman, 1987). The Dutch Disease theory attempts to 
describe the association between the exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the 
manufacturing sector. This term originally referred to the decline of the Dutch manufacturing 
sector due to the discovery of large natural gas fields in 1959, which subsequently led to the 
appreciation of the Dutch real exchange rate (Humphreys, et al., 2007). In this model, there is a 
non-tradable good sector (e.g., services), and two tradable good sectors: the booming sector 
(e.g., oil or natural gas) and the lagging sector or the non-booming tradable sector(s) (e.g., 
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manufacturing or agriculture). A boom in the natural resource sector leads to the ‘resource 
movement effect’ and the ‘spending effect’ (Cordon and Neary, 1982). The former takes place 
when the resource boom leads to an increase in the demand for labor in the booming sector that 
shifts the direction of the production away from the lagging sector and toward the booming 
sector. This effect is also called ‘direct de-industrialization’. The latter results from the 
excessive revenues generated by the resource boom, which leads to a higher demand for labor in 
the non-tradable sector, taking labor away from the lagging tradable sector towards the non-
tradable sector. This is also called ‘indirect de-industrialization’ (Cordon, 1984).  
   
The abundance of resource revenues may therefore lead to the formulation and implementation 
of unsustainable industrial policies as most resource-rich economies have not succeeded in 
promoting a competitive manufacturing sector (Ranis, 1991; Krause, 1995; Mikesell, 1997; 
Sachs and Warner, 1997). These economies have commonly pursued industrial policies with 
two main elements, namely protectionism and generous subsidy payments. Once these elements 
are in place, the growing resource revenues may reduce incentives to create competitive 
manufacturing industries. Often as a reaction to the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
the declining tradable sectors of the economy, many resource-rich developing economies tend to 
encourage industrialization through adopting import substitution polices to support infant 
industries. However, the key problem is thought to be that ‘the relaxation of market discipline 
and associated accumulation of economic distortions … retards competitive diversification and 
lies at the heart of the underperformance of the resource abundant countries’ (Auty and Kiiski, 
2001, page 28). An export-oriented competitive industrial policy is instead expected to help 
maintaining the competitiveness of such industries (Auty, 1994). Also, often based on the infant 
industry argument, ample resource rents have encouraged unsustainable allocation of sizable 
subsidies, which has often been accompanied by the formation of powerful interest groups and 
rent-seeking activities in these economies (Auty, 1994; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001).  
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Table 3.5 Leading arguments in explaining the resource curse thesis 
Political-economy and Institutional Explanations 
Approach Proposition Key literature   
Rent-seeking behavior Resource windfalls can be appropriated, incentivizing distorted public 
policies, bribes and diversion of the public towards corruption  
Mahdavi (1970); Torvik, (2002); Vicente 
(2010) 
Corruption effects Natural resource abundance de-incentivizes to reform and to be held 
accountable and triggers corruption and misuse of resource windfalls 
Moore (2000); Auty (2001); Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004)  
Voracity effects Transfer of capital from the formal sector to the informal sector by the 
powerful political groups, hence shrinking formal capital eventually 
due to resource price volatility 
Lane and Tornell (1996); Lane and 
Tornell (1999) 
The role of institutions Abundant nature of natural resources constitutes the preferred means 
of governance in resource-rich economies, allowing for redistributive 
and resource allocative policies that direct extractive rents to preferred 
sectors and groups  
North (1990); Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard 
(2008) 
Economic Explanations 
Approach Proposition Key literature   
Structuralist approach Decline in terms of trade of primary commodities and poor linkages 
between natural resource sectors and the rest of the economy  
Prebish (1950); Hrischman (1958) 
The Dutch Disease theory Decline in the non-resource tradable manufacturing sector (or 
agriculture) is associated with the exploitation of natural resources; 
real exchange rate appreciation is caused by inflationary pressures 
from resource revenue spending, which in turn leads to the contraction 
of the non-resource tradable sectors 
Corden (1984); Neary and Wignbergen 
(1986); Sachs and Warner (1997) 
Resource revenue management and 
government policies 
Resource rents may result in unsustainable government and industrial 
policies, retarding competitive economic diversification in resource 
abundant economies 
Sachs and Warner (1997); Auty and 
Kiiski (2001); van der Ploeg (2011a) 
Volatility of natural resource prices  Natural resource price volatility may make it hard to adopt prudent 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies, which may be exacerbated by 
resulting in resource revenue volatility; this may worsen investors’ 
willingness to invest given changeable expenditure policies, hence 
resulting in unsustainable consumption rather than investment  
Behrman (1987); Sachs and Warner 
(1997); Rodriguez and Sachs (1999); 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) 
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Although the Dutch Disease theory was first associated with real exchange rate appreciation 
bred by inflationary pressures from resource income spending and the resulting contraction of 
the manufacturing sector, this understanding has developed over time. For instance, more 
narrowly, the meaning of the Dutch Disease has been associated with the failure of resource-rich 
economies to promote a more competitive manufacturing sector (Sarraf and Jiwanjo, 2001). 
Also, earlier work on the Dutch Disease theory often focused on the contracting effects of the 
Disease on the manufacturing sector. Yet, more lately, attention is also given to the contracting 
effects on the agriculture sector (Love, 1994). Therefore, a controversy exists over the Dutch 
Disease effects in explaining the resource curse thesis (Auty, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).  
 
Another body of literature attempts to explain the resource curse thesis by suggesting that the 
abundance of natural resources and resource dependency may deteriorate or undermine 
institutional and governance quality (Collier and Hoefeler, 2004; Ross, 2001; Rosser, 2004). 
This is because institutions provide the incentive structure for an economy. As that structure 
evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation or decline 
(North, 1990). Institutions can facilitate economic exchanges and determine resource allocation 
and efficiency of economic activities. However, if combined with poorly defined property rights 
and an ill-functioning legal system, natural resources could entail corruption, voracity and civil 
conflicts (Mauro, 1995; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Torvik, 2002; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Robinson, et al., 2006). For instance, the voracity effects could 
constrain economic growth through an increased transfer of capital generated by positive 
resource price shocks from the formal sector to the informal sector by powerful political groups 
(Lane and Tornell, 1996).  
 
Resource gains may also cause a ‘feeding frenzy’ in which various groups fight over the rents 
from natural resources, thus leading to inefficient exhaustion of the resources (Lane and Tornell, 
1996; Robinson, et al., 2006). The latter may further be aggravated through direct accrual of 
resource rents to the government, hence adversely affecting the structural reforms in such 
economies and distracting the respective governments from carrying out growth-inducing 
investment activities (Isham, et al., 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). Moreover, resource-rich 
economies often pursue more protective trade policies which could affect institutional 
development in these economies, often motivated by diversifying the economy away from 
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resources (Sachs and Warner, 1997). This in turn may reduce incentives of the governments of 
these economies to reform and to establish a well-functioning taxing system. Lax taxation, 
consequently, undermines the relationships between such governments and their citizens as the 
income of these governments is guaranteed from resource rents rather than taxes from the 
citizens (Moore and Unsworth, 2007).  
 
Substantial windfalls from natural resources may therefore encourage rent-seeking activities 
(Mahdahvy, 1970). In the rent-seeking literature, it is assumed that resource rents can be easily 
appropriated by the governments of resource-abundant countries, thus incentivizing distorted 
public policies, bribes and diversion of the public towards corruption (Torvik, 2002; Vicente, 
2010). In these economies, thus, rent appropriation (as opposed to wealth creation) may 
dominate as it offers immediate political as well as economic gains. Resource rents, 
consequently, can be used for power consolidation by the respective governments. The 
appealing nature of these gains, that is favoring specific groups of the elites, may in turn give 
rise to the emergence of ‘extractive’ political states (Ross, 2001). However, the trade-off 
between appropriating rents to favor specific interest groups and adopting economic policies 
which could promote economic development may be significantly large. That is, to maintain the 
ruling elites in power, resource revenues prevent the distribution of power towards the middle 
class and the adoption of growth-promoting economic policies. Also, as a result of the existence 
of abundant natural resources, rent-seeking may make the respective governments responsive to 
public pressure in spending more and in triggering ill-coordinated decisions which would induce 
distortions in the economy (Auty, 2001; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). 
Moreover, the development of human capital may be neglected by these governments due to 
inadequate devotion of attention to education or lack of incentives for financing it (Ascher, 
1999; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Stijins, 2006).  
 
An additional line of argument is associated with the volatility impact of natural resources. Such 
volatility could cause a range of challenges for resource-rich economies. Unexpected increases 
or decreases in commodity prices trigger resource wealth fluctuations, which could result in 
cycles of boom and bust in resource revenues (van der Ploeg, 2011b). Volatility of resource 
revenues, hence, exposes public finances of resource exporting countries to unpredictable booms 
and busts in their fiscal cash flows. In fact, some studies suggest that the volatility of resource 
revenues, driven by violent fluctuations in resource prices, is a cause for the presence of the 
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resource curse in resource-based economies (Mikesell, 1997; Auty, 1998). This induces 
macroeconomic costs including swift changes in public expenditures, the volatility of real 
exchange rates and distortions in allocation of investment funds to the rest of the tradable sectors 
of the economy. In fact, fluctuating resource revenues make it hard to adopt prudent fiscal 
policies due to creating an uncertain environment for investment activities resulting from 
changeable expenditure policies. Also, under these circumstances, resource revenues may not be 
used for investment but rather for excessive unsustainable consumption (Behrman, 1987; 
Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003).  
 
A body of literature focuses on fiscal policy challenges in managing the volatility of natural 
resource revenues. For instance, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) provide evidence to support the 
idea that the resource curse may stem from governments’ inability to sustainably manage sizable 
resource windfalls. Inefficient management of fiscal surpluses in times of resource price booms 
and financing of the deficits in times of price busts may result in the transmission of resource 
revenue volatility to the rest of the economy. Many resource-rich countries suffer from poorly 
developed financial systems and financial remoteness, so that they are likely to experience 
greater macroeconomic volatility and instability (Aghion, et. al, 2006; Rose and Spiegel, 2007).  
 
At large, both developed and developing economies aim at achieving and maintaining high 
levels of economic growth. In this picture, domestic investment is particularly crucial in 
developing economies mainly for the purpose of sustainable economic development, and is a 
prior objective on the agenda of policies-makers in these economies. In fact, to achieve 
sustainable growth, investment is a prerequisite. Without sufficient investment, physical capital 
cannot be accumulated and economic growth will be limited even if other conditions of 
economic growth are satisfied. Anderson (1987) relates economic growth to allocative 
efficiency and the investment rate, and concludes that when investment is applied efficiently, it 
‘accounts for most of a country's growth’. 
 
In developing economies, the investment requirements are far greater than the available size of 
finance. In contrast, in natural resource exporting economies like Iran, resource revenues are the 
main source of financing investment activities. As a result, the main challenge of such 
economies, particularly during times of favorable natural resource prices, is how much to invest 
rather than where to get the finance from. Thus, it is possible for resource-rich and resource-
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driven economies to mismanage or even waste the windfalls from resources if they under-invest 
or over-invest. Furthermore, if resource income is the only major source of financing 
investment, actual investment can be subject to instability and uncertainty since natural resource 
prices are prone to be volatile. Consequently, it is often very difficult for the governments and 
economic policy-makers in these economies to determine the direction towards and the extent to 
which investment should be channeled.  
 
The literature has therefore identified some solutions to the resource curse on the grounds of 
efficient investment and saving (see Table 3.6). Based on the Hotelling rule, to ensure the 
sustainable depletion of natural resources in a competitive world, the rate of capital gains from 
depletable resources must equal the rate of return on any other assets. In this setting, the equality 
between the prices of natural resources and the interest rate should direct resource extraction. 
Depletion of a finite resource will cause a scarcity rent since less of that resource is left for the 
future. This would lead to an increase in the resource price. Higher prices lower the quantities 
demanded; thus, more is conserved for future consumption. This process will result in efficient 
allocation of resources over time in competitive markets (Hotelling, 1931). Such optimal 
depletion of natural resources, however, does not account for rent-seeking activities and 
corruption which may emerge due to the abundance of natural wealth in resource-rich 
economies. Matsen, et al., (2005) propose that the share of natural resources which are used for 
consumption should be optimally adjusted downwards over time and that some degree of the 
Dutch Disease effect should be accepted to represent the existing economic distortions in many 
resource-rich economies.   
 
The Hartwick rule states that the resource windfalls should be re-invested in reproducible capital 
to overcome the problem of the current generation’s over-consuming of the exhaustible 
resources. The total value of net investment accordingly will be kept equal to zero which would 
be sufficient for a constant utility path (Hartwick, 1977). Another body of literature argues that 
distortions caused by a booming resources sector, which potentially can hamper the 
competitiveness of the non-resource sector, could be corrected with a tax on natural resources 
(Dixit and Newbery, 1985; Karp and Newberry, 1991). An alternative approach suggests that 
resource windfalls should be directly distributed among the citizens of the resource-rich 
economies, and that the governments of such economies may tax their citizens to reduce debts 
and to finance their investment activities (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Various 
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practical issues, nevertheless, undermine the success of the latter approach such as difficulties in 
identifying the citizens who should be entitled to such transfer payments and the associated 
administrative costs. Another view is to allocate the excess resource revenues to a sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF) in order to cushion the economy from over-injections of resource windfalls 
and macroeconomic instability, and then to live on the interest on the fund (Davis, 2001; Barnett 
and Ossowski, 2003; Stevens, 2003). Thus, a SWF can be a means to accumulate resources for 
precautionary savings purposes or can be saved for intergenerational equity, hence allowing for 
a sustained increase in consumption (Bacon and Tordo, 2006).  
 
The establishment of a SWF may give rise to the bird-in-hand policy with no increase in 
consumption before the windfall and a slow increase in consumption during the windfall. Also, 
future resource revenues can be used as security for borrowing which would give rise to 
borrowing before the windfall and paying off the debt and accumulating enough SWF to 
maintain a rise in consumption during the windfall. This is in line with the permanent income 
hypothesis (PIH) which suggests an increase in consumption financed by borrowing ahead of 
the windfall and then accumulating a SWF during the windfall. In contrast, van der Ploeg (2010) 
argues that these policies are not relevant for resource-rich developing economies. This is 
because they do not consider common issues in many of these economies such as capital 
scarcity, absorptive capacity constraints, adjustment costs of capital stock, and demand 
pressures on the expansion of the non-tradable sectors due to exchange rate appreciation. For 
example, absorptive capacity can be constrained by three factors: (i) scarcity of supply of skilled 
workers, physical capital and infrastructure; (ii) institutional constraints; and (iii) relative price 
effects (e.g., increases in the price of non-tradable) with implications for sector-level 
competitiveness in the economy (Bourguignon and Sunderg, 2006).   
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Table 3.6 Some proposed solutions to the resource curse 
Approach Proposition Motivation Key literature   
The Hotelling rule The rate of capital gains from exhaustible 
resources, in a competitive world, must be 
equal to the rate of return on any other assets 
To achieve sustainable depletion and efficient allocation of 
resources, under competitive markets, resource extraction 
should be guided by the equality between the rate of return on 
any other assets and the prices of natural resources. Depletion 
of an exhaustible resource results in a scarcity rent as less 
resource is left for the future, which in turn increases the 
resource price. Higher prices reduce the quantities demanded; 
hence more is saved for future consumption  
Hotelling (1931); 
Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979); Matsen and 
Torvik (2005) 
The Hartwick rule An efficient constant utility path, in an 
economy with stationary technology and 
instantaneous preferences, must be 
characterized by the value of net investment 
being null at each point in time 
To deal with the problem of current generation’s over-
consuming of the current finite resources, resource revenues 
should be reinvested in reproducible capital. Consequently, 
net investment total value would be kept equal to zero, hence 
sufficient for a constant utility path 
Stiglitz (1974); 
Hartwick (1977); 
Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979) 
Introducing taxes on 
natural resources 
Tax on natural resources can correct 
economic distortions caused by the booming 
sector 
To correct distortions induced by the booming resource sector, 
which hinders the competitiveness of non-resource sectors, 
taxes must be imposed on natural resources  
Dixit and NewBery 
(1985); Karp and 
Newbery (1991) 
Direct allocation of 
resource revenues 
Direct allocation of resource revenues Resource revenues should be directly distributed to the 
citizens of a resource-rich economy; the government may tax 
citizens to finance investment or to reduce debt 
Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) 
Establishment of sovereign 
resource funds and 
precautionary savings  
Excess resource revenues must be allocated 
to a resource fund to cushion the economy 
from volatility in natural resource prices and 
revenues 
To efficiently manage resource income and to achieve 
intergenerational fairness, parts of natural wealth can be saved 
in sovereign resource funds for future generations and for 
smooth consumption 
Davis, et al., (2001); 
Stevens (2003) 
Investing-to-investing 
strategy  
Efficiency of public investment management 
and promotion of private investment through 
open-to-trade policies and removing rigidities 
in the business environment; windfall-driven 
structural adjustment through home-grown 
private, public and human capital 
To spend resource revenues effectively, governments must 
anticipate resource discovery booms and address bottlenecks 
that are possible to be dealt with so as to build up government 
capacity for investment project selection and implementation 
along with private sector investment 
Collier (2010); 
Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2011); Gupta, et al., 
(2011); van der Ploeg 
and Venables (2011c) 
 96 
 
Van der Ploeg (2010) proposes an optimal response which takes into account the need for 
‘investing to investing’ strategy, home-grown public capital (e.g., to be produced by non-
tradabled sector) and a temporary tolerance of the Dutch Disease. In this setting, home-grown 
public capital can give rise to the Dutch Disease. This happens if increased private demand for 
consumption, driven by a windfall of foreign exchange, leads to real exchange rate appreciation 
or increase in the relative price of non-tradable goods and services. This would prompt factors 
of production to move away from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector. When the 
production of the tradable sector falls, the increased demand for tradable are met by higher 
imports of tradable which are funded by the windfall of foreign exchange. An increase in 
production of non-tradable is further required to meet the rise in demand for non-tradable. Yet,  
an economy’s response to a foreign exchange windfall varies depending on the initial level of 
income and capital, absorptive capacity and expectations about the sustainability of resource 
windfalls (Gelb and Grasmann, 2008; van der Ploeg and Venables, 11a). For instance, the 
challenge of the ‘investing to investing’ strategy is that absorption constraints get bigger as the 
home-grown components of public capital increase (van der Ploeg, 2011b).  
 
Overall, the literature on the natural resource curse thesis has tried to study and investigate the 
impact of the abundance of natural resources on economic growth, political stability and the 
quality of institutions in the economies of resource-rich countries. But the findings have been 
inconclusive and subject to debates. Some researchers suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between the abundance of natural resources and economic growth. Others argue that 
natural resource endowment per se is not a problem, and that natural resource wealth can 
advance economic growth if complemented with the accumulation of high levels of human 
capital, physical capital and innovation. Furthermore, as a result of profound fluctuations in the 
price of oil since the early 1970s, a body of literature studies the macroeconomic implications of 
resource price volatility in both resource-exporting and resource-importing economies. Some 
scholars emphasize the channels through which price fluctuations affect the economy. Others 
attempt to explore the optimal fiscal policy responses, such as government expenditure, to price 
shocks in these countries. Consequently, different suggestions and policy implications regarding 
the optimal management of resource income and addressing the resource curse thesis have been 
developed.  
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However, there has been very little research investigating how investment behavior and policies 
in resource-economies respond to resource price shocks. Furthermore, the existing literature on 
investment has largely ignored the question as to what role a country’s deeper characteristics, 
such as endowments, may play in shaping investment patterns of resource-rich economies (Bond 
and Malik, 2007). This thesis, therefore, attempts to contribute to the existing debates in the 
literature on investment and the natural resource curse thesis along with the application of such 
theories in the context of oil-abundant and oil-dependent countries. The current study therefore 
investigates the theory-consistent economic determinants of domestic investment in Iran, both at 
aggregate-level and at sector-level, within the theoretical framework of modified neoclassical-
accelerator type investment models. The theoretical framework is further extended by 
incorporating measures of resource-driven uncertainty in order to consider the effects of 
resource-driven financial constraints on investment patterns in the country.  
 
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The review of the theoretical literature on investment in this chapter presented the conventional 
demand-side theories of investment, theories of irreversible investment under uncertainty and 
the supply-side theories of investment. The review of the empirical literature included individual 
country and cross-country comparison studies of investment at firm, industry and aggregate 
levels. Findings based on various investment models and econometric techniques vary 
depending on individual industry and country specific factors and measures of uncertainty. 
Moreover, it seems that investment behavior is influenced by political environments and by the 
efficiency of institutional arrangements. Most empirical studies are not based on testing the 
theoretical models, but are motivated by them. Broadly speaking, different models serve various 
purposes and there is no single model even for the same problem in the same country. Agenor 
and Montiel (1996, p.12) state that ‘the standard analytical tools of modern macroeconomics are 
indeed of as much relevance to developing countries as they are to industrial countries, but that 
different models are needed to analyze familiar issues’. 
 
In sum, the accelerator model of investment assumes a fixed capital-output ratio and therefore is 
restrictive as the substitution between factors of production is constrained to zero. Similarly, the 
cash flow models, according to which optimal capital stock is merely affected by internal cash 
flows, do not consider any roles for the substitution of production factors. The Jorgensonian 
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neoclassical investment models, however, allow for substitution of input factors of production as 
a crucial element of production and cost, hence these models remain a common reference in the 
studies of the neoclassical theory of domestic investment. The distinguishing feature of the 
neoclassical models is that they are based on an explicit model of optimization behavior that 
associates the optimal level of capital stock to capital prices, interest rates, output and tax 
policies. Jorgenson assumes a perfectly competitive market. Yet, in practice, investment 
decisions can be affected by capital market imperfections. The literature accordingly identifies 
financial factors in causing and intensifying financial market imperfections in the economy. To 
study the effects of capital market imperfections on investment, a range of variables that may 
represent financial constraints are incorporated to the reduced form investment models, of which 
the most commonly used ones are cash flows. The literature often divides firms into sub-
samples for which the extent of financial constraints is expected to vary. In addition, a growing 
body of literature emphasizes on the effects of uncertainty on investment behavior. At large, the 
findings support that increased uncertainty adversely affects aggregate and disaggregate 
investment patterns. 
  
Since investment models have been mainly developed for market-driven economies, they are 
only expected to be partially applicable for studying investment behavior in mixed-market, 
developing or resource-based economies. The latter are usually faced with soft budget 
constraints, where ambitious investment and output targets replace profit- or value-maximizing 
objectives. In fact, the role of governments in allocating resource rents to various economic 
sectors gives rise to non-market determinants of investment in these countries. Hence, 
investment behavior in the respective economies could be distorted, leading to under-investment 
in firms which could potentially be profit-making or over-investment in loss-making firms as a 
result of inefficient credit allocations by the authorities. In particular, in oil-rich and oil-based 
developing economies such as Iran, investment could be chiefly oil-driven. Therefore, in 
determining domestic investment in these economies, the influence of market-oriented variables 
as specified by the conventional investment models may be relevant, but partially.   
 
Further, the survey of the literature on the resource curse thesis provides several explanations in 
addressing this paradox of plenty. At large, the literature identifies a range of arguments for the 
curse such as the structuralist and the Dutch Disease theories, the paradigm of the rentier state, 
volatility of resource prices and revenues as well as institutional causes. Nevertheless, the 
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question as to what causes the ‘curse’ rather than ‘blessing’ in resource-rich and developing 
economies cannot be answered by a single explanation. This is because these economies differ 
in their type of government, economic policies, political institutional economic system and 
international relations. This suggests that rather than trying to impose some sort of 
generalization, a case-by-case or a country-specific approach would be more appropriate in 
providing explanations for the resource curse. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the oil-rich 
and oil-based economy of Iran due to the country’s distinctive economic, political and 
institutional structure. As discussed in Chapter Two, the control of the state over resources 
coupled with different policies adopted by the government during the period under study 
brought about structural shifts in actual investment patterns within the Iranian economy by 
altering the distribution of financial resources towards services and manufacturing. This 
suggests that the country has been the subject of the Iranian-type Dutch Disease and, therefore, 
it is important to empirically evaluate this argument in the context of Iran’s actual investment 
behavior during the years under consideration. 
 
In brief, the Iranian economy has become an oil-based economy since the 1950s. The country 
has undergone dramatic political and economic upheavals during the period under study 
including the big nationalization and the introduction of the Islamic financial system during the 
early 1980s. Throughout the study period, the state has enjoyed a high degree of control in 
distributing a sizable share of oil income to decide on the pattern and pace of investment, and 
has played an influential role in the evolution of political structure and institutions of capital 
accumulation in the country. Also, the extent of government development expenditure for 
capital accumulation has been highly influenced by the expected oil income and its availability 
during the years under study. However, the availability of oil income as an important source of 
financing investment has been subject to uncertainty and Iran’s ability to borrow from the 
international capital markets has been restricted. Furthermore, the country’s economy is a partial 
market economy and the allocation of financial resources to firms in various economic sectors is 
not completely driven by the market mechanism. Having reviewed the literature on investment, 
and given Iran’s unique political economy and institutional setup, some interesting questions 
arise that are in line with the objectives of this study: 
 
1. (i) Are the modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment theories relevant and 
applicable at all in the context of the mixed-market, oil-rich and oil-based economy of 
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Iran? (ii) If yes, how successful are these models in describing aggregate- and sector-
level economic determinants of investment in the Iranian economy? 
2. To what extent can the modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models, to 
which oil-driven financial constraint measures are incorporated (as specified by cash 
flow models), explain investment patterns in the country? 
 
The second question further allows accommodating the principles of the theoretical framework 
of investment under uncertainty as financing investment in the Iranian economy are expected to 
be driven by the availability of oil income, and hence subject to uncertainty.44  
 
Consequently, the next chapter first aims at discussing the theoretical propositions behind the 
hypothetical relationships based on the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models of 
investment; the chapter also describes the methodology employed in the empirical analysis, 
namely the cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) method, to determine the theory-
consistent long-run cointegrating relationships. This is because a cointegration interpretation 
within the neoclassical-accelerator type framework is supported in the literature as an enriching 
method to model investment behavior (see among others, see Gerard and Verschueren, 2000). 
Moreover, employing the CVAR methodology, the identification and validation of long-run 
relations are supported by the evidence rather than by imposing them as a priori and allows 
producing new insights by testing economic phenomena associated with more than one 
economic theory. 
   
                                                          
44 See Chapters Five (Sections 5.4.5) for a discussion on oil-driven financial constraint measures used in this study. 
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4. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis investigates economic determinants of domestic investment in Iran and the extent to 
which these determinants are consistent with the theoretical framework of modified 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. Given the distinguishing characteristics of the 
Iranian economy, it could be expected that the existence of imperfect capital markets have 
influenced the country’s investment behavior. Also, the uncertainty associated with the 
unpredictable nature of international oil prices is expected to have had affected the availability 
of finance for investment activities in the country. Hence, it is necessary to incorporate 
uncertainty-driven financial constraints proxies as specified by the principles of cash flow 
models in modelling investment behavior in Iran. Furthermore, the CVAR approach developed 
by Johansen and Juselius allows identifying and validating theory-consistent long-run 
relationships between the variables of interest, rather than imposing them as a priori. 
Importantly, the CVAR methodology makes it possible to take a flexible approach to the 
empirical exploration through testing more than one economic theory, hence producing new 
insights based on the available data.  
 
Accordingly, the objectives of this chapter are: 
 
i) to develop a theoretically consistent model of investment within the framework of the 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment theories for the Iranian economy; 
ii) to extend this theoretically consistent model by incorporating (oil-driven) financial 
constraints measures as specified by cash flow models; 
iii) to describe the empirical methodology used in this thesis.  
 
Following this introduction, Section 4.2 provides an overview of the major issues related to the 
modeling of investment behavior, mainly in the context of imperfect capital markets. Section 4.3 
outlines the models of investment related to this study and develops a theoretically consistent 
model of investment based on the neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. Section 4.4 
explains the empirical methodology used in this study in detail. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes 
the chapter.  
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4.2. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
In this section, as a prerequisite background before the construction of a theoretically consistent 
model of domestic investment for the Iranian economy, some general issues are reviewed. 
Investment is one of the major determinants of long-term growth and plays a key role in 
explaining business cycle fluctuations.45 Yet, as discussed in Chapter Three, there is no general 
consensus on the identification of the factors that are believed to drive capital spending. If 
markets are characterized by imperfect information, investment funds may only be available in 
capital markets on less favorable terms, or may not be available at all. This entails that the 
investment spending of some firms may be constrained by the scarcity of funds; thus the main 
suggestions of the neoclassical investment theory are expected to hold partially.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in perfect capital markets, the financing decision of a 
firm is irrelevant for its investment behavior, implying that external and internal finance are 
perfect substitutes. The literature on financing constraints, however, suggests that in the 
presence of capital market imperfections investment is determined by a firm’s expected future 
profitability and not by the firm’s net worth or internal funds. Accordingly, some empirical 
papers examine the sensitivity of investment to cash flows as a proxy for financing constraints 
(see, among others, Bond and Meghir, 1994; Fazzari, et al., 1988; Harisson, et al., 2004). This 
body of literature supports the hypothesis that investment-cash flow sensitivities reflect the 
extent of financing constraints. At a macroeconomic level, however, capital market 
imperfections may result from a country’s limited ability to borrow from abroad. When an 
economy is credit-rationed in the face of the world credit markets, then it will be capital-scarce. 
In the context of the oil-based economy of Iran, the country’s ability to borrow in the 
international capital markets is constrained because of the economic sanctions imposed against 
Iran by the US and the international community. Also, the availability of oil revenues as the 
major source of financing investment is uncertain and affected by the volatility of international 
oil prices.  
 
Furthermore, the country’s economy is a mixed-market economy and investment has been partly 
determined by the Iranian government in its development plans and annual budgets over the 
                                                          
45 Investment is a crucial determinant of long-run economic growth and involves the formation of: (i) fixed (or 
tangible) capital e.g., machinery or factories; (ii) intangible capital e.g., reputations or technical knowledge; and 
(iii) human capital e.g., skills or education. This study is mainly concerned with investment in fixed capital.  
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years under study. As a result, the allocation of financial resources to firms in various economic 
sectors is expected to be incompletely driven by the ‘free play’ of market forces. Consequently, 
although market forces existed in the country throughout the study period, the border between 
the public and the private sector became blurred over time, particularly because of the role that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played in the country. As explained in Chapter Two, the SOEs 
and semi-SOEs are in charge of a high share of production units and activities in the economy 
and are provided with (indirect) financial support by the state regardless of their efficiency. In 
this picture, the presence of imperfect capital markets may have had an impact on investment 
behavior in the country’s various economic sectors. Also, investment is expected to have been 
affected by uncertainty stemming from the volatile nature of oil prices and oil revenues. This, in 
return, affects the government’s fiscal policy (via government spending channel) and monetary 
policy (through the user cost of capital and money supply channels) in the country. Thus, given 
the distinctive political economy and institutional features of the Iranian economy in comparison 
to that of less regulated economies, the question arises as to the extent to which the predictions 
of the conventional investment models hold in the context of the mixed-market economy of Iran. 
 
To address this question, this study uses two specifications on the demand side. The first one 
relates to Jorgenson’s neoclassical and the second one relates to Clarck’s, Chenery’s and 
Koyck’s accelerator models of investment demand. These models have been broadly used in the 
context of advanced economies and allow for testing whether, and the degree to which, 
investment behavior in the planned economy of Iran is consistent with the profit maximization 
hypothesis inherent in these models. It would be of interest for this thesis to investigate how 
well a mixed-market economy is able pre-determine some market-based determinants such as 
factor prices so as to generate the desired effects through incentivizing individual agents to 
respond to these factors in a profit-maximizing manner. On the supply side, I accommodate the 
principles of the cash flow model by incorporating oil-driven uncertainty measures of financial 
constraints related to financing investment both at aggregate and sectoral levels. This allows 
examining the significance of the availability of external finance for domestic investment in the 
country. The nature of imperfect capital markets in Iran makes it possible to assume that the 
investment behavior in some sectors (i.e. the prioritized sectors of the economy) could be more 
(structurally) influenced by the availability of oil windfalls in the economy.  
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4.3. THE NEOCLASSICAL-ACCELERATOR TYPE MODELS  
Clarck’s (1917) accelerator model relates investment to changes in output and Keynes’ (1936) 
General Theory provides an explanation for investment behavior based on the user cost of 
capital. Jorgenson (1963), based on a firm’s maximization behavior, proposes a synthesis of 
both approaches by providing an investment function taking into account Clark’s output demand 
and Keynes’ user cost of capital, postulating a long-run relationship of proportionality between 
capital, output and the user cost of capital.46 Accordingly, on the demand side, I start with the 
neoclassical model of investment which constitutes this study’s main conceptual framework for 
explaining the development of investment in the long-run.  
 
In the neoclassical model, as shown in Chapter Three, it is assumed that a firm maximizes a 
profit function πt = ptYt – wtLt – CtKt, subject to the Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function 
with constant returns to scale, Yt = f(Kt, Lt), Yt = AKt
αLt
1−α, where α + (1 – α) = 1, capital (Kt) 
and variable factor inputs (Lt) are substitutable and α is the output-capital elasticity.47 Yt is 
output, pt is the price of output, wt is the price of the labor input, and Ct is the user cost of capital 
services.48 All prices are taken as given. The maximization leads to the first order conditions 
                                                          
46 In line with the static analysis of the optimal capital stock, in his neoclassical theory of growth, Solow (1956) 
predicted that the growth rate of output would be independent of that of investment in the long-run. This (counter-
intuitive) outcome is derived as follows. Given the assumptions of constant return to scale, diminishing marginal 
productivity and a constant saving rate, there is a single optimal level of capital stock at any point in time in 
equilibrium, which corresponds to capital-output ratio. If the growth rate of capital stock rises above the growth rate 
of output, the production will become more capital-intensive and due to diminishing returns, then the risen rate of 
investment will have smaller impacts on output. For a given population, however, higher levels of investment 
results in higher output per capita as long as the marginal productivity of capital exceeds zero (although such 
investment will be increasingly inefficient and in the long-run, the growth rate of output per capita will be 
determined by technological progress that increases total factor productivity. The neoclassical growth theory does 
not address the sources of such critical technological advances. The (post-neoclassical) endogenous growth theory, 
however, explains that investment on R&D or human capital may be crucial factors in determining the long-run 
growth rate in an economy.  
47 The CD production function used here assumes: i) constant returns to scale (α + (1 – α) = 1): if capital and the 
variable factor inputs are multiplied by a positive constant, then the amount of output is also multiplied by the same 
amount (i.e. F(λK, λL) = λF(K, L) for all λ > 0); ii) positive and diminishing returns to inputs: for all K > 0 and L > 
0, F exhibits positive and diminishing marginal products with respect to each input. If the level of the variable 
factor inputs is held constant, then each additional unit of capital delivers additional output, but these additions 
decrease as the stock of capital rises. The same is true for the variable factor inputs (i.e. 𝜕F/𝜕K > 0; 𝜕2F/𝜕K2 < 0; 
𝜕F/𝜕L > 0; 𝜕2F/𝜕L2 < 0); iii) Inada conditions: the marginal product of capital (the variable factor inputs) 
approaches infinity as capital (the variable factor inputs) goes to zero and approaches zero as capital (the variable 
factor inputs) goes to infinity (i.e. lim
K→0
(𝜕F/𝜕K) = lim
N→0
(𝜕F/𝜕L) = ∞; lim
K→∞
(𝜕F/𝜕K) = lim
N→∞
(𝜕F/𝜕L) = 0).  
48 Based on the neoclassical theory of investment, given the assumptions of constant return to and diminishing 
marginal productivity of factors of production, the optimal capital stock will be at the point where the expected rate 
of return from the marginal investment equals the marginal cost of capital. Any investment more than this level 
would not be efficient and could result in a capital stock that is too high. This could become a policy concern, for 
instance, if the rate of return that investors require on investment (the cost of capital) becomes too high. Under the 
assumption of risk neutrality, the cost of capital would be identical to interest rate as it would not be important how 
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equating the marginal product of capital and inputs to their user cost and price of inputs, 
respectively. It must be noted that the maximization problem is actually intertemporal (i.e. 
maximize net worth over an infinite horizon). However, it reduces to a static profit 
maximization problem, because its optimality conditions only include variables in the current 
period due to the absence of adjustment costs, implying that capital stock can be adjusted 
without incurring costs at each point in time. From the first order derivative with respect to Kt, 
assuming that investment requires one period to be fully installed and given the CD production 
function, one can obtain:  
  
(4.1) α(Y/K)t = (C/p)t.  
 
Accordingly, the equilibrium level of capital stock Kt is given by:
49 
 
(4.2) Kt = α(pY/C)t. 
 
Equation (4.2) is the basis for the neoclassical investment equations, stating that investment 
depends on the cost of obtaining capital, and that there exists an inverse relationship between the 
desired capital stock and the cost of capital. Bean (1981) first incorporated the neoclassical 
theory of investment within a general-to-specific approach to the parameterization of the 
dynamic relationships between the variables (see also Carruth, et al., 2000).  
 
In this thesis, in line with Bean’s (ibid.) steady state approach, a static framework is adopted to 
show the basic arguments resulting in a reduced form empirical specification. Assuming a CES 
production function, which includes the CD production function as a special case and constant 
returns to scale technology, the demand for capital is:50 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
investment is financed (for example, by debt or equity). Nevertheless, since investors may be risk-averse, the cost 
of capital will be equal to interest rate plus a risk premium and could be time-varying. The required rate of return is 
net of depreciation known as the cost of finance. This rate, if gross of depreciation, is often referred to the user cost 
of capital.  
49 According to the Jorgensian model of investment, capital will be employed until the marginal cost of capital 
equals the marginal product of capital. 
50 In general, the three most commonly used production functions are the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), 
the Cobb-Douglas (CD), and Transcendental Logarithmic (Translog). The CD production function is a special case 
of CES and is thought to provide a reasonable description of actual economies. A unit elasticity of substitution 
corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas production function. Generally, the literature on macroeconomic production 
functions does not provide any support that would lead to choose one form over the other and aggregation issues 
pose a serious theoretical challenge to both CD and CES forms, hence one should avoid making strong inferences 
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(4.3) Kt = α(pY/C)t
σ,  
 
where Kt is capital, α is a constant, Yt is output, Ct is the user cost of capital and σ is the 
elasticity of substitution between factor inputs in equilibrium.51 Equation (4.3) yields: 
 
(4.4) 𝜕Yt/𝜕Kt = α(pY/K)t
1/σ
. 
 
Employing the static profit maximization condition implies: 
 
(4.5) αpt(Y/K)t
1/σ
 = Ct. Hence: 
 
(4.6) Kt = ptYt(α/C)t
1/σ
. 
 
In logarithmic form, equation (4.6) is: 
 
(4.7) kt = αˈ+ yt – ct, 
 
where kt = ln(Kt), αˈ = (1/σ)ln(α), yt = ln(ptYt), ct = (1/σ)ln(Ct) and ln refers to the natural 
logarithm. Given the capital accumulation identity equation (i.e. Kt = It + (1 – δ)Kt-1), capital 
stock in each period is derived from investment as well as the rate of depreciation δ and capital 
stock in the preceding period. In steady-state, the long-run equilibrium growth rate of capital 
stock is gt
K = ∆Kt/Kt-1. Accordingly, the capital accumulation identity equation in the steady 
state level can be written as: 
  
(4.8) It = (gt
K + δt)Kt-1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that cannot be justified (for the review of the empirical performance of the CES and the CD and their general 
theoretical problems with the use of aggregate production functions, see Miller, 2008). The Translog production 
function is a generalization of the CD production function and allows the partial elacticities of substitution between 
inputs to vary, thus avoiding strong assumptions about the production functions. 
51 A general form of the CES production function is as follows: Qt =  
F[α Ktr + (1 – α)Ltr]1/r, where F is factor productivity, α is the distribution parameter, r = (σ - 1)/σ, and σ is the 
elasticity of substitution (for instance see Eisner and Nadiri (1968)). 
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Substituting equation (4.3) into equation (4.8) eliminates the capital stock term and gives the 
following equation: 
 
(4.9) It+1 = α(gt
K + δt)[pY/C]t.  
 
From (4.8), It = gt
KKt-1 + δtKt-1, which can be written as Kt-1 = It/(gt
K + δt). Accordingly, in the 
steady state level at time t:  
 
(4.10) kt = it – ln(gt
K + δt), 
 
where it = ln(It). Equating equations (4.7) and (4.10) gives the following long-run equation: 
 
(4.11) it = β + yt – ct + ln(gt
K + δt),  
 
where β = ln(α'). 
 
As implied by equations (4.10) and (4.11), two cointegrating or long-run equilibrium 
relationships within the framework of modified neoclassical-accelerator type theories of 
investment are identified. This is an example of multi-cointegration introduced by Granger and 
Lee (1991). Equation (4.10), based on the capital accumulation identity (CAI) equation, implies 
that kt is positively related to it and negatively related to ln(g
k + δ)t. Equation (4.11), based on 
substituting the steady-state condition into the first order equation, implies that it is positively 
related to yt and ln(g
k
 + δ)t and negatively related to ct in the long-run. Furthermore, the lagged 
capital accumulation identity can be written as: 
 
(4.12) ΔKt/Kt-1 = – δt + It/Kt-1.  
 
This, to represent the error correction form, can be approximated as: 
 
(4.13) kt ≈ α0 + α1(it-1 – kt-1), 
 
where αi are coefficients.  
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However, as mentioned earlier, the Jorgensonian model is not a dynamic model because its 
optimality conditions only consist of variables in the current period as a result of the absence of 
adjustment costs.52 Yet, it is important to take into account the temporal nature of the data by 
examining both the stationarity of the data-series and cointegration in the investment functions. 
This is one of the reasons why investment can be well described by distributed lag models. For 
instance, following Bean (1981) and Carruth, et al., (2000), the discrete time equivalent of 
equation (4.11) can be shown in the following form, allowing for a general polynomial lag 
structure to model dynamic adjustment processes:  
 
(4.13 ˈ) α1(L)Δit = α0 + α2(L)Δyt + α3(L)Δct + β1it-j + β2yt-j + β3ct-j + et,  
 
where L is the lag operator and et is the error term. According to Carruth, et al., (2000), the 
parameterization of the log levels terms allows the imposition of a long-run steady-state solution 
in a conventional equilibrium correction form. Modelling investment in a vector error correction 
model will be explained in Section 4.4. However, it must be noted that the capital stock equation 
is just a capital accumulation identity equation. That is, if the capital stock is measured by 
cumulating the next investment flows, it is identically true that it will be related to investment 
and deprecation; hence it is not a behavioral equation. Therefore, the focus of this thesis will be 
merely on investment function and its dependence on oil.  
 
Given the recent theoretical focus on the role of uncertainty and financial constraints on 
investment, and that current profitability is a rather backward-looking signal of potential future 
earnings, a more accurate reflection of the expectations of investment determinants may be 
needed. Hence, in modelling the determinants of the steady-state level of investment, it could be 
crucial to take into account that investment spending may be responsive to uncertainty-driven 
financial constraints. This need could be more pronounced for the case of economies in 
transition, partial-market economies, and equally for resource-based economies like Iran. The 
latter is due to the significance of expectations of resource-rich and -dependent economies about 
resource rents for the formulation and implementation of their economic development plans and 
                                                          
52 This corresponds to a situation in which capital stock is adjusted without incurring costs and immediately at each 
time, implying that the rate at which capital changes over time (net investment) is infinite. In such models, it is not 
possible to study the effects of uncertainty on investment behavior. 
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investment spending.53 For instance, an oil shock due to decreased international oil prices could 
indirectly constrain the access of firms in various economic sectors to external finance through 
the bank lending channel effects. This in turn could intensify the fluctuations of the real 
economy and adversely affect investment spending in the country. This setting raises questions: 
(i) to what degree can the conventional neoclassical-accelerator type models help explain 
domestic investment in the oil-based Iranian context? (ii) To what extent is Iran’s investment 
pattern are related to oil-driven uncertainty measures of financial constraints? (iii) Could a 
windfall of oil revenues as a primary source of external financing be associated with a rise in 
investment spending at aggregate or sector-level?  
 
Within the body of literature on investment and financial constraints, the credit rationing theory 
of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explains that due to information asymmetries in the relationship 
between lender and borrower, firms’ demand for external capital is faced with an inadequate 
supply. This in turn leads to underinvestment for credit-rationed firms. To account for the 
likelihood that a firm may face constraints or transaction costs in obtaining external financing, a 
common approach is to augment firms’ investment demand equations by cash flow variables 
(Fazzari, et al., 1988).54 In these studies, a positive and significant investment-cash flow 
coefficient in the estimated models corresponds to binding liquidity constraints. Nevertheless, 
the estimated coefficients should be interpreted with caution depending on the context in which 
the study is conducted and the variables according to which financial constraints proxies are 
construed. For instance, in the context of resource-rich economies for which the measures of 
financial constraints tend to depend upon the availability of oil income, the findings should be 
explained in a different way. In the latter case, a positive relationship between investment and 
oil-based proxies of financial constraints may suggest that firms’ investment practices are not 
credit-rationed. However, an insignificant or negative coefficient may indicate that firms are 
liquidity-constrained.55  
                                                          
53 A body of literature attempts to explain that investment and financial decisions are related in such economies 
(see, among others, Rizov (2004) and Lizal and Svejnar (2002)). 
54 Cash flow is defined as profits after taxes plus depreciation less dividend payments to shareholders, and 
traditionally has accounted for a substantial share of firms’ sources of funding for investment. Other sources of 
funds, for instance, include debt financing and issuing of shares (see Chapter Three for discussion on models with 
cash flow variables). 
55 Another body of literature, concerning investment and financial constraints, is related to the soft budget 
constraint (SBC) theory of Kornai, et al., (1998). This theory explains the willingness of the state or other 
institutions to provide additional resources and extend credits to unprofitable or preferred firms with credit and tax 
privileges, direct or indirect subsidies and other policy instruments (or otherwise bail them out). Faced with SBCs, 
 110 
 
Accordingly, this study extends the theory-consistent investment equation derived above 
(equation 4.11) by accommodating the principles of cash flow models in the modelling of Iran’s 
investment as follows:  
 
(4.11ˈ) it = β + yt – ct + ln(gt
K + δt) + ft,  
 
where  refers to parameters associated with uncertainty-driven financial constraints variables ft 
in logs. The latter includes symmetric oil measures which are constructed and explained in detail 
in Chapter Five Section 5.4.5. The symmetric measures include: (a) the level of oil revenues; 
and (b) oil price volatility. As discussed in Chapter Two, it must be noted that the sign and 
persistence of investment and uncertainty relationship is yet subject to debates. Therefore, it is 
of both theoretical and empirical interest to investigate the importance of these measures on 
investment in the context of the oil-rich and oil-dependent economy of Iran (see also Section 
5.3).  
 
In sum, the main long-run equilibrium relationship is identified within the framework of 
(modified) neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment for the situation in which the 
financial constraints proxies do not have long-run impacts on domestic investment behavior in 
Iran. This long-run relationship is given by equations 4.10. As specified by the principles of the 
cash flow models, this equation is then incorporated by oil-driven financial constraints measures 
as shown in equation 4.11ˈ.  
 
In modelling investment, when aggregate data are used, the most commonly employed 
econometric framework is the cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model. In this study, 
similarly, Juselius’ (2006) approach is used to allow for investigating the existence of long-run 
relationships among the variables under consideration as specified by the theory. In what 
follows, the methodology used in this study is explained. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
firms’ investment may take place regardless of the availability of external funds as capital access is not limited due 
to public support and may not depend on the firms’ capital structure. This can result in over-investment in 
unprofitable firms, leading to capital misallocation and waste of resources. For the case of Iran, because of the 
existence of the SOEs, the border between the public and private sector is unclear. Therefore, it is very hard to 
gather adequate and reliable data to draw conclusions based on the SBC theory. Besides, a body of literature 
questions the SBC theory and argues that ‘there are only binding and non-binding constraints; no such thing as a 
‘soft’ constraint has ever existed’ (Lue, 2014, p. 206). For the reasons mentioned above, this study does not 
consider this concept any further.    
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4.4. THE COINTEGRATED VAR METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the CVAR methodology employed in the empirical analysis of this thesis. 
The CVAR methodology is a data first methodology, which allows structuring the data in such a 
way that prior hypotheses can be examined rather than imposed from the outset. 
4.4.1. THE CVAR METHODOLOGY 
Many economic time-series exhibit non-stationary behavior in their mean or trending pattern. 
Therefore, in order to determine the appropriate method of time-series econometric analysis, a 
common approach is to identify the form of the trend in the data and whether individual data 
series contain unit root properties.56 If the data is trending, then some form of de-trending is 
needed. The most common de-trending practices are differencing and time-trend regressions. 
The former is appropriate for I(d) time-series (where d ≠ 0), whereas the latter is relevant for 
trend stationary I(0) time-series data. ‘A stochastic process is stationary if its first and second 
moments are time invariant’ (Lutkepohl, 2005). A series can have both a stochastic and a 
deterministic trend component. Formally, if a series yt becomes stationary on differencing once, 
such as a pure random walk series, then it is said to be integrated of order one, denoted by I(1). 
For example, a pure random walk is given by Δyt = (yt – yt-1) = (1 – L)yt = εt, where Δ is the 
difference operator, L is the lag operator, and εt are the errors assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed random variables with constant variance. In this case, yt is I(1), thus Δyt is 
I(0); if yt is I(d), then Δyt is I(d-1). 
 
When two or more non-stationary variables of different orders of integration are linearly 
combined to form a relationship, the relationship will be zero (not necessarily spurious). A 
spurious relationship, however, arises when one nonstationary variable is regressed on another 
unrelated variable of the same order of integration. If the variables are integrated of the same 
orders, cointegration techniques can be employed to model the long-run relations present in the 
data series. Thus, the first step in cointegration modelling is often taken by testing for unit roots 
to determine whether trending data should be differenced or regressed on deterministic functions 
of time. The most common unit root tests are Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1979), Kwaitkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) (Kwaitkowski, et al., 1992), and 
Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS) (Elliott, et al., 1996) tests.  
                                                          
56 However, it must be noted that the strength of the CVAR model is that it works equally well whether all variables 
are unit root variables or some of them are stationary. Also, contrary to the static regression model, two unrelated 
non-stationary variables cannot be cointegrated and the test is very powerful to show this. 
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However, the CVAR model does not require explicit univariate unit root test. Alternatively, it 
tests for the presence of unit root and stationarity relationships between the time-series variables 
(in a multivariate manner) in a vector when testing for cointegrating ranks (see Juselius, 2006, 
pp.131-36). Employing the CVAR methodology, it is shown in Chapters Five and Six that the 
process generating the time-series data used in this study are not stationary; therefore, we can 
proceed to cointegration tests. 
 
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models, based on normally distributed (Gaussian) errors, have 
been frequently used to model time-series macroeconomic data. This is mainly because these 
models provide a good fit to macroeconomic data and allow for combining short-run and long-
run information in the time-series data by exploiting the cointegration properties of them 
(Juselius, 2006, p.14). The CVAR methodology employed in this study follows Johansen (1996) 
and Juselius (2006) approach. Under the assumption of multivariate normality, the CVARs are 
the linear representation of a vector of observable variables on their own lags (and possibly on 
exogenous variables), and are economically interpretable under certain theoretically-driven and 
statistically acceptable identifying and over-identifying restrictions. Assuming a p-dimensional 
VAR(k), vector xt can be expressed as follows:  
 
(4.14) xt = ∑  kτ=1 Πxt-i + ΦDt + εt, 
 
where xt comprises both endogenous and exogenous variables, a vector of deterministic 
components Dt (including constant and dummies), and independent Gaussian errors ε with zero 
mean and variance Ω (see Chapters Five and Six for details). Equation (4.14) refers to an 
unrestricted VAR model because no conditions on the parameters are imposed, and is equivalent 
to the reformulation of the covariance of the data (Juselius, 2006, p.46). For simplicity, 
assuming a VAR(2) model where k = 2, then equation (4.14) can be written as: 
 
(4.15) xt = Π1xt-1 + Π2xt-2 + ΦDt + εt. 
 
The error correction form of the above VAR(2) model is then obtained by adding – xt-1 to both 
sides of expression (4.15) as follows: 
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(4.16) xt – xt-1 = Π1xt-1 – xt-1 + Π2xt-2 + ΦDt + εt, 
 
where Dt is a vector of deterministic components. Then, first adding and then subtracting Π2xt-1 
to the right hand side of equation (4.16) gives the following: 
 
(4.17) xt – xt-1 = (Π1 – I)xt-1 + Π2xt-1 + Π2xt-2 – Π2xt-1 + ΦDt + εt. 
 
Equation (4.17) can be re-written as: 
 
(4.18) Δxt = (Π1 + Π2 – I)(xt-1) + (Π2)(xt -2 – xt-1) + ΦDt + εt. 
 
Lastly, setting – (I – Π1 + Π2) = Π and – Π2 = Γ in equation (4.18), gives the following vector 
error correction model (VECM): 
 
(4.19) Δxt = Πxt-1 + ΓΔxt-1 + ΦDt + εt, εt ~ N(0, Ω) for t = 1, …, T. 
 
Equation (4.19) can then be generalized with k lags as follows: 
 
(4.20) Δxt = Πxt-1 + ∑  k−1i=1 ΓiΔxt-i + ΦDt + εt, 
 
where xt-1 is the lagged levels, and Π is the matrix of coefficients and contains information about 
long-run effects, hence is of particular interest when solving the cointegration problem. Γ 
contains short-run information about the time-series data and describes pure transitory effects 
measured by the lagged changes of the variables (Juselius, 2006, p.63).  
 
The presence of unit roots (i.e. the stochastic trends) in the unrestricted VAR model corresponds 
to non-stationary stochastic behavior and leads to a reduced rank condition (r < p) restriction of 
the long-run level matrix Π. Within the VAR model, accordingly, the cointegration hypothesis 
can be formulated as a reduced rank restriction on the Π matrix. If the vector xt ~ I(1), then Δxt 
~ I(0), indicating that Π cannot have full rank as this would result in inconsistency in equation 
(4.20) (Juselius, 2006, p.80). Therefore, Π has a reduced rank and can be decomposed as 
follows: 
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(4.21) Π = αβ' 
         Δxt = αβ'xt-1 + ∑  k−1i=1 ΓiΔxt-i + ΦDt + εt,       εt ~ N(0, Ω), 
 
where Π is a p x r matrix of long-run coefficients, α is the matrix of loading coefficients, and β 
is the matrix of long-run coefficients. If r = p, then xt is stationary, hence standard inference 
applies. If r = 0, then there are p independent trends in xt and the vector process is driven by p 
different stochastic trends which have no stochastic trends in common and do not move 
together. Thus, no stationary cointegration relations between the levels of the variables can be 
obtained. Under these circumstances, the VAR model in levels can be re-written as a VAR 
model in differences, and as Δxt ~ I(0), standard inference for this model is applicable. On the 
other hand, if there are r cointegrating relations (0 < r < p) between the variables, then xt ~ I(1) 
and there exists r stationary linear combinations in the data-series. The reduced form in equation 
(4.21) can be written in a structural form by pre-multiplying it with a non-singular p x p matrix 
A0 as follows:  
 
(4.22) A0Δxt = A0αβ'xt-1 + ∑  k−1i=1 A0ΓiΔxt-i + A0ΦDt + A0εt. 
 
Finally, equation (4.22) can be written as: 
  
(4.23) A0Δxt = Θβ'xt-1 + ∑  k−1i=1 θAiΔxt-i + Φ̃Dt + vt, vt ~ N(0, ∑), 
 
where the relation between short-run parameters of the reduced form in (4.21) and the structural 
form in (4.23) are given by: α = A0-1Θ, Γi = A0-1θ, εt = A0-1vt, Φ = A0-1Φ̃, and  
Ω = A0-1∑A'0-1. The parameters of the reduced form are obtained from the data-series, whereas 
A0 is estimated by the imposition of further restrictions. It must be noted that the identifications 
of short-run and long-run structures are considered as different statistical problems. The short-
run parameters of the reduced form are uniquely defined, whereas those of the structural form 
are not, unless a minimum of p(p-1) just-identifying restrictions are imposed. The long-run 
matrix β is the same in the reduced and structural forms; therefore, cointegrating relations can be 
estimated in both forms. However, in order for the normalized uniquely defined long-run 
parameters to correspond to economic identification, a minimum of r(r-1) just-identifying 
restrictions are required to be imposed on β (Juselius, 2006).  
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The CVAR model used in this chapter is specified in terms of a vector ‘x’, containing both 
endogenous and exogenous variables. The blip dummies are specified based on large 
observations in some of the residuals (see Chapter Five Section 5.5 and Chapter Six Section 6.5 
for discussion on blip dummies). In VECM notation, the cointegrating vectors in terms of the 
endogenous variables are included in the dynamic specification given by:57  
 
(4.24) Δxt = Πxt-1 + ∑  k−1i=1 Γi(L)Δxt-i + εt,        
 
where L is the lag operator, Π = αβ', and x is a matrix of I(1) variables. For instance, in the 
baseline VECM model, there are five endogenous variables with two cointegrating vectors. For 
this model, accordingly, the long-run matrix can be decomposed into the following reduced rank 
form:   
 
(4.25) αβ'xt = 
[
 
 
 
 
α11   α12
α21   α22
α31   α32
α41  α42
α51   α52]
 
 
 
 
[
β11   
β21   
β12
β22
   β13   
β23
β14  β15 
β24  β25
]
[
 
 
 
 
i
y
c
ln(gk +  δ)
dp ]
 
 
 
 
  ,  
 
(4.26) Γi(L)Δxt-i =  ∑  k−1i=1 Γi(L)Δ(i, y, c, ln(g
k
 + δ), dp)'t-i, 
 
where β defines the cointegrating vectors. A cointegrating vector could for instance represent the 
long-run relationships between (it, yt, ct, ln(g
k
 + δ)t, dpt). Inflation (dpt) acts ‘as a proxy for the 
(missing) market interest rate’ for the case of the Iranian economy (Esfahani, et al., 2009, p.1).58  
However, it must be noted that a cointegration relation is not necessarily the same as an 
economic relation as an economic relation can be the sum of two or several cointegration 
relations. α is the speed of adjustment and the response of each variable to the cointegrating 
vectors (the loadings). Not all of the variables necessarily respond to all of the vectors. In the 
next two chapters, the CVAR models are estimated for the economy as a whole and on a sector-
level basis, respectively.  
 
                                                          
57 It must be noted that if some of the variables are exogenous, they have separate equations (the marginal 
equations). For instance, if there are p variables, but one is exogenous, then there are p – 1 equations in the CVAR. 
58 See Chapter Five (Section 5.4.3) for a description of the method of construction of this variable. 
t 
 116 
 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter, firstly, provided a theoretical framework for Iran’s investment behavior motivated 
by the modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. Accordingly, domestic 
investment in the Iranian context is modelled by a function for gross domestic investment given 
by equation 4.11. In particular, the CD production function is replaced by the CES production 
function to relax the restrictive assumptions regarding the interactions between capital and labor 
in production. Secondly, because the Jorgensonian model is not a dynamic model, this thesis 
attempts to overcome this shortcoming by modelling investment in a vector error correction 
model (VECM). This approach makes it possible to take into account the dynamic nature of the 
data and allows for the estimation of flexible specifications for the short-run investment 
dynamics from the data. Further, the CVAR methodology allows producing insights based on 
the data by testing long-run relations instead of imposing them as a priori. 
 
Thirdly, uncertainty-driven measures of financial constraints are incorporated into the long-run 
relationships, given by equation 4.11ˈ, to consider the presence of imperfect capital markets for 
investment behavior in the Iranian context as well as the effects of financial constraints for 
investment activities in the country. This is because, although Jorgenson identifies key factors in 
determining the current level of a firm’s investment (e.g., current and expected levels of 
demand, relative factor prices and income tax), it assumes that the future variables are known 
and that capital markets are perfect. However, these assumptions do not hold if the firms are 
uncertain or have different expectations about the future.59  
 
In fact, investment has to be financed and is likely to be influenced by the efficiency of financial 
markets in providing finance and the terms upon which the finance is available. Therefore, there 
is a need to take into account that investment could be sensitive to proxies of financial 
constraints when modelling investment. This need is particularly important for investment 
modelling of resource-rich and -dependent economies like Iran. This is because, in these 
economies, the proxies for financial constraints often depend on the availability of oil windfalls 
                                                          
59 As discussed earlier, the Jorgensonian-type investment models implicitly assume that the supply of investment 
funds is perfectly elastic and that investment decisions and financial decisions are separable under the assumption 
of perfect capital markets. Also, investment should not be constrained by a shortage of internal funds where capital 
markets are perfect and tax treatment of various sources of investment funds are the same. However, the 
assumption of a perfect capital market is not supported by economic facts. Some empirical studies of investment 
and financial constraints provide evidence that the assumption of perfect capital markets is not realistic and firms 
may face liquidity constraints for investment activities (Kuh, 1963; Bond and Jenkinson, 1996) 
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as a source for capital spending. Also, despite the uncertain nature of international resource 
prices, formulating economic policies in these economies is usually based on expectations about 
the future income streams from their resources with implications for investment practices.  
 
Chapters Five and Six estimate the CVAR model for the Iranian economy on aggregate and 
sectoral levels, respectively. In each chapter, the analysis begins by conducting misspecification 
tests, determining cointegration ranks, and identifying the long-run equilibrium and then the 
short-run dynamic structures, employing general-to-specific CVAR modelling described by 
Juselius (2006). The robustness of the results is examined by employing alternative measures of 
the user cost of capital and uncertainty-driven proxies of financial constraints.  
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5. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF AGGREGATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
IN IRAN 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, a theory-consistent model of investment is estimated to investigate the long-run 
economic determinants of aggregate domestic investment in the oil-rich economy of Iran during 
the period from 1974 to 2011. In Iran, investment is a rather fluctuating component of GDP (see 
Figure 5.1). The volatility of investment is expected to be at least partly caused by uncertainty 
stemming from fluctuations in international oil prices through their impact on oil revenue 
availability as a source of capital spending. Thus, in studying aggregate investment 
determinants, it is important to incorporate oil-driven financial constraint measures into the 
modelling of the country’s investment behavior. This chapter, therefore, aims at providing 
answers to the following questions: 
 
a. (i) What are the economic determinants of aggregate domestic investment in the oil-rich 
partial-market economy of Iran? (ii) To what extent does the modified neoclassical-
accelerator type model of investment (derived in Chapter Four) provide an explanation 
for aggregate investment in the country? (iii) What are the key underlying reasons for 
(likely) partial applicability of such model it the Iranian context? 
b. (i) Does the presence of oil play a role in shaping the investment pattern in Iran? (ii) Is 
aggregate investment responsive to the availability of oil windfalls and/or to the 
volatility of international oil prices (iii) Are these responses asymmetric?60  
c. To what extent have other factors such as the oil shocks, the Iranian revolution or the 
Iran-Iraq war influenced the basic relationships discussed under (a) and (b)? 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of Iran’s aggregate 
investment pattern over the period under study. Section 5.3 specifies the estimation model. 
Section 5.4 outlines the variables used in this study and their sources. Section 5.5 estimates a 
cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model for Iran’s aggregate investment where the 
evidence of cointegrating relations is supported by the data. Section 5.6 presents the Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs). Finally, section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
                                                          
60 Various methods are used, as explained in Chapter Three Section 3.3, to construct different measures of oil. 
Therefore, these measures, although presenting some co-moving behavior, are not the same (see also Appendix 5B, 
Figures for the graphs of various oil measures). 
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5.2. AGGREGATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR IN IRAN 
Theoretically, investment decisions can be made either by individuals, firms, governments, or 
all of them. In the oil-driven economy of Iran, the government intervenes in the country’s 
economic life. This includes assigning a budget for capital spending as a tool for promoting 
investment activities.61 The government regulates the quantity of credits allocated to the 
economy for investment through different methods. Firstly, the government determines the 
credits that are to be directly distributed in its annual budgets. Secondly, it controls the supply of 
credits provided by the Iranian banks through a system of bank specific lending quotas (CBI, 
2002). The government further sets the quantity of credits allocated for the major economic 
sectors including agriculture, manufacture, construction, exports and services in order to give 
priority to its preferred sectors. In addition, the government sets the official lending and deposit 
rates of return in the banking systems, which is one of the key determinants of investment 
according to the neoclassical theory of investment.62 
 
Thus, the Iranian government supports investment expenditure through intervention in the 
financial markets.63 Such interventions have resulted in a rather rapid  
expansion of a system of deposit mobilization and high overdues on loans. For instance, the 
expansion of subsidized credits coupled with low lending real rates of  
return encouraged excessive lending in the country’s banking system, which resulted in as high 
as 25 percent growth of non-performing loans in 2010 (CBI, 2010; Shajari and Shajari, 2012).64 
In addition to their lending practices, these banks take deposits; yet, a considerable part of their 
loanable funds is financed by the central government and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). The 
latter supervises all the credit institutions and banks. Once the government approves the annual 
budgets, the CBI presents its credit and monetary policies to the Money and Credit Council 
(MCC), where the annual credit allocation to various economic sectors including the private 
sector is set.  
                                                          
61 The budget is subject to the availability of a key source of finance, i.e. oil income. Since oil activities are under 
the control of the Iranian state, an essential part of the income generated in this sector accrues to the government in 
the form of government resource (or oil) revenues.  
62 See Chapter Two (Sections 2.2 and 2.3) for a discussion on the role of the state in the process of capital 
accumulation and the evolution of investment institutions in Iran during the study period.  
63 Although, the CBI is formally an independent institution, in practice it does not have the ability to design or 
conduct proactive monetary and fiscal policies. The government instead controls lending and investment activities 
of the banks (Jafari-Samimi, 2010; see also Chapter Two Section 2.3). 
64 A non-performing loan is ‘defined as a loan that is not earning income when the bank can no longer anticipate the 
full payment of principal and interest which are past due by 90 days or more, or at least 90 days of interest 
payments have been capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement’ (Shajari and Shajari, 2012, p.166).  
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The lending and deposit rates are centrally administrated and change only at infrequent 
intervals, hence do not reflect market conditions. Due to highly persistent inflation and the 
deterioration of the value of the Iranian currency, these rates have been kept superficially very 
low with zero or negative real returns on deposit and saving accounts.65 This, in return, has 
discouraged savings and has adversely affected the flow of funds through the financial 
intermediaries and within the banking system, and so the availability of finance for investment 
activities.66 The unavoidable consequence of low lending rates has been excess demand for bank 
credits and credit rationing. Consequently, the domestic credit markets in Iran operate under 
tight controls and lending rates are not market-determined, making them relatively non-
responsive to the changes in the economy’s inflationary pressures.  
 
In 1979, the lending rates for short-term and long-term deposits were 7 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively. In 1984, after the approval of the interest-free banking, the MCC approved legal 
limitations and conditions necessary for granting of banking facilities. Since then these rates 
have been fluctuating widely between 4 and 23 percent across various economic sectors; the 
former and the latter corresponding to the minimum and the maximum expected rates of profits 
on facilities to the agriculture sector and commerce, respectively (see Appendices 2B and 2C). 
The legal reserve rates are set to mainly control the implementation of the monetary policy and 
the inflationary effects of credits granted by the banking system in the Iranian economy. First 
used in 1946, the banks were required to deposit 15 percent of their deposits in the Central 
Bank. This ratio demonstrated an ascending trend until 1973. For example, this rate increased to 
20 percent and 30 percent in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively; but in 1974, following the 
sudden increase in oil prices, the CBI lowered the required reserve deposit ratio to 25 percent to 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 This situation is worsened especially when the black market for gold coins, cars and foreign currency provides 
higher returns in the short-run. 
66 Under the arrangement of Islamic banking, interest paying deposits with the banking system are viewed as 
participation in the investment activities of the banking system. Such deposits are subject to two profit rates. An 
initial rate, known as the ‘provisional’ or ‘alal-hessab’ rate which is announced at the time deposits are placed with 
the banks; and a ‘final or actual’ rate which is computed on the basis of the bank’s operations at the end of the year. 
However, in practice, the provisional and actual returns are very close. See Chapter Two Section 2.3 for a more 
detailed account of Iran’s financial and banking system.  
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provide further credits for the private sector. In 1978, because of the political and economic 
upheavals in the country and people’s inclination to withdraw their deposits from the banking 
system, this ratio decreased to as low as 10 percent (Izadi and Izadi, 2013). After the Islamic 
revolution, depending on the banks’ liabilities and fields of activities and in accordance to the 
Iranian Monetary and Banking Law, the CBI has been determining this rate within a range of 10 
and 30 percent.  
 
During the years under consideration, the tax system in the country has helped finance only a 
trivial share of the government’s expenditures due to the small fraction of taxes in total 
government revenues. Between 1971 and 2010, the share of taxes in total government revenues 
averaged only about 30 percent per annum with small variations throughout the period. The 
highest average per annum share of taxes was related to corporate tax (11%) followed by import 
tax (9%), sales and consumption tax (5%) and wealth tax (1%). Compared to the post-
revolutionary years, during the years from 1970 and 1978, the average annual share of taxes in 
total government revenues recorded a slightly lower rate. In addition to the expected rates of 
profit on facilities in the large state-owned commercial banks, limited credits at subsidized rates 
have been available for various economic sectors and the state has paid the difference between 
the lending and the subsidized rates. In the years after the revolution, the cost of loans has often 
been lower for those firms with access to the state-owned banks’ credits as the private banks and 
non-bank credit institutions are able to charge about 4-5 percent per annum higher lending rates 
on their loans. Small enterprises have often been rationed with low collaterals.  
There are also hidden costs associated with obtaining loans including long waiting lists (Jalali-
Naini, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.1 displays the aggregate investment-GDP ratio in the Iranian economy during the years 
under consideration. The average ratio was as high as 33% p.a. during 1965-2010, typically for 
commodity exporters, and particularly oil producers, due to investment-inducing effects of large 
influx of commodity income in these economies.67 Nevertheless, the country’s output growth 
did not record as high as its investment growth. For most of the years under study, the aggregate 
 
                                                          
67 See Cherif and Hasanov (2012) for a detailed discussion on oil exporting countries’ investment share. 
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investment rate fluctuated and followed a similar pattern to the movements of real oil revenues 
and international oil prices, with three distinct trending patterns.68 The aggregate investment rate 
rose during most of the 1960s and 1970s, with a substantial increase following the first oil shock 
in 1973.  
 
The share of aggregate investment in GDP illustrated a considerable downward trend during the 
1980s largely due to the revolution and the uncertain political atmosphere it left in its aftermath, 
the Iran-Iraq war and the third oil shock of the mid-1980s. After the war and given the favorable 
international oil prices, the investment rate recovered for most of the 1990s and 2000s. An 
exception was the decline of the aggregate investment rate in the mid-1990s chiefly due to the 
country’s foreign debt crisis coupled with lower international oil prices, which in return, left 
insufficient foreign exchange resources to finance capital spending on a large scale.  
 
Figure 5-1 Investment-GDP ratio 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the evolution of the real Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR), defined as 
the ratio of gross investment to changes in output, which is the reciprocal of marginal product of 
capital stock. The ICOR measures the increment in capital needed to produce an additional unit 
of output and therefore can be considered as a measure of efficiency of capital. During the years 
under consideration, the ICOR exhibited a fluctuating and upward trend, with recurrent hikes 
particularly after the revolution since 1980s, suggestive of the destruction of existing capital due 
to the war and the declining investment efficiency in the country. At large, is seems that Iran has 
                                                          
68 See Chapter Two Section 2.4.2 for graphs and discussion on the co-moving pattern of real aggregate investment 
and the growth rate of real oil prices. Also see Section 2.4.2 in Chapter Two for graphs and discussion on the 
development of real aggregate investment, real public and private investment growth rates and real sectoral 
investment during the period under study. 
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rather over-invested particularly since the implementation of its post-revolutionary development 
plans and that the government has played an interventionist role in the size of real investment 
and in the allocation of mainly oil-based financial resources to various economic sectors. 
 
Figure 5-2 Incremental capital-output ratio                                   
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data from CBI. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, during the years under study, Iran experienced some major 
political events and its political economy and institutions underwent substantial changes. These 
included different oil shocks, the revolution, the war with Iraq, and the implementation of 
various economic reforms reflected in the country’s development plans throughout the study 
years. Therefore, although the above analysis allows investigating the long-run relationships 
between the theory-motivated variables under study, it could be expected that at least some of 
these events to have affected some of the variables in the models stated above. 
 
In brief, from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, real oil revenues gradually increased. 
Although the oil sector share in GDP was about 20 percent on average, this was achieved in a 
rather low inflationary economic environment due to higher oil output growth. However, the 
1970s were characterized by considerable oil price increases with oil revenue growth of about 
14% p.a. on average during that time. In particular, oil revenues increased over 30% p.a. Until 
the mid-1970s. Consequently, the Shah’s regime injected significant sums of money into the 
economy and replaced the development plans’ projections by ambitious targets. As a result, the 
oil sector’s share in the economy grew to about 50%, yet the production capacity did not 
increase comparatively. The state’s rapid fiscal expansion considerably increased the liquidity 
base and the dependency of the country on oil windfalls, and resulted in inflationary pressures in 
the economy.  
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The 1980s were characterized by the regime shift, the war between Iran and Iraq, the big 
nationalization of various private sectors and stagnation. In the immediate post-war era, high 
growth rates seemed feasible with injections of money in the economy. During 1989-1996, 
assessments in the first post-revolutionary development plan aimed at rapid expansion of the oil 
sector, export promotion, reduced import controls and attracting foreign investment.69 The key 
objectives of the first plan were to employ expansionary financial policy including monetary 
expansion and short-run external borrowing to finance public investment spending, maintaining 
negative real lending rates as well as depreciated exchange rates.  
 
However, the experience of the Iranian economy during the first plan was unstable growth due 
to short-term planning and speculations. The optimism regarding the amount  
of oil windfalls due to oil price fluctuations in the 1980s proved not to be adequate. At first, the 
volatility of oil prices was attributed to the Iran-Iraq war and considered transitory.  
But, persistent fluctuations of oil prices throughout the first plan made policy  
makers realize that oil prices were determined in the international markets. During  
this period, the government’s economic liberalization policies, along with  
the single floating exchange-rate mechanism fueled inflation and income  
disparity. Also, price distortions led to further inflationary pressures in the  
economy. 
 
The second plan, implemented during Rafsanjani’s presidency, was more inward-looking and 
drawn with two high-end and low-end scenarios for resources and quantitative goals. The 
second plan focused on issuing investment certificates, promoting private non-bank credit 
institutions and setting lending rates at levels that ensured positive real return on bank deposits. 
The economy, however, witnessed the reoccurrence of stagflation (which it suffered from during 
the 1980s) due to the debt crisis of 1993, high inflation and slowed economic growth. Although 
economic performance started to recover at a steady level since 1994, the actual annual rates of 
growth and investment remained lower than their targets.  
 
Coinciding with Khatami’s presidential years, the third plan’s main macroeconomic policies 
focused on the privatization of the large public sector, limiting subsidies and price decontrols, 
                                                          
69  See Chapter Two Table 2.1 for a comparison of projected versus actual figures on economic indicators in Iran. 
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moving away from administered credit allocation and establishing an oil fund. Also, the plan 
aimed at encouraging investments through reducing aggregate consumption for the promotion of 
faster fixed capital formation and FDI. The former proved to be disappointing mainly because 
both public and private consumption expenditures highly exceeded their projected figures. The 
increase in the private sector expenditure was driven by plentiful oil receipts, greater money 
supply and new possibilities for purchases on credit. The higher than targeted increase in public 
consumption was partly because of the reckless spending inclination among public agencies and 
stickiness of government current expenditures. The real expected rates of return on facilities 
remained mandatorily low. Further, due to increased use of capital-intensive technology and the 
choice of capital-intensive projects, capital productivity did not increase much.  
 
The main objective of the establishment of the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) during this period 
was to cushion the economy from unexpected oil price fluctuations and eventual oil price 
decline. The government was authorized to draw from the OSF only when the oil windfalls fell 
below the budget target for the year. In practice, however, during the plan’s period which 
coincided with steady increase in oil prices, the parliament (Majlis) frequently allowed 
withdrawals from the fund to curb budget deficits. The rest of the fund was partially used to 
support the war veterans, disabled and military militia (Basij), to help the agriculture sector 
against drought and to finance subsidies. The plan proved to be unable to control prices and 
inflation. Even though the actual oil windfalls earnings in the fourth plan were 
about three times of the projected amount, their economic impact was much less than expected. 
The real annual average investment growth recorded much lower than its target, contributing 
further to low GDP growth and high inflation.  
 
Accordingly, it could be expected that at least some of the events above to have affected the 
estimation models presented in Section 5.3. According to Juselius (2006), the need for dummies 
could be (tentatively) identified by checking the residuals, but should only be considered if the 
large residual corresponds to a known intervention, a reform or a regime shift. Further, a large 
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residual does not imply that the model exclusively needs an impulse dummy. A large outlier 
could indicate a shift in the level of one or more variables. Hence, the appropriate procedure is 
first to examine whether there has been a shift in the equilibrium mean (using a step dummy) 
and, if so, to estimate the model with such a shift plus additionally an impulse dummy (blip 
dummy) in the short-run part of the model. If the step dummy is insignificant, then only the 
impulse dummy can be included in the model. Given that the interventions in the Iranian 
economy have been very significant, a priori one would expect to see changes in the equilibrium 
means. When appropriate, therefore, dummy variables are included in the empirical models to 
capture their associated effects on the models (see Section 5.5.2). In what follows, the 
estimation investment model for the oil-based economy of Iran is explained and a number of 
hypotheses are stated. 
 
5.3. THE ESTIMATION MODEL 
In specifying and estimating Iran’s model of investment behavior within the modified 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment models, the widely-used Johansen’s (1996) and 
Juselius’ (2006) CVAR approach is employed. The basic idea behind this methodology is to 
describe the macro-economy by a linear representation of a vector of observable variables on 
their own lags, and where applicable, on exogenous variables. These vectors are economically 
interpretable under certain identification and over-identification restrictions imposed by 
economic theories.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.3), the following long-run capital equation (4.11) was 
derived in Chapter Four:  
 
(5.1) it = β + yt – ct + ln(gt
K + δt), 
 
where β = ln(α'), kt is the capital stock at time t, yt is output at time t, ct is the user cost of capital 
at time t, gk is the growth rate of capital and β is a constant.  
 
Since Iran’s economy is an oil-based economy, it is important to incorporate measures of oil-
driven uncertainty into investment modelling of the country (as specified by the cash flow 
models). This provides an insight into whether any relationships exist between aggregate 
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investment and alternative measures of oil-driven uncertainty. In resource-rich economies, the 
relationship between natural resources and economic activities is yet subject to debate. Some 
scholars argue that there is a negative relationship between the abundance of natural resources 
and economic performance. However, others suggest that natural resources are neither curse nor 
blessing, and that various factors such as low levels of human capital, debt overhang or poor 
political and financial institutions are among the core issues causing crises (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Lederman, 2007). However, the capital stock equation could be considered as a capital 
accumulation identity equation. That is, if the capital stock is measured by cumulating the next 
investment flows, it is identically true that it will be related to investment and deprecation; 
hence it is not a behavioral equation. Accordingly, this study chooses to focus merely on the 
investment function in the empirical analysis.70 
 
A common approach in the early studies was to stipulate a linear relationship between the 
changes in oil prices and economic performance (Darby, 1982; Hamilton, 1883). The oil price 
collapse of the 1980s spurred research efforts to derive new specifications that produce a more 
responsive oil-macroeconomy relationship, one of which was the notion of asymmetry in the 
economy’s response to positive and negative oil price changes (Hamilton, 1996; Mork, 1989). 
Early studies on net oil importing economies show that oil price increases and decreases are 
associated with significant recession and insignificant boom, respectively (Mork, 1989, 1994; 
Mory, 1993; Hamilton, 1996). Asymmetric responses could be different in net oil exporting 
economies where positive and negative oil shocks may have significant aggregating and 
insignificant dampening effects, respectively, on the economic activities of these countries (Eika 
and Magnussen, 2000; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005; Korhonene and Ledyaeva, 2010; 
Dissou, 2010; Gausden, 2010; Mendora and Vera, 2010).  
 
Intuitively, an increase in oil windfalls in an oil-dependent economy relaxes foreign exchange 
constraints and stimulates government expenditures. For instance, Talvi and Vegh (2005) argue 
that in countries where the revenue base is highly fluctuating, budget surpluses create political 
                                                          
70 The capital stock accumulates net investment flows, that is, gross investment net of depreciation, but it must be 
noted that depreciation could itself be a function of economic variables, as it almost certainly is; this imparts a time 
subscript to depreciation, which becomes behavioral. The measurement of the capital stock may vary depending on 
the method of construction, i.e., the perpetual inventory method (PIM) and the capital accumulation identity (CAI). 
The PIM usually assumes a constant depreciation rate; the actual capital stock may – or may not – have a constant 
depreciation rate. For the two, PMI and CAI, to be the same, the depreciation rate for the PIM must match the 
actual depreciation rate for the CAI. 
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pressures to increase government spending. In this picture, positive oil shocks can induce faster 
growth in government spending. However, it is often less recognized that this stimulating effect 
could only be transitory and that such blessing could turn into a curse in the long-run. This is 
because a sudden inflow of oil windfalls could result in the appreciation of real exchange rate, 
inflationary pressures on the economy and contraction of tradable sectors including non-oil 
exports. Furthermore, the notion of asymmetric response to oil revenue changes (rather than oil 
price changes) may arguably be of greater importance for oil exporting economies where oil 
revenues have been and are expected to be a crucial feature of their economies. Also, some 
studies found a stronger economic impact from the volatility of oil prices than the changes in oil 
prices (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2013). Therefore, the long-run investment equation is 
augmented with measures of oil, namely oil revenues and oil price volatility (see Section 5.4.4 
for the construction of oil-driven financial constraint measures). 
 
Accordingly, employing the CVAR methodology, the stated relations (equations 4.25-26) are 
tested for the Iranian sample during the period from 1974 to 2011. Table 5.1 outlines the 
hypotheses which are divided into two parts. The first part reports hypothesis H1 under the 
heading of ‘Baseline Investment Equation’. This hypothesis predicts that, in the long-run, 
investment (it,) is positively related to output (yt) and the sum of the growth rate of capital (g
k
t) 
and capital depreciation (δ), while it is negatively related to the user cost of capital (ct,) as 
implied by substituting the steady-state condition into the FOC equation.  
 
Table 5.1 Hypotheses of long-run relationships 
Baseline Investment Equation           
H1 Long-run relationships between [it, yt, ct, ln(g
k + δ)t, dpt]  
Investment Equation Augmented with Symmetric Oil-driven Measures 
H1.1 Long-run relationships between [it, yt, ct, ln(g
k + δ)t, dpt, orevt] 
H1.2 Long-run relationships between [it, yt, ct, ln(g
k + δ)t, dpt, volot] 
Note: it: investment; yt: output; ct: user cost of capital; δ: capital depreciation rate; gk: capital growth rate; orevt: oil 
revenues; volot: oil volatility; and dpt: inflation as measured by the changes in the implicit deflator of gross 
domestic product (percent). Data are in natural log and in real terms (Base Year 2004/05). Source: CBI, Time-series 
Data; See also Section 5.4. 
 
The second part of Table 5.1 presents two hypotheses H1.1-H1.2, under the heading ‘Investment 
Equation Augmented with Symmetric Oil-driven Measures’, investigating the long-run 
relationships between aggregate domestic investment and oil-based measures in the Iranian 
economy. Inflation (dpt) based on the changes in the implicit deflator of gross domestic product 
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is further included in the models to act ‘as a proxy for the (missing) market interest rate’ 
(Esfahani, et al., 2009, p.1). As discussed in Chapter Two, ‘the theoretical literature leaves open 
the sign and persistence of any relationships between investment and uncertainty’ (Bond, et al., 
2005, p.10). Thus, it is of interest for this thesis to empirically estimate the relationship between 
oil-based uncertainty and aggregate investment in Iran, using symmetric oil-driven financial 
constraint measures as explained in Section 5.4.5. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 4.4.1), the CVAR model used in this chapter is specified 
in terms of a vector ‘x’, comprising endogenous and exogenous variables, and deterministic 
terms including constant term and dummies ‘D’. In VECM notation, the cointegrating vectors 
are included in the dynamic specification given by: 
 
(5.2) Δxt = Πxt-1 + Γi(L)Δxt-i + ΦDt + εt,  
 
where L is the lag operator, Π = αβ', and x is a matrix of I(1). In the macroeconomic analysis of 
small open (oil-based) economies like Iran, it is plausible to assume that some variables are 
exogenous, implying that these variables have a direct contemporaneous impact on the 
endogenous variables, but they are not affected by the error correction terms which are the 
disequilibria in the economy. Dt is a set of variables weakly exogenous in the long-run 
cointegration space, and may contain deterministic terms such as constant and trend as well as 
intervention dummies.71 The error term εt is thus partitioned to εt = (ε'x*t, ε'zt)'. For instance, in 
the baseline VECM model, there are five endogenous variables, with two cointegrating vectors 
(it, yt, ct, ln(gk + δ)t, dpt) and the long-run matrix can be decomposed into the following reduced 
rank form:   
 
(5.3) αβ'xt = 
[
 
 
 
 
α11   α12
α21   α22
α31   α32
α41  α42
α51   α52]
 
 
 
 
[
β11   
β21   
β12
β22
   β13   
β23
β14  β15 
β24  β25
]
[
 
 
 
 
i
𝑦
c
ln(gk +  δ)
dp ]
 
 
 
 
  ,  
 
                                                          
71 In this chapter, there exist linear trends in the level of variables, but the linear trends in the variables do not 
cancel in the cointegrating relations, i.e. the models contain trend stationary variables or trend stationary 
cointegrating relations. Therefore, the trend is restricted only to appear in the cointegration relations, but the 
constant is unrestricted in the model (see case four in Juselius, 2006, p, 100).  
 
t 
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(5.4) Γi(L)Δxt-i =  ∑  k−1i=1 Γi(L)Δ(i, y, c, ln(g
k + δ), dp)'t-i + εt, 
 
where β defines the cointegrating vectors and α is the response of each variable to the 
cointegrating vectors as defined above.  
 
5.4. VARIABLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA  
In this chapter, the data comprises annual observations for the years from 1974 to 2011. The 
variables include real investment, real output, the user cost of capital, the sum of the growth rate 
of capital and the rate of capital depreciation, inflation and alternative measures of oil. Appendix 
5A provides a summary of the variables used in this chapter and their sources. Figures 5B1-B11 
in Appendix 5B illustrates the graphs of these variables. These data are collected from the 
Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) and British Petroleum (BP). 
Where possible, the data have been cross-checked with international databases including the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS), the World Bank and 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The choice of the period under consideration is 
based on data availability for all the variables. All of the variables are in natural logarithms, 
corresponding to the specifications of the derived empirical equations presented in Section 5.3 
and Chapter Four Section 4.3. The use of logarithms transforms some non-linear models into 
linear ones, thus allowing the use of linear estimation procedures. Accordingly, the estimated 
regressors are the coefficients of elasticity and not the coefficients of marginal effects.  
 
5.4.1.  INVESTMENT  
The data on gross fixed capital formation (in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) are used to 
proxy for real investment, and are collected from the CBI’s annual national accounts (historical 
data series) available from 1959/60-2010/11. This variable in natural log is denoted by it and is 
illustrated in Figure 5B1.  
 
5.4.2. OUTPUT 
The data on real gross domestic product or GDP (in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) are 
used to proxy for real output. This variable in logarithm form is denoted by yt and is shown in 
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Figure 5B2. The data on gross domestic product are collected from the CBI’s annual national 
accounts (historical data series) available from 1959/60-2010/11.  
 
5.4.3. THE USER COST OF CAPITAL AND INFLATION 
The user cost of capital for the Iranian economy is shown in Figure 5B3, denoted by ct and 
calculated as follows: 
 
(5.5) ct = (1 – Taxt)((Returnt/100) – dpt + δt),      
 
where Taxt is the corporate tax rate variable calculated by dividing corporate taxes by total 
revenues in current prices, and their data are collected from the CBI’s Time-series Government 
Budget and Fiscal Data. Returnt refers to the weighted average of the expected rates of return on 
facilities and is used as a proxy for the rates of interest at the economy level. This variable is 
calculated as follows. First, the shares of i) Agriculture, ii) Manufacturing and Mining, iii) 
Construction and Housing, and iv) and the Rest of the Economy, in total GDP were computed. 
Then, the associated averages of minimum and maximum expected rates of return on facilities 
(presented in Appendix 2B) were calculated. Lastly, the weighted average of the expected rates 
of return on facilities was calculated. dpt is used as a proxy for inflation and refers to the implicit 
deflator of gross domestic product. The annual data for this variable is collected from the CBI’s 
online database for the years from 1973/74-2010/11. The growth rate of capital (gkt) is 
calculated as:  
 
(5.6) gkt = (Kt – Kt-1)/Kt-1,  
 
where Kt denotes the capital stock. Assuming geometric depreciation at a constant rate δ, net 
capital stock in each period can be shown to be a function of net capital stock in the previous 
period and gross investment in the current period as follows: Kt = (1 – δ)Kt-1 + It, where It  is 
gross investment. Thus, the following can be obtained: Kt = It + Kt-1 – δKt-1. Accordingly, 
Kt – Kt-1 = It – δKt-1 and δKt-1 = It  – (Kt – Kt-1). Hence: 
 
(5.7)  δ = (It  – (Kt – Kt-1))/Kt-1.  
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Capital stock is the stock of produced tangible fixed assets and the data on real capital stock (in 
billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) are obtained from the CBI’s annual national accounts 
(historical data series) available from 1974/75-2010/11. In addition, as explained earlier, 
inflation (dpt) based on the changes in the implicit deflator of gross domestic product is 
calculated to proxy for the user cost of capital. The inclusion of dpt is due to the fact that the 
data available on interest rates are centrally set and change infrequently, hence do not represent 
the market conditions in the Iranian economy. Therefore, depicted in Figure 5B4, this variable 
‘acts as a proxy for the (missing) market interest rate’ in the country (Esfahani, et al., 2013, 
p.221). The variable ln(gk + δ)t is constructed employing equations (5.6) and (5.7), and is shown 
in Figure 5B5, corresponding to the sum of depreciation rates and the growth rates of capital 
stock. Appendix 5L presents a table illustrating the methods of construction of these variables.  
 
5.4.4. OIL-BASED MEASURES  
This sub-section outlines different transformations of data on oil revenues and oil prices. Each 
of these measures suggests a different channel through which the presence of oil may have 
affected investment. 
 
In this study, first, the oil revenue variable is introduced to the model of investment. Annual data 
on oil revenues at current prices are collected from the CBI’s annual national accounts 
(historical data series) from 1973/74-2010/11, and are converted to real figures using the 
implicit deflator of gross domestic product as follows: orevt = norevt – pt, where orevt, norevt 
and pt refer to real oil revenues, nominal oil revenues and the implicit deflator of gross domestic 
in (natural) logarithmic forms. Figure 5B6 demonstrates the graph of the real oil revenue 
variable for the period under study. Mork’s (1989) commonly used asymmetric specification as 
given in equation (3.22) in Chapter Three is then employed to calculate oil revenue increase and 
oil revenue decrease variables, displayed in Figures 5B8 and 5B9 and denoted by dorevit
 and 
dorevdt, respectively.  
 
Next, the volatility of international oil prices is introduced to the investment model. The data on 
monthly real crude oil prices are collected from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. 
First, the changes in international oil prices (dpot) are calculated. Then, following Mohaddes and 
Pesaran (2013), the changes in oil prices are used to compute the realized annual volatility of oil 
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prices based on equation (3.21) in Chapter Three. Figure 5B7 illustrates the development in 
realized annual volatility of oil prices, denoted by volot, based on this method. Mork’s (1989) 
asymmetric specification, explained in equation (3.22), is further used for a non-linear 
transformation of oil price volatility by specifying oil price volatility increase and decrease, 
shown in Figures 5B10 and 5B11 and denoted by voloit and volodt, respectively. 
 
5.5.  THE COINTEGRATED VAR MODEL 
In this section, first, the long-run economic determinants of aggregate domestic investment in 
Iran within the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment are investigated. 
Two measures of oil, namely oil revenues and oil price volatility, are next incorporated in the 
model of investment to study the extent to which the presence of oil has influenced aggregate 
domestic investment in the country.  
 
5.5.1. THE COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS  
This section uses the integration and cointegration properties of the data to infer the strength of 
the link between the relations explained in Section 5.3 as potential long-run equilibrium 
relations. First, the appropriate lag length is determined for each model based on the Schwarz 
(SC) and the Hannan-Quinn (H-Q) criteria. The suggested criteria vary in terms of the strength 
of the penalty associated with the increase in model parameters due to adding more lags. The 
test criteria for different values of lags denoted by ‘p’ are calculated and accordingly the value 
of p corresponding to the smallest value is chosen. The results of the lag length determination 
tests, reported in Appendix 5C, suggested p = 2 for all the models. The Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) tests in each VAR (p) are further used to check for left-over residual autocorrelation in 
each VAR (p) model (Juselius, 2006, p.72). These tests seem to accept absence of 
autocorrelation in the VAR (2). Following Juselius (2006), both multivariate and univariate 
misspecification tests are then implemented to test for the statistical adequacy of the chosen 
VAR models. These include tests of residual autocorrelation, residual heteroscedasticity and 
normality tests. The multi- and uni-variate test results, presented in Appendix 5D, suggest that 
the models are adequately specified with p = 2.72 Therefore, the analyses are carried out with 
VAR(2). 
                                                          
72 See Juselius (2006, pp.66-145) for details on how to conduct misspecification tests and obtain results. 
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The Johansen cointegration rank tests based on the Bartlett corrected trace test and the 
maximum eigenvalue test are then conducted on the data to determine the rank for each model. 
Appendix 5E reports the estimated eigenvalues (λi), the trace test (Trace), the Bartlett corrected 
trace tests (Trace*) with p-values in brackets, and the 95% quantile from the asymptotic tables 
(Q.95), all of which are generated in CATS software. The trace tests analyses have been 
corrected for small sample size.73 Statistically significant, the Bartlett corrected trace test results 
suggest the choice of r = 3 for both models. Appendix 5F reports the moduli of the roots of the 
companion matrix where the rank is chosen so that the largest unrestricted root is far from a unit 
root (i.e. it has modulus less than one).74 The findings are further confirmed by the graphs of the 
cointegration relations shown in in Figures 5G1-5G2 in Appendix 5G.  
 
With estimation based on such a long time-series of data in a country that has undergone 
substantial political changes, it is crucial to test the stability of the model parameters. Therefore, 
the statistical adequacy of the models is investigated by conducting recursive stability tests, 
beginning with a sample of 1977-2003 and then adding observations until the full sample size is 
reached. The tests are based on the log-transformed eigenvalues demonstrated in Figures 5H1-
5H2 Appendix 5H, as these tests provide more detailed information about the constancy of the 
individual cointegration relations.75 The findings could suggest that there is no significant 
change in the model parameters over the period under study. Yet, it must be noted that the 
sample is small and not many observations are left for testing the constancy of the parameters.  
 
Shown in Appendix 5I, the test results for a unit vector in β (variables’ stationarity), suggest that 
the variables are non-stationary, hence supporting the treatment of the main variables as being 
I(1). Appendix 5J presents tables from CATS’ short-run parameters output for weakly 
exogenous/fixed variables, time t-1 and t-2, dummy variables and constant, with their associated 
t-values. For each equation, Figures 5K1-K2 in Appendix 5K plot the residuals including the 
fitted and the actual values of Δxit, the residuals scaled by their standard deviation, 
autocorrelations of the residuals and the histogram. On the whole, the graphs of the residuals 
                                                          
73 Juselius (2006) argues that for moderately-sized typical macro-economic samples (50-70 observations), the 
corrections can be substantial. This is because for a small sample, the asymptotic distributions often do not tend to 
be good approximations to the true distributions and using asymptotic tables can lead to size and power distortions. 
74 It must be noted that the characteristic roots are reported without confidence bands and the discussion as whether 
a root is big or not is only indicative. 
75 See Juselius (2006, pp.157-162) for a detailed discussion on forward recursive tests. 
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illustrate that the estimated values capture the dynamic responses and follow the actual values 
reasonably closely.  
 
Juselius (2006) suggests transforming the long-run matrix Π = αβ' by a non-singular r x r matrix 
Q as follows: Π = αQQ'β' = α̃β̃', where α̃ = αQ and β̃ = βQ'-1. The matrix Q imposes a total of  
r(r – 1) just-identifying restrictions on β and (r – 1) just-identifying restrictions on each βi.76 In 
order to identify long-run structures, one approach is to first impose just-identifying restrictions 
on β vectors and then imposing over-identifying restrictions by setting the least significant 
coefficients in the just-identified model to zero one after another. The just-identifying 
restrictions do not change the likelihood function, whereas the over-identifying restrictions 
constrain the parameter space and change the likelihood function and therefore are testable. 
Another approach is to test sets of irreducible relations. This study takes the latter approach. The 
over-identification restriction tests are based on the log-likelihood ratio (LR) test procedures 
detailed in Juselius (2006, pp.209-12).  
 
Accordingly, the cointegrating structures of the steady-state relations are formulated. In all of 
the models, further to equation (4.11ˈ), the first relation (β1) is normalized on the investment 
variable. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the results of the over-identified cointegrating structures of 
the theoretically motivated relations in the data, where the reported over-identifying restrictions 
in all of the models are not rejected based on the p-values associated with the LR test statistics 
reported in the tables. Respectively, the β and α coefficients correspond to the long-run 
structures and the estimated adjustment dynamics. The statistically significant β estimates are in 
bold face to distinguish them from the α coefficients.77 Section 5.5.2 estimates the baseline 
model of investment incorporated with symmetric measures of oil for the Iranian economy.  
 
                                                          
76 The hypotheses tested are of the form βc = (H1φ1, ψ1, ψ2) and implies that the test is for whether a single relation 
is on sp(β). βc is the constrained cointegrating vector, Hi, i = 1, … , r, are the design matrices of the long-run 
structure of dimension p1 x s1, φi are si x 1 matrices of unrestricted coefficients, and ψ1 and ψ2 are the unrestricted 
cointegration vectors. The cointegrating relationships which are not rejected are chosen for further identification by 
imposing just- and over-identified restrictions on them. 
77 In this approach, for the just- and over-identified structures, the degree of freedom is computed employing the 
following formula, ν = ∑  ri=1 (mi – r + 1), where r is the cointegration rank and mi is the number of restrictions on βi 
(see Juselius, 2006, pp. 212-21). 
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5.5.2. TESTS OF SYMMETRIC LONG-RUN RELATIONS 
This section tests the long-run relationships between it, yt, ct, ln(g
k + δ)t, dpt and symmetric 
measures of oil for the Iranian sample. The oil measures include the level of oil revenues (orevt) 
and oil price volatility (volot), corresponding to hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2, respectively. As 
explained earlier, the rate of inflation based on the changes in the implicit GDP deflator (dpt) is 
included in the model to proxy for the user cost of capital in the country.78 Accordingly, two 
CVAR models are estimated based on the above set of variables given by the vector xt
(H1.1) = [it, 
yt, ct, ln(g
k + δ)t, dpt, orevt]' and xt(H1.2) = [it, yt, ct, ln(gk + δ)t, dpt, volot]', t = 1974-2012. The 
variables orevt and volot are a priori assumed to be weakly exogenous variables, 
zt
(H1.2 and H1.2) = [orevt, volot]'. This is because, oil prices are set in the international oil markets as 
the demand for crude oil is mainly determined by global economic growth and oil markets’ 
speculations, and that the production of Iran’s crude oil and export quota are pre-determined by 
OPEC.  
 
The inspection of the data does not reveal any large residuals in the models. However, an 
intercept is needed to account for the initial level of measurements (Juselius, 2006, pp. 99-100). 
Accordingly, based on the observation of the plots of the data and their first differences in 
Appendix 5B and the graphs of the cointegration relations in Appendix 5G, the specification for 
the constant term in both estimations is as follows. The trend is restricted to appear in the 
cointegration relations, while the constant term is unrestricted in the model.79 Table 5.2 reports 
the results of over-identified cointegrating structures of the theoretically motivated relations in 
the data given the baseline investment model augmented with the measure of oil revenues. The 
over-identified structures specify three interpretable long-run relations accepted based on  
χ2(2) = 0.739 [0.691].  
 
The first relation (β1), normalized on investment, is the investment equation implied by 
substituting the steady-state condition into the FOC equation.80 According to the empirical 
findings, investment largely depends on factors which lie within the modified neoclassical-
                                                          
78 Among others, see for instance Esfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2009), for a similar approach. 
79 Linear trends in the level of variables and a non-zero mean of the cointegration relations are allowed 
(corresponding to Case 4 in Juselius, 2006, p.100). 
80 The findings are interpreted taking into account the three meanings of identification, consistent with Juselius 
(2006): the formal meaning (related to the adequacy of the statistical model), the empirical meaning (related to the 
significance of actual estimated parameter values) and the economic meaning (related to the economic 
interpretability of the estimated coefficients).  
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accelerator framework. That is, the findings show that investment is strongly and positively 
related to output (yt) and ln(g + δ)t with the estimated coefficients equal to 0.87 and 1.22, 
respectively. In addition, the coefficient of oil revenue variable (orevt) is positive and 
statistically significant with the magnitude of 0.06, implying that oil income and real investment 
are positively associated in the long-run. Consistent with the theory, the empirical evidence 
further supports a long-run negative relationship between investment and inflation (dpt), which 
acts as an alternative proxy for the user cost of capital, with the corresponding coefficient 
magnitude -0.89.  
 
However, the long-run relationship between investment and the user cost of capital (ct) does not 
hold. This behavior mainly results from the government’s attempts to maintain the lending rates 
non-responsive to high and persistent inflationary pressures by imposing tight controls over the 
credit markets and centrally determining expected rates of return. Even despite the partial 
deregulation of the rates of returns since the late 1990s, the real rates tend to become negative 
when inflation rises and less negative when inflation falls. This is contrary to the equilibrating 
effects of market forces in credit markets where real rates increase in response to inflationary 
pressures. In fact, during the period under consideration, high and persistent inflation has been 
translated into lower real lending rates and thus lower user cost of capital, resulting in 
insignificant relation between investment and the user cost of capital in the long-run.  
 
Based on the estimated α loading coefficients for the first relation, the error correction 
coefficients for investment is found to be statistically insignificant. This finding is not surprising 
because by their very nature investment projects are rarely so flexible that they can adjust 
instantaneously to changes in the availability of finance. Instead, they need to continue for some 
time even when the windfall revenues have been exhausted. However, the estimated α loading 
coefficients for variable ln(gk + δ)t is error correcting with an adjustment coefficient equal to 
0.84, indicating a very fast adjustment of this variable to the system. This suggests that a higher 
rate of capital depreciation or a lower rate of capital growth could considerably affect 
investment spending in the short-run.  
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Table 5.2 Fully-identified long-run structures (1974-2011) 
 
 Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
Table 5.3 Fully-identified long-run structures (1974-2011) 
 
 Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUE MEASURE
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(2) = 0.739 [0.691]
r = 3 it yt ct ln(δ + g
k
)t dpt orevt trend
β1(H1.1) 1.000 (NA) -0.873 (-53.056) 0.000 (.NA) -1.220 (-48.674) 0.893 (7.851) -0.061 (-6.378) 0.000 (.NA)
α1(H1.1) 0.595 (1.329) -0.174 (-0.759) 0.089 (0.271) 0.841 (1.839) -0.148 (-0.408) - -
β2(H1.1) 0.000 (.NA) 1.000 (NA) 2.703 (14.516) 0.000 (.NA) 1.443 (7.650) 0.000 (.NA) -0.036 (-45.834)
α2(H1.1) -0.675 (-1.698) -0.629 (-3.096) -0.769 (-2.640) -0.507 (-1.249) 0.802 (2.480) - -
β3(H1.1) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) 3.099 (7.430) 1.000 (.NA) 4.286 (10.546) -0.188 (-5.202) 0.000 (.NA)
α3(H1.1) -0.790 (-5.866) -0.066 (-0.961) 0.060 (0.606) -0.823 (-5.992) -0.139 (-1.270) - -
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(3) =  1.820 [0.611]
r = 3 it yt ct ln(δ + g
k
)t dpt volot trend
β1(H1.2) 1.000 (NA) -0.883 (-56.663) 0.000 (.NA) -1.287 (-66.380) 0.230 (2.850) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA)
α1(H1.2) 1.204 (2.927) -0.219 (-1.041) 0.202 (0.543) 1.444 (3.498) -0.277 (-0.654) - -
β2(H1.2) 0.000 (.NA) 1.000 (NA) 2.414 (14.514) 0.000 (.NA) 1.775 (9.607) 0.309 (3.835) -0.036 (-42.973)
α2(H1.2) 0.099 (0.304) -0.899 (-5.394) -0.405 (-1.371) 0.265 (0.809) 0.374 (1.114) - -
β3(H1.2) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) 3.175 (5.888) 1.000 (NA) 3.136 (7.031) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA)
α3(H1.2) -0.557 (-3.373) 0.000 (0.000) 0.041 (0.272) -0.572 (-3.456) -0.147 (-0.866) - -
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The second identified relation (β2) is a long-run output equation, which is consistent with a 
number of other long-run output equations for the Iranian economy (for instance see Esfahani, et 
al., 2013).81 According to the empirical results, in the long-run, output is negatively associated 
with inflation with a coefficient magnitude equal to -1.44, implying that inflation in the Iranian 
economy has major long-run adverse effects on output. This finding is in line with a body of 
literature that argues for a negative long-run relation between output and inflation in both 
advanced and emerging economies when the latter is above a certain level (for instance, see 
López-Villavicencio and Mignon, 2011). This, in the context of Iran, could be explained by the 
adverse effects of high inflation on productively growth, suggesting that economic policies in 
the country are insufficient, and that inflation must be controlled in order to encourage output 
growth in the country. The α loading coefficients in the second cointegrating relationship show 
that the error correcting coefficient for output is expectedly signed and adjusts with a coefficient 
equal to 0.62. The estimated α coefficient for inflation is error increasing with a magnitude of 
0.80 owing to persistent and high inflationary pressures, whereas that of the user cost of capital 
is error correcting with an adjustment coefficient equal to 0.76, suggestive of the error 
correcting behavior of this variable in the short-run for the output equation.  
 
The third relation (β3) is normalized on ln(gk + δ)t. According to the empirical evidence, in the 
long-run, the growth rate of capital is negatively associated with inflation and the user cost of 
capital with respective coefficients equal to -4.28 and -3.09. This is because Iran imports most 
of its capital equipment and, bred by continuously high inflation, the country’s currency 
depreciates resulting in a lower real value (or a higher depreciation rate) of capital assets. Thus, 
the rate of capital depreciation in the country could be large. In the long-run, however, the 
relationship between ln(gk + δ)t and oil income is positive with a coefficient magnitude equal to 
0.18, indicative of a positive association between the growth rate of capital and oil income 
through the latter’s positive impact on investment and capital accumulation process over the 
study period. The α loading coefficients in the third cointegrating relationship reveal that the 
error correcting coefficient for the variable ln(gk + δ)t is correctly signed and adjusts rather fast 
                                                          
81 Esfahani, et al. (2013) develop a long-run growth model for the Iranian economy and drive conditions under 
which oil income could have a long-run impact on output. Accordingly, they investigate a long-run output equation 
involving (among others) log per capita output, log per capita oil income and the rate of inflation, employing a 
cointegration analysis. According to their empirical findings, the long-run relationship between output and oil 
income is statistically significant and positive, whereas that of between output and inflation is statistically 
significant but negative and large.  
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with an error correcting coefficient equal to 0.82, suggestive of its short-run equilibrating effects 
in the system.  
 
The results of the over-identified cointegration structures of the data based on the investment 
model augmented with the oil price volatility measure are shown in Table 5.3. Three 
interpretable long-run relations based on the over-identified structures are not rejected with  
χ2(3) = 1.820 [0.611]. When the same over-identifying restrictions as before are imposed, the 
coefficients of the non-oil macroeconomic variables in all three relations show similar signs and 
magnitudes to those of the model with oil income. However, oil price volatility is statistically 
significant only in the output equation with a coefficient magnitude of -0.30, indicative of its 
negative long-run relationship with output. This finding is in line with the suggestion of 
Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013) that volatility in commodity prices adversely affect the resource-
rich and -dependent economy of Iran. This is because the volatility of oil prices gives rise to 
perceived price uncertainty in the country and therefore reduces planning horizons with negative 
implications for investment activities. In fact, for the budget-constrained economy of Iran which 
relies on oil income, formulating robust annual budgets and development plans becomes much 
harder. Among others, the subsidy system exposes the government to significant budgetary risks 
leading to substantial economic costs, which further gives rise to the magnitude of volatility-
induced investment losses in the country.  
 
It must be noted that this study employs the CVAR methodology to identify the theory-
consistent long-run relationships between the variables of interest as this approach allows ‘the 
data to speak for itself freely’ rather than by imposing them as a priori (Juselius, 2006). Yet, the 
choice of the CVAR model as the empirical methodology is a rather flexible approach to the 
empirical investigation as it allows producing new insights based on the available data through 
examining economic phenomena and testing of more than one economic theory, i.e., the second 
and the third identified long-run relations in both models in this study. Given that this study 
primarily focuses on investigating the economic determinants of investment, notably, the first 
long-run relations in both models correspond to the theory consistent investment equation as 
derived in Chapter Four and are therefore more straightforward to interpret.  
 
The empirical findings associated with the investment equation in both models are largely 
consistent with the theoretical framework, with the exception of the long-run relation between it 
 141 
 
and ct due to the missing market interest rates in the country as discussed earlier (for instance, 
see Chapter Two Section 2.3). The empirical results seem most consistent in the estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution in a CES production function from the investment equation, which is 
typically positive and less than unity. It must be borne in mind that the assumptions in the 
standard investment models are restrictive with conditions that are at least partially at variance 
with the assumptions of the standard investment. This applies to both market- and mixed-market 
economies where distortions in output and capital markets provide incomplete support for the 
associated underlying assumptions (e.g., perfect capital markets or price takers). Nevertheless, 
even though the neoclassical model does not fully apply here, the partial applicability of the 
theoretical framework in the context of the mixed-market economy of Iran seems plausible, 
provided that relative prices are signaling some appropriate substitution opportunities (for 
example to reduce costs).  
 
In brief, the government’s direct investment in different productive sectors of the economy was 
noticeable before the Iranian revolution in 1979. Since then, however, direct investment by the 
government and the share of public investment compared to that of the private sector has been 
significantly reduced (Figure 2.3, p.37). Also, the share of government development 
expenditures in manufacturing as well as that of credit facilities extended to public enterprises 
has been declining over time (see Tables 6M3 and 6M4 in Appendix 6M). Relative to market 
economies, it may not be easy to define the private sector in the context of the partial market 
economy of Iran. Nonetheless, the semi-SOEs could still be categorized as private entities in 
investment analysis. This is because they are commercial entities producing for the market; 
hence follow the same logic as private businesses, i.e., some parts of the market at least take 
relative prices as the appropriate signals on input and output decisions.  
 
Given the fluctuating behavior of investment and output in the country, it can be expected that 
aggregate investment spending could have been influenced by effects from the oil shocks, the 
Iranian revolution and the subsequent regime shift in 1979, the Iran-Iraq war during 1980-1988 
or different policies during Iran’s FYDPs. In order to identify the outliers in the data 
corresponding to the above events, the data were checked for large residuals. This is because, 
following Juselius (2006), blip dummies must be included in the models where the residuals are 
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large (greater than |3.5σε|) in the data so as to achieve normality and thus valid statistical 
inference. However, no large residuals were inspected in the investment models augmented with 
measures of oil revenues and oil price volatility, suggesting insignificant impacts from the above 
events on the over-identified long-run structures.82 These findings, at first, seem surprising. A 
closer look, however, proves otherwise. For instance, some of the plans’ achievements were not 
so much the outcome of the planning process, but mostly that of a range of various exogenous 
factors, such as considerable increase in the unprecedented oil windfalls.  
 
Section 5.6 employs the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to investigate the degree to which 
shocks from symmetric and asymmetric measures of oil contribute to the shorter-run variability 
of investment and output in the country’s economy. 
 
5.6.   SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS: IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
This section employs the generalized Impulse Response Functions (IRFs), developed by Koop, 
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), to study the extent to which shocks from oil revenues 
and oil price volatility contributed to the shorter-run variability of investment and output in the 
Iranian economy.83 The use of the generalized IRFs is due to their invariant to the ordering of 
the variables in the VAR model (unlike the orthogonalized IRFs). The IRFs trace the dynamic 
effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on the current and future values of the 
macroeconomic variables. The innovation process ɛt is an unobservable zero-mean white noise 
process with a time invariant positive-definite variance-covariance matrix.  
 
It has been argued that the relationship between oil and the macroeconomy is non-linear (among 
others, see Mork, 1989; Lee, et al., 1995; Hamilton, 1996). Both linear and non-linear 
specifications of oil measures are used for the IRFs, where the models with linear oil measures 
are considered as the benchmark models. The IRFs are presented in Figures 5.3-5.4 and 5.6-5.7 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 The dummies associated with the above events have no explanatory powers when they are included in the 
models. 
83 It has been argued that in the short-run, the unrestricted VAR model performs better compared to the cointegrated 
VAR model or VECM (Engle and Yoo, 1987, Clements and Hendry, 1995, Naka and Tufte, 1997). Hence, the 
unrestricted VAR models are used for the IRFs analysis. 
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for the years from 1974 to 2011. The middle dark lines in the graphs show point estimates of the 
responses to the level of each variable to a one standard deviation positive shock. The 
simulation horizon covers ten years and is shown on the x-axis. The y-axis plots the percentage 
change response to the shock. The IRFs analysis is conducted using EViews-7 software.  
 
Figure 5-3 Incremental Responses to orevt Generalized One S.D. Innovations                                   
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the IRFs of the macroeconomic variables to a shock in the linear benchmark 
measure of oil revenues. The responses of investment and output variables to a shock in real oil 
revenues are positive until the fifth period, after which they return to the long-run level but stay 
above the equilibrium level throughout the period. Yet, the response of investment appears to be 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that, even though the Iranian economy is oil-based, oil 
revenues cannot be considered as an important driver of financing investment activities in the 
short-run.  
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Figure 5-4 Responses to dorevit and dorevdt Generalized One S.D. Innovations 
 
 
The responses of investment and output to shocks to asymmetric measures of oil revenues are 
statistically insignificant (Figure 5.4). Such outcome, at first, might appear to be counter-
intuitive. Yet, this can be (at least partly) explained through the structure of the government 
expenditures in Iran. Government expenditures can broadly be categorized into current and 
capital expenditures. The former relates to recurrent expenditures including subsidies and 
payments of the state’s employees, whereas the latter aims at adding to physical and capital 
assets of the economy. Since the early 1970s, an increasingly large share of the expenditures in 
the country is preliminarily used to finance the payments of the government’s sticky current 
expenditures and its external debt rather than investment spending. Interestingly, the reactions of 
investment and output to a shock to the differenced real oil revenue decrease appear to be very 
similar to that of oil revenue increase. This can be described through the inflationary effects of 
negative oil shocks. Due to the high inflexibility of the government’s current expenditures, any 
significant negative oil revenue shocks will adversely affect the government’s budget deficits, 
hence creating further inflationary pressures in the economy. Furthermore, such results appear to 
be consistent with the differenced real oil revenue variable being a stationary variable. 
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Figure 5.5 illustrates gross domestic expenditure, public consumption expenditure and 
investment expenditure during the period under consideration. During 1965-2010, the average 
annual share of current expenditures in total expenditures recorded about 70 percent, whereas 
that of capital expenditures registered under 30 percent. Due to the high level of state 
engagement within the domestic economy and the rigidity of its current expenditures, the 
increased oil income has mostly been used to pay for the state’s sticky current spending. In this 
picture, subsidies have played an important role in the size and inflexibility of the current 
expenditures. The government, as the main recipient of oil windfalls, has tried to redistribute 
part of the windfalls through subsidies in the form of free or below cost provision of state 
services such as utilities, education, health, transport and inputs for specific economic sectors. 
Spending efficiency has consequently suffered due to high amount of unfinished projects and 
capital investments that could not be efficiently utilized because of inadequate recurrent 
resources. Hence, the presence of oil seems not to have contributed to the long-run sustainable 
investment spending in the country.  
 
Figure 5-5 Investment, public consumption and gross domestic expenditures 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
Since the government’s revenue mainly depends on the oil sector, it is beyond the control of the 
authorities, thus the effects of oil-driven uncertainty have been profound on macroeconomic 
policies. That is, the evolution of monetary and fiscal policies has been dominated by the oil 
windfalls. Monetary policy involves printing money to convert oil revenues into the Iranian 
currency before being used by the government and is connected to fiscal policy through the 
monetization of the budget deficits. The government budget has been mostly in deficit, largely 
as a result of pressures in favor of expansionary expenditures. The current government 
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spending, on average, has been more than twice the level of the government development 
expenditures. Although the government has realized the importance of anti-inflationary policy, a 
tighter fiscal policy as scheduled in the development plans often has not been maintained. 
Negative real rates of return have further adversely affected the economy by altering the 
combination of assets held by the public since the financial resources have been mostly invested 
in durable goods (e.g., gold, cars and houses) or in financial assets (e.g., foreign currencies).  
 
Figure 5-6 Response to volot Generalized One S.D. Innovations 
 
 
Figure 5.6 presents the reactions of investment and output to a shock to oil price volatility, after 
which investment responds slightly positively and reaches its peak in the second period. It then 
decreases and remains below its steady state level throughout the period. Similarly, output 
shows a sustained negative reaction, indicative of the adverse effects of a shock to oil price 
volatility on output in the short-run.  
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Figure 5-7 Responses to voloit and volodt Generalized One S.D. Innovations 
 
 
Figure 5.7 presents the responses of investment and output to innovations to oil price volatility 
increase and decrease. The responses of investment to a unit shock to both oil price volatility 
increase and decrease are statistically insignificant. The response of output to a unit shock to oil 
price volatility increase is initially negative, reaching its lowest point in the third period, 
respectively. Then it starts reverting to the steady state level from the fourth period. However, 
output appears to be insensitive to innovations to oil price volatility decrease in the short-run 
and remain very close to the long-run equilibrium level throughout the period.  
 
The findings at large suggest that there are non-linear effects of shocks to various measures of 
oil on investment and output. Investment seems rather insensitive to shocks to various 
symmetric and asymmetric measures of oil. The response of output to one standard innovation 
in oil revenues is positive and tends to persist for a longer period, whereas its response to a unit 
shock to oil price volatility seems negative and rather shorter lived. Considering the asymmetric 
measures of oil, shocks to oil revenue increase and decrease seem not to stimulate or suppress 
output in the short-run. However, output responses negatively to a unit shock to oil price 
volatility increase relative to the insignificant effect of an innovation to oil price volatility 
decrease.  
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Overall, the rapid increase in government expenditures, stemming from the influx of oil 
windfalls, have affected spending quality and brought about unsustainable entitlements like 
recurrent cost commitments in the long-run. Fiscal and monetary policies have become 
expansionary and had obvious inflationary effects. Despite the government’s attempts to tame 
inflation, high inflation has remained a problem, creating economic uncertainty which has led to 
the lower level of investment spending. Seemingly, policies, in particular fiscal, seems to be one 
of the main underlying reasons for the presence of the natural resource curse in the Iranian 
economy chiefly through the inflation channel.  
 
5.7.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter, using annual data over the period 1974-2011, investigated the economic 
determinants of aggregate domestic investment in the oil-rich partial-market economy of Iran 
and the importance of oil in shaping investment patterns in the country. Two oil-based proxies, 
namely oil revenues and oil price volatility were used to explore the relationships between oil-
driven constraint measures and investment in the long-run. Employing the IRFs, this chapter 
further examined the short-run impacts of shocks to oil income and oil price volatility on 
investment and output.  
 
Some key findings emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the results are largely consistent with the 
modified neoclassical-accelerator theoretical framework used in this study for the mixed-market 
economy of Iran. The empirical results appeared particularly consistent in the estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution in a CES production function from the investment equation, which is 
typically less than unity and positive. Moreover, it is plausible to use a CVAR model, to assess 
the extent of the applicability of such a theoretical framework in the context of partial-market 
economies like Iran. Further to the empirical evidence, inferences could be made based on the 
theoretically motivated relationships within such a framework obtained by utilizing the 
integration and cointegration properties of the data in the sample, bearing in mind that the 
outcome of such an analysis depends on the market conditions prevailing in such economies. 
For instance, in the Iranian context, a variable such as the user cost of capital needs to be more 
carefully defined in the face of external and government influences which affect the economy 
through the regulation of the lending rates.  
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The empirical results further showed that investment is related to oil-driven measures in the 
long-run; the relationship between investment and oil revenues was found positive while that of 
between investment and oil price volatility was found negative. Surprisingly, the regime shift 
and dramatic political and economic upheavals during the period under study did not have 
determining effects on the underlying investment relationships in the long-run. This could be to 
some extent due to rigidities in government current expenditures coupled with persistent 
inflationary pressures throughout the years under study. Similarly, the IRFs of the 
macroeconomic variables to shocks to symmetric and asymmetric oil measures were found 
insignificant in most cases. 
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6. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF SECTOR-LEVEL DOMESTIC 
INVESTMENT IN IRAN 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the theory-based economic determinants of sector-level domestic 
investment in Iran during 1974-2011 within the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models 
of investment, augmented with an oil-driven financial constraint measure, namely oil revenues. 
Consistent with the Dutch Disease theoretical framework, the economic sectors in this study 
includes the non-resource tradable sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, the resource sectors 
of oil and gas, and the non-tradable sector of services. This is because one regularly studied 
topic in the literature on resource-rich economies is the macroeconomic effects of the discovery 
of natural resources on non-resource sectors which often centers on the Dutch Disease theory 
(see Chapter Three Section 3.4). The use of sector-level data further allows the recognition of 
sectoral heterogeneity in modelling investment behavior in the presence of resource windfalls. 
Accordingly, this chapter attempts to study the following questions:  
 
a. (i) What are the long-run economic determinants of sector-level domestic investment in 
Iran? (ii) Do the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment, 
augmented with oil income measure, explain sector-level investment in the country?  
b. (i) Do long-run relationships exist between sector-level investment and the availability of 
oil windfalls? (ii) Are there sectoral differences?  
c. Do the empirical findings suggest the presence of a mechanism in line with the Dutch 
Disease theory in the Iranian context?84  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview of growth and structural 
changes in the major economic sectors under study. Section 6.3 specifies the estimation model. 
Section 6.4 reports the data and their sources used in this study. Section 6.5 estimates sectoral 
CVAR models and discusses the empirical findings for each economic sector. Section 6.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
                                                          
84 It must be noted that according to the Dutch Disease theory, one of the main mechanisms through which the 
(lagging) tradable sector(s) are expected to decline (relative to the non-tradable sector) is the appreciation of the 
exchange rate. Chapter two Section 2.5.3 provides an overview of the Iranian exchange rate movements where the 
data reveal the appreciation of the real exchange rate for most of the years under study.  
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6.2. OVERVIEW OF SECTORAL GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
In Iran, the major economic sectors include manufacturing and mining, oil and gas, agriculture 
and services. The Iranian economy is an oil-based economy; however, the value-added 
contribution of the oil sector in total GDP averaged only 19 percent during 1970-2010 and 
declined from 46.6 percent in 1970 to only 8.8 percent in 2010. The panel on the left in Figure 
6.1 illustrates the development of sectoral value-added share in total GDP over the years under 
study. Overall, the sectors of services and manufacturing have gained higher value-added shares 
in GDP, whereas the sectors of agriculture and oil have lost their shares over the years under 
study. The panel on the right in Figure 6.1 depicts the pattern of sector-level investment share in 
total investment over the same period. Comparatively, the service sector enjoyed the greatest 
share of investment in total investment throughout this period, averaging as high as 50 percent, 
followed by that of the manufacturing and mining sectors (13 percent), the oil sector (4 percent) 
and the agriculture sector (4 percent). 
 
Figure 6-1 Sector-level value-added and investment (1970-2010) 
Sectoral share of value-added in total GDP 
 
Sectoral share of investment in total investment 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
A rather similar but less pronounced shift took place in the composition of sectoral employment 
in Iran. In particular, the service sector substantially increased its share of employment 
compared to the other sectors. Table 6.1 presents the sector-level shares of employment in the 
country during 1956-2007. Since the mid-1960s, the employment share of the service sector 
registered the highest among the other major economic sectors and increased from 33 percent in 
1966 to 64 percent in 2007. Similarly, the employment share of the oil sector grew from 0.4 
percent in 1966 to 0.7 percent in 2007. On the contrary, the employment share of the agriculture 
and on a smaller scale the manufacturing and mining sectors fell respectively from 47 and 18 
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percent in 1966 to 18 percent and 17 percent in 2007. Even though the growing pattern of the 
service sector’s employment share corresponds to the high value-added share of this sector, the 
considerably greater magnitude of the former does not appear to be proportionate to the latter, 
suggesting the relatively low labor productivity in the service sector.  
 
Table 6.1 Employment by sector (% share) 
 
Note: the figures include employees of age 10 years old and older. Source: SCI (various years). 
 
Overall, the growth rates of output and investment as well as the changes in the structure of 
value-added and employment of the major economic sectors in the country varied during the 
years under consideration. In particular, the value-added contribution of the oil sector 
significantly fell, whereas that of the service sector witnessed a two-fold increase during this 
period from 10 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 2010. Interestingly, the value added contribution 
of the manufacturing sector more than doubled from 5 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 2010. 
Similarly, but to a smaller extent, the value-added share of the agriculture sector grew from 
nearly 10 percent in 1970 percent to 12 percent in 2010. Nevertheless, particularly relative to 
that of the service sector, the share of the agriculture sector’s investment in total investment 
remained small during these years.  
 
6.3. MODEL SPECIFICATION  
In this section, the long-run economic determinants of investment in the major Iranian economic 
sectors, namely agriculture, manufacturing and mining, oil group and services are specified 
within the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, because Iran is an oil-based economy, it is important to incorporate an oil-
driven uncertainty measure into the investment modelling in order to investigate the extent of 
sector-level oil dependency in the economy of the country. Therefore, the long-run investment 
Year Agriculture
Manufacturing 
and mining Oil Utilities Construction
Transport and 
communication Other services
1956 56.3 13.8 0.4 0.2 5.7 3.5 20.1
1966 47.5 18.2 0.4 0.7 7.2 3.1 22.9
1976 34 19 1 0.7 13.5 4.9 26.9
1986 29 13.2 0.3 0.8 11 5.7 40
1996 22.9 17.5 0.82 1.09 11.32 6.6 39.77
2007 17.97 17 0.73 1.07 12.48 9.47 41.28
Services
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model for each sector is augmented with an oil measure, namely oil revenues (orevt). 
Accordingly, H1sector-level hypothesizes the long-run relationships between:  
 
{it
sector-level,yt
sector-level, ct
sector-level, ln(gk + δ)tsector-level, dpt, orevt}.  
 
Table 6.2 presents the hypothesis under the heading ‘Sector-level Investment Equation’. Further 
to the first hypothesis (H1sector-level), as implied by substituting the steady-state condition into the 
FOC equation, investment is expected to be a positive function of output and ln(gk + δ)t, and a 
negative function of the user cost of capital in the long-run. As discussed in Chapter Five 
Section 5.3, the theoretical literature on (oil-driven) uncertainty and investment relationship, 
both in terms of the sign and the magnitude is ambiguous and subject of debates. Therefore, this 
chapter attempts to first empirically test the presence of any long-run relationships between 
investment and the oil-driven measure on a sector-level basis, and then to shed light on the 
direction and the size of any existing relationships.  
 
Table 6.2 Hypotheses of long-run relationships 
Sector-level Investment Equation  
H1sector-
level 
Long-run relationships between  
[itsector-level, ytsector-level, ctsector-level, ln(gk + δ)tsector-level, dpt, orevt] 
Note: it: investment; yt: output; ct: user cost of capital; δ: capital depreciation rate; gk: capital growth rate; orevt: the 
level of oil revenues; and dpt: inflation measured by the changes in the implicit deflator of gross domestic product 
(percent). The superscript ‘sector-level’ refers to sector-level variables. Data are in natural log and in real terms 
(Base Year 2004/05). Source: CBI, Time-series Data. 
 
Based on the Dutch Disease theory, it is expected that the relation between the oil variable and 
investment in the sectors of oil and services is positive, while that between the oil proxy and 
investment in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors is negative. As explained in Chapter 
Three Section 3.4, in its simplest form, the Dutch Disease theory posits a drop in the output and 
employment of the non-resource tradable sector(s), especially manufacturing or agriculture, 
through resource movements and spending effects (Corden and Neary, 1982; Krugman, 1987; 
Torvik, 2001). The former is related to the migration of the mobile factors of production to the 
resource sector and the booming non-tradable (service) sector. The latter refers to spending of 
the extra income generated by the resource sector on the non-tradable (service) sector, leading to 
an increase in the price of the non-tradables relative to that of the non-booming tradables. Thus, 
the investment resources are taken away from the lagging tradable sectors, lowering the 
productivity of those sectors and deterring their growth.  
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6.4. VARIABLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA  
This chapter uses annual data spanning the period 1974-2011 for Iran on a sector-level as well 
as on an economy basis. The economy level data used in this chapter are the same as the 
aggregate data explained in Chapter Five Section 5.4. These include data on real investment, the 
user cost of capital, inflation and the measure of oil revenues. The sector-level data consists of 
investment, output, value-added, the user cost of capital, capital growth rates, capital 
depreciation rates and employment for the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and mining, oil 
and gas, and services. Appendix 6A presents a list of the variables and their sources used in this 
chapter. Figures 6B1-20 in Appendix 6B presents the graphs of these variables.  
 
The data on sector-level real gross domestic product (in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) 
are collected to proxy for real output of agriculture, manufacturing and mining and services 
sectors. The data on the oil sector’s value-added (in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) are 
used to proxy for the sector’s real output.85 These variables in level and logarithm forms are 
respectively denoted by Yt
Agriculture and yt
Agriculture for the agriculture sector, Yt
Manufacturing and 
yt
Manufacturing for the manufacturing and mining sectors, Yt
Oil and yt
Oil for the oil and gas sectors, 
and Yt
Services and yt
Services for the service sector. The data on gross fixed capital formation (in 
billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) for each sector are used to proxy for real investment 
and collected from the CBI’s annual national accounts (historical data series) available from 
1959/60-2010/11. These variables in level and logarithm forms respectively are denoted by 
It
Agriculture and it
Agriculture for the agriculture sector, It
Manufacturing and it
Manufacturing for the 
manufacturing and mining sectors, It
Oil and it
Oil for the oil and gas sectors, and It
Services and 
it
Services for the service sector.  
 
The sector-level user cost of capital variables are denoted by ct
Agriculture for the agriculture sector, 
ct
Manufacturing for the manufacturing and mining sectors, and ct
Services for the service sector and are 
calculated as: 
 
(6.1) ct
sector-level = (1 – Taxt)((Returntsector-level /100) – dpt) + δtsector-level,      
 
                                                          
85 This is due to the lack of data available on real output in billion Rials at constant 1997/98 prices for the oil sector. 
To test the robustness of the empirical findings, the model was also estimated employing the data on oil output in 
thousand barrels per day. The empirical findings were robust using both measures of oil output. 
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where Taxt is the corporate tax rate variable calculated as explained in Chapter Five (Section 
5.4.3). Returnt
sector-level refers to the sectoral average of the expected rates of return on facilities, 
and is used as a proxy for the rates of interest at the sector-level and are measured as sectoral 
averages of minimum and maximum expected rates of return on facilities. As in Chapter Five, 
dpt is used as a proxy for inflation and refers the implicit deflator of gross domestic product.
86  
Due to lack of data on expected rates of return on facilities for the oil and gas sectors, the 
economy-level weighted average of expected rates of return on facilities, denoted by ct and as 
described in Section 5.4.3 in Chapter Five, are used to proxy for the user cost of capital for these 
sectors. The sector-level ln(gk + δ)t variables are constructed employing equations (5.6) and 
(5.7) based on the sectoral data. These variables are denoted by ln(gk + δ)tAgriculture for the 
agriculture sector, ln(gk + δ)tManufacturing for the manufacturing and mining sectors, ln(gk + δ)tOil 
for the oil and gas sectors, and ln(gk + δ)tServices for the service sector. Appendix 6P reports the 
calculation of the data in details.  
 
In what follows, the CVAR model for each sector is estimated and some of the theoretically-
driven long-run relationships are identified employing Johansen’s (1996) and Juselius’ (2006) 
‘general to specific’ method. Then, the empirical findings are discussed. 
 
6.5. ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS 
This section estimates the long-run determinants of domestic investment on a sector-level basis 
within the theoretical framework of neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. Further, 
the section is complemented with economic discussions related to the empirical findings for 
each economic sector. As in Chapter Five, Johansen’s (1996) and Juselius’ (2006) cointegrated 
vector autoregressive (CVAR) method is employed to specify and estimate the model of 
investment behavior for each of the major economic sectors in the country. This approach 
allows a linear representation of an economically interpretable vector of observable variables on 
their own lags, and where applicable, on exogenous variables.87 Accordingly, for each sector, a 
CVAR model is estimated based on a set of variables given by the vector:  
 
                                                          
86 The expected rates of profit on facilities include those for economic sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, 
mining, construction, housing, trade, service and export (see Chapter Two Section 2.3 for further discussion on the 
concept of profit rates in the Iranian Islamic Banking System). 
87  For a detailed discussion on model specification see Chapter Four Section 4.4 and Chapter Five Section 5.3. 
 156 
 
xt = [it
sector-level, yt
sector-level, ct
sector-level, ln(gk + δ)tsector-level, dpt, orevt], 
 
and the hypotheses are tested over the period from 1974 to 2011. First, the appropriate lag 
length is determined for each model based on the SC and the H-Q criteria as well as the LM 
tests (see Appendix 6C). Next, multivariate and univariate misspecification tests are conducted 
according to which the statistical adequacy of the chosen VAR models for all the sectors is 
established (see Appendix 6D). The Johansen cointegration rank tests, based on the Bartlett 
(corrected) trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test, are then conducted to decide on the rank 
for each model, the results of which are reported in Appendix 6E. The Bartlett corrected trace 
test results for all the models suggest the choice of r = 2. The eigenvalues of the companion 
matrix and the graphs of the cointegration relations are presented in Appendix 6F and Appendix 
6G, respectively.88  
 
The models’ statistical adequacy is next investigated by conducting recursive stability tests 
based on the log-transformed eigenvalues depicted in Figures 6H1-4 in Appendix 6H.89 The 
results of the stationarity tests are then reported in Appendix 6I and support the treatment of the 
variables as non-stationary. Furthermore, the graphs of the residuals presented in Figures 6K1-4 
in Appendix 6K show that the estimated values of the residuals follow the actual values 
closely.90 Where the residuals are greater than |3.5σε|, blip dummies are included in the models 
to achieve normality and thus valid statistical inference, the results of which are presented in 
Appendix 6J. Lastly, over-identifying restrictions are imposed. The latter is done by testing sets 
of irreducible relations to formulate the cointegrating structures of the long-run relations. In all 
the models, the first relation (β1) is normalized on the investment variable. The results of the 
over-identified cointegrating structures of the theoretically-driven relations based on the sector-
level data are demonstrated in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8. The statistically significant β 
coefficients in the tables are in bold face to differentiate them from the reported α coefficients. 
According to the p-values related to the LR test statistics shown in the tables, the over-identified 
cointegrating structures in the data are not rejected in any of the models. The following sub-
sections provide overviews of the major economic sectors and discuss the empirical findings. 
                                                          
88 Please note that the observation of the time-series and the graphs of the cointegration relations of the sectoral data 
reveal some changes in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras. However, the findings appear to be robust according to 
the empirical evidence presented in Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.3, 6.5.5 and 6.5.7. 
89 However, since the sample is not very large, these results are not informative. 
90 It must be noted that, given the choices of lag length and the sample size, some evidence of autocorrelations 
(particularly for the agriculture sector) is observed. 
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6.5.1. THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR: OVERVIEW  
In Iran, about one third of the total surface area is suitable for farming. However, due to 
inadequate water distribution in many areas and poor soil, most of this surface area is not under 
cultivation. During 1970-2010, output and investment in the agriculture sector registered yearly 
average growth rates of 5 percent and 8 percent, respectively. Over these years, Iran’s 
agricultural policy intended to protect farmers. For instance, the policy of guaranteed purchase 
of agricultural crops was put in place in 1989 so as to encourage the production of strategically 
essential crops, to establish equilibrium in the production system and to maintain farmers’ 
income levels. Accordingly, the government guaranteed the purchase of certain products from 
the farmers at a pre-set price to protect them against seasonality in the market prices. On 
average, increases in the guaranteed prices had been in line with the changes in the rate of 
inflation. The government further supported the farmers through the distribution of agricultural 
inputs at subsidized prices as well as investment expenditures for the development of agriculture 
and water resources, and by implementing protectionist foreign trade policies. The government 
also tried to protect the agriculture sector via intervention in the financial markets such as direct 
credit allocations and providing the farmers with banking facilities at preferential rates.  
 
At large, investment in the agriculture sector has been mainly financed by the government’s 
expenditure scheme for the expansion of the agriculture sector and water resources, and by the 
extended facilities to the agriculture sector by the agriculture and commercial banks as well as 
credit institutions. The data on the extended facilities to the agriculture sector by banks and 
credit institutions revealed an annual average increase of 9.7 percent during 1999-2010 (see 
Table 6L1 in Appendix 6L). Over these years, the guaranteed purchasing prices for three major 
agricultural products of wheat, barley and sugar beets continued and the government’s subsidy 
payments increased on average by 9.8 percent per annum (see Tables 6L2 and 6L3 in Appendix 
6L). Table 6L4 in Appendix 6L presents the figures related to credits for the expansion of the 
agriculture sector and water resources based on the government’s development expenditures 
during 1999-2010. Overall, the total changes in expenditures appeared positive and grew by 4 
percent on average per annum, of which an annual average of 79 percent was allocated for the 
development of water resources.91  
 
                                                          
91 The figure includes programs for water supply to cities and industries as well as irrigation networks and drainage 
programs.  
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Despite the protection of this sector by the government, agricultural planning has been only 
partially successful. For example, the development of rural banking and subsidized lending 
rates gave rise to the outstanding facilities extended to the agriculture sector by banks and credit 
institutions, resulting in the expansion of the system of deposit mobilization and high overdue 
on loans. The government’s adoption of new market-oriented policies since the early 2000s 
increased the prices of agricultural products, contributing even more to the level of inflation in 
the country. Also, despite the increased investment and government support for the agriculture 
sector, the sector’s productivity remained low over the years under consideration. For instance, 
the production of many agricultural crops and their area under cultivation grew only marginally. 
Table 6L5 in Appendix 6L presents the production and the area under cultivation for major 
farming and horticultural products during 1999-2010. Based on the data for the selected range of 
products, the production of the crops and their areas under cultivation depicted average growth 
rates of only 5.5 percent and 2.9 percent per annum, respectively. Similarly, the harvested 
fishery products and livestock during this period rose merely by an annual average rate of 4.9 
percent (see Table 6L6 in Appendix 6L).  
 
Also, despite such a high share of extended credits, the usage of modern irrigation systems 
remained disappointing during most of this period. For instance, the area under cultivation with 
modern irrigation systems and the amount of water used for irrigation grew by just 3.9 percent 
and 5.1 percent during 1999-2007, respectively (see Table 6L7 in Appendix 6L). In addition, the 
agriculture sector’s low productivity was partially due to the scarcity of water resources and 
very low amount of rainfall in the country coupled with sand dune progression and increasing 
size of desserts, all adversely affecting the preparation of lands under cultivation and the yield 
per hectare for agricultural activities. For instance, total plantation and seeding for sand dune 
fixation and combatting desertification fell from 521.633 hectares in 1991 to 588.12 hectares in 
2006 (see Table 6L8 in Appendix 6L).  
 
Table 6L9 in Appendix 6L exhibits the performance of agricultural insurance funds. In general, 
government policies that reduce production risks could encourage producers to expand 
production. This could be realized through bringing economically marginal lands into 
production, altering crop mix production in favor of certain crops and improving their cropping 
practices via higher deficiency payments or insurance premium subsidies. Despite their role in 
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stabilizing financial fluctuations for those engaged in agricultural activities and providing 
income support by reducing income variability in the sector, the area of insured farmlands by 
the funds grew from 1.9 thousand hectares in 1999 to only 4.2 thousand hectares in 2010. Due to 
the small operational size of the farmlands together with low and unstable income growth of the 
farmers as well as increasing risk of natural calamities, the demand for agricultural insurance did 
not come into existence on a large scale. This, in return, contributed to the low growth of 
agricultural production through adversely affecting the farmers’ confidence in adopting new and 
improved farm practices and in attracting greater investment in the sector.92  
 
Other factors further contributed to the low productivity of the agriculture sector in the country. 
In 2004, Iran’s total lands were 162.85 million hectares of which only 17.66 million hectares 
(about 11 percent) were suitable for agriculture, indicating the marginal share of land 
appropriate for agricultural activities. Of these 17.66 million hectares, about 66 percent, were 
lands for annual cultivation of crops, 26 percent were uncultivated lands and about 8 percent 
were orchards and nurseries (SCI, 2006). In addition to the small share of suitable land for 
agriculture, mechanisation and efficiency of production had been restricted due to the high level 
of fragmentation of agricultural land in the country mainly as a result of the pre-revolutionary 
land reform and inheritance.93  
                                                          
92 Under the current Agricultural Products Insurance Law (enacted in 1983), the coverage includes the insurance of 
crops, livestock, forestry, pastures, and watershed management against risks of flood, hail, storm, windstorm, heavy 
rainfall, frost, frost-bite, earthquake and draught. Among others, some of the strategic crops under coverage are 
cotton, sugar-beet, soybean, rice, wheat, potato, onion, corn, sunflower, colza, grapes, date palm, citrus fruits, 
apple, tea, pomegranate, almond and pistachio. The activities in the field of strategic livestock insurance include 
coverage for dairy cattle stationed at industrialized units, poultry insurance, farmed aquatics, rural herd (sheep and 
goat), pure bred Iranian horses, honeybees and their respective hives, camel, shrimp, registered bull, native and 
hybrid cow as well as cattle raising units and breeding centers (see Agricultural Insurance in Iran. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.agroinsurance.com/en/pratice/?pid=6604 [Accessed 17 Feb 2015]. 
93 The pre-revolutionary land reform refers to a series of reform policies, the so called White Revolution, launched 
by Iran's ruler of the time, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The major element of the White Revolution was a land 
reform program with the aim of redistributing about one-half of private agricultural land to peasants holding 
traditional cropping-share rights (approximately one-half of all village families). Five other programs included the 
nationalization of forests; sales of shares in (some) government-owned industries; plans for workers to share in 
profits of large factories; voting rights for women; and the formation of a literacy corps of draftees assigned to 
villages as teachers. Later, the literacy corps model was extended to a health corps (for draftees who had college-
level training in medicine) and a development corps (for college graduate draftees). By the mid-1970s, the White 
Revolution comprised a total of eighteen programs. The results of the White Revolution were mixed. On the 
positive side, about half a million peasants obtained adequate land under the land reform program to engage in 
profitable farming, primary schools were established in several hundred villages that previously had none, and 
small towns and rural areas benefited from various government development initiatives. On the negative side, 
perhaps the most serious deficiency of the White Revolution was the raising of popular expectations that remained 
unfulfilled. With respect to land reform, for example, one-half of all rural families received no land at all; among 
those obtaining land, about 73 percent got less than six hectares, an amount sufficient only for subsistence farming 
(growth of crops predominantly for consumption by the farm family rather than for sale). The net result was the 
 160 
 
Table 6.3 Area of holdings lands (2003) - thousands 
 
Note: the figure of total number of holdings is a sum of irrigated and rained lands holdings. Source: SCI (various 
years). 
 
Table 6.4 shows the number and area of land holdings in 2003. About 27 percent of the holdings 
were related to the lands smaller than 1 hectare even though their share in total agricultural lands 
was very small (about 2.3 percent). Nearly 30.3 percent of the holdings were associated with the 
lands between 1 and 5 hectares, despite their small share in total lands (about 19.4 percent). The 
holdings of only these two groups made up 58.1 percent of all the holdings although their total 
share was just 19.5 percent of the total areas under cultivation. About 18.1 percent of holdings 
were related to the lands between 5 and 20 hectares, despite their share in total lands (about 40 
percent). Only 3.1 percent and 0.77 percent of holdings were related to the remaining two 
groups of lands which were between 20 and 50 hectares and over 50 hectares, respectively, with 
considerably high shares of lands suitable for agriculture (about 41 percent).  
 
For the use of land to be economically productive and efficient, a minimum of 20 hectares is 
needed. However, in Iran, 58.1 percent of land usage is related to lands smaller than 5 hectares, 
indicating a very unequal pattern of agricultural activities based on the holdings and the area 
size in the country. Table 6L10 in Appendix L6 illustrates the agricultural holdings by type of 
holders and by agricultural machinery and equipment at province level in 2003. From over 4 
million of agriculture holdings, about 80 percent were with private settled households and 
farmers’ families. Out of a total of 30 provinces, three provinces held a quarter of the holdings. 
Similarly, about a quarter of tractors and ploughs were used in only three provinces. These 
figures signify the extent of the concentration of agricultural activities in certain areas and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
creation of widespread disillusionment in villages. This pattern, some benefits accruing to a minority but overall 
disappointment for the majority, characterized many of the White Revolution programs by the early 1970s.  
Area under cultivation
Number of 
holdings Area
Total 4344.32 17665.18
Irrigated lands 2828.64 8297.03
Rained lands 1515.68 9368.16
Smaller than 1 hectare 1205.03 407.07
Between 1 and 5 hectares 1319.96 3032.22
Between 5 and 20 hectares 786.33 7019.16
Between 20 and 50 hectares 135.64 3736.33
50 and greater than 50 hectare 33.75 3470.4
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imbalanced use of modernization and mechanization in the sector, all of which contributed to 
low productivity of the sector.  
 
Rural-to-urban migration, mainly due to low wages and poor working conditions in the 
agricultural sector, further led to the sluggish output growth of that sector. For instance, the total 
number of paid and unpaid employees at modern cattle and chicken farms rose from 25,413 
employees in 1989 to 41,865 in 2003, of which the share of unpaid employees remained high 
and declined only slightly from 43.20 percent in 1989 to 39.80 percent in 2003 (see Table 6L11 
in Appendix 6L). The high rate of migration resulted in the slower growth of the number of 
villages (compared to that of cities) where over 90 percent of the agricultural products were 
produced, hence adversely affecting the supply of particularly educated labor in the sector (see 
Table 6L12 in Appendix 6L). Table 6.5 shows the agricultural holdings by literacy status, 
educational degree and age groups in 2003. From a total of 4.32 million agricultural holders, 
45.3 percent were illiterate. When the number of holders with primary and non-official 
education is also added to that of the illiterate ones, those with no or very little education 
increases to about 80 percent of total holders.  
 
Table 6.4 Agricultural holdings owned by literacy status, educational degree and age 
groups (2003) 
 
Source: SCI. 
 
Moreover, Iran has become a major importer of wheat, meat, rice and other basic food products. 
Due to increased oil revenues, and their impact on exchange rates, the imported agricultural 
products became less expensive than local production, adversely affecting the competitiveness 
of the sector. Figure 6.2 illustrates the balance of trade for agricultural products during 1999-
2010. As it can be seen, agricultural products’ imports remained higher than their exports, 
leaving the trade balance negative throughout this period for this sector. 
Age group 
(years) 
Total 
(1000 
persons)
Share  in 
total (% )
Total 
(1000 
persons)
Share in 
total (% )
Primary 
and non-
official 
(1000 
persons)
Lower and 
upper 
secondary 
(1000 
persons)
Agricultura
l associate 
degree and 
higher 
(1000 
persons)
Non-
agricultural 
 associate 
degree and 
higher 
(1000 
persons)
All 4324.314 2363.094 54.646679 1961.22 45.353321 1489.62 739.43 34.82 99.21
Under 15 to 29 390.54 342.34 87.658114 48.2 12.341886 150.93 174.53 5.43 11.41
30-74 3653.81 1934.86 52.954587 1718.95 47.045413 1257.28 561.48 29.17 86.93
75 and older 234.87 42.86 18.248393 192.01 81.751607 38.38 3.42 0.22 0.87
Total 
literate 
and 
illiterate 
(1000 
persons) 
Literate Illiterate Literate by educational degree
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Figure 6-2 Trade balance of agricultural products 
 
Note: Data are in current prices. Source: CBI. 
 
The development of the agriculture sector’s ratio of real output in total output and the sector’s 
ratio of real investment in total investment are plotted in Figure 6.3 (the panels on the top and 
middle left, respectively). During 1970-2010, the former and the latter averaged 16 percent and 
4 percent per annum, respectively, and their respective average annual growth rates registered 
only 1 percent and 3 percent over the same period. The panel on the top right in the same Figure 
depicts the development of the sector’s ratio of real investment to its capital stock of the earlier 
(see Taghipour, 2008). Even though this ratio revealed a rapidly declining trend during the 
revolution, it remained positive yet at a lower level compared to that of the pre-revolutionary era 
throughout the years under study. The panel on the middle right illustrates the development of 
the sector’s output to its investment of the previous period. Overall, this ratio grew merely by an 
annual average rate of 0.85 percent, and first depicted a fluctuating and slightly increasing trend 
from the mid-1970 to the mid-1990, but then appeared to decline during the rest of the period. 
The panels on the bottom left and right respectively plot the development of the agriculture 
sector’s output and investment against the movements of oil revenues. Both output and 
investment do not seem to co-move with oil income in the long-run. 
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Figure 6-3 Agriculture sector’s output and investment shares 
Share of agriculture real output 
in total output (%) 
 
 
Share of agriculture real investment in total 
investment (%) 
 
 
Agriculture real output and real oil revenues 
(billion Rials) 
 
 
Agriculture real investment and real oil revenues 
(billion Rials) 
 
 Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
An overall strategy therefore is needed to create a longer-term vision for this crucial industry. 
Within this strategy, particular attention should be given to capacity development and 
facilitating the modernization and mechanization of the sector from a traditional setting to a 
more modern structure. This, combined with protection of the farmers through appropriate price, 
taxing and trade strategies for the agricultural products as well as the promotion of entities such 
as specialized insurance companies, could enhance the productive capacity and efficiency of this 
sector.  
 
6.5.2. THE CVAR ANALYSIS FOR THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
In this section, the economic determinants of investment in the Iranian agriculture sector are 
investigated and a CVAR model is estimated based on the set of variables given by the vector 
xt
Agriculture = [it
Agriculture, yt
Agriculture, ct
Agriculture, ln(gk + δ)tAgriculture, dpt, orevt]', t = 1974-2011. The 
inspection of the data based on this model reveals large residuals in the data for output in 2008 
consistent with the decline of agricultural production due to severe draught in that year. 
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Therefore, the dummy variable [DP2008] is included in the model to control for the largest 
outliers in the data. Also, based on the observation of the time-series and cointegration relations 
graphs (see Appendices 6B and 6G), an unrestricted constant term [trend] is included in the 
model allowing for trends in the levels of the variables and a non-zero mean in the cointegration 
relations. A shift dummy [T(1988:01)] is further added to the model as there seems to be shifts 
in the slopes of the trends in the agriculture sector’s investment and output as the growth rates 
seem to have changed significantly in 1988, corresponding to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in that 
year. The results of tests of statistical significance for the dummy variables are presented in 
Appendix 6J. The appropriate lag length is determined for the model based on the SC and the H-
Q criteria and the LM tests, the results of which suggest p = 1 for the agriculture sector (see 
Appendix 6C). 
 
Table 6.3 reports the results of the over-identified cointegrating structures of the long-run 
relations in the data. The over-identified structures specify two long-run irreducible relations for 
the agriculture sector based on χ2(5) = 2.653 [0.753]. The first one, normalized on investment, 
corresponds to hypothesis H1Agriculture and relates to the investment equation according to which 
a positive relationship between investment and output and a negative relation between 
investment and the user cost of capital are expected. The empirical findings are, however, only 
partially in line with the predictions of the theory. That is, as expected by the theory, the long-
run relationship between investment and ln(gk + δ)tAgriculture is positive with the coefficient 
magnitude 1.34.  
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Table 6.5 Agriculture sector’s fully-identified long-run structures (1970-2010) 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
(t-values in parentheses)[p-values in brackets]
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(5) =  2.653 [0.753]
r = 2 it
Agriculture
yt
Agriculture
ct
Agriculture ln(δ + gk)t
Agriculture
dpt orevt T(1988:01) trend
β1Agriculture 1.000 (NA) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) -1.348 (-15.245) -0.681 (-2.591) 0.000 (.NA) -0.142 (-11.253) 0.066 (5.710)
α1Agriculture -0.159 (-1.618) -0.001 (-0.037) 0.045 (0.856) -0.028 (-0.271) -0.099 (-1.974) - - -
β2Agriculture 0.246 (7.024) 0.000 (.NA) 1.000 (NA) 0.000 (.NA) 1.500 (10.388) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) -0.012 (-4.383)
α2Agriculture -1.661 (-3.733) -0.012 (-0.078) 0.375 (1.584) -1.596 (-3.369) -0.736 (-3.239) - - -
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Inconsistent with the predictions of the theory, however, the relations between investment and 
output as well as the user cost of capital are statistically insignificant in the long-run. Further, 
the long-run association between investment and oil windfalls in the non-resource sector of 
agriculture in the country is insignificant, hence appears to be consistent with the intuitively 
expected non-positive relation based on the Dutch Disease theory. Surprisingly, the empirical 
evidence suggests that investment is positively associated with inflation in the long-run with a 
coefficient magnitude 0.68. At first, this finding seems to be counter-intuitive as one would 
expect that higher inflation could have a depressing impact on investment behavior. However, in 
the context of the Iranian agriculture sector, this outcome may be plausible. At large, given the 
extent of the protection of this sector by the government, investment in Iran’s agriculture sector 
has been largely financed by the government’s expenditure scheme for the development of the 
sector. This could explain the positive long-run relation between investment and inflation 
resulting from expansionary monetary policies to provide funds for the expansion of the sector.  
 
The estimated α loading coefficients for the first cointegrating relationship show that inflation is 
error increasing with a coefficient magnitude equal to 0.09. Evidently, despite its protectionist 
policies for the sector, the government’s intervention has contributed  
further to the higher level of prices of agricultural products through  
adoption of market-based policies since the early 2000s. Although statistically  
rather insignificant, the own error correction coefficient for investment is correctly signed and 
slowly adjusts with a coefficient equal to 0.16. Hence, the findings may suggest a weak 
equilibrating role for investment in the sector’s investment equation in the short-run.  
 
The second relation is normalized on the user cost of capital. In the long-run and consistent with 
the theory, the results show that the user cost of capital and investment are negatively related 
with an investment coefficient of magnitude -0.24. That is, higher expected rates of return on 
facilities (or lower subsidies on these lending rates) have a suppressing long-run effect on 
investment in the agriculture sector through lowering (demand for) extended facilities to the 
sector by banks and credit institutions. Also, expectedly, the real user cost of capital is a 
negative function of inflation with a coefficient magnitude of -1.50. The over-identified 
structures do not identify any statistically significant associations between the user cost of 
capital and oil windfalls in the long-run. The estimated α coefficients for the second long-run 
relation demonstrate that both investment and inflation carry the expected error adjusting signs 
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with respective coefficients equal to 1.66 and 0.73, suggestive of the equilibrating roles of these 
variables for the user cost of capital equation in the short-run.  
 
On the whole, the agriculture sector’s investment behavior has been only partly consistent with 
the predictions of the neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. The insignificance of the 
long-run relationship between the sector’s investment and output has been due to the key 
underlying factors affecting the economic performance of the agriculture sector  
as explained in the previous section. These factors include the inadequate  
modernization of the sector, high rural-to-urban migration, inappropriate pricing policies and 
trade strategies for the agricultural products as well as inefficiency and inadequate productive 
capacity of the sector.  
 
Further, the insignificant relation between investment in the sector and oil revenues suggests 
that this sector did not benefit from investment spillovers bred by the availability of oil income 
in the long-run. Such insignificant long-run association between investment in the non-booming 
tradable sector of agriculture and oil revenues intuitively appears to be consistent with the 
presence of the Dutch Disease mechanism in the economy. That is, over the years under study, 
the abundant supply of foreign exchange being made available by oil windfalls resulted in 
imports of raw materials and agricultural products to meet the growing domestic demand. This, 
in return, made investment in the agriculture sector unattractive because of the unfavorable 
exchange rate, even at the time of higher oil prices when some funding for investment was 
available. On the other hand, when oil prices were lower, there were fewer resources available 
for investment in the sector. This setting consequently resulted in the lowered share of the 
sector’s investment in total investment contributing to the contraction of the agriculture sector 
over time. 
 
6.5.3. THE MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS: OVERVIEW  
In Iran, the most important manufactured products include petrochemical products, steel, 
automobile, cement, copper, electric appliances, industrial machinery and telecommunication 
equipment.94 During 1970-2010, the country’s real output of the manufacturing sector grew on 
average by about 7 percent per annum and the annual share of the sector’s output in total GDP 
                                                          
94 Other manufactured products include processed food, paper, rubber and leather products and textile. 
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averaged 30 percent. For example, during 1988-2010, the production of automobile, 
petrochemical products, steel and cement grew by annual average growth rates of 25 percent, 22 
percent, 12 percent and 7 percent, respectively. This was mainly as a result of the increased 
investment in the sector and enhanced domestic demand in the country after the Iran-Iraq war as 
well as the booming housing sector over these years (see Tables 6M1 and 6M2 in Appendix 
6M),  
 
Moreover, Iran is endowed with over 68 different types of minerals, approximately 37 billion 
tons of proven mineral reserves and more than 57 billion tons of potential mineral reserves 
spread across the country.95 The country holds more than 7 percent of the world's total mineral 
reserves, and with only about 1 percent share of the world's population, it is ranked among the 
15 major mineral-rich countries. The most important mines in the country consist of coal, 
metallic minerals, sand, salt and chemical minerals. Zinc, copper, iron, uranium and lead are 
amongst other large yet mostly under-developed deposits in the country. The mining sector’s 
output increased on average by 3 percent per annum and the share of the mining output in total 
GDP presented a remarkably small share and averaged 0.67 percent over the years from 1970 to 
2010 (see Table 6M1 in Appendix 6M).  
 
During these years, the government supported the manufacturing and mining sectors by direct 
credit allocations bred by increased oil revenues. Various banks and credit institutions further 
provided support for these sectors by extending facilities to public and non-public sectors. The 
figures on the allocated credits based on the government’s expenditures plans for the 
development of the manufacturing and mining sectors during 1998-2010 are presented in Table 
6M3 in Appendix 6M. The credits allocated by the government to the manufacturing and 
banking sectors increased on average by 12 percent annually. Table 6M4 in Appendix 6M 
illustrates the data on the extended facilities to these sectors by the non-public sector, namely 
commercial and specialized banks and credit institutions, and by the public sector. The figures 
show a growth rate of 8.2 percent by the former and a declining rate of 17 percent by the latter 
on average per annum during 1998-2010.  
 
                                                          
95 ‘Iran's mineral exports up 39 percent’. PressTV. 17 January 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index.php/economy-and-business/92737-irans-copper-output-will-increase-35-fold 
[Accessed 25 July 2014].  
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Figure 6-4 Manufacturing and mining sectors’ output and investment shares 
Share of manufacturing and mining real output 
in total output (%) 
 
 
Share of manufacturing and mining real 
investment in total investment (%) 
 
 
Manufacturing and mining real output and real 
oil revenues (billion Rials) 
 
 
Manufacturing and mining real investment and 
real oil revenues (billion Rials) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Thanks to the government’s support fueled by oil revenues, on the whole, the share of 
manufacturing and mining sectors’ output in total GDP averaged 31 percent and rose yearly on 
average by 2.7 percent during 1970-2010. Likewise, these sectors’ output and investment 
presented positive growth rates of 6 percent and 8 percent on average per annum, respectively, 
over the same period. This increasing trend is ascribed partly to the increased number of 
manufacturing establishments and issued permits in the mining sector, improved technology and 
deployment of modern equipment, the increased ratio of the skilled to unskilled employees in 
these sectors as well as an increase in the effective demand for industrial products over the study 
period. For example, during the 17-year period interval from 1986 to 2003, the number of 
manufacturing establishments grew by a total of 77 percent (see Table 6M5 in Appendix 6M). 
Similarly, the share of the technical workers in the manufacturing establishments increased from 
45.6 percent 1986 to 49.5 percent in 2003. Yet, the share of unskilled workers declined from 
42.2 percent in 1986 to 29.5 percent in 2003 (see Table 6M6 in Appendix 6M). In the mining 
sector, the number of the operation permits issued by the Ministry of Industries and Mines rose 
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on average by 8.9 percent per annum. Also, over the years 1998-2010, employment related to 
operation permits went up on average by 9.8 percent on a yearly basis (see Table 6M7 in 
Appendix 6M).  
 
The panels on the top left and right in Figure 6.4 illustrate the development of the manufacturing 
and mining sectors’ real output and investment in total GDP and total investment, respectively. 
During 1970-2010, the combined share of these sectors’ output and investment in total output 
and in total investment respectively averaged 31 percent and 13 percent. The graphs of the 
sectors’ output and investment against oil revenues are plotted in the panels on the bottom left 
and right in Figure 6.4, respectively. In particular, investment appeared to co-move with changes 
in oil revenues over the years under study, indicating the dependency of these sectors on oil 
income. 
 
Figure 6-5 Sectoral imports and exports (in billion Dollars at current prices) 
 
Source: SCI. 
 
At large, the productivity of the manufacturing sector in the country is heavily oil-reliant. Each 
year, owing to the availability of oil income, Iran imports a great deal of raw materials, 
machinery and equipment to be used in the manufacturing sector, while income from the export 
of manufactured products has remained relatively low. For instance, the sector’s imports and 
exports respectively amounted to 25.77 and 2.59 billion US $ in 2008. In the same year, the 
share of the sector’s imports in total imports registered 48 percent whereas the share of exports 
in total non-oil exports recorded only 14 percent (SCI, Statistical Year Book, 2008, pp.432 and 
435). Figure 6.5 illustrates the development of imports and exports of the manufacturing and 
mining as well as the agriculture sector. Over the year under consideration, a great share of total 
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imports was destined to the manufacturing sector. Given the import substitution policies pursued 
for most of the years under study, the low size of export ratios may seem unsurprising.  
 
6.5.4. THE CVAR ANALYSIS FOR THE MANUFACTURING AND MINING 
SECTORS 
In this section, the economic determinants of investment in the manufacturing and mining 
sectors within the theoretical framework of modified neoclassical and accelerator type 
investment models are investigated.96 The estimated CVAR model is based on a sample of 
variables for these sectors given by the vector: 
 
 xt
Manufacturing = [it
Manufacturing, yt
Manufacturing, ct
Manufacturing, ln(gk + δ)tManufacturing, dpt, orevt]',  
 
t = 1974-2011. The examination of the data does not reveal any large outliers in the data for the 
manufacturing sector, but there seems to be a level shift [T(1988:01)] in the sector’s investment 
associated with the effects from the end of the war with Iraq. An unrestricted constant term 
[trend] is further included in the model so as to allow for a non-zero mean in the cointegration 
relations and trends in the levels of the variables (see Appendices 6B and 6G for the time-series 
graphs of the data and cointegration relations). The test results for the statistical significance of 
the level shift dummy and the unrestricted constant are reported in Appendix 6J. Further to the 
H-Q criteria and the LM test results, the lag length of p = 2 is chosen (see Appendix 6C). 
 
                                                          
96 Although the manufacturing and the mining sectors have very different characteristics, in the empirical analysis, 
the author uses the combined data on investment for both sectors as the disaggregate data on gross fixed capital 
formation for the manufacturing sector separately is not provided by the official data sources. However, because the 
share of the mining sector’s output in total GDP is very low (0.67 p.a. on average during 1970-2010), the overall 
findings arguably pertain to the tradable sector of manufacturing (rather than the mining sector). Therefore, this 
chapter uses the terms ‘manufacturing’ and ‘manufacturing and mining’ interchangeably (see Table 6M1 in 
Appendix 6M).  
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Table 6.6 Manufacturing and mining sectors’ fully-identified long-run structures (1974-2011) 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
(t-values in parentheses)[p-values in brackets]
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(1) =  0.044 [0.834]
r = 2 it
Manufacturing
yt
Manufacturing
ct
Manufacturing ln(δ + gk)t
Manufacturing
dpt orevt T(1988:01) trend
β1Manufacturing 1.000 (NA) -0.593 (-6.464) 2.905 (4.477) 0.000 (.NA) 2.369 (3.484) -0.080 (-2.172) 0.059 (5.629) -0.069 (-7.379)
α1Manufacturing -1.214 (-3.582) -0.475 (-3.599) -0.621 (-5.311) -1.197 (-3.508) 0.614 (4.244) - - -
β2Manufacturing 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) 3.348 (3.353) 1.000 (NA) 5.313 (5.295) -0.299 (-4.205) 0.131 (6.488) -0.097 (-6.013)
α2Manufacturing -0.433 (-1.635) 0.009 (0.092) 0.514 (5.625) -0.520 (-1.949) -0.564 (-4.990) - - -
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The over-identified structures specify two interpretable irreducible long-run relations based on 
χ2(1) = 0.044 [0.834]. The first relation describes the investment equation. As predicted by the 
theory, the relation between investment and output is positive with a coefficient magnitude 0.59. 
Also, consistent with the theory, investment is strongly and negatively related to the user cost of 
capital with a coefficient equal to -2.90. Furthermore, investment in the sector is found to be a 
negative function of inflation in the long-run with the latter’s coefficient equal to  
-2.36. In the long-run, however, the relation between investment and ln(gk + δ)tManufacturing 
appears to be statistically insignificant.       
 
Notably, investment is a positive function of oil revenues with an estimated coefficient equal to 
0.08, indicating a positive relation between investment and the availability of oil income in the 
country’s manufacturing and mining sectors in the long-run. This relationship, however, is 
inconsistent with the predictions of the Dutch Disease theory in terms of the sign of the 
coefficient on oil revenues for the non-booming tradable sectors of manufacturing and mining. 
The estimated α loading coefficients show that investment, output and the user cost of capital 
are all error correcting to the first long-run equilibrium relation, with respective adjustment 
coefficients of 1.21, 0.47 and 0.62. However, the estimated α coefficient on inflation for the first 
relation suggests that in the short-run the highly persistent inflationary pressure in the Iranian 
economy is error increasing with a coefficient magnitude 0.61. The second relation describes the 
capital growth equation. Expectedly, in the long-run, the growth rate of capital stock is a 
positive function of oil revenues with a coefficient of 0.29, and a negative function of the user 
cost of capital and inflation with respective coefficients equal to -3.34 and -5.31. Inflation and 
ln(gk + δ)tManufacturing are both adjusting with error correcting coefficients of 0.56 and 0.52, 
indicative of the significance of these variables in the short-run for the second cointegrating 
relationship.  
 
Overall, the manufacturing and mining sectors’ investment pattern largely corresponds to the 
theoretical framework of the neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment, i.e. a long-run 
positive relationship between investment and output, and a long-run negative association 
between investment and the proxies of the user cost of capital. Interestingly, there exists a long-
run relationship between investment activities in these sectors and oil revenues suggesting that 
they benefited from investment spillovers (facilitated by the government’s decision to promote 
industrialization) fueled by the availability of oil income. Nevertheless, the contribution of the 
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manufacturing and mining sectors in GDP and employment could have been greater given the 
diversity of the manufacturing activities as well as the quantity and quality of the proven mineral 
deposits in country.   
 
6.5.5.   OIL SECTOR: OVERVIEW  
Iran was the first country in the Persian Gulf which discovered oil in 1908. Since the 1920s, the 
country’s economy became increasingly reliant on the oil sector, and oil revenues accounted for 
about 65 percent of the government’s revenues during 1970-2010. Yet, in total GDP, the value-
added of the oil sector contributed only 19 percent on average per annum over these years. The 
country holds the fourth largest proven crude oil reserves and the second largest natural gas 
reserves in the world. The country ranks among the world’s top 10 and top 5 crude oil and 
natural gas producers, respectively, and is blessed with about 10 of the world’s and 13 percent 
of OPEC’s crude oil reserves (EIA, 2014). About 70 percent of the country’s crude reserves are 
located onshore mostly in the Luristan-Khuzestan basin in the Southwest near the Iraqi border, 
with the rest located offshore in the Persian Gulf as well as the Caspian sea.97 The country 
further shares several onshore and offshore fields with its neighboring countries including Iraq, 
Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Figure 6.6 maps the major crude oil and natural gas 
infrastructure and facilities in the country.98  
 
                                                          
97 Iran's largest producing oil fields are the onshore Ahwaz-Asmari, Marun, and Gachsaran fields, all of which are 
located in the Khuzestan Province. 
98 Iran’s major crude oil terminals are Kharg (with a capacity of 5.0 million barrels per days), Lavan, and Sirri 
Islands, all of which are located in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the country has two small crude oil terminals at 
Cyrus and Bahregansar, one terminal along the Caspian Sea, and other terminals that handle mostly refined product 
exports and imports. Condensate from the South Pars natural gas field is exported from the Assaluyeh terminal.  
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Figure 6-6 Map of key petroleum facilities in Iran 
 
Source: Parstimes, Iran oil and gas resources: key petroleum facilities [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.parstimes.com/ioil.html [Accessed 30 July 2014].  
 
The Supreme Energy Council, established in 2001 and chaired by Iran’s president, consists of 
various ministries including the Ministry of Petroleum, and oversees the energy sector in the 
country. The Ministry of Petroleum supervises the enterprises of the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), and the National Petrochemical 
Company (NPC), all of which are state-owned.99 NIOC and NIGC through their subsidiaries, 
listed in Table 6N1 (Appendix 6N), control upstream oil and natural gas activities and 
downstream natural gas activities (incl. pipelines, city natural gas networks and gas processing 
plans), respectively. 
 
The country’s proven oil reserves grew by a total of about 160 percent from 57 thousand million 
barrels in 1980 to 151 thousand million barrels in 2010 (see Table 6N2 in Appendix 6N). The 
country’s crude oil production increased from 3.8 million barrels per day in 1970 to 4.3 million 
barrels per day in 2010, illustrating a total growth rate of 12 percent over these years. During 
this period, the amount of the country’s oil production greatly varied. For instance, during 1970-
                                                          
99 NPC accounts for approximately 90 percent of the country’s total petrochemical production and exports through 
its subsidiary, the Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company (Source: National Iranian Oil Company. [Online]. 
Available at: http://nioc.ir [Accessed 28 July 2014].  
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1975, the crude oil production was at its highest averaging 5.1 million barrels per day, while this 
figure registered its lowest and averaged 2 million barrels per day during the early years of the 
war with Iraq from 1981-1985. The share of value added of the oil sector in total GDP declined 
from 46.6 percent in 1970 to as low as 8.7 percent in 2010. Despite its declining share of value-
added in total GDP, during 1972-2007, the oil sector’s share of export in total export averaged 
as high as 78 percent on a yearly basis, while that of the non-oil sector recorded merely 22 
percent. The panel on the left in Figure 6.7 graphs total and non-oil exports during 1973-2010. 
Currently, the largest buyers of Iranian crude oil are China, India, South Korea, and Turkey 
(EIA, 2014). The panel on the right in Figure 6.7 shows the geographical distribution of Iran’s 
oil exports during 1973-2009. During 1965-2006, there has been a significant shift away from 
Europe with a declining rate of 20 percent towards Asia and Far East (see Table 6N3 in 
Appendix 6N).  
 
Figure 6-7 Total exports, oil exports and non-oil exports 
Total and non-oil exports
 
Distribution of oil exports
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Figure 6.8 plots the oil production quota designated to Iran by OPEC against the amount of 
Iran’s oil output. The quota for Iran increased from 1.2 million barrels per day in 1982 to 3.8 
million barrels in 2010. However, the output of the oil sector grew from 2.3 million barrels in 
1982 to 4.3 million barrels in 2010. Although the amount of production exceeded the allowed 
quota, the growth rate of oil production remained lower than that of the quota. This could 
suggest that the low growth of oil output was due to the sector’s limited capacity rather than the 
designated oil quota.100  
                                                          
100 Nevertheless, exceeding the quota by a large margin may not have been possible as it would have caused 
disturbances within OPEC. 
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Figure 6-8 OPEC quota and oil production in Iran 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
The oil industry in the country has been challenged by a number of structural problems such as 
financial constraints and the consequent underinvestment. Others include sanctions by the US 
and the West, technical shortages, and increasing demand and consumption due to heavily 
subsidized energy prices and the growing population. In 2012, for instance, oil and natural gas 
accounted for about 37 and 61 percent of the country’s total energy consumption, respectively, 
with a minimal contribution from hydropower, coal, nuclear and non-hydro-renewables (EIA, 
2014, p.4). Iran is the second largest oil consumer in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia. The 
domestic oil consumption mainly includes gas oil, gasoline and fuel oil (see Figure 6.9). In order 
to meet the domestic demand and due to limited domestic oil refining capacity, Iran has relied 
on imports of refined products, particularly gasoline, and the country’s import of oil products 
illustrated a substantial growth during 1978-2010 (see Table 6N2 in Appendix 6N).101  
  
About 80 percent of the crude oil reserves in Iran were discovered before 1965. Since 2007, no 
new oil field has entered into production. Table 6N4 in Appendix 6N illustrates the declining 
development of refinery activities in the country during 1986-2007. Relatively low cost and 
highly productive oil fields are declining by about 2-2.5 million barrels per day (Ghanbari, 2012, 
p.130). Also, the country’s oil fields have high annual natural decline rates of 8-11 percent and 
low recovery rates of 20-25 percent (EIA, p.11). The sanctions and the consequent lack of 
international participation have adversely affected the Iranian oil sector’s activities of 
particularly upstream projects through affecting the availability of technology, expertise and 
                                                          
101 Iran’s energy prices, in particular gasoline prices, have been substantially subsidized. In 2010, the government 
initiated subsidy reform and lowered the subsidies on energy prices in order to discourage wasteful energy use. 
Since 2010, the import of oil products and mainly gasoline fell due to subsidy cuts. 
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investment leading to postponements or even annulments of some of the projects.102 The 
development of only a few projects still continues, although at a slower pace than initially 
planned. Table 6N5 in Appendix 6N presents a selected number of new upstream oil projects in 
Iran and their status. Although there are a few Chinese and Russian companies involved in the 
country’s oil sector, the activities of all western companies have been stopped.103  
 
Figure 6-9 Oil products consumption (thousand barrels daily)  
 
Source: CBI. 
 
In addition to its considerable proven oil reserves, Iran holds the second largest proven natural 
gas reserves after Russia and more than a third of OPEC’s reserves. The country’s proven 
natural gas reserves grew from 494 trillion cubic feet in 1980 to 1165 trillion cubic feet in 2010, 
and natural gas production increased from 1.2 billion cubic feet per day in 1970 to 14 billion 
cubic feet per day in 2010 (see Table 6N2 in Appendix 6N). The South Pars field, discovered in 
1990, is an offshore gas field located in the Persian Gulf and the largest gas field, accounting for 
about 40 percent of the country’s gas reserves.104 The country is also estimated to hold 2 trillion 
cubic feet of proven onshore and offshore natural gas reserves in the Caspian basin. In recent 
                                                          
102 The contracts with CNPC for the development of Phase 11 of the South Pars natural gas field and the South 
Azadegan field were cancelled in 2012 and 2013, respectively, due to project delays. 
103 Further, according to the Iranian Constitution, the private or foreign ownership of natural resources and any kind 
of production-sharing agreements are not permitted. Instead, unattractive buyback contracts are allowed based on 
which an International Oil Company (IOC) enters into exploration and production activities via an Iranian 
subsidiary.103 The contractor invests its own capital and expertise for the development of oil or gas fields. However, 
when the field is developed and production has begun, the field is given up to the NIOC or one of its agents. The 
IOC gets its capital costs back from a pre-determined percentage of the field’s production and rate of return which 
varies between 12 and 17 percent within a five to seven years payback period, presuming the field generates an 
agreed upon amount and the international energy prices are high enough (Van Groenendaal and Mazraati, 2006). 
104 See Oil and Gas Journal (January 2014) for details. South Pars has a 24-phase development scheme, shown in 
Table 6J.3 in Appendix 6J, with a total cost expected to exceed 100 billion US $. The entire project is managed by 
Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC), a subsidiary of NIOC. Production from phases 1 to 10 was originally designed 
to be allocated for domestic market consumption and reinjection. Production from the remaining phases is planned 
for export via 26 pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and/or used for proposed gas-to-liquids (GTL) projects 
(EIA, 2014). Other gas fields in Iran are Kish, North Pars, Tabnak, Forouz and Kangan. 
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years, there have been substantial gas discoveries in the country yet most of the natural gas 
fields are underdeveloped because of a range of constraints such as financial and technical as 
well as contractual barriers. 
  
Figure 6-10 Iran’s natural gas imports and exports 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
Despite holding 17 percent share of the world’s natural gas reserves, the country has relied on 
imports of natural gas due to high domestic needs.105 Figure 6.10 graphs Iran’s imports and 
exports of natural gas during 2001-2007. The imports and exports of natural gas respectively 
grew from 158.92 and 17.657 billion cubic feet in 2001 to 218.95 and 197.76 billion cubic feet 
in 2007 (see Table 6N2 in Appendix 6N). Natural gas has been used domestically for residential, 
commercial, industrial and transportation sectors, for electric power and for reinjection into oil 
fields to boost crude oil production through enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques. The 
country’s natural gas consumption grew from 0.89 billion cubic feet in 1970 to 13.9 billion 
cubic feet in 2010. Figure 6.11 depicts the development of natural gas production and domestic 
consumption (the panel on the top left) and the share of domestic natural gas consumption in 
total gas production (the panel on the top right) during 1973-2007. At large, both natural gas 
production and domestic consumption increased on average by 5.6 percent and 10 percent per 
annum, respectively, suggestive of the higher growth rate of domestic consumption compared to 
that of production. Over the same period, the share of domestic gas consumption in total 
production increased from 25 percent in 1973 to 85 percent in 2007. 
                                                          
105 The majority of the country’s natural gas imports come from Turkmenistan and the remainder from Azerbaijan. 
The country also exports gas mainly to Turkey and to a lesser degree to Armenia and Azerbaijan Iran exports 
natural gas to Nakhchivan in Azerbaijan through the Salmas Nakhchivan pipeline. In return, Azerbaijan exports 
natural gas to the Northern provinces in Iran through the Astara-Kazi-Magomed pipeline. The NIOC started 
construction projects in the past to build an LNG export plant, but it has not yet built a liquefaction facility mainly 
due to the lack of technology and finance stemming from international sanctions. The proposed regional gas 
pipelines include Iran-Iraq pipeline, Iran-Oman pipeline, Iran-Pakistan pipeline and Iran-UAE gas contract. 
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Figure 6-11 Natural gas production and consumption 
Natural gas production and domestic consumption 
 
Natural gas consumption in total gas production 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion cubic meters. Source: CBI. 
 
During 1970-2010, the oil sector’s value added and investment recorded average annual growth 
rates of 2 percent and 10 percent, respectively, indicative of investment inefficiency in the sector 
given the higher growth rate of the latter compared to that of the former (see Appendix 6N Table 
6N2). The share of the oil sector’s value-added in total output, shown in Figure 6.12 (the panel 
on the top left), fell by an annual average rate of 2 percent during 1970-2010. The share of the 
sector’s investment in total investment, illustrated in Figure 6.12 (the panel on the top right), 
highly fluctuated and grew on average only by 3 percent per annum over the same period.  
 
Figure 6-12 Oil sector’s output and investment shares 
Share of oil real output in total output (%) 
 
 
Share of oil real investment in total investment (%) 
 
Oil real output and real oil revenues  
(billion Rials) 
 
Oil real investment and real oil revenues  
(billion Rials) 
 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Domestic gas consumption (billion cubic meters) 
Gas production (billion cubic meters) 
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Oil revenues (billion Rials)
Oil real output (billion Rials)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Oil revenues (billion Rials)
Oil real investment (billion Rials)
 181 
 
The bottom left and right panels in Figure 6.12 plot the development of the oil’s output and 
investment against the movements of oil revenues, respectively. The former appears to co-move 
closely with the movements of oil revenues. This is not surprising as oil revenues are a function 
of oil output and oil prices. However, unexpectedly, yet consistent with the empirical findings, 
investment in the oil sector does not appear to follow the movements of oil revenues, with the 
exception of a small rise in investment in the sector after the first oil shock. Over these years, 
the oil sector’s share of investment in total investment averaged merely 4.7 percent. 
 
Figure 6-13 Government’s revenues and expenditures 
Oil revenues and government’s public expenditure 
 
 
Oil revenues and government’s payments 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
At first, the non-trending pattern of the sector’s investment with oil revenues and its low share 
of investment seem puzzling given the oil-driven nature of the Iranian economy as well as the 
country’s abundant oil windfalls during these years. There are, however, some major underlying 
factors which contributed to this pattern. During the period under study, the government over-
relied on oil income to finance its public expenditure. The co-moving pattern of oil revenues and 
the government’s public expenditure between 1970 and 2010 is depicted in Figure 6.13 (the 
panel on the left). In this picture, the share of the government’s current expenditure amounted to 
72 percent of total expenditure. This, in return, adversely affected the government’s budget 
available for development and capital spending in various economic sectors. Particularly the 
share of investment in the oil sector reduced to a very low level. Even the National Development 
Fund (NDF), which was introduced in 2009 to replace the country’s Oil Stabilization Fund 
(OSF), allocated merely 14 percent to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).106  
                                                          
106 According to the rules of the NDF in 2009, 63.5 percent of oil and gas are allocated to the national budget, 20 
percent to the NDF, 14.5 percent to NIOC, and 2 percent to impoverished and oil-based regions (IMF, 2011, p.8). 
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A sizable part of the government’s current expenditure was spent on subsidies including 
domestic energy subsidies, accounting for about 15 percent of the government’s national budget.  
 
In short, the oil sector seemed to have been caught in a vicious circle. During most of the years 
under consideration, the imposed sanctions against the Iranian oil sector and the resulting 
insufficient foreign investment, expertise and technology coupled with the maturity of existing 
oilfields undermined the production capacity of this key sector in the Iranian economy.  
 
6.5.6. THE CVAR ANALYSIS FOR THE OIL SECTOR 
This section tests the theory-motivated economic determinants of investment in the Iranian oil 
industry and estimates a CVAR model for a sample based on a set of variables given by the 
vector xt
Oil = [it
Oil, yt
Oil, ct, ln(g
k + δ)tOil, dpt, orevt]', t = 1974-2011. An inspection of the data 
shows large residuals for output in 1980 corresponding to the lagged adverse effects of the 
Iranian revolution in 1979 on the oil sector’s output. The dummy variable [DP1980] has been 
accordingly included in the model to control for the largest outliers in the data for output. The 
examination of the time-series graphs of the data and cointegration relations (see Appendices 6B 
and 6G, respectively) indicates a need for an unrestricted constant term while allowing for a 
non-zero mean in the cointegration relations and trends in the levels of the variables [trend]. The 
LM test results as well as the SC and the H-Q criteria suggest that the appropriate lag length is 
p = 1 (see Appendix 6C). The results of the over-identified cointegrating structures of the long-
run relations in the data based on hypotheses H1Oil are reported in Table 6.7. These results 
specify two interpretable irreducible long-run relations based on χ2(4) = 3.028 [0.553].  
 
The first relation is normalized on investment. In line with the predictions of the investment 
theory, the oil sector’s investment is negatively related to the user cost of capital and positively 
related to ln(gk + δ)tOil in the long-run with coefficients’ magnitude equal to -9.38 and 1.62, 
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respectively. Also, investment is a negative function of inflation with a coefficient magnitude  
-7.28 in the long-run. However, counter-intuitively, the long-run relation between investment in 
the oil sector and oil income does not appear to hold. The latter points towards insignificant 
effects of oil windfalls on the oil sector of the economy, hence contradicts the Dutch Disease 
theory according to which the presence of oil rents are expected to cause investment spillovers 
to the oil sector of oil-based economies. The estimated α loading coefficients for the user cost of 
capital in this cointegrating relation is correctly signed and equilibrium adjusting with a 
coefficient equal to 0.08, suggesting a slow adjustment process for this variable to return to the 
equilibrium level. However, for this long-run relation, the α coefficient for inflation is error 
increasing in the short-run. The error correction term related to investment is statistically 
insignificant yet reveals an equilibrating behavior with an adjustment coefficient magnitude  
-0.11.  
 
The second relation is normalized on the user cost of capital and describes that this variable is 
negatively related to oil revenues in the long-run. Considering that both variables are based on 
the aggregate economy level data, this relationship can be explained through oil income-driven 
expansionary monetary effects which gave rise to Iran’s domestic liquidity and monetary base 
over the study period. This in turn increased inflationary pressures in the economy as a result of 
which lending rates became negative and the real cost of capital declined. The own error 
correction term for the user cost of capital carries the expected sign and is statistically 
significant with a rather fast equilibrium-converging coefficient 0.88.  
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Table 6.7 Oil sector’s fully-identified long-run structures (1970-2010) 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
(t-values in parentheses)[p-values in brackets]
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(4) = 3.028 [0.553]
r = 2 it
Oil
yt
Oil
ct ln(δ + g
k
)t
Oil
dpt orevt trend
β1Oil 1.000 (NA) 0.000 (.NA) 9.385 (9.964) -1.621 (-54.738) 7.280 (9.153) 0.000 (.NA) -0.029 (-12.661)
α1Oil -0.111 (-0.632) 0.069 (1.685) -0.089 (-4.388) 0.027 (0.150) 0.094 (4.496) - -
β2Oil 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) 1.000 (NA) 0.000 (.NA) 0.000 (.NA) 0.072 (4.999) -0.002 (-2.522)
α2Oil -0.954 (-0.902) -0.101 (-0.407) -0.888 (-7.281) -1.112 (-1.032) 0.964 (7.658) - -
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Overall, the empirical results for the oil sector do not support the prediction of the investment 
model. In particular, counterintuitively, investment is not related to output in the long-run due to 
the major underlying factors discussed in Section 6.5.5 such as inadequate investment under the 
sanctions, production decline rates and inherent technical challenges in production. Yet, 
investment in the oil sector revealed a long-run relation with the sector’s growth rate of capital. 
The latter suggests that the true depreciation rates are not very high. This is because, in order to 
be able to raise output when investment is stagnant, old capital assets still need to be productive. 
Also inconsistent with the predictions of the Dutch Disease theoretical framework and quite 
surprisingly, the relation between investment and the availability of oil revenues was found 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that oil income has not been a blessing for domestic 
investment in the oil sector in the long-run.  
 
6.5.7.  THE SERVIC SECTOR: OVERVIEW  
During the years under study, the service sector witnessed extensive growth. The output of all 
the sectors under study revealed increasing trends with that of the construction sector accounting 
for the highest growth followed by the transport sector. Figure 6.14 illustrates the graphs of 
sector-level output (the panel on the left) and their output share in total GDP (the panel on the 
right) in the service industry during 1970-2010. In particular, the high level of output during the 
mid-1970s was due to the positive impact of the increased oil prices and oil revenues on the 
activities of the sectors, whereas the declining trend during the mid-2000s resulted from high 
inflationary pressures and the subsequent economic instability during that time. Between 1970 
and 2010, the construction sector’s share of output in total GDP averaged the highest (16 
percent) followed by the sectors of transport (10.8 percent), utilities (1.3 percent), 
communication (0.9 percent) and real estate (0.6 percent).  
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Figure 6-14 The service sector output 
Real output of the service sector 
 
The service sector share in total GDP 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
The construction industry in Iran is booming, and with an annual turnover of about 39 billion 
US $, it is considered as one of the most profitable sectors in the country (Asnaashari, et al., 
2009). There has been a substantial increase in the number of construction permits, building 
units and land prices during the years under study (see Table 6O3 in Appendix 6O). On a yearly 
basis, the number of new buildings under construction, the total floor space, and the average 
cost per square meter in all urban areas registered annual average growth rates of 5.3 percent, 
8.7 percent and 20 percent, respectively, during 1972-2010. Over these years, the private sector 
played a strong role in the construction industry. For instance, during 1975-2010, the number of 
residential units completed by the private sectors in the urban areas grew on average by 6.5 
percent per year (see Table 6O4 in Appendix 6O). As a result of the booming construction 
industry in the country, the construction service index for wages as well as the land and rental 
price indices of the urban areas increased considerably (see Figure 6.15). For instance, during 
1990-2010, the construction service index for wages grew with an annual average rate of over 
20 percent (see Table 6O5 in Appendix 6O). 
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Figure 6-15 Land and rental housing price indices 
Land price index  
 
Rental housing index 
 
Source: CBI. 
 
The growing performance of the transport sector during 1978-2010 is reported in Table 6O6 in 
Appendix 6O. The number of passengers transported by rail and air increased on average by 6 
percent and 7 percent per annum over these years. The volume of goods transported by rail, air 
and sea recorded average annual growth rates of 5 percent, 7 percent and 8 percent per annum, 
respectively. Similarly, the performance of the communication sector during 1986-2006, shown 
in Table 6O7 in Appendix 6O, presented a significant development. At large, the number of 
installed and in use telephones for the housing, commercial and industrial units, radio stations 
and radio transmitters, television and FM main stations and transmitters all largely increased.107  
 
During the study years, investment activities in the service sector were supported in various 
ways. For instance, the number and the amount of extended facilities to the construction and 
housing sectors by Maskan Bank, the only Iranian bank specializing in the housing sector, 
registered respective annual average growth rates of 17 percent and 22 percent during 1978-
2010. Further, the extended facilities by other banks and credit institutions to the public and 
non-public housing sectors rose on average by 11 percent per annum. Moreover, according to 
the Budget Law, yearly amounts of credits were approved to be allocated by the government for 
the implementation of the housing projects and for urban and rural development.  Similarly, the 
government’s allocated credits to the transport sector increased in real terms, for instance from 
3256 billion Rials in 2003 to 3318 billion Rials in 2010. Likewise, during 1999 and 2010, the 
government’s credits extended to the transport sector grew on average by 9.9 percent per annum 
(see Tables 6O9 and 6O10 in Appendix 6O). 
                                                          
107 Despite an increased number of operating postal units in the country, the activities of this sub-sector declined, 
mainly those related to the dispatch of mail abroad and received overseas mail. 
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Figure 6-16 Services’ investment and output shares 
Share of services real output 
in total output (%) 
 
Share of services real investment  
in total investment (%) 
 
 
Services real output and real oil revenues  
(billion Rials) 
 
Services real investment and real oil revenues 
(billion Rials) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI. 
 
Overall, consistent with the Dutch Disease theory, the service sector grew significantly over the 
period from 1970 to 2010. Total output and total investment in this sector registered annual 
average growth rates of 5.5 and 5.8 percent during 1970-2010, respectively (see Tables 6O1 and 
6O2 in Appendix 6O). Over the same period, the output share of services in total output and its 
investment share in total investment respectively averaged 30 percent and 49 percent (see the 
panels on the top left and right in Figure 6.16, respectively). The development of the service 
sectors’ output and investment against oil revenues are further plotted in the panels on the 
bottom left and right in Figure 6.16, respectively. Both output and investment seemingly co-
moved with oil revenues over this period.   
 
6.5.8. THE CVAR ANALYSIS FOR THE SERVICE SECTOR 
This section investigates the long-run economic determinants of investment in the service sector 
in Iran. The service sector in the country consists of utilities, construction, real estate, transport 
and communication, financial and monetary institutions, public service, trade, tourism, 
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restaurant and hotels, and social, personal and household sectors. This section focuses on the 
performance of utilities, construction, real estate, transport and telecommunication sectors due 
to data availability for all the variables. The combined output share of these sectors in total 
output of the services increased from 10 percent in 1970 to over 31 percent in 2010, signifying 
their growing importance in the country’s economic picture at large and also among the services 
group (see Table 6O1 in Appendix 6O).  
 
A CVAR model is estimated based on a sample of variables given by the vector xt
Services = 
[it
Services, yt
Services, ct
Services, ln(gk + δ)tServices, dpt, orevt]', t = 1974-2011. The inspection of the data 
does not show any large outliers in the data for the services, however, there seems to be a level 
shift [T(1988:01)] in the sector’s investment, output and ln(gk + δ)tServices corresponding to the 
cessation of Iran-Iraq war. Based on the observation of the time-series graphs of the data and 
cointegration relations shown in Appendices 6B and 6G, an unrestricted constant term is 
included in the model allowing for trend in the levels of the variables and a non-zero mean of 
the cointegration relations. The H-Q and SC criteria as well as the LM tests determine the lag 
length of p = 2 as an appropriate lag length for this model, the results of which are reported in 
Appendix 6C.  
 
The empirical findings identify two over-identified irreducible long-run structures based on 
χ2(2) = 2.556 [0.279]. The over-identified cointegrating structures of the long-run relations in 
the data are presented in Table 6.8. As predicted by the theory, based on the first relation 
normalized on investment, investment is a positive function of output and ln(gk + δ)tServices with 
coefficients magnitude equal to 0.20 and 1.82, respectively. Also, the long-run association 
between investment and inflation as a proxy for the user cost of capital is negative with an 
estimated coefficient of -1.88. Further, through its impact on the availability of funds for 
investment activities, oil revenues are significantly and positively related to investment in the 
long-run with a coefficient magnitude 0.17. This finding points toward the long-run importance 
of oil windfalls for investment activities in the services sector. To this cointegrating relation, the 
error correction terms for output, ln(gk + δ)tServices and inflation are statistically significant and 
carry the expected signs with respective coefficients equal to 0.53, 0.54,  and 0.42.  
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Table 6.8 Services’ fully-identified long-run structures (1970-2010) 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
 
SERVICES (1974-2011)
(t-values in parentheses)[p-values in brackets]
OVER-IDENTIFIED VECTORS - χ2(2) =  2.556 [0.279]
r = 2 it
Services
yt
Services
ct
Services ln(δ + gk)t
Services
dpt orevt T(1988:01)
β1Services 1.000 (NA) -0.209 (-4.438) 0.000 (.NA) -1.824 (-22.565) 1.887 (7.359) -0.172 (-4.153) 0.000 (.NA)
α1Services 0.496 (1.970) 0.530 (3.979) 0.484 (3.662) 0.547 (2.149) -0.425 (-2.668) - -
β2Services 0.000 (.NA) 1.000 (NA) 2.432 (6.042) 0.000 (.NA) 4.064 (7.943) -0.247 (-3.890) -0.051 (-13.826)
α2Services -0.937 (-4.228) -0.704 (-6.004) -0.007 (-0.059) -0.973 (-4.336) -0.071 (-0.504) - -
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The second relation corresponds to the output equation and describes that the output of the services 
is a negative function of the user cost of capital and inflation in the long-run, with estimated 
coefficients -2.43 and -4.06, respectively. Also, implicitly consistent with the Dutch Disease theory, 
the oil sector’s output and oil revenues are significantly and positively associated in the long-run 
with a coefficient magnitude 0.24. To this cointegration relationship, output and inflation present 
error correcting patterns with respective adjustment coefficients magnitude 0.70 and 0.07. In 
particular, the speed at which the former converges towards the long-run equilibrium level is quite 
high, indicative of a significant own equilibrating role for the output equation in the short-run.  
 
On the whole, investment behavior in the service sector is largely consistent with the predictions of 
the investment theoretical framework. The coefficients on oil revenues for both long-run relations 
are positive as implicitly expected by the Dutch Disease theory and suggest the importance of oil 
income for domestic investment activities and output in the service sector in the long-run. In 
essence, bred by the availability of oil windfalls, various financial supports coupled with the 
growing output promoted higher investment activities in the service sector.  
 
6.5.9. SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT AND STRUCTURAL 
CHANGES  
The empirical results show that the neoclassical-accelerator type investment theories are partially 
but not uniformly successful in providing investment behavior specifications for the case of the oil-
rich and mixed-market economy of Iran. Although, according to the economy-level analysis, 
investment is a positive function of output in the long-run, this relationship appears to be 
inconclusive given the findings from the sector-level analyses. That is, for the agriculture sector and 
particularly counterintuitively for the oil sectors, this relationship becomes insignificant. The 
insignificant long-run relationship between investment and output in the agriculture sector largely 
results from insufficient modernization and mechanization, negative balance of trade for the 
agricultural products, land fragmentation, and low levels of human capital and (skilled) labor 
caused largely by rural-to-urban migration. In the oil sector, the surprisingly lack of long-run 
relationship between investment and output mainly results from the lack of advanced technology 
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and equipment due to insufficient domestic and foreign investment coupled with the aging and 
declining productive oil fields in the country.   
 
The findings from the economy-level analysis, in line with the resource curse theory, presented a 
negative relationship between aggregate domestic investment and the volatility of oil in the long-
run for the Iranian economy. However, the long-run relationship between investment and oil 
revenues was marginally positive. This coefficient for the agriculture sector as well as for the oil 
sector was insignificant, whereas it was found positive for the sectors of manufacturing and mining 
as well as services. The expectedly insignificant and positive coefficients of oil revenues for the 
lagging tradable sector of agriculture and the booming non-tradable sector of services, respectively, 
appeared being consistent with the Dutch Disease theory. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Dutch 
Disease theory, the coefficient on oil revenues for the non-oil tradable sector of manufacturing was 
found positive. This positive long-run relationship, given the highly oil-based feature of this sector, 
largely stemmed from the sizable credits extended to this sector by the government together with 
high imports of raw materials as well as machinery and equipment for the sector. Also, inconsistent 
with the Dutch Disease theory and surprisingly, the relationship between investment in the oil 
sector and oil revenues was found insignificant in the long-run.  
 
The industrialization objectives of the Iranian government throughout the period under study and 
the post-revolutionary government’s ambition to diversify the economy away from the oil sector 
were key underlying reasons for the channeling of the oil revenues to other sectors of the economy, 
namely services and manufacturing. Furthermore, the government’s over-reliance on oil  
rents for particularly financing its current expenditure and generous subsidies played an important  
role in this development. This left only a small share of the government’s budget  
for development spending in the economy, of which a great proportion was given to the services 
and then the manufacturing sector. This in turn hindered investment activities and development in 
the oil sector and the agriculture sector over the years under study. Overall, there empirical findings 
suggested an upward level shift in investment and output of agriculture, manufacturing and mining 
as well as services sectors corresponding to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Remarkably,  
both at aggregate and at sectoral levels, the trivial long-run importance of oil  
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shocks, the regime shift and various macroeconomic policies on investment points at the common 
and most important feature of the pre-and post-revolutionary Iran, that is the oil dependency of the 
economy of the country.  
 
Table 6.9 Investment growth and structural changes in the Iranian economy (1970-2010) 
 
Notes: All variables are of real values. Annual average output and investment growth rates refer to cumulative annual 
average growth rates. Manufacturing includes mining. Oil group includes gas. Services include construction and real 
estate, transport, telecommunication and utilities. Years 1971-1979 and 1980-1988 cover the pre-revolutionary era and 
the Iran-Iraq war period, respectively. Years 1989-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2010 correspond to the years 
of implementing the first, second, third and fourth development plans, respectively. Source: CBI and author’s 
calculations. 
 
The sector-level rates of growth and the changes in the structure of investment and output over the 
period 1970-2010 are reported in Table 6.9. Over these years, consistent with the empirical results, 
the Iranian economy underwent a structural shift from the agriculture sector to the heavy industry 
and the service sector. The latter, at large, benefited from the highest share of investment in total 
investment of about 50 percent on average during these years, whereas that of the sectors of 
agriculture and oil witnessed as low as 4 percent of this share. Similarly, the highest shares of 
1971-1979 1980-1988 1989-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1970-2010
Economy-level 6.53 -1.29 6.35 3.26 6.14 4.68 4.01
Agriculture 3.45 5.37 5.96 2.04 4.43 9.11 5.06
Manufacturing 8.34 4.05 4.63 7.78 14.23 2.78 6.65
Oil Group -2.22 6.72 6.65 -1.21 4.09 0.19 2.40
Services 12.59 -2.83 7.29 4.89 7.94 5.22 5.68
Economy-level 9.94 -1.89 6.60 8.41 10.72 5.85 6.07
Agriculture 11.47 -0.69 8.00 16.19 10.31 12.96 8.88
Manufacturing 9.71 2.33 10.28 18.18 18.12 -0.32 8.74
Oil Group 21.93 -6.92 23.87 28.10 -2.65 -0.05 10.13
Services 9.39 -1.15 5.02 4.02 13.70 6.59 5.81
Agriculture 10.81 16.51 20.15 20.17 18.48 18.83 16.83
Manufacturing 23.94 37.42 36.55 36.52 37.54 39.37 34.45
Oil Group 36.20 12.98 16.84 14.39 11.86 9.91 18.36
Services 29.05 33.08 26.46 28.92 32.13 31.89 30.36
Agriculture 4.00 3.75 4.63 4.36 4.78 6.27 4.52
Manufacturing 12.40 7.67 12.49 13.06 19.15 18.90 13.25
Oil Group 6.78 4.18 2.65 6.21 4.17 2.68 4.56
Services 48.97 57.39 50.43 44.51 45.52 47.40 49.86
Annual average output growth rates
Annual average investment growth rates
Structural changes - Output share in total output
Structural changes - Investment share in total investment 
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output belonged to the sectors of manufacturing and mining as well as services, both averaging 
about 30 percent of total output over these years. On the contrary, the output shares of the oil and 
the agriculture sectors registered the lowest average of 18 percent and 16 percent, respectively. On 
the whole, there has been an evident decrease in share of investment of the oil sector from 6 percent 
in 1970 to only 2 percent in 2010. Also, the share of the output of the oil sector in total investment 
decreased considerably accompanied by a comparable increase in the share of output of the 
manufacturing and mining sectors in total output. The oil sector’s share of output declined from 46 
percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 2010, while that of the manufacturing and mining sectors rose from 
18 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 2010.108  
 
The comparison of the oil and manufacturing and mining sectors’ growth of investment and output 
helps substantiate some of the empirical findings and arguments made in this chapter about the 
shrinking investment activities of the agriculture and oil sectors and the growing manufacturing 
sector in the Iranian economy. The structural development took place gradually throughout the 
period under study. During the years between 2000 and 2004, coinciding with the third 
development plan, interestingly, an inverse relation between the rates of growth of investment in the 
sectors of manufacturing and oil is observed, with the former registering annual average growth rate 
of 14 percent and the latter a yearly average declining rate of 1 percent.109 Over the same period, the 
average share of investment of the manufacturing sector in total investment witnessed its highest 
rate (19 percent), whereas that of the oil sector recorded merely 4 percent. Likewise, the share of 
output of the manufacturing sector in total output was 38 percent, while that of the oil sector 
registered as low as 11 percent. In fact, the objective of the third plan was to ‘pave the way to 
establish a platform for strengthening those sectors which can be substituted for the oil sector in the 
long run as a mainstay of the economy’ (Valadkhani, 2001, p.8). 
 
At large, the output growth of the service sector and the manufacturing sector appeared to be pro-
cyclical with regards to oil revenue movements. Similarly, the development of capital formation 
seemed to be pro-cyclical with respect to oil revenue changes in the sectors of services and 
                                                          
108 It must be born in mind that these structural changes could occur also in non-resource-based economies. 
109 This is with the exception of the war years when the annual average growth rate of investment in the oil sector 
registered even lower and fell annually on average by 2 percent during that time. 
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manufacturing, suggestive of state-driven investment spillovers to these sectors. This is in contrast 
to the basic Dutch Disease theory which postulates that the presence of natural resources could 
depress the output of the manufacturing sector through crowding-out effects. In practice, beginning 
during the pre-revolutionary era and continuing in the post-revolutionary period, income gains from 
oil exports coupled with the pursuit of industrial policies, positively affected the manufacturing 
sector’s investment and output throughout the years under study.  
 
Nevertheless, this pattern of development was mainly import-driven. As discussed before, the 
imports associated with the sectors of manufacturing as well as agriculture co-moved with oil 
revenues. Consistent with the Dutch Disease theoretical framework, this stemmed from the 
spending effects brought about by the persistent availability of oil windfalls and the consequent 
restructuring of the whole economy. In practice, the latter contributed to the shift of the factors of 
production away from the lagging tradable sector of agriculture to the non-tradable sector of 
services. Also, according to the results, it seems that oil revenues were re-invested in the 
manufacturing sector mainly though the government-led investment expenditures. Although, not 
explicitly presented in the Dutch Disease theoretical model, this is a possible countering factor to 
the Dutch Disease framework.110 In contrast to the Dutch Disease theory, because the tradable 
manufacturing sector is capital intensive, the movement of labor towards the non-tradable sector of 
services implied further industrialization for this sector without resulting in the fall of investment or 
output of the sector.  
 
Yet, the findings that are particularly inconsistent with the Dutch Disease theory in this study are 
associated with the relative contraction of the oil sector in the Iranian economy. This could be 
attributed to the fact that the Dutch Disease theory assumes that the booming sector’s product is 
entirely exported. Therefore, it neglects the impact of domestic absorption considerations in the 
domestic markets of resource producing countries like Iran, both as final goods for consumption 
and as intermediate inputs for the productive activities of other economic sectors. In the case of the 
former, if the domestic prices are subsidized as it is the case in the Iranian economy, then the 
                                                          
110 Arguably though, this mechanism would contradict the theoretical core of the Dutch Disease model only if the 
manufacturing sector would be considered as the non-booming tradable sector of the Iranian economy. 
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increase in the income of the oil sector could be eaten up by the increase in prices for domestic use 
of oil, leaving little financial resources for investment in the productive activities of the oil sector. 
This situation has worsened due to the constrained absorptive capacity of the economy, both in 
terms of insufficient human capital as well as the capacity required to produce home-grown capital 
for development of the sector. The use of oil as an intermediate good in other economic sectors has 
been relatively less intensive and less needed for the service sector’s productivity and profitability, 
hence has been a further contributing factor in the structural shifts in the Iranian economy.  
 
The empirical results are therefore suggestive of the partial presence of the Dutch Disease 
mechanism in the long-run, primarily affecting the non-booming tradable sector of agriculture. It 
must be born in mind that the Dutch Disease theory does not assume a partial market economy like 
Iran, where the objectives to achieve industrial development could override the Dutch Disease 
effects. In essence, the findings suggest that oil windfalls spurred only partial de-industrialization 
through a shift away from the sectors of agriculture and oil (and not manufacturing) towards the 
service sector. Although there are tendencies towards the Dutch Disease, there are even stronger 
influences from the broad-ranging development processes where resources shifted toward 
manufacturing and services and away from the sectors of natural resources and agriculture. This is a 
special case of the Dutch Disease, and could be referred to as the ‘Iranian Disease’. 
 
6.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has investigated the economic determinants of domestic investment for Iran’s major 
economic sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and mining, oil and gas, and services, within the 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment theoretical framework. In the long-run, as implied by 
substituting the steady-state condition into the FOC equation, investment is expected to be a 
positive function of output and ln(gk + δ)t, and a negative function of the user cost of capital. Given 
the high level of oil-dependency of the Iranian economy, the investment equation has been 
augmented with oil revenues measure to examine the extent to which the empirical results support 
the presence of the Dutch Disease mechanism particularly through the spending effect. This effect 
relates to the increased real income fueled by a resource boom to boost the demand for services, 
which in the short-run, could result in higher prices of services to clear the market. As the output of 
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the service sector increases compared to its initial level, the output of the lagging tradable sectors of 
manufacturing and agriculture declines, known as indirect de-industrialization. 
 
According to the empirical results, the modified neoclassical-accelerator type models of investment 
are applicable for explaining investment on a sector-level basis in the mixed-market economy of the 
country, but partially, and the determinants of investment vary depending on the idiosyncrasies of 
across the economic sectors. The findings suggest that oil revenues resulted in state-led investment 
spillovers in the tradable sector of manufacturing and in the non-tradable sector of services. 
However, these spillovers did not benefit the agriculture and oil sectors, suggestive of the presence 
of a special case of the Dutch Disease in the economy of the country, i.e. the ‘Iranian Disease’. The 
surprising and counterintuitive finding associated with the statistically insignificant long-run 
relationship between investment in the oil sector and oil revenues indicated that oil abundance in 
the Iranian economy was not a blessing for the resource sector itself. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis aimed at investigating the theory-consistent economic determinants of aggregate and 
sector-level domestic investment for the oil-driven economy of Iran within the theoretical 
framework of modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models. The investigation was 
centred around the importance of oil for investment and the structural shifts during the capital 
accumulation process with an emphasis on the role of the state and institutional changes in this 
process. The thesis estimated a cointegrated VAR model in which the specification of equilibrium 
relationships helped to identify the long-run determinants of domestic aggregate and sectoral 
investment, and to answer the question of how well the theoretical framework was able to explain 
these determinants in the context of the mixed-market economy of Iran.  
 
At large, this study was carried out in three interlinked stages as follows: 
 
i) Firstly, the thesis outlined the distinctive characteristics of the Iranian economy that were 
taken into account for the analysis of the determinants of aggregate and sector-level 
domestic investment processes in Iran. 
ii) Secondly, an extensive description of principles of investment and of natural resource curse 
theories was provided, according to which the theoretical framework of the modified 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment models for Iran were developed. The models 
included the recent and leading developments in the investment literature such as market 
imperfections and uncertainty associated with investment decision-making. 
iii) Thirdly, the theoretically consistent models of aggregate and sector-level domestic 
investment were estimated and inferences were made. In particular, the models were 
evaluated in terms of economic consistency, statistical significance and sensitivity. Lastly, 
policy implications were drawn. 
 
It was expected that the standard neoclassical-accelerator theoretical framework could explain 
investment behavior, but partially, in the context of the partial-market economies like Iran. This is 
because the neoclassical model of investment was principally developed for market economies. 
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Hence, it assumes perfect capital markets and certainty about the future profitability so that future 
expectations are not relevant for the present since the stock of capital can be costlessly and 
immediately adjusted in the future. Yet, in the mixed-market and oil-dependent economy of Iran, 
uncertainty associated with the volatile nature of international oil prices and thus oil revenues could 
be expected to affect investment activities in the economy.  
 
This concluding chapter brings together the key findings of this thesis along with their policy 
implications. The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the findings of each 
chapter and Section 7.3 draws policy implications. 
 
7.2. SUMMARY OF STUDY FINDINGS  
This thesis focused on the determinants of aggregate and sectoral domestic investment and the 
associated structural problems in the context of the oil-rich and -dependent economy of Iran. The 
scope of this study further made it possible to shed light on the contribution of oil income 
availability and the role of the state in the process of capital formation in the country. Chapter One, 
motivated by the existing gap in the investment and natural resource curse literature, outlined key 
objectives of the thesis. These included: (i) examining the economic determinants of aggregate and 
sector-level domestic investment in Iran within the framework of modified accelerator-neoclassical 
type investment models; (ii) investigating how well the theoretical framework could explain 
investment in the context of the Iranian economy and the underlying reasons for (possible) partial 
applicability of such framework; and (iii) studying the role of the Iranian state in the process of 
growth, capital formation and structural shifts and the extent to which the presence of oil has altered 
the path of institutional structure in the Iranian economy. The chapter further discussed the 
methodology used in this study based on a comparative assessment of various econometrics 
methods and their applications.  
 
Chapter Two provided a description of the development of Iran’s real economy with an emphasis 
on the role of the state and institutions. The Iranian state enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and a 
dominant role in allocating resources for domestic investment in the country over the years under 
consideration. It appeared that the availability of oil influenced capital accumulation processes and 
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sectoral balances mainly through its income generating effects. Despite the presence of abundant oil 
income, the government’s budgets presented a tendency towards deficits and were largely financed 
through implementation of expansionary monetary policies.  
 
Chapter Three reviewed the key aspects of the development of the literature on investment and on 
natural resource curse theories together with their empirical applications. The chapter broadly 
identified three categories of investment theories, namely the conventional demand-side theories, 
theories of irreversible investment under uncertainty and the supply-side investment theories. In its 
simplest form, on the demand side, the desired level of capital stock was found to be related to 
output, the user cost of capital, capital prices and tax policies. It was, however, discussed that the 
restrictive assumptions related to the conventional theories spurred attention towards addressing 
other factors in determining investment such as uncertainty, financial constraints and the presence 
of imperfect capital markets. These factors are broadly identified by the literature to be distortionary 
for investment behavior due to their implications for over- or under-investment. The chapter argued 
that investment models are expected to be partly relevant in partial-market or resource-rich 
economies as they have been chiefly developed and applied for market economies. Yet, the extent 
of their relevance is subject to debates depending on different economic, political and institutional 
structures of resource-rich and partial-market economies. Also, the chapter discussed several causes 
of the curse including the Dutch Disease effects, the rentier state paradigm, resource prices 
volatility and a range of institutional factors. The chapter further argued that the curse in resource-
rich economies could not be explained by a single reason, and that a country-specific or a case-by-
case approach is more appropriate due to distinctive characteristics of these countries.  
 
Chapter Four discussed the theoretical propositions behind the hypothetical relationships within the 
framework of modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models and developed a theory-
consistent investment model in which separate cointegrating relations are identifiable. Accordingly, 
long-run domestic investment in the Iranian context was modelled by a function for gross domestic 
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investment (eq. 4.11). To do so, the assumptions related to the substitutability of factors of 
production were relaxed by replacing the CD production function by the CES one. Equation 4.11, 
as implied by substituting the steady-state condition into the FOC equation, predicts that investment 
is positively related to output and ln(gk + δ), while it is negatively related to the user cost of capital. 
Taking into account the specifications of the principles of cash flow models, the above equations 
were incorporated with oil-driven measures of financial constraints, given by equation 4.11ˈ. The 
latter was justified on the basis of the presence of imperfect capital markets in Iran and the inherent 
uncertainty associated with the availability of oil-based finance for investment due to the 
unpredictable nature of oil prices. The chapter further described the methodology used for the 
empirical analysis, namely the cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) method to allow for 
determining the theory-consistent relationships between the variables in the long-run. 
 
Chapter Five reported estimation of the theory-consistent model of investment within the modified 
neoclassical-accelerator type investment theories as developed in Chapter Four for the mixed-
market and oil-abundant economy of Iran during 1974-2011. Subsequently, the chapter identified 
long-run economic determinants of aggregate investment and shed light on how well the theoretical 
framework could explain investment behavior in the country. According to the empirical results, 
investment was found to depend on factors which lay within the theoretical framework. That is, 
consistent with the predictions of the theory, the estimation of equation 4.11ˈ indicated that 
investment was positively associated with output and the growth rate of capital in the long-run. 
Further, as expected by the theory, investment was negatively related to inflation, the common 
proxy for the user cost of capital in the Iranian context. Inconsistent with the expectations of theory, 
however, investment and the user cost of capital were not associated in the long-run when the 
expected rates of return on facilities were used in the calculation of the user cost of capital (see 
Section 5.4.3). This expected relation was explained on the grounds that the Iranian domestic credit 
markets function under strict government controls and the lending rates of return are centrally-set. 
Hence, they remain quite unresponsive to the changing market conditions.  
 
The empirical evidence further supported that the coefficients associated with the oil income 
measure carried a positive sign, suggestive of the importance of oil windfalls for investment 
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spending in the Iranian economy. Oil price volatility, however, was found having a depressing 
impact on gross fixed capital accumulation in the long-run. Surprisingly, according to the empirical 
evidence, the regime shift and the dramatic political and economic upheavals during the study 
period had not had determining effects on investment due to rigidities in government current 
spending. The findings further suggested that the Iranian economy was characterized by oil-
dependency throughout the period under consideration. Employing Impulse Response Functions 
(IRFs), the chapter further examined the degree to which shocks from oil revenues and oil price 
volatility played a role in the shorter-run variability of investment and output. In most cases, the 
IRFs were found insignificant. 
 
Chapter Six investigated the theory-consistent long-run economic determinants of sector-level 
investment, to which oil income variable were incorporated, within the modified neoclassical-
accelerator type models of investment during 1974-2011. The economic sectors, in line with the 
Dutch Disease theoretical framework, included the resource sectors of oil and gas, the non-resource 
tradable sectors of agriculture as well as manufacturing and mining, and the non-tradable sector of 
services. Given the Dutch Disease theory, it was expected that the association between oil income 
and investment in the sectors of oil and services to be positive, while that association in the sectors 
of manufacturing and agriculture to be negative.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, the sector-level investment behavior partly lay within the 
theoretical investment framework. The findings related to the manufacturing sector were 
inconsistent with the basic Dutch Disease theory, which postulates that the presence of natural 
resources has a depressing impact on the output of the manufacturing sector through crowding-out 
effects. Instead, oil revenues were re-invested in the manufacturing sector, primarily through state-
led investment expenditures for the promotion of industrialization in Iran. However, a surprising 
finding was associated with the long-run insignificant relationships between investment and output 
of the oil sector and oil revenues. Such counterintuitive relationships, also inconsistent with the 
Dutch Disease theory, suggested that the abundance of natural resources in the country was not a 
blessing for the resource sector itself. Hence, seemingly the oil sector (rather than the 
manufacturing sector) was subject to the Dutch Disease.  
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On the whole, although the evidence suggested a partial relevance of the Dutch Disease theory, it is 
of a special case which was referred to as the ‘Iranian Disease’. In its simplest form, the ‘Iranian 
Disease’ was characterized by the expansion of output and capital accumulation in the sectors of 
services and manufacturing (suggestive of state-directed investment spillovers to both sectors), yet 
by their shrinkage in the sectors of oil and agriculture. Similar to that of the economy-level analysis, 
the trivial effects of the regime change as well as political and economic upheavals during the study 
signified the common and most significant feature of the Iranian economy in both pre- and post-
revolutionary eras, that is, oil-dependency. 
 
In brief, the Iranian economy was caught in a vicious circle over the years under consideration (see 
Figure 7.1). The state taxed lightly, as the major source of its revenues consisted of rents from oil 
exports. In fact, due to its high degree of involvement within the domestic economy, the abundant 
oil income was mostly utilized to finance the government’s current expenditure in a form of free or 
below cost provisions of state services, causing its current spending to become sticky. This, coupled 
with low tax income, adversely affected the government’s budget deficits to the extent that they 
were financed through the conversion of foreign exchange from oil rents into the domestic 
currency. This setting created a close link between fiscal and monetary policies and led to the 
expansion of money supply and therefore bred highly persistent inflation in the economy. The 
existence of the Iranian-type Dutch Disease effects also fueled the inflationary pressures due to 
shifting investment towards the non-tradable service sector particularly real estate and property 
markets, causing price bubbles and sectoral imbalances in the Iranian economy.  
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Figure 7-1 Vicious circle of oil-dependency in Iran 
   
Source: Designed by the author 
 
Even though higher inflation allowed the government to earn higher income through seigniorage, it 
led to higher uncertainty with costly implications for investment and savings in the economy.111 
Under inflationary circumstances, the Iranian currency continuously lost its value. Coupled with 
negative or zero real profit rates for term deposits, little incentives were left for the public to save 
their funds in the banking system. Instead, investment in real estate, gold coins and foreign 
currencies became a common practice as they provided the public with higher returns on investment 
both in the short- and in the long-run. Therefore, the propensity to save and consequently the 
                                                          
111 Seigniorage is regarded as a form of inflation tax which redistributes real resources to the currency issuer. Rather 
than collecting taxes paid out of the existing money stock, issuing new currency is then considered in effect a tax that 
falls on those who hold the existing currency. In the long-run, inflation in the money supply may cause a general rise in 
prices due to the reduced purchasing power of the currency. 
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availability of finance for domestic investment declined. Under these circumstances, investment 
both in the tradable and non-tradable sectors became more reliant on support from the government. 
This setting in turn made the current and development budgets of the government further 
oil-dependent over the study period.  
 
On the whole, during both the pre- and post-revolutionary years under consideration, the economy 
of Iran remained oil-driven and suffered from high inflation. The development plans were primarily 
concerned with economic growth, and contained abundant quantitative projections based on rather 
implausible assumptions, all highlighting a need to control inflation. However, the implementations 
of these plans’ fell short of intentions. Expansionary monetary policies coupled with deficit 
financing by the government via the CBI borrowing increased liquidity growth and added to the 
persistent inflationary pressures in the economy. The share of government expenditure in GDP 
increased over time and became more oil-reliant. The Iranian currency lost its value, inflation rose 
and the economy continued to remain stagnant. This brought about an uncertain economic and 
financial environment with no positive impact on the promotion of investment activities or the 
formation of capital stock. The government chose expansionary policies when oil revenues 
increased, yet did not pursue contractionary policies when oil windfalls declined, partly due to its 
sticky current expenditures and the undertaking of more projects during the booms which had to be 
financed in the following years regardless of the movement of oil prices and revenues, further 
fueling inflationary pressures in the economy. 
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7.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
To achieve sustainable development, investment is a crucial requirement and thus it is a central 
objective on the agenda of policy makers. In Iran, unlike in developing economies where the 
investment needs are far greater than the available finance, the major challenge is how to manage 
oil rents so as to promote efficient investment and growth. This is especially important because oil 
income as the essential source of financing investment in the country is subject to uncertainty due to 
the notoriously volatile nature of oil prices.  
 
With the advent of substantial oil windfalls and the consequently larger magnitude of resources at 
the disposal of the Iranian state, the state has played an interventionist role in the process of 
investment and structural changes in the Iranian economy. Yet, massive oil windfalls have not been 
justly distributed in the economy given the uneven expansion of credits in the economy and the 
differences in the significance of coefficients associated with the oil income growth 
variable as discussed in Chapters Two and Six. This could partly be due to inefficient utilization of 
oil windfalls. As a result, the economy has experienced an interrupted capital accumulation process 
and periodical balance of payment problems over the study period. This has influenced some of the 
long-run relationships among the determinants of investment predicted by the framework of 
modified neoclassical-accelerator type investment models used in this study, particularly at sector-
level.  
 
Based on the above discussion, two major policy-based questions arise in the context of the Iranian 
economy: 
 
1) What can be done to improve the management of oil wealth so as to promote (efficient) 
investment in the country?  
2) What are the macroeconomic measures that Iran needs to adopt to break the vicious circle of 
oil dependency in order to encourage and strengthen domestic investment? 
 
Chapter Three, in accordance with the extant literature on the resource curse, has identified some 
solutions on the basis of resource revenue management and efficient investment and savings (see 
 207 
 
Table 3.6). These include the Hotelling and Hartwick rules, taxing natural resources, the oil-to-cash 
transfers, the bird-in-hand and permanent income policies, establishment of a sovereign wealth fund 
and the investing-to-investing strategy. However, due to the existing institutional and political setup 
in Iran, these policy recommendations must be treated with caution. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, more recently several mechanisms have been developed to cope with oil dependency 
and its consequences. In 2000, the government established an oil stabilization fund (OSF) to save a 
share of oil income for buffering against the effects of oil price variations. According to the OSF’s 
published rules, the money available in the fund was to be given to the private and public sectors in 
a form of loans to promote investment.  
 
In 2005, the government introduced the direct transfer of oil income to Iranian citizens. Initially, 
this reform aimed at the low-income and poor population of the country. Yet,  
the program’s coverage expanded to include over 70 million of the Iranian  
population, awarding an estimated US$45 billion on a yearly basis.112 This has mainly resulted in 
higher public spending and budget deficits of the government. In 2009, the National Development 
Fund (NDF) replaced the OSF. But, according to the NDF’s rules, as much as 63.5% of the profits 
from oil and gas are required to be allocated to the national budget and 14.5% of the profits to the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), leaving only 20% for the NDF to be used for saving and 
investment purposes.  
 
At large, the impact of these reforms has been insignificant. For instance, during 2005-2010, 
inflation averaged above 15% p.a. Also, during this period, despite the favorable oil prices and high 
oil income during most of these years, the economy grew only by 4.8% p.a. (lower than the 8% 
target).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 See, for instance, Guillaume, et al., (2011) 
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Therefore, employing the proposed policies as stated above may prove ineffective. This could have 
major consequences for the efficient allocation of finance for investment in the country particularly 
when investment practices encounter bottlenecks that can dampen their marginal returns in the 
economy. Therefore, in order to achieve a greater degree of economic efficiency, Iran should 
enhance its capacity to alleviate investment-dampening distortions and to promote effective 
utilization of oil windfalls through practical reforms, some of which may include: 
 
i. formulating clear and enforcing rules for saving and spending of the NDF’s resource 
income and accumulating greater savings in the fund to cushion against oil price 
volatility; 
ii. diversifying the economy and encouraging private sector competition to promote 
investment and hence growth, particularly in the resource sector and the non-oil tradable 
sectors of the economy; 
iii. introducing a law that necessitates cost-benefit analysis of how resource income should 
be spent before large public investments are exercised through independent domestic 
and international consulting companies;  
iv. lowering capital and corporate income taxes to enable firms to expand business 
opportunities so as to induce investment. 
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Furthermore, the results of the investigation of the determinants of domestic investment in Iran have 
policy implications, which should be taken into account by the Iranian authorities when considering 
the investment outlook for the Iranian economy. As shown by these empirical results, for instance, 
investment is rather insignificantly related to the user cost of capital in the long-run. This finding is 
not in line with the predictions of the theoretical framework and has been explained in the previous 
chapters on the basis that Iranian domestic credit markets function under strict government controls.  
  
Important policy implications can be drawn from this finding. Firstly, inconsistent with the 
objectives of the policy-makers to enhance investment activities by lowering real rates of return, 
very low or negative rates did not succeed in promoting aggregate and sectoral investment in the 
country in the long-run. Also, because the rates of return are centrally-determined and change 
infrequently, they remain quite unresponsive to changing market conditions. This suggests that the 
user cost of capital channel of monetary transmission is rather weak. In particular, in the absence of 
a strong and realistic user cost of capital system, it may not be effective for the government to 
encourage investment by lowering real rates of return or to control inflationary pressures by 
increasing them to curb excess aggregate demand in the economy.  
  
Also, despite the long-run positive relationship between aggregate investment and oil revenues, the 
small magnitude of the coefficient associated with oil revenues suggests that oil wealth has not been 
converted into productive investment. The negative long-run association between investment and 
oil price volatility in the Iranian economy points towards the vulnerability of the economy to the 
fluctuations in the oil prices. Therefore, since government spending in Iran is pro-cyclical to the 
movements of oil prices and oil revenues, it is strongly recommended for the government’s budgets 
to break the vicious circle of oil-dependency. However, as discussed in the thesis, given the rather 
underdeveloped nature of capital markets in the country, the banking system has met almost all the 
financing needs of the public and the private sector. This in turn has given rise to the oil-bred 
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growth of money supply, the pursuit of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and thus 
inflationary pressures in the economy.  
  
Accordingly, when assessing the effects of monetary policy on the economy, due to the high degree 
of oil-dependency of the Iranian economy and the presence of oil-driven uncertainty as the 
empirical findings suggested, it is crucial to consider the structural rigidities in the economy. This is 
because, in Iran, monetary and fiscal policies are closely linked through the monetization of budget 
deficits due to the conversion of oil income into the Iranian currency. In fact, money supply will 
continue to rise as long as budget deficits persist and the government attempts to pay for these 
deficits by printing money. This explains the expansionary monetary policy that is being pursued in 
Iran. It is therefore strongly advisable to limit oil-income based government spending to reduce 
budget deficits as a key source of inflation in the economy. Hence, it is necessary for the Iranian 
authorities to constrain oil-fueled money growth and to adopt appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policies in order to control inflation and to stimulate investment activities in the country.  
  
Further, in order to cushion the oil-based economy of Iran against volatile oil income and their 
adverse long-run effects on investment, the motives still remain to keep the NDF as a ‘stabilization 
fund’. Otherwise, if the government does not succeed to adequately manage oil income, the real 
exchange rate will remain volatile and the symptoms of the ‘Iranian Disease’ will become more 
profound. It is also desirable that the government accumulates reserves for investment purposes in a 
separate ‘investment fund’ to protect domestic investment in Iran against the negative consequences 
of exchange rate volatility.  
  
As stated earlier, the depreciation of the free exchange rate due to inflation has lowered the demand 
for the domestic currency and has increased the demand for foreign currencies and gold coins, 
which are perceived as more credible because of their higher expected returns under inflationary 
circumstances. This in turn has negatively affected the propensity to save in the banking system and 
has consequently reduced the available finance for domestic investment activities. Hence, an 
investment-inducing policy should consider preserving the value of the domestic currency, 
stabilizing exchange rates and reducing the gap between formal and informal exchange rates. It is 
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therefore advisable for the government to maintain a fixed exchange rate system as a nominal 
anchor to control inflation. This is because a fixed exchange rate has been associated with lower 
volatility that could positively affect expectations with regards to higher expected return on 
investment. Nevertheless, further research is needed to determine the optimal exchange rate policies 
in the country, which is beyond the scope of this study.  
  
From the above discussion, some policy suggestions pertinent for the case of Iran are to:   
  
i. exercise caution in formulating development plans based on the expected income from oil 
exports and to reduce overall dependence on oil; 
ii. establish a more realistic and stronger rates of return system; 
iii. limit the government’s current spending and ensure that government deficits are not allowed 
to become large too quickly; to analyze budget deficits and pursue appropriate monetary and 
fiscal policies; 
iv. preserve the value of the Iranian currency and stabilize exchange rates; 
v. establish an ‘investment fund’ for saving and investment purposes, and a ‘stabilization fund’ 
to help protect against oil price volatility and the consequent pro-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary responses. 
 
On the whole, it is a challenge to convert oil wealth into productive investment and physical capital. 
However, in the presence of efficient institutional and political institutions and by adopting 
appropriate macroeconomic policies which are not pro-cyclical to oil price movements, it is 
possible to harness the Iranian oil wealth for investment and economic development. Although a 
number of policies have been proposed, a coordinated and well-structured policy-mix with regards 
to the management of natural resource wealth and investment is required in order to obtain optimal 
outcomes. Therefore, future research could consider simulating and evaluating different individual 
and combined investment-promoting policy scenarios.  
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In Iran, even though prior to the revolution in 1979, direct investment by the government in 
different economic sectors was substantial, this has been reduced in the post-revolutionary era. 
Furthermore, as a result of the implementation of the privatization program since the early 2000s, a 
large part of the public enterprises has been divested by the government. Against this background, 
the Iranian economy is characterized by a mixed-market nature and consequently a neoclassical 
model of investment may be pertinent, even though the prices may provide incomplete signals to 
participants relative to market economies.113 Also, despite the fact that a great share of the 
economy’s large scale private sector was nationalized at the time of the revolution, these enterprises 
are organized in large conglomerates and are independent of the central government. Undeniably, 
compared to the market economies, it may not be easy to define the private sector in 
the context of the mixed market economy of Iran. Nevertheless, in investment  
analysis, the semi-SOEs could still be considered as private entities. This is because they are 
commercial entities producing for the market, thus following the same rationale as private 
businesses.  
 
Hence, due to the peculiarities of the country as discussed in depth in Chapter Two, the mixed 
market economy of Iran is not a fully neoclassical economy. Therefore, as was to be expected, the 
empirical findings were partially consistent with the modified neoclassical-accelerator theoretical 
framework used in this thesis. In particular, the empirical evidence associated with the aggregate 
level investment equations were found largely consistent with the theoretical framework. The 
results were most consistent in the elasticity of substitution estimates in a CES production function, 
which are typically less than unity and positive.  
 
Overall, due to the restrictive assumptions inherent in the standard investment models, it has 
become evident that adjustments are needed to make the conventional neoclassical-accelerator type 
theoretical framework more applicable for the context of partial-market oil-based economies like 
Iran. For example, a variable like the user cost of capital may be required to be more cautiously 
defined and measured if the rates of return are centrally-determined. Also, it seems inevitable to 
 
                                                          
113 See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion on the peculiarities of the Iranian economy during 1965-2010. 
 213 
 
extend the theory-consistent investment equations by incorporating oil-based proxies (as specified 
by the principles of cash flow models) to account for capital market imperfections and the 
importance of oil in modeling investment behavior in the context of oil-rich economies.  
 
This, therefore, calls for the modification or development of investment theories to help better 
identify investment determinants in countries with conditions that are at variance with the 
assumptions of the standard investment models. Importantly, however, the conventional investment 
theories like the ones applied in this thesis are found to be relevant in identifying some of the key 
determinants of investment in the context of mixed-market economies like Iran. Also, these models 
could be used as a guide to investigate the degree of the applicability of such a theoretical 
framework and thus to draw policy implications in the context of partial-market, oil-abundant, and 
-exporting economies like Iran. Such analysis, for instance, can shed light on the extent to which 
privatization programs and market-based policies could be effective in such economies. Moreover, 
utilizing the integration and cointegration properties of the data employing a CVAR model such as 
the one employed in this thesis could be used to make inferences based on the theoretically 
motivated long-run relationships between market-based economic determinants of investment, its 
outcome rests on the idiosyncrasies of such economies.  
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 2A: IRANIAN BANKS AND INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS  
 
Source: Collected by the author from various data sources. 
 
 
 
 
  
Name Year of establishment Privatization Year
State-owned Banks
Commercial banks
Sepah Bank 1925
Melli Bank 1928
Post Bank 1996
Specialized Banks
Keshavarzi Bank 1933
Sanat-o-Madan 1957
Maskan Bank 1979
Toseye-o-Saderat 1991
Toseye-Taavon 2009
Private Banks
Saderat Bank 1952 2008
Refah e Karegaran Bank 1960
Tejarat Bank 1978 2008
Mellat Bank 1980 2008
Sina Bank 1985 2007
Eghtesad e Novin Bank 2001
Karafarin Bank 2001
Parsian Bank 2001
Saman Bank Corp 2001
Sarmayeh Bank 2001
Pasargad Bank 2005
Tat Bank 2009
Ansar Bank 2009
Garzol-Hasaney e Mehr Iran Bank 2009
Day Bank 2010
Cyrus Bank 2010
Tourism Bank 2010
Hekmat Iranian Bank 2010
City Bank 2010
Investment Institutions
Firuzeh 2005
Amin 2008
Sarmayeh Novin 2008
Pasargard 2008
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APPENDIX 2B: EXPECTED RATE OF RETURN ON FACILITIES (%) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
 
 
 
 Exports  Trade and 
Services
 Construction 
 and Housing
 Manufacturing 
and Mining
 Agriculture
1973 13 13 8-11  8-11  5-11  
1974 9 13 8-11  8-11  5-11  
1975 9 13 8-11  8-11  5-11  
1976 9 13 9-11  9-11  5-11  
1977 9 14 9-12  9-12  5-12  
1978 9 14 9-12  9-12  5-12  
1979 8-12  8-12  4-8  6-10  4-8  
1980 8-12  8-12  4-8  6-10  4-8  
1981 8-12  8-12  4-8  6-10  4-8  
1982 8-12  8-12  4-8  6-10  4-8  
1983 8-12  8-12  4-8  6-10  4-8  
1984 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1985 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1986 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1987 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1988 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1989 8-12  8-12  8-12  6-12  4-8  
1990 17-19  17-19  12-14  11-13  6-9  
1991 18=< 18=< 12-16  11-13  6-9  
1992 18=< 18=< 12-16  13 9
1993 18 18-24  12-16  16-18  12-16  
1994 18 18-24  15 16-18  12-16  
1995 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
1996 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
1997 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
1998 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
1999 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
2000 18 22-25  15-16  17-19  13-16  
2001 18 23=< 15-16  16-18  14-15  
2002 17 22=< 14-15  15-17  13-14  
2003 15 21=< 15 16 13,5
2004 14 21=< 15 15 13,5
2005 16 16=< 15 16 16
2006 14 14 13 14 14
2007 12 12 11 12 12
2008 12 12 11 12 12
2009 12 12 11 12 12
2010 12,14 12,14 11,14 12,14 12,14
2011 14,15 14,15 11,15 14,15 14,15
2012 14,15 14,15 11,15 14,15 14,15
 Expected Rates of Return on Facilities (% )
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APPENDIX 2C: TERM-INVESTMENT DEPOSIT RATE (%) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Short-Term  One-Year  Two-Year   Three-Year  Four-Year  Five-Year 
1973 8 9 9 9 9 9
1974 8 9 9 9 9 9
1975 8 9 9 9 9 9
1976 8 9 9 9 9 9
1977 9 10 10 10 10 10
1978 9 10 10 10 10 10
1979 7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1980 7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1981 7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1982 7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1983 7 8.5 8.5 8.9 8.5 8.5
1984 7.2 9 9 9 9 9
1985 6 8 8 8 8 8
1986 6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1987 6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1988 6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1989 6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
1990 6.5 9 10 11 11 13
1991 6.5 9 10.5 11.5 11.5 14
1992 7.5 10 11.5 13 13 15
1993 8 11.5 13.5 14.5 14.5 16
1994 8 11.5 13.5 14.5 14.5 16
1995 8 14 15 16 16 18.5
1996 8 14 15 16 16 18.5
1997 8 14 15 16 16 18.5
1998 8 14 15 16 16 18.5
1999 8 14 15 16 16 18.5
2000 8 14 15 16 17 18.5
2001 7 13 13-17  13-17  13-17  17
2002 7 13 13-17  13-17  13-17  17
2003 7 13 13-17  13-17  13-17  17
2004 7 13 13-17  13-17  13-17  17
2005 7 13 13-17  13-17  13-17  17
2006 7 7-16  7-16  7-16  7-16  16
2007 7 7-16  7-16  7-16  7-16  16
2008 9 =< 15 =< 16 =< 17 =< 18 =<  19 =<
2009 9 14.5 15.5 16 17 17.5
2010 6 14 14.5 15 16 17
2011 7-15  17 18-18.5  18.5-19  19-19.5  20
2012 7-15  17 18-18.5  18.5-19  19-19.5  20
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APPENDIX 2D: FINANCING CAPITAL FORMATION IN REAL TERMS (BILLION RIALS) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. GFCF stands for gross fixed capital 
formation. Net factor income includes receipts minus payments related to profit of investment and compensation of 
employees in public and private sectors. Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
 
 
  
Year GFCF
Gross 
domestic 
savings
Non-oil 
income
Oil 
income
Net 
factor 
income 
from Year GFCF
Gross 
domestic 
savings
Non-oil 
income
Oil 
income
Net 
factor 
income 
from 
1965 19926.45 22556 6817.35 8253.45 -1161 1987 58428.08 82614 14070.64 9106.48 -1027
1966 20441.24 24205 8665.80 7929.71 -742 1988 46936.32 35428 11423.12 7244.52 -1522
1967 25255.59 25133 8908.82 9025.82 -754 1989 50418.33 45549 12671.70 11569.08 -1377
1968 28012.53 31315 10834.58 10206.96 -1368 1990 57400.64 73543 14297.07 21375.94 -1410
1969 30051.18 33178 12109.99 11644.86 -1431 1991 84016.03 77402 17122.98 17959.37 -2655
1970 34369.23 37470 14307.54 13833.89 -1732 1992 81090.17 79139 18720.47 20329.56 -2332
1971 41346.47 46887 15242.48 22982.12 -1928 1993 72729.37 108507 14379.75 37923.81 -2464
1972 50038 63554 17228.79 24779.43 676 1994 62389.86 99837 15313.55 42361.74 -4010
1973 56305.82 85192 15711.04 31862.20 99 1995 59560.22 101853 17264.93 41841.18 -1319
1974 67451.53 146043 12556.01 79981.51 2826 1996 74465.36 118346 21622.94 43491.19 -1675
1975 97352.98 138756 21145.52 78628.78 3034 1997 83764.5 110407 25931.41 36446.71 -491
1976 129524.1 176517 22898.30 78452.46 4334 1998 86485.12 94217 28409.51 20583.55 -129
1977 112238.9 158102 24835.35 69348.22 2128 1999 91505.34 120469 33798.35 31007.95 -803
1978 92248.32 114448 25742.60 44532.01 -4173 2000 95267.39 124330 25090.76 33005.80 -490
1979 64238.75 117951 16600.91 42192.40 5752 2001 108761.5 113877 26620.65 35789.59 485
1980 66839.12 61348 12363.05 25139.05 3861 2002 123776.3 134415 24474.07 40167.50 -2522
1981 61553.75 50069 15873.38 23495.36 2778 2003 139032.8 150647 27346.97 43965.15 -2755
1982 66111.26 69886 15450.60 32131.70 1032 2004 151806.1 160435 29488.08 42408.71 -3306
1983 95297.07 75192 17018.05 30455.51 788 2005 164954 177125 47642.13 44096.16 -3167
1984 88222.59 58226 20101.84 21648.97 664 2006 169837 190536 48033.73 37649.44 -3089
1985 70880.82 46580 21494.24 17822.41 -218 2007 181020 230804 51388.40 29774.91 -3434
1986 59916.55 37299 16773.39 5729.52 -189
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APPENDIX 5A: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION  SOURCES 
it Gross fixed capital formation (in billion Rials at 
constant 2004/05 prices) in natural logarithmic 
form 
Data are collected from the 
CBI’s annual national accounts. 
yt Gross domestic product (in billion Rials at 
constant 2004/05 prices) in natural logarithmic 
form 
Data are collected from the 
CBI’s annual national accounts. 
ct   The user cost of capital calculated as [(1 minus 
tax rates) multiplied by ([weighted average of 
expected rates of return on facilities/100] minus 
[changes in natural log of the implicit deflator of 
gross domestic product]) + (the rate of capital 
stock depreciation)] 
Constructed by the author. Data 
on corporate tax, total 
revenues, expected rates of 
return on facilities and implicit 
deflator of GDP are collected 
from the CBI’s annual national 
accounts. 
ln(gk + δ)t Constructed employing equations (5.6) and (5.7) 
and explained in Chapter Five Section (5.4.3) 
and presented in details in Appendix 5L 
Constructed by the author. Data 
on capital stock are collected 
from the CBI’s annual national 
accounts. 
dpt Changes in natural log of the implicit deflator of 
gross domestic product (GDP) 
Constructed by the author. Data 
on the implicit deflator of GDP 
are collected from the CBI’s 
annual national accounts. 
pot Real oil prices in logarithmic form Monthly, quarterly, and annual 
data on real (imported) crude 
oil prices are collected from 
energy information 
administration’s (EIA) short-
term energy outlook (February 
2013); data during 1959-1973 
represent real spot oil prices 
collected from the British  
Petroleum (BP) statistical 
review of world energy; data 
from EIA are cross-checked 
with data from BP.114 
dpot Changes in logarithm of real oil prices 
employing Hamilton’s (1983) specification  
Constructed by the author. 
volot Realized annual volatility of logarithm of real oil 
prices employing Mohaddes’ and Pesaran’s 
(2013) method  
Constructed by the author. 
voloit Realized annual volatility increase of logarithm 
of real oil prices  
Constructed by the author. 
                                                          
114 The quarterly data for crude oil exports in thousands barrels per day (collected from CBI) during 1973/Q2-1978/Q1 
and 1986/Q3-1988/Q2 reflect the annual figures of the respective years. The quarterly data for nominal and real 
imported crude oil (collected from EIA) during 1973/Q2-1973/Q4 reflect the annual figures of the respective years. 
Also, where the unified exchange rates regime was in place, the figures on official and market exchange ratess 
(collected from CBI) are the same. 
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volodt Realized annual volatility decrease of logarithm 
of real oil prices  
Constructed by the author. 
orevt Real oil revenues are calculated as:  
orevt = norevt – pt, where orevt, norevt and pt 
refer to real oil revenues, nominal oil revenues 
and implicit deflator of gross domestic in 
(natural) logarithmic forms 
Calculated by the author; data 
on Iran’s nominal oil revenues 
are collected from the CBI 
time-series database. 
dorevt Changes in logarithm of real oil revenues  Constructed by the author. 
dorevit Logarithm of real oil revenue increase 
employing Mork’s (1989) asymmetric 
specification  
Constructed by the author. 
dorevdt Logarithm of real oil revenue decrease 
employing Mork’s (1989) asymmetric 
specification  
Constructed by the author. 
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APPENDIX 5B: GRAPHS OF THE IRANIAN DATA IN LEVELS 
FIGURE 5B1: LOG AGGERGATE INVESTMENT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES)   
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
 
FIGURE 5B2: LOG AGGERGATE OUTPUT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES)   
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
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FIGURE 5B3: THE REAL USER COST OF CAPITAL  
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
FIGURE 5B4: INFLATION 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base) 
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FIGURE 5B5: LOG SUM OF CAPITAL DEPRECIATION AND CAPITAL GROWTH  
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
FIGURE 5B6: REAL ANNUAL OIL REVENUES 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base) and author’s calculation. 
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FIGURE 5B7: REALIZED ANNUAL VOLATILITY OF OIL PRICES 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
FIGURE 5B8: DIFFERENCED OIL REVENUE 
INCREASE 
 
FIGURE 5B9: DIFFERENCED OIL REVENUE 
DECREASE  
 
FIGURE 5B10: REALIZED ANNUAL  
OIL VOLATILITY INCREASE 
 
 
FIGURE 5B11: REALIZED ANNUAL  
OIL VOLATILITY DECREASE 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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APPENDIX 5C: LAG LENGTH DETERMINATION 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. SC: Schwarz Criterion. H-Q: Hannan-Quinn 
Criterion. LM(p): Lagrange Multiplier for autocorrelation of order (p) and p is the number of lags. 
 
 
 
 
  
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 35 15 696.357 -32.173 -34.356 0.571 0.149
VAR(1) 1 35 9 649.676 -32.553 -33.863 0.007 0.007
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 34 15 670.779 -31.679 -33.898 0.891 0.493
VAR(1) 1 34 9 621.319 -31.881 -33.212 0.134 0.134
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APPENDIX 5D: MISSPECIFICATION TESTS 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. P-values are in brackets. 
 
 
 
  
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE
Multivariate tests
Norm. χ2(10) = 4.825 [0.903]
Univariate tests
dit dyt dct d(ln(δ + g
k
)t) ddpt
ARCH (2) 1.185 [0.553] 1.380 [0.502] 3.378 [0.185] 1.147 [0.564] 3.685 [0.158] 
Norm.  2.117 [0.347] 2.045 [0.360] 0.234 [0.889] 2.073 [0.355] 0.839 [0.657] 
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
Multivariate tests
Norm. χ2(10) = 8.534 [0.577]
dit dyt dct d(ln(δ + g
k
)t) ddpt
ARCH (2) 1.195 [0.550] 2.590 [0.274] 0.692 [0.708] 1.225 [0.542] 0.382 [0.826] 
Norm. 1.365 [0.505] 1.073 [0.585] 0.313 [0.855] 1.161 [0.560] 0.477 [0.788]
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APPENDIX 5E: RANK DETERMINATION  
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. Critical/P-values correspond to the 'Basic 
Model'. The Bartlett Corrections correspond to the 'Basic Model'. 
  
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 1 0.917 178.965 132.262 100.127 0.000 0.000
4 2 0.735 91.771 67.540 73.128 0.001 0.128
3 3 0.504 45.238 36.613 50.075 0.132 0.467
2 4 0.350 20.701 17.452 30.912 0.444 0.670
1 5 0.149 5.650 4.846 15.331 0.733 0.818
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 0 0.950 185.485 140.452 100.127 0.000 0.000
4 1 0.740 83.568 63.383 73.128 0.006 0.229
3 3 0.458 37.717 30.658 50.075 0.412 0.768
2 4 0.300 16.917 13.346 30.912 0.706 0.902
1 5 0.132 4.814 3.879 15.331 0.821 0.904
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APPENDIX 5F: EIGENVALUES OF THE COMPANION MATRIX 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
  
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.907 0.768 0.768 0.611 0.611
Rank = 4 1.000 0.735 0.735 0.662 0.662
Rank = 3 1.000 1.000 0.725 0.725 0.532
Rank = 2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.741 0.741 
Rank = 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.687 
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.995 0.784 0.784 0.610 0.610
Rank = 4 1.000 0.795 0.795 0.711 0.711
Rank = 3 1.000 1.000 0.806 0.806 0.687
Rank = 2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.721 0.721
Rank = 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.586
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APPENDIX 5G: GRAPHS OF COINTEGRATING RELATIONS 
FIGURE 5G1: H1.1 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES 
MEASURE 
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Beta3'*Z1(t)
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FIGURE 5G2: H1.2 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE 
VOLATILITY MEASURE 
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Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software.  
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APPENDIX 5H: RECURSIVE STABILITY TESTS 
FIGURE 5H1: H1.1 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES 
MEASURE 
 
 
FIGURE 5H2: H1.2 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE 
VOLATILITY MEASURE 
 
Note: the recursively calculated tests statistics are for log transformed eigenvalues. The x-axis plots the recursive 
sample period and the y-axis plots the significance level (the 95% confidence bands). The analysis is conducted 
employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
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APPENDIX 5I: TEST OF STATIONARITY - ECONOMY-LEVEL DATA  
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. P-values in brackets. *: Restricted Trend and W. 
Exogenous variables included in the cointegrating relation(s). **: Restricted Trend and W. Exogenous variables 
included in the cointegrating relation(s). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (STATIONARITY)
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE*
r = 3 it yt ct ln(δ + g
k
)t dpt
χ2(2) 18.582 [0.000] 12.700 [0.000] 5.735 [0.057] 18.961 [0.000] 7.604 [0.022]
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE**
r = 2 it yt ct ln(δ + g
k
)t dpt
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (stationarity)
χ2(3) 8.685 [0.013] 8.632 [0.013] 10.622 [0.005] 7.179 [0.028] 9.823 [0.007]
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APPENDIX 5J: TESTS OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR DUMMY VARIABLES 
 
Note: Statistically significant coefficients with absolute t-values (in parentheses) greater than 2.00 are in bold. The 
analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
H1.1: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES MEASURE
DOREV (t-0) DOREV (t-1) CONSTANT
di -0.038 -0.210 4.263
(-1.050) (-3.831) (0.636)
dy 0.068 -0.051 9.353
(3.831) (-1.907) (2.858)
dct -0.103 -0.057 10.078
(-3.825) (-1.398) (2.028)
d(ln(δ + gk)) -0.041 -0.213 1.050
(-1.104) (-3.810) (0.154)
ddp 0.132 0.074 -10.583
(4.392) (1.640) (-1.922)
H1.2: BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURE
DVOLO (t-0) DVOLO (t-1) CONSTANT
di -0.487 0.419 -9.483
(-3.143) (2.556) (-1.727)
dy -0.211 0.153 13.643
(-2.549) (1.748) (4.665)
dct 0.091 0.048 -0.123
(0.692) (0.343) (-0.026)
d(ln(δ + gk)) -0.491 0.407 -12.553
(-3.156) (2.474) (-2.280)
ddp -0.058 -0.093 1.206
(-0.383) (-0.584) (0.225)
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APPENDIX 5K: GRAPHS OF THE RESIDUALS   
FIGURE 5K1: H1.1 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL REVENUES 
MEASURE 
 
 
 253 
 
 
 
 
 254 
 
 
FIGURE 5K2: H1.2 - BASELINE MODEL AUGMENTED WITH OIL PRICE 
VOLATILITY MEASURE 
 
 
 255 
 
 
 
 
 256 
 
 
Note: Panels on the top left plots the fitted and the actual values; panels on bottom left plot the residuals scaled by their 
standard deviation; panel on the top right plots the autocorrelation of the residuals; and panel on the bottom right plots 
the histogram. 
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APPENDIX 5L: DETAILED CALCULATION OF THE DATA 
 Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices.
t
Investment  
(Constant 
2004/2005 
Prices - 
Billion Rials) 
Natural 
Log 
Investment
Capital stock  
(Constant 
2004/2005 
Prices - 
Billion Rials)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital 
(kt-Kt-
1)/kt-1
Capital 
Stock 
Depreciation 
(δ = (It  – (Kt 
– Kt-1)) / Kt-
1)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital 
+ δ
Natural Log 
(Growth 
Rate of 
Capital + δ)
GDP at Basic 
Prices  
(Constant 
2004/2005 
Prices - Billion 
Rials)
Natural 
Log 
GDP at 
Basic 
Prices 
Revenues 
(Current 
Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Corporate 
Tax  
(Current 
Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Tax Rate: 
Corporat
e Tax / 
Revenues
Weighted 
Average 
Rates of 
Return on 
Facilities 
/100
Implicit 
Deflator of 
GDP 
(Base 
Year 
2004/05) 
Natural 
Log 
Implicit 
Deflator of 
GDP
Changes 
in ln 
Implicit 
Deflator of 
GDP
User 
Cost of 
Capital
1974/75 242424,6361 12,398446 1490454 0,041237075 1060038,816 13,8738 1394,40 44,90 0,03 0,105276729 0,2914217 -1,232984 0,459511 -0,3029
1975/76 330707,9638 12,708991 1759700 0,180647 0,041237075 0,22188 -1,50560035 1048237,727 13,8626 1582,10 113,30 0,07 0,104521191 0,3302208 -1,1079939 0,1249901 0,0193
1976/77 467306,0544 13,05474 2154205 0,224189 0,041371287 0,26556 -1,32591421 1238378,831 14,0293 1836,40 128,90 0,07 0,105783002 0,3797811 -0,9681603 0,1398336 0,0068
1977/78 398657,8864 12,895859 2467287 0,145335 0,039725043 0,18506 -1,6870734 1192312,134 13,9914 2034,20 160,20 0,08 0,110631143 0,4629069 -0,7702294 0,1979309 -0,0438
1978/79 370791,4187 12,823395 2738353 0,109864 0,040419059 0,15028 -1,89523475 1039931,512 13,8547 1598,90 200,10 0,13 0,110154206 0,5131774 -0,6671337 0,1030957 0,0415
1979/80 261264,8968 12,47329 2891706 0,056002 0,039407592 0,09541 -2,3495771 941703,2584 13,7554 1699,60 143,00 0,08 0,089544406 0,676011 -0,391546 0,2755878 -0,1343
1980/81 267743,7442 12,497786 3027262 0,046878 0,045712719 0,09259 -2,37957157 722812,7499 13,4909 1325,90 45,90 0,03 0,086561992 0,9141785 -0,0897294 0,3018166 -0,1637
1981/82 236392,934 12,373251 3126699 0,032847 0,045240859 0,07809 -2,54991846 686901,6615 13,4399 1770,10 227,60 0,13 0,085332227 1,1543683 0,1435533 0,2332827 -0,0895
1982/83 257430,1876 12,458504 3198708 0,02303 0,059302538 0,08233 -2,49698453 843207,6177 13,645 2501,90 173,90 0,07 0,087606101 1,2394792 0,2146913 0,071138 0,0705
1983/84 353474,0745 12,775565 3355789 0,049108 0,061397625 0,11051 -2,20269211 925030,7526 13,7376 2773,70 208,30 0,08 0,086116356 1,4307679 0,3582113 0,14352 0,0037
1984/85 315436,9825 12,661714 3505982 0,044756 0,04924147 0,094 -2,36448327 855035,522 13,6589 2714,80 257,70 0,09 0,095937815 1,6847099 0,5215934 0,1633821 -0,0165
1985/86 264690,396 12,486316 3559568 0,015284 0,06021263 0,0755 -2,58366511 870351,445 13,6767 2666,20 357,70 0,13 0,095883727 1,7530163 0,5613379 0,0397445 0,1007
1986/87 249055,2204 12,42543 3530435 -0,00818 0,078152242 0,06997 -2,65971983 785295,0414 13,5738 1707,30 373,50 0,22 0,095533967 1,9675073 0,6767674 0,1154295 0,0455
1987/88 239201,0635 12,38506 3564523 0,009655 0,058098524 0,06775 -2,6918719 786922,3228 13,5759 2171,50 374,40 0,17 0,09511811 2,3911789 0,8717865 0,1950191 -0,0346
1988/89 180555,588 12,103794 3545968 -0,00521 0,055858971 0,05065 -2,98274683 745357,4303 13,5216 2085,40 392,50 0,19 0,094856443 2,8713348 1,054777 0,1829905 -0,0262
1989/90 193728,7001 12,174214 3588509 0,011997 0,04263651 0,05463 -2,90710774 789133,0296 13,5787 3174,60 340,10 0,11 0,094845497 3,3640561 1,2131474 0,1583704 -0,0187
1990/91 202753,1559 12,219745 3568450 -0,00559 0,062090455 0,0565 -2,87350282 899964,7251 13,7101 5632,50 495,60 0,09 0,138254149 4,1309666 1,4185114 0,205364 -0,0046
1991/92 309129,5054 12,641516 3720992 0,042747 0,043881098 0,08663 -2,44612631 1010601,408 13,8261 6933,50 774,60 0,11 0,142803369 5,189201 1,6465797 0,2280683 -0,0368
1992/93 294528,8841 12,593132 3854575 0,0359 0,043253488 0,07915 -2,5363685 1041570,021 13,8562 9884,50 1297,30 0,13 0,146107817 6,7117921 1,903866 0,2572863 -0,059
1993/94 253581,5425 12,443441 3943487 0,023067 0,042720544 0,06579 -2,7213306 1055689,679 13,8697 20250,70 1601,00 0,08 0,168041232 10,060763 2,308643 0,404777 -0,1787
1994/95 223373,0915 12,316599 4000791 0,014531 0,042112245 0,05664 -2,87097721 1045963,407 13,8604 29244,50 2398,30 0,08 0,169907158 13,474529 2,6008012 0,2921582 -0,0736
1995/96 208495,4566 12,247673 4043842 0,010761 0,041352937 0,05211 -2,95433012 1074044,239 13,8869 41575,40 3296,20 0,08 0,178722569 18,586428 2,9224316 0,3216305 -0,0935
1996/97 261803,5729 12,47535 4139621 0,023685 0,041056147 0,06474 -2,73735601 1131945,929 13,9394 57121,90 5378,30 0,09 0,178171841 23,945572 3,1757834 0,2533518 -0,0309
1997/98 281059,3569 12,546321 4253212 0,02744 0,040454997 0,06789 -2,68979364 1141305,29 13,9477 62378,10 6857,80 0,11 0,177017954 27,663862 3,3201269 0,1443435 0,0651
1998/99 285439,9395 12,561787 4366981 0,026749 0,040362658 0,06711 -2,7013981 1166376,014 13,9694 53626,00 7923,60 0,15 0,176236532 30,259151 3,4097987 0,0896717 0,1082
1999/00 300025,9997 12,611624 4489635 0,028087 0,040616618 0,0687 -2,67795807 1186177,388 13,9862 92315,70 10048,40 0,11 0,176145 39,853677 3,6852147 0,275416 -0,0523
2000/01 325362,2555 12,692694 4630609 0,0314 0,041069765 0,07247 -2,62458749 1253472,419 14,0414 104640,80 11295,50 0,11 0,176512554 49,788904 3,9077921 0,2225775 -0,0045
2001/02 405406,4981 12,912646 4843668 0,046011 0,041538272 0,08755 -2,43555341 1279192,984 14,0617 125479,50 12371,90 0,10 0,171182469 57,16036 4,0458606 0,1380685 0,0673
2002/03 432467,5834 12,977263 5073888 0,04753 0,041755047 0,08929 -2,41592019 1383116,287 14,1398 165156,70 17152,30 0,10 0,160049059 73,325134 4,2949034 0,2490428 -0,0423
2003/04 460022,3002 13,03903 5318709 0,048251 0,04241349 0,09066 -2,4005877 1499527,855 14,2207 207867,50 20375,70 0,10 0,140576192 82,957413 4,4183274 0,1234239 0,0537
2004/05 496354,9967 13,115047 5583078 0,049705 0,043616975 0,09332 -2,37169449 1569066,175 14,266 255000,30 26027,50 0,10 0,135863855 99,999998 4,6051702 0,1868428 -0,0066
2005/06 519449,9297 13,160526 5855058 0,048715 0,044325 0,09304 -2,37472509 1668186,119 14,3272 387669,40 64459,90 0,17 0,156838479 119,51092 4,7834078 0,1782376 0,0191
2006/07 512184,7815 13,146441 6102945 0,042337 0,045140079 0,08748 -2,43637572 1769425,961 14,3862 413928,00 72861,70 0,18 0,136777229 136,08683 4,9132931 0,1298854 0,0429
2007/08 569217,635 13,252018 6391414 0,047267 0,046002157 0,09327 -2,37226387 1906446,692 14,4608 472995,00 92610,80 0,20 0,116651946 164,68365 5,1040264 0,1907332 -0,0226
2008/09 631738,1724 13,35623 6727578 0,052596 0,046245506 0,09884 -2,31423578 1918680,955 14,4671 595975,20 127794,20 0,21 0,116768896 195,09955 5,2735099 0,1694836 -0,0051
2009/10 650329,9009 13,385235 7067326 0,050501 0,046165485 0,09667 -2,3364907 1942989,543 14,4797 625159,40 167299,90 0,27 0,11678944 200,39731 5,3003019 0,026792 0,0997
2010/11 675347,0457 13,422982 7416106 0,049351 0,046208006 0,09556 -2,34801077 2068911,853 14,5425 820068,20 116500,20 0,14 0,128385348 229,17294 5,4344769 0,134175 0,0347
2011/12 699061,9894 13,457495 7770045 0,047726 0,046536955 0,09426 -2,36166998 2157934,131 14,5847 1114379,10 157892,60 0,14 0,140038834 289,43264 5,6679226 0,2334456 -0,0402
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APPENDIX 6A: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION  SOURCES 
itsector-level Sectoral gross fixed capital formation (in 
billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) in 
natural logarithmic form 
Data are collected from the 
CBI’s annual national accounts. 
ytsector-level Sectoral gross domestic product (in billion 
Rials at constant 2004/05 prices) in natural 
logarithmic form 
Data are collected from the 
CBI’s annual national accounts. 
ctsector-level  The sectoral user cost of capital calculated as 
[(1 minus tax rates) multiplied by ([average 
of expected rates of return on facilities/100] 
minus [changes in natural log of the implicit 
deflator of gross domestic product]) + (the 
rate of sectoral capital stock depreciation)] 
Constructed by the author. Data 
on corporate tax, total 
revenues, expected rates of 
return on facilities and implicit 
deflator of GDP are collected 
from the CBI’s annual national 
accounts. 
ln(gk + δ)tsector-level  Constructed employing equations (5.6) and 
(5.7) as explained in Chapter Five Section 
(5.4.3) and presented in details in Appendix 
6P 
Constructed by the author. Data 
on capital stock are collected 
from the CBI’s annual national 
accounts. 
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APPENDIX 6B: GRAPHS OF THE IRANIAN SECTOR-LEVEL DATA IN LEVELS 
FIGURE 6B1 – AGRICULTURE LOG REAL INVESTMENT 
 
FIGURE 6B2 – AGRICULTURE LOG REAL OUTPUT  
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES)   
 
 
FIGURE 6B3 – AGRICULTURE USER COST OF CAPITAL  
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES)   
 
IAGRI
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
8.50
9.00
9.50
10.00
10.50
Levels
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Differences
YAGRI
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
10.8
11.2
11.6
12.0
12.4
Levels
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15 Differences
CAGRI
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
Levels
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Differences
 260 
 
FIGURE 6B4 – AGRICULTURE log (gk + δ)t 
 
 
FIGURE 6B5 – AGRICULTURE DP2008 
 
 
FIGURE 6B6 – AGRICULTURE T(1988:01) 
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FIGURE 6B7 – MANUFACTURING LOG REAL INVESTMENT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
 
 
FIGURE 6B8 – MANUFACTURING LOG REAL OUTPUT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
 
 
FIGURE 6B9 – MANUFACTURING USER COST OF CAPITAL 
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FIGURE 6B10 – MANUFACTURING log (gk + δ)t 
 
 
FIGURE 6B11 – MANUFACTURING T(1988:01) 
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FIGURE 6B12 – OIL LOG REAL INVESTMENT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
 
 
FIGURE 6B13 – OIL LOG REAL OUTPUT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
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FIGURE 6B14 – OIL log (gk + δ)t 
 
 
FIGURE 6B15 – OIL DP1980 
 
 
FIGURE 6B16 – SERVICES LOG REAL INVESTMENT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
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FIGURE 6B17 – SERVICES LOG REAL OUTPUT 
(IN BILLION RIALS AT CONSTANT 2004/05 PRICES) 
 
 
FIGURE 6B18 – SERVICES USER COST OF CAPITAL 
 
 
FIGURE 6B19 – SERVICES log (gk + δ)t 
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FIGURE 6B20 – SERVICES T(1988:01) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base) and author’s calculation. 
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APPENDIX 6C: LAG LENGTH DETERMINATION 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. SC: Schwarz Criterion. H-Q: Hannan-Quinn 
Criterion. 
 
  
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 35 18 593.492 -24.772 -27.390 0.349 0.062
VAR(1) 1 35 12 564.930 -26.187 -27.933 0.499 0.499
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 35 17 645.454 -28.249 -30.722 0.052 0.233
VAR(1) 1 35 11 595.784 -28.458 -30.058 0.003 0.003
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 35 16 573.160 -24.626 -26.953 0.028 0.319
VAR(1) 1 35 10 541.463 -25.862 -27.317 0.310 0.310
SERVICES (1974-2011)
p T regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(p)
VAR(2) 2 35 16 677.170 -30.569 -32.897 0.127 0.420
VAR(1) 1 35 10 631.741 -31.020 -32.475 0.007 0.007
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APPENDIX 6D: MISSPECIFICATION TESTS 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. P-values are in brackets. 
 
  
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
Univariate tests
dit
Agriculture
dyt
Agriculture
dct
Agriculture d(ln(δ + gk))t
Agriculture ddpt
ARCH (1) 0.056 [0.813] 9.246 [0.002] 1.809 [0.179] 0.020 [0.887] 0.014 [0.907]
Norm. 2.019 [0.364] 3.945 [0.139] 1.878 [0.391] 3.856 [0.145] 1.727 [0.422]
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
Univariate tests
dit
Manufacturing
dyt
Manufacturing
dct
Manufacturing d(ln(δ + gk))t
Manufacturing ddpt
ARCH (2) 0.079 [0.961] 0.170 [0.919] 1.556 [0.459] 0.135 [0.935] 2.837 [0.242]
Norm. 0.032 [0.984] 8.472 [0.014] 1.097 [0.578] 0.204 [0.903] 0.882 [0.643] 
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
Univariate tests
dit
Oil
dyt
Oil dct d(ln(δ + gk))t
Oil ddpt
ARCH (1) 0.030 [0.861] 2.970 [0.085] 0.458 [0.498] 0.148 [0.700] 0.301 [0.583]
Norm. 2.701 [0.259] 0.925 [0.630] 0.051 [0.975] 3.100 [0.212] 0.955 [0.620]
SERVICES (1974-2011)
Univariate tests
dit
Services
dyt
Services
dct
Services d(ln(δ + gk))t
Services ddpt
ARCH (2) 1.242 [0.537] 2.886 [0.236] 1.947 [0.378] 1.252 [0.535] 3.158 [0.206] 
Norm. 3.274 [0.195] 2.326 [0.313] 0.128 [0.938] 3.486 [0.175] 0.430 [0.807] 
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APPENDIX 6E: RANK DETERMINATION 
  
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. Critical/P-values correspond to the 'Basic 
Model'. The Bartlett Corrections correspond to the 'Basic Model'. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 0 0.928 177.633 163.089 88.554 0.001 0.000
4 1 0.558 83.009 77.870 63.659 0.024 0.098
3 2 0.452 53.621 51.315 42.770 0.163 0.345
2 3 0.421 31.964 31.158 25.731 0.585 0.513
1 4 0.290 12.316 12.209 12.448 0.619 0.732
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 0 0.865 173.390 136.173 88.554 0.000 0.000 
4 1 0.709 103.271 84.050 63.659 0.000 0.033
3 2 0.564 60.056 50.303 42.770 0.039 0.313
2 3 0.400 30.984 27.010 25.731 0.364 0.675
1 4 0.313 13.120 12.444 12.448 0.281 0.462
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 0 0.943 179.374 164.688 100.127 0.000 0.000
4 1 0.659 76.199 71.481 73.128 0.000 0.035
3 2 0.492 37.418 35.809 50.075   0.015 0.201
2 3 0.195 13.065 12.735 30.912 0.392 0.699
1 4 0.136 5.253 5.207 15.33 0.771 0.885
SERVICES (1974-2011)
p - r r λi Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value*
5 0 0.888 163.096 112.800 69.611 0.000 0.063
4 1 0.591 86.416 60.804 47.707 0.000 0.092
3 2 0.542 55.101 38.396 29.804 0.025 0.577
2 3 0.426 27.784 20.189 15.408 0.239 0.761
1 4 0.213 8.381 6.245 3.841 0.640 0.853
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APPENDIX 6F: EIGENVALUES OF THE COMPANION MATRIX 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.784 0.505 0.505 0.184 0.036 
Rank = 4 1,000 0.838 0.266 0.266 0.033 
Rank = 3 1,000 1,000 0.846 0.217 0.045
Rank = 2 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.820 0.036
Rank = 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.815
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.790 0.790 0.782 0.782 0.728
Rank = 4 1,000 0.796 0.796 0.777  0.777  
Rank = 3 1,000 1,000 0.771 0.771 0.653
Rank = 2 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.751 0.751
Rank = 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.666
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.904 0.780 0.780 0.489 0.014
Rank = 4 1,000 0.853 0.853 0.531 0.047  
Rank = 3 1,000 1,000 0.760 0.760 0.068
Rank = 2 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.793 0.067 
Rank = 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.756
SERVICES (1974-2011)
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
Rank = 5 0.822 0.822 0.720 0.720 0.604
Rank = 4 1,000 0.835 0.706 0.706 0.630
Rank = 3 1,000 1,000 0.788 0.629 0.629
Rank = 2 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.795 0.628
Rank = 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0.767
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APPENDIX 6G: GRAPHS OF COINTEGRATING RELATIONS 
FIGURE 6G1: AGRICULTURE INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6G2: MANUFACTURING AND MINING INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6G3: OIL GROUP INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6G4: SERVICES INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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APPENDIX 6H: RECURSIVE STABILITY TESTS 
FIGURE 6H1: AGRICULTURE INVESTMENT EQUATION 
 
 
FIGURE 6H2: MANUFACTURING AND MINING INVESTMENT EQUATION 
 
 
FIGURE 6H3: OIL GROUP INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6H4: SERVICES INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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APPENDIX 6I: STATIONARITY TESTS - SECTOR-LEVEL DATA 
 
Note: the analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. P-values in brackets. Restricted Trend 
included in the cointegrating relation(s). For models with exogenous variables, Restricted Trend and W. Exogenous 
variables included in the cointegrating relation(s). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1974-2011)
r = 2 it
Agriculture
yt
Agriculture
ct
Agriculture (ln(δ + gk))t
Agriculture
dpt
Agriculture
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (stationarity)
χ2(3) 6.820 [0.078] 8.350 [0.039] 9.708 [0.021] 4.437 [0.218] 6.844 [0.077]
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1974-2011)
r = 2 it
Manufacturing
yt
Manufacturing
ct
Manufacturing (ln(δ + gk))t
Manufacturing
dpt
Manufacturing
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (stationarity)
χ2(3) 24.161 [0.000] 28.431 [0.000] 15.041 [0.002] 23.355 [0.000] 12.65 [0.005]
OIL GROUP (1974-2011)
r = 2 it
Oil
yt
Oil
ct (ln(δ + gk))t
Oil dp
Oil
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (stationarity)
χ2(3) 23.494 [0.000] 29.548 [0.000] 1.785 [0.618] 15.872 [0.001] 9.533 [0.013]
SERVICES (1974-2011)
r = 2 it
Services
yt
Services
ct
Services (ln(δ + gk))t
Services
dpt
Services
TESTING A UNIT VECTOR IN β (stationarity)
χ2(3) 11.453 [0.010] 7.123 [0.068] 9.598 [0.022] 15.435 [0.001] 6.760 [0.080]
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APPENDIX 6J: TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR DUMMY VARIABLES 
 
Note: Statistically significant coefficients with absolute t-values (in parentheses) greater than 2.00 are in 
bold. The analysis is conducted employing WinRATS Pro8.1 software. 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR (1970-2010)
DOREV (t-0) DT(1988:01) DP2008{0} CONSTANT
di
Agriculture
0.063 -0.001 0.150 11.477
(1.022) (-0.015) (0.994) (1.646)
dy
Agriculture
0.016 -0.105 -0.188 8.639
(0.857) (-3.901) (-4.208) (4.180)
dc
Agriculture
-0.051 -0.109 0.056 5.586
(-1.756) (-2.550) (0.780) (1.690)
d(ln(δ + gk))
Agriculture
0.061 -0.012 0.149 10.047
(0.935) (-0.123) (0.937) (1.359)
ddp
Agriculture
0.070 0.098 -0.040 -5.656
(2.318) (2.209) (-0.551) (-1.664)
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS (1970-2010)
DOREV (t-0) DOREV (t-1) DT(1988:01) CONSTANT
di
Manufacturing
-0.085 0.243 -0.102 4.570
(-1.518) (2.907) (-0.590) (0.918)
dy
Manufacturing
0.046 0.050 -0.165 3.081
(2.058) (1.497) (-2.399) (1.547)
dc
Manufacturing
-0.038 0.126 -0.426 -2.735
(-1.914) (4.217) (-6.943) (-1.543)
d(ln(δ + gk))Manufacturing -0.078 0.219 -0.060 2.359
(-1.387) (2.608) (-0.344) (0.472)
ddp
Manufacturing
0.063 -0.133 0.419 4.363
(2.698) (-3.821) (5.828) (2.102)
OIL GROUP (1970-2010)
DOREV (t-0) DT(1980:01) CONSTANT
di
Oil
-0.184 -0.395 24.191
(-0.968) (-1.473) (2.669)
dy
Oil
0.092 -0.853 4.961
(1.882) (-12.322) (2.122)
dc -0.128 -0.143 2.885
(-4.834) (-3.846) (2.291)
d(ln(δ + gk))Oil -0.190 -0.382 23.184
(-0.985) (-1.399) (2.517)
ddp
Oil
0.156 0.172 -2.280
(5.575) (4.354) (-1.711)
SERVICES (1970-2010)
DOREV (t-0) DOREV (t-1) DT(1988:01) CONSTANT
di
Services
-0.018 0.011 -0.332 13.356
(-0.369) (0.166) (-3.195) (2.973)
dy
Services
0.009 0.007 -0.196 3.371
(0.372) (0.200) (-3.529) (1.407)
dc
Services
-0.061 0.051 -0.143 0.443
(-2.312) (1.369) (-2.473) (0.178)
d(ln(δ + gk))Services -0.020 0.012 -0.351 12.624
(-0.412) (0.173) (-3.331) (2.774)
ddp
Services
0.094 -0.042 0.144 -1.792
(3.033) (-0.968) (2.125) (-0.614)
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APPENDIX 6K: GRAPHS OF THE RESIDUALS   
FIGURE 6K1: AGRICULTURE INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6K2: MANUFACTURING AND MINING INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6K3: OIL GROUP INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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FIGURE 6K4: SERVICES INVESTMENT EQUATION 
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Note: Panels on the top left plots the fitted and the actual values; panels on bottom left plot the residuals scaled by their 
standard deviation; panel on the top right plots the autocorrelation of the residuals; and panel on the bottom right plots 
the histogram. 
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APPENDIX 6L: THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
TABLE 6L1: OUTSTANDING FACILITIES EXTENDED BY BANKS AND CREDIT 
INSTITUTIONS TO PUBLIC AND NON-PUBLIC AGRICULTURE SECTORS (deflated by 
GDP-deflator) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Finance and Budget Laws (various years). 
 
TABLE 6L2: GUARANTEED PURCHASING PRICE OF AGRICULTURAL CROPS 
(deflated by GDP-deflator) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic 
Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
Year Total (Billion Rials) %  Change
1999 15881 -
2000 16464 4
2002 24990 52
2003 22665 -9
2004 23335 3
2005 26552 14
2006 33160 25
2007 35786 8
2008 32327 -10
2009 35676 10
2010 36197 1
Annual average 
growth rate (% )
10
Facilities extended by banks and credit institutions
Year
Wheat (Rial per 
kilogram)
Barley (Rial per 
kilogram)
Suger beets (Rial 
per kilogram)
1999 472 376 123
2000 486 385 125
2001 522 398 125
2003 515 384 122
2004 479 352 110
2005 485 360 109
2006 424 315 95
2007 386 283 86
2008 410 242 73
2009 437 386 89
2010 413 326 94
Annual average growth rate (% ) -1
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FIGURE 6L3: SUBSIDY PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT (deflated by GDP-deflator) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
 
TABLE 6L4: GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES FOR EXPANSION OF 
AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES (deflated by GDP –deflator) 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Finance and Budget Laws (various years). 
Years
Total subsidy to all 
economic sectors 
(Billion Rials)
Subsidy to agriculture 
sector (Billion Rials)
%  Share of subsidy to 
agriculture sector from 
total
1999 4830.72323 4748.167165 98.29102059
2000 4658.403985 4229.345574 90.78958346
2001 5206.510779 4639.902346 89.1173099
2002 5147.828246 4742.146894 92.11936894
2003 6628.981141 5222.756697 78.78671828
2004 7764.393066 6045.836249 77.86617959
2005 12267.53988 9918.835266 80.8543144
2006 11929.70989 8948.079368 75.00668039
2007 9383.418784 7245.540837 77.2164283
2008 12523.19265 10145.04711 81.0100698
2009 9898.331504 7659.570243 77.38243805
2010 10802.89127 5270.344714 48.78642747
Annual average 
growth (% )
9.864630246 4.222813416
Year
Total 
(Billion 
Rials)
Agricultu
re and 
natural 
resources 
(Billion 
Rials)
Water 
resources 
(Billion 
Rials)
%  Share 
of water 
reources 
from total
Total %  
change 
 
Agricultu
re %  
change 
Water 
resources 
%  change
1999 2482.7192 831.10651 1651.6127 66.524345 - - -
2000 3032.7789 1004.6341 2028.1449 66.874142 22.155535 20.879098 22.79785
2002 3401.1088 644.4717 2756.6371 81.051129 12.144961 -35.850104 35.919139
2003 4345.5732 871.86602 3473.7072 79.936685 27.769309 35.283833 26.012495
2004 3335.8944 676.02639 2659.868 79.734778 -23.234652 -22.462124 -23.428549
2005 4447.5405 869.08602 3578.4545 80.459177 33.323782 28.558001 34.535042
2006 3015.7649 610.60912 2405.1557 79.752761 -32.192526 -29.741234 -32.787863
2007 3031.3873 575.87093 2455.5164 81.003057 0.5180276 -5.689103 2.0938635
2008 3851.7374 640.38046 3211.3569 83.374244 27.061868 11.20208 30.781326
2009 4022.5476 435.95 3,586.60 89.16229 4.4346272 -31.922962 11.684737
2010 2751.7163 471.83 2,279.89 82.85341 -31.592698 8.2287642 -36.433012
Annual average growth rate (% ) 4.038823 -2.15138 7.117503
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TABLE 6L5: PRODUCTION AND AREA UNDER CULTIVATION OF MAJOR 
FARMING AND HORTICULTURAL CROPS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
h
e
a
t
B
a
r
le
y
S
u
g
e
r
 
b
e
e
t
S
u
g
e
r
 
c
a
n
e
P
o
ta
to
e
s
O
n
io
n
s
P
is
ta
c
h
io
Area (1000 hectares) 4739 1403 186 26 161 56 256
Production (1000 tons) 8673 1999 5548 2236 3433 1677 131
Area (1000 hectares) 5101 1194 163 26 169 44 275
Production (1000 tons) 8088 1686 4332 2367 3658 1344 304
Area (1000 hectares) 5553 1487 172 37 175 47 281
Production (1000 tons) 9459 2423 4649 3195 3486 1419 112
Area (1000 hectares) 6241 1670 192 43 166 45 295
Production (1000 tons) 12450 3085 6098 3712 3756 1529 249
Area (1000 hectares) 6409 1510 178 55 173 46 312
Production (1000 tons) 13440 2908 5933 5196 4211 1574 235
Area (1000 hectares) 6605 1600 156 61 184 48 327
Production (1000 tons) 14568 2940 4916 5911 4454 1627 185
Area (1000 hectares) 6951 1659 153 63 190 50 440
Production (1000 tons) 14308 2857 4902 5530 4830 1685 230
Area (1000 hectares) 6879 1567 186 67 164 59 444
Production (1000 tons) 14664 2956 6709 4959 4219 2038 250
Area (1000 hectares) 7222 1642 160 61 149 59 357
Production (1000 tons) 15887 3104 5407 5315 4026 2014 280
Area (1000 hectares) 5250 1070 54 62 177 50 431
Production (1000 tons) 7957 1547 1829 3097 4707 1849 192
Area (1000 hectares) 6647 1676 56 60 154 47 453
Production (1000 tons) 13484 3446 2016 2823 4108 1512 302
Area (1000 hectares) 7035 1584 99 68 146 56 463
Production (1000 tons) 13500 3580 4096 5685 4274 1923 347
Annual average area %  change 4.637957 6.590795 -2.18097 12.85405 2.04146 1.222421 13.74046
Annual average production %  change 4.03742 1.075077 -3.89785 13.46154 -0.7764 0 6.738281
2008
2009
2010
2005
2006
2007
2002
2003
2004
1999
2000
2001
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TABLE 6L6: LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES PRODUCTION 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
TABLE 6L7: THE USAGE OF MODERN IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fisheries
Years
Red meat  (1000 
tons)
Milk  (1000 
tons)
Poultry  (1000 
tons)
Eggs  (1000 
tons)
All types (1000 
tons)
1999 721 5564 725 570 411.2
2000 729 5623 803 580 560.7
2001 743 5748 885 581 399
2002 742 5877 942 547 401.67
2003 752 6316 1104 629 441.871
2004 785 6720 1152 655 474.5
2005 800 7179 1237 759 522.051
2006 829 7741 1360 677 575.56
2007 866 8251 1468 703 562.4
2008 870 8772 1565 727 562.6
2009 902 9552 1610 751 599.8
2010 934 10242 1666 767 664
Annual 
average 
growth 
(% )
2.46185853 7.006350347 10.81609195 2.880116959 5.123216602
Livestock 
Years
Area 
under 
cultivation 
(hectare)
%  
Change
Water 
(cubic 
meter)
%  
Change
1378 1999 796583 - 11601 -
1379 2000 822755 3.2855333 8506 -26.678735
1380 2001 778694 -5.3553002 7464 -12.250176
1382 2003 817850 5.0284194 11164 49.571275
1383 2004 802901 -1.8278413 8761 -21.524543
1384 2005 936981 16.699444 11966 36.582582
1385 2006 966395 3.1392312 11939 -0.2256393
1386 2007 1033513 6.9451932 13174 10.34425
Annual average growth (% ) 3.987811 5.117002
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FIGURE 6L8: COMBATING DESERTIFICATION AND DUNE 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
FIGURE 6L9: PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE FUND 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year
Nursery, 
plantation and 
seeding 
(hectares)
Plastic bag seedling 
(1000)
1991 521633 6259
1996 175505 3470
2001 94191 4290
2006 58812 7349
Insurance funds
Year
Area of insured farmlands 
(1000 hectares)
1999 1926.70
2000 1657.80
2002 3062.30
2003 4983.30
2004 5340.80
2005 5712.30
2006 5715.80
2007 5402.00
2008 3550.00
2009 4927.00
2010 4214.00
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TABLE 6L10: AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS BY HOLDER AND BY AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AT PROVINCE LEVEL (2003) 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
Total
of 
which 
without 
land Total
of 
which 
without 
land Tractors Combines Plough
Total country 4332423 851693 3471.9 802.3 2419.55 1014.94 2047.51
Province 
East Azarbayejan 5.63 3.12 6.25 3.16 169.88 36.96 153.74
West Azarbayejan 4.8 4.48 5.08 4.68 157.77 28.68 130.06
Ardebil 2.56 2.31 3.47 2.33 82.74 53.71 78.94
Esfahan 4.66 3.29 4.7 3.38 131.2 40.18 116.73
Ilam 1.33 1.26 1.19 1.26 45.1 15.55 43.69
Bushehr 1.08 1.87 1.13 1.8 24.2 10.85 13.3
Tehran 1.96 1.42 1.46 1.33 26.58 10.97 20.11
Chaharmahal & Bakhtiyari 1.5 1.31 1.74 1.39 44.74 6.01 39.32
South Khorasan 1.17 1.66 1.12 1.63 23.24 1.91 20.15
Khrasan Razavi 9.16 8.66 8.91 8.97 242.86 72.73 221.73
North Khorasan 1.89 1.56 2 1.6 57.82 19.38 55.19
Khozestan 4.42 7.56 4.45 7.18 109.01 52.49 88.42
Zanjan 1.96 1.32 2.23 1.39 57.72 14.6 54.32
Semnan 0.89 0.81 0.72 0.76 19.32 8.64 17.84
Sistan & Baluchestan 3.91 10.26 4.33 10.28 37.9 2.04 32.13
Fars 6.39 8.43 6.22 7.75 155.74 107.89 139.81
Qazvin 1.84 0.88 1.91 0.92 38.76 12.07 35.79
Qom 0.36 0.63 0.34 0.52 5.43 3.28 4.89
Kordestan 2.6 1.85 2.76 1.95 81.06 42.7 75.26
Kerman 5.97 5.64 4.47 5.14 135.97 16.42 84.93
Kermanshah 3.3 2.62 2.96 2.41 109.39 76.58 106.39
Kohgiluyeh & Boyerahmad 1.38 1.39 1.49 1.38 39.37 7.83 29.96
Golestan 3.23 4.71 3.57 4.96 99.32 78.29 91.15
Gilan 7.32 3.68 7.36 3.82 48.14 11.21 17.1
Lorestan 3 2.21 2.94 2.03 106.52 57.19 103.37
Mazandaran 7.77 5.85 7.85 6.12 179.57 152.17 102.34
Markazi 2.11 1.46 2.25 1.51 55.67 20.92 53.29
Hormozgan 2.21 5.48 2.52 5.76 8.17 1.79 5.96
Hamedan 3.29 2.57 3.59 2.69 88.53 46.5 83.48
Yazd 1.96 1.64 1.59 1.66 37.98 4.64 26.99
Total holdings 
(1000 holdings)
Private settled 
household 
holdings
Machinery and equipment 
(1000 units)
%  Share 1000 Units
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TABLE 6L11: EMPLOYEES AT MODERN CATTLE AND CHICKEN FARMS 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
TABLE 6L12: NUMBER OF CITIES AND VILLAGES 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Years
Total number 
of employees 
(1000 persons)
Number of 
unpaid 
employees 
(1000 persons)
Share of total( 
% )
Number of 
paid 
employees 
(1000 persons)
Share of total 
(% )
1989 25413 10979 43.20229804 14434 56.79770196
1993 36018 21042 58.42078961 14976 41.57921039
1995 29843 14823 49.66993935 15020 50.33006065
1999 32916 17893 54.35958197 15023 45.64041803
2003 41865 16664 39.80413233 25201 60.19586767
Years Number of cities Number of villages
1986 496 1583
1991 520 2093
1992 520 2093
1993 578 2182
1994 591 2191
1995 612 2212
1996 678 2227
2001 889 2305
2003 939 2353
2004 982 2378
2005 1015 2400
2006 1016 2400
2007 1016 2430
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APPENDIX M: THE MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS 
TABLE 6M1: OUTPUT AND VALUE-ADDED IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: CBI (Economic Time-series Data-
base). 
Manufactur
ing and 
Mining 
Manufactur
ing
Mining 
Year
Output 
(billion 
Rials)
Output 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
Output 
(billion 
Rials)
Output 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
Output 
(billion 
Rials)
Output 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
Value-
added 
(billion 
Rials)
Value-
added 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
Value-
added 
(billion 
Rials)
Value-
added 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
Value-
added 
(billion 
Rials)
Value-
added 
share 
in total 
GDP 
(% )
1970 21329.1 17.3988 20963.6 17.1007 365.506 0.29816 6363 5.19051 6039.0 4.92622 324.0 0.2643 4404.35468 4101.1086 303.246079
1971 24429.3 17.54 24031.1 17.2541 398.217 0.28592 7364 5.28727 7013.0 5.03525 351.0 0.25201 5024.17887 4694.36435 329.814521
1972 28213.7 17.3562 27731.6 17.0596 482.127 0.29659 8624 5.30522 8196.0 5.04192 428.0 0.26329 5309.65198 4826.95635 482.695635
1973 32474.6 18.5922 31884.4 18.2543 590.215 0.33791 10184 5.83049 9699.0 5.55282 485.0 0.27767 6732.96239 6120.8749 612.08749
1974 39420.8 20.0532 38829.2 19.7522 591.637 0.30096 11802 6.00363 11280.0 5.73809 522.0 0.26554 7987.47359 7267.60116 719.872426
1975 41265.5 20.0207 40535.9 19.6667 729.591 0.35397 12844 6.2315 12204.0 5.921 640.0 0.31051 15061.5465 13725.6077 1335.93877
1976 49926.5 20.6031 49016.3 20.2274 910.211 0.37561 16673 6.8804 15869.0 6.54862 804.0 0.33178 19930.5169 18202.3918 1728.12507
1977 54516.8 23.0374 53545.5 22.6269 971.365 0.41047 17514 7.40096 16659.0 7.03966 855.0 0.3613 15533.246 14193.0832 1340.1628
1978 48740.6 22.2366 47841.8 21.8265 898.833 0.41007 15709 7.16681 14918.0 6.80594 791.0 0.36087 10292.5746 9394.13256 898.44206
1979 41059 19.5595 40218.5 19.159 840.523 0.4004 13730 6.54062 12995.0 6.19048 735.0 0.35014 5882.07743 5363.47187 518.605561
1980 42769.9 24.008 41891 23.5146 878.922 0.49336 15361 8.62256 14594.0 8.19202 767.0 0.43054 5261.40085 4790.26137 471.139473
1981 46439.9 27.2725 45526.8 26.7363 913.055 0.5362 16558 9.72393 15767.0 9.2594 791.0 0.46453 4115.99208 3743.23864 372.753439
1982 44587.8 23.2632 43491.3 22.6911 1096.52 0.5721 16004 8.3499 15077.0 7.86625 927.0 0.48365 4229.44343 3832.15298 397.290452
1983 50149.7 23.5581 48947.9 22.9935 1201.76 0.56453 17881 8.39969 16871.0 7.92523 1010.0 0.47445 7386.67833 6668.14767 718.530658
1984 56155.9 26.9312 54898.7 26.3283 1257.23 0.60294 19997 9.59015 18943.0 9.08467 1054.0 0.50548 7797.62634 7033.97306 763.653279
1985 55087.9 25.901 53864.8 25.326 1223.1 0.57507 19562 9.1976 18544.0 8.71896 1018.0 0.47864 4537.94163 4078.72879 459.212846
1986 51674.3 26.7417 50603.3 26.1875 1070.92 0.55421 18251 9.44498 17365.0 8.98647 886.0 0.45851 4063.07959 3613.61475 449.464843
1987 57909 30.2694 56789.8 29.6844 1119.27 0.58505 20228 10.5733 19296.0 10.0861 932.0 0.48716 4416.66634 3908.2657 508.400648
1988 57491.6 31.7944 56350.7 31.1635 1140.83 0.63091 20497 11.3354 19692.0 10.8902 805.0 0.44519 5029.222 4432.75944 596.462563
1989 62070.3 32.4122 60905.5 31.8039 1164.81 0.60825 21190 11.0651 20371.0 10.6374 819.0 0.42767 5199.15548 4583.15258 616.002895
1990 71727.8 32.8215 70295.5 32.1661 1432.24 0.65537 27166 12.4307 26160.0 11.9704 1006.0 0.46033 6653.26612 5854.37273 798.893391
1991 73628.5 30.048 71952.3 29.364 1676.21 0.68407 32973 13.4564 31804.0 12.9793 1169.0 0.47707 12135.99 10465.4556 1670.53442
1992 73878.4 28.9921 72065.2 28.2806 1813.22 0.71156 32758 12.8552 31508.0 12.3647 1250.0 0.49054 12395.0695 10680.6655 1714.404
1993 70986.3 27.4501 69104.2 26.7223 1882.09 0.7278 31149 12.0452 29852.0 11.5437 1297.0 0.50154 9260.17952 7876.81268 1383.36684
1994 74670.2 28.733 72418.8 27.8667 2251.39 0.86633 32408 12.4706 30837.0 11.866 1571.0 0.60452 6580.42671 5576.83826 1003.58845
1995 77680.7 29.0358 75494.6 28.2187 2186.02 0.8171 32328 12.0837 30810.0 11.5163 1518.0 0.5674 6396.12839 5448.24581 947.882574
1996 89363.6 31.4874 86960.9 30.6409 2402.67 0.84659 38168 13.4486 36485.0 12.8556 1683.0 0.59301 7690.61087 6619.67953 1070.93134
1997 99378.2 34.0606 97066.1 33.2681 2312.13 0.79245 42352 14.5156 40751.0 13.9669 1601.0 0.54872 9829.80437 8595.43289 1234.37148
1998 100125 33.3596 97740.6 32.565 2384.92 0.7946 40728 13.5697 39076.0 13.0193 1652.0 0.55041 14793.509 13216.5332 1576.97578
1999 108024 35.4247 105280 34.5247 2744.36 0.89997 44145 14.4766 42265.0 13.8601 1880.0 0.61651 14078.075 12782.8649 1295.21011
2000 114706 35.838 112015 34.9973 2690.86 0.84071 48710 15.2186 46881.0 14.6472 1829.0 0.57144 15716.58 14423.8978 1292.68213
2001 129638 39.2172 126439 38.2494 3199.1 0.96777 54625 16.5247 52459.0 15.8695 2166.0 0.65524 20788.2096 18877.0225 1911.18716
2002 148339 41.4735 144522 40.4064 3816.81 1.06713 60847 17.012 58256.0 16.2876 2591.0 0.72441 24211.0897 21889.4983 2321.5914
2003 176425 45.7499 172417 44.7106 4008.06 1.03935 68648 17.8015 65931.0 17.097 2717.0 0.70456 27071.0924 24207.6358 2863.45662
2004 209223 50.9767 205021 49.9528 4202.15 1.02384 76304 18.5913 73493.0 17.9064 2811.0 0.68489 32053.8141 28358.7595 3695.05455
2005 232001 52.8596 227593 51.8552 4407.97 1.00432 86431.6 19.6928 83514.5 19.0281 2917.1 0.66464 32979.895 28901.7341 4078.16083
2006 250686 53.5734 245601 52.4866 5085.48 1.0868 95846.6 20.4831 92484.7 19.7646 3361.9 0.71846 33432.8521 29109.037 4323.81514
2007 241343 49.1436 236597 48.177 4746.72 0.96655 96897 19.7307 93128.0 18.9632 3769.0 0.76746 37444.7944 32923.131 4521.66337
2008 246015 49.6732 241099 48.6806 4916.1 0.99262 99510.5 20.0923 95323.0 19.2468 4187.5 0.84551 36653.5678 34232.2348 2421.33301
2009 243679 47.79 238848 46.8425 4831.41 0.94753 104550 20.5043 99510.5 19.5159 4193.2 0.82237 41830.1582 38682.4253 3147.73291
2010 244847 45.4077 239973 44.5038 4873.76 0.90385 115037 21.334 104550 19.3892 4615.2 0.8559 29198.039 27077.6977 2120.3413
Investment (billion Rials)
Manufacturing 
and Mining 
Manufacturing Mining 
Manufacturing 
and Mining 
Manufacturing Mining 
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TABLE 6M2: PRODUCTION OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
 
Sources: CBI, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
  
TABLE 6M3: TABLE 6X: GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN 
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS 
 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic 
Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
  
Year
Thousand tons %  Change Thousand tons %  Change
1998 5608 - 11139 -
1999 6303 12.39300999 11001.4 -1.235299399
2000 6604 4.775503728 11807.9 7.33088516
2001 6927 4.890975167 12542.9 6.224646211
2002 7477.1 7.941388769 13110 4.521282957
2003 7991 6.872985516 13969 6.552250191
2004 8989.6 12.49655863 12517 -10.39444484
2005 9603.6 6.830114799 15757.6 25.88959016
2006 9989.5 4.01828481 17993.8 14.1912474
2007 9944.4 -0.451474048 23869 32.65124654
2008 10483.2 5.418124774 30040 25.85361766
2009 11126.9 6.140300672 34433 14.62383489
2010 12728 14.38945259 40175 16.67586327
Steel Production Petrochemical Production
Manufacturing and mining
Year
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
1998 276.4 252.52082 - 37.9 34.625684 - 314.3 287.14651 -
1999 260.4 182.80272 -27.608854 211.3 148.33415 328.39342 471.7 331.13687 15.319833
2000 502.8 279.15446 52.70805 263 146.01755 -1.5617477 765.8 425.17201 28.397666
2001 374.255 186.1447 -33.318388 236.396 117.57722 -19.477338 610.651 303.72192 -28.564932
2002 747.324 292.49919 57.135387 358.305 140.23894 19.273901 1105.629 432.73813 42.4784
2003 3642.365 1249.5688 327.20421 384.612 131.94701 -5.9127125 4026.977 1381.5159 219.24986
2004 2736 771.40936 -38.265958 318.8 89.884979 -31.877972 3054.8 861.29434 -37.655849
2005 2903.7 687.13312 -10.92497 83.7 19.806813 -77.964269 2987.4 706.93993 -17.921215
2006 2696.4 558.15527 -18.77043 18.8 3.8916033 -80.352198 2715.2 562.04688 -20.495808
2007 2522.5 432.84697 -22.450438 23.5 4.0324693 3.6197422 2546 436.87944 -22.269928
2008 2668.2 391.11478 -9.6413271 27.4 4.0163949 -0.3986237 2695.6 395.13117 -9.5560154
2009 1886.9 270.08501 -30.944821 18.2 2.6050915 -35.138562 1905.1 272.6901 -30.987449
2010 2311 289.51192 7.1928884 18.9 2.3677089 -9.1122549 2329.9 291.87963 7.0371204
Industrial research Total credits
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TABLE 6M4: FACILITIES EXTENDED BY BANKS AND CREDIT INSTITUTIONS TO 
MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic 
Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
TABLE 6M5: NUMBER OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS AND WORKERS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
%  
Change
1998 23285.2 21273.509 - 10023.7 9157.717 - 33308.9 30431.226 -
1999 30259.2 21242.181 -0.1472622 11073.1 7773.3977 -15.116424 41332.3 29015.579 -4.6519556
2000 39913.2 22159.801 4.3198009 15258 8471.2387 8.9772969 55171.2 30631.04 5.567564
2001 58190.8 28942.59 30.608527 17729.9 8818.3909 4.0980098 75920.7 37760.98 23.276849
2002 81470.6 31887.22 10.174038 20845.9 8158.9898 -7.4775671 102316.5 40046.209 6.0518263
2003 121267.4 41602.63 30.46804 18243.8 6258.8137 -23.289354 139511.2 47861.444 19.515542
2004 172642.3 48676.128 17.002524 21238.8 5988.2343 -4.3231745 193881.1 54664.362 14.213775
2005 228133.2 53985.562 10.907676 24170.6 5719.7437 -4.4836361 252303.8 59705.306 9.2216271
2006 293126.7 60677.278 12.395381 18730.7 3877.2582 -32.212728 311857.4 64554.536 8.1219427
2007 373560.4 64100.887 5.6423242 9533.3 1635.8613 -57.808813 383093.7 65736.748 1.8313382
2008 403639.3 59166.965 -7.6971201 7366.6 1079.8239 -33.990496 411005.9 60246.789 -8.3514316
2009 456470.7 65337.799 10.429527 7601 1087.9836 0.7556467 464071.7 66425.783 10.256139
2010 600814.4 75267.388 15.19731 4795.1 600.70905 -44.786936 605609.5 75868.097 14.214832
Non-public sector Public sector Total
Year Total Total Skilled
%  Share 
to total Unskilled
%  Share 
to total Others
1986 718 42295 19324 17888 42.293415 5083
1991 1920 50322 30170 59.953897 13047 25.92703 7105
1996 2704 53046 23259 43.84685 16372 30.863779 13415
2001 2892 55560 28013 50.419366 14939 26.888049 12608
2003 3125 56554 28046 49.591541 16722 29.5682 11786
Number of 
manufacturing 
establishments
Number of workers
Production line
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TABLE 6M6: NUMBER, INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
PERMITS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
 
TABLE 6M7: NUMBER OF MINES AND WORKERS 
 
Note: Others include number of workers employed in the administrative, financial and services sections. Source: 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Number %  Change Employment %  Change
1998 2615 - 54349 -
1999 3387 29.52198853 67144 23.54229149
2000 3264 -3.631532329 56493 -15.86292148
2001 3550 8.762254902 74578 32.01281575
2002 4147 16.81690141 77296 3.644506423
2003 4482 8.078128768 113372 46.67253157
2004 4926 9.906291834 129834 14.52034012
2005 6025 22.31019082 121319 -6.55837454
2006 6746 11.96680498 126200 4.023277475
2007 8731 29.42484435 167000 32.3296355
2008 7689 -11.93448631 146000 -12.5748503
2009 7684 -0.065027962 146300 0.205479452
2010 6661 -13.31337845 140600 -3.896103896
Operation permits
Year Total Total Skillled
%  Share 
to total Unskilled
%  Share 
to total Others
1991 1920 50322 30170 59.953897 13047 25.92703 7105
1996 2704 53046 23259 43.84685 16372 30.863779 13415
2001 2892 55560 28013 50.419366 14939 26.888049 12608
2006 3582 60062 31107 51.791482 16146 26.882222 12809
Number of workers
Number of 
mines Production line
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APPENDIX N: THE OIL AND GAS SECTORS 
TABLE 6N1: SUBSIDIARIES OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY 
NIOC subsidiary Main activities 
National Iranian South Oil 
Company (NISOC)  
Controls oil and gas upstream activities in the south and southwest of the country;  
produces approximately 80 percent of all crude oil produced in Iran covering the 
provinces of Khuzestan, Bushehr, Fars, and Kohkiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad 
Iranian Central Oil Fields 
Company (ICOFC)  
Oversees oil and gas production in the south and central areas of Iran; is the largest 
natural gas producer in Iran 
Iranian Offshore Oil 
Company (IOOC)  
Controls all upstream activities in offshore fields, including Salman, Sirri, Doroud, 
and Balal 
Khazar Exploration and 
Production Company 
(KEPCO)  
In charge of exploration and production in the Caspian Sea region; has recently 
undertaken drilling at the Sardare Jangal offshore gas discovery 
Pars Oil and Gas Company 
(POGC)  
develops South and North Pars gas fields as well as the Golshan and Ferdowsi 
fields 
Pars Special Economic 
Energy Zone (PSEEZ)  
Promotes the use of South Pars oil and gas resources; established in 1998  
 
Karoon Oil and Gas 
Production Company 
(KOGPC)  
Operates in Khouzestan;  delivers natural gas to NIGC  
 
Petroleum Engineering and 
Development Company 
(PEDEC) 
Carries out all engineering and development projects conducted by NIOC 
  
National Iranian Drilling 
Company (NIDC)  
Conducts most of the onshore and offshore drilling in Iran ; handles related 
technical services and well control operations 
North Drilling Company 
(NDC)  
Aims at developing internal expertise needed for complex oil and gas drilling 
Kala Naft Company  
 
Manufactures equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; distributes 
equipment to operational centres  
Naftiran Intertrade Company 
(NICO)  
Invests in and finances Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical trade 
Iranian Oil Terminals 
Company (IOTC)  
Accepts deliveries and stores crude oil, petroleum products and condensates for 
exports 
National Iranian Oil Refining 
and Distribution Company 
(NIORDC)  
Oversees the subsidiaries that control the refining sector, pipelines, 
telecommunications, and oil products distribution; Engages in exports of petroleum 
products; controls the refining and domestic distribution networks 
Iranian Fuel Conservation 
Organization (IFCO)  
Aims at optimizing energy consumption, protecting the environment and increasing 
energy efficiency; established in 2000 
NIGC subsidiary Main activities 
Iran Gas Engineering and 
Development Company 
(IGEDC) 
Processes, delivers and distributes gas for domestic use 
Iran Gas Transmission 
Company (IGTC) 
Processes, delivers and distributes gas for domestic use 
Iran Gas Storage Company 
(IGSC) 
Processes, delivers and distributes gas for domestic use 
Iran Gas Distribution 
Company (IGDC) 
Processes, delivers and distributes gas for domestic use 
Iran Gas Commercial 
Company (IGCC) 
Sells natural gas plant liquids as NIGC’s trading company  
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National Iranian Gas Exports 
Company (NIGEC) 
Controls new pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects 
Source: US EIA (2014), National Iranian Oil Company (2014). 
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TABLE 6N2: SELECTED FIGURES AND GROWTH RATES 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
 
Year
Oil 
investm
ent 
(consta
nt 1997 
prices)
Oil 
value-
added 
(consta
nt 1997 
prices)
Oil 
reserve
s
Oil 
output
Oil 
export
Oil 
product 
import
Oil 
consum
ption
Oil 
refiner
y 
capaciti
es
OPEC 
qouta
Natural 
Gas 
reserve
s
Natural 
gas 
output
Natural 
gas 
consum
ption
Natural 
gas 
imports
Natural 
gas 
exports
Oil 
value-
added/ 
GDP 
(consta
nt 1997 
prices)
(billion 
Rials)
(billion 
Rials)
(1000 
billion 
barrels
)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(1000 
barrels 
daily)
(trillio
n cubic 
meters)
(billion 
cubic 
feet 
daily)
(billion 
cubic 
meters)
(billion 
cubic 
meters)
(billion 
cubic 
meters)
(billion 
Rials)
1970 2033.71 57138.4 - 3847.66 - - 343.633 594 - - 1.24628 0.8941 - - 46.6097
1971 3030.51 65807.4 - 4572.42 - - 381.091 605 - - 1.38141 0.93732 - - 47.2489
1972 3364.44 74576.3 - 5058.96 - - 421.24 605 - - 1.57683 0.90581 - - 45.877
1973 3096.39 82173.1 - 5907.38 5320 - 491.239 660 - - 1.72112 0.99763 - 8.6 47.0453
1974 3830.71 81804.5 - 6060.3 5244 - 530.554 690 - - 1.99901 1.25703 - 9.2 41.6136
1975 4369.08 71885.2 - 5386.62 4607 - 605.694 810 - - 1.96236 1.19027 - 9.6 34.8764
1976 13287.2 81440.7 - 5918.19 5280 - 625.007 810 - - 1.92944 1.18391 - 9.3 33.6079
1977 8116.03 74867.2 - 5713.96 4816 - 669.973 1050 - - 1.824 1.06288 - 9.2 31.6369
1978 7196.64 53168.9 - 5302.05 3455 10.7 727.615 1080 - - 1.63974 0.97935 - 5.3 24.2569
1979 3864.93 41296.9 - 3217.59 2632 10.1 764.618 1080 - - 1.73316 1.25047 - 3.5 19.6728
1980 2414.09 13497.4 58.296 1478.96 770 8.2 661.909 1085 - 14.101 0.68871 0.66748 - 0 7.57647
1981 2834.53 14432.4 57.02 1321.03 791 56.6 591.315 590 - 14.085 0.57568 0.55095 - 0 8.47564
1982 4426.27 32927.1 56.148 2396.92 1686 83 641.033 590 1200 14.069 0.69662 0.69662 - 0 17.1793
1983 5411.48 33587.8 55.257 2453.58 2045 154.7 771.171 632 2400 14.045 1.06428 1.06428 - 0 15.778
1984 4298.59 26686.5 58.874 2042.54 1607 101.9 830.245 680 2300 14.016 1.30259 1.30259 - 0 12.7983
1985 2335.2 27164.1 59 2205.21 1460 165.4 919.253 685 2300 13.986 1.41259 1.41259 - 0 12.7719
1986 2373.51 23431.3 92.86 2054.24 1250 148.4 884.236 685 2317 13.955 1.47064 1.47064 - 0 12.1258
1987 1367.28 26815.4 92.86 2342.44 1546 191.2 924.919 715 2312 13.922 1.54804 1.54804 - 0 14.0166
1988 1181.14 29165.9 92.86 2349.48 1647 183 805.062 735 2369 14.2 1.92976 1.92976 - 0 16.1296
1989 819.113 31247.9 92.86 2894.34 1823 131.4 943.903 825 2783 17 2.14791 2.14791 - 0 16.3172
1990 1823.99 37367.2 92.85 3270.18 2224 123.9 1016.61 865 314 17.003 2.23982 2.19628 - 2.1 17.0987
1991 2175.18 42609.9 92.86 3499.56 2460 121.4 1075.37 980 3217 19.8 2.49138 2.20058 - 2.9 17.3893
1992 1632.11 42622.4 92.86 3523.02 2397 171.1 1119.97 1050 3184 20.7 2.4122 2.4122 - 0.5 16.7264
1993 1697.65 44757.6 92.86 3712.16 2184 155.3 1105.83 1145 3415 20.7 2.61909 2.56932 - 0 17.3076
1994 2595.8 42116 94.3 3730.03 2220 114.5 1157.69 1280 3600 20.764 3.07673 3.07673 - 0.1 16.2062
1995 2537.05 42729.2 93.7 3743.77 2290 78 1245.24 1290 3600 19.35 3.41536 3.40569 - 0 15.9715
1996 5194.61 43044.6 92.6 3758.58 2441 76.7 1290.32 1290 3600 23 3.76304 3.75339 - 0 15.1668
1997 5160.88 40763.5 92.6 3776.46 2342 67.9 1294.84 1345 3600 23 4.54737 4.55704 1.6 0 13.9712
1998 5072.26 41736 93.7 3854.75 2300 23.9 1262.27 1495 3650.5 24.1 4.83762 5.00694 1.9 0 13.9055
1999 7121.29 39515.4 93.1 3603.36 2079 21.4 1292.21 1597 3359 25 5.45297 5.64648 2.1 0 12.9584
2000 5562.6 42795 99.53 3852.32 2345 33.3 1365.73 1597 2872 26 5.81245 6.06814 3.3 0 13.3706
2001 6684.66 38053.3 99.08 3825.38 2208 49.1 1392.39 1597 3552 26.1 6.38566 6.78138 4.5 0.5 11.5116
2002 3583.59 39463.8 130.69 3579.82 2021 65.4 1479.88 1597 3186 26.69 7.25644 7.6657 5.3 1.3 11.0336
2003 3828.31 45579.3 133.25 4002.37 2396 95 1574.78 1607 3575 27.57 7.88533 8.02078 5.7 3.4 11.8194
2004 4901.24 47405.9 132.74 4201.47 2548 142.8 1633.02 1642 3743.75 27.5 8.19184 8.35008 5.9 3.5 11.5503
2005 5752.15 47543.8 137.49 4183.54 2602 155.9 1695.62 1642 4073.5 27.58 10.0139 10.1571 5.2 4.8 10.8325
2006 5137.45 49248.9 138.4 4260.24 2433 213 1806.56 1727 4000.5 26.85 10.5073 10.517 6.3 5.7 10.5248
2007 5394.32 57570.4 138.22 4302.69 2480.5 157.8 1842.94 1772 4000.5 28.13 10.8266 10.9369 6.2 5.6 11.7228
2008 4315.55 58665 137.62 4396.04 2370.8 158.4 1905.96 1805 3801.5 29.61 11.2216 11.5101 - - 11.8451
2009 4444.49 47665.5 137.01 4248.54 2056 141.8 1922.54 1860 3801.5 29.61 12.6901 12.7094 - - 9.3481
2010 4667.72 61112.4 151.17 4338.46 2021 100.3 1886.82 1860 3801.5 33.09 14.1404 13.9885 - - 11.3335
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TABLE 6N3: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CURDE OIL EXPROTS (%) 
  
Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic Time-series Data-base). 
 
TABLE 6N4: REFINERIES AND ACTIVITIES (% SHARE IN TOTAL) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Years
West 
Europe Japan
Asia and 
Far East Africa Others
1966 42.2 31.1 11.8 6.8 8.1
1971 27.2 46.4 9.3 7 10.1
1976 52.8 23.1 2.9 6.6 14.6
1981 47.3 14.5 23.5 - 14.7
1986 51.6 17.2 18.1 - 13.1
1991 38.5 17.7 16 - 27.8
1996 49.5 20 27.6 - 2.9
2001 14 23.7 41.8 6.9 13.6
2006 33.5 20 39.4 7.1 -
Refinery 1986 1991 1996 2002 2007
Abadan - 24.27 28.8 27.78 26.22
Arak - - 12.62 10.01 11.21
Isfahan 42.07 36.59 26.68 17.7 14.95
Bandar-Abbas - - - 15.85 17.35
Tabriz 15.17 8.72 8.11 7.48 8.22
Tehran 31.89 23.56 16.8 15.2 16.45
Shiraz 6.06 2.46 3.2 2.66 2.99
Kermanshah 2.02 2.27 1.69 1.99 1.12
Lavan 2.79 2.13 2.1 1.33 1.49
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TABLE 6N5: SELECTED NEW UPSTREAM OIL PROJECTS IN IRAN 
Project Recoverable 
Reserves 
(billion barrels) 
Developer Status 
South Azadegan  
 
6.0 to 7.0 
 
The National Iranian 
Drilling Company 
will drill wells115 
Came online in 2007; phase I targets 150000 
bbl/d and Phase II targets 110000 bbl/d 
 
North Azadegan  
 
  CNPC Phase I is underway and expected to be 
completed by 2015-16 (75,000 bbl/d); phase II 
expected to be completed by 2020 (75,000 
bbl/d) 
Yadavaran  
 
3.2 (and 2.7 tcf 
of recoverable 
gas reserves) 
Sinopec 
 
Expected to increase to 85,000 bbl/d in 2015; 
phase II is expected to add 50,000 to 100,000 
bbl/d in 2018; phase III is expected to add 
more than 100,000 bbl/d after 2020 
Yaran  
 
1.1 (oil in place)  
 
PEDEC (South 
Yaran) and Persian 
Energy (North Yaran) 
North Yaran is expected to produce 30,000 
bbl/d in 2015 and South Yaran 50,000-60,000 
bbl/d in 2018 
Azar (Badra) 
 
NA Iranian consortium  
 
Iran-Iraq shared oil field; operated by Gazprom 
Neft; drilling set to resume in 2015 with initial 
target production of 30,000 bbl/d at Azar to 
increase to 65,000 bbl/d 
 
South Pars (oil 
layer)  
 
1.3 PEDCO  
 
Initial capacity is expected to be 35,000 bbl/d; 
a floating production, storage and offloading 
unit needs to be installed before production can 
start 
 
Zagheh  
 
3 (oil in place)  
 
Iran is looking for a 
new developer  
 
Production potential is estimated at 55,000 
bbl/d of heavy crude; in 2014, Iran cancelled 
the MOU2 signed with Tatneft Iran Oil  
 
Bushgan, Kuh-e-
Kaki, Kuh-e-
Mond  
 
1.1 (oil in place)  
 
Iran is looking for a 
new developer  
 
Total production potential is estimated at 
22,000 bbl/d; in 2014, Iran cancelled the MOU 
signed with joint Iranian-Russian and Iranian-
Ukrainian companies (Gazprom Pars Kish 
International) 
Source: US EIA, 2014, p.15. Oil in place is the amount of oil estimated to exist in naturally occurring reservoirs of 
which a portion is typically not technically and/or economically recoverable. MOU stands for memorandum of 
understanding. Sinopec, CNPC, PEDEC and PEDCO refer to China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, China 
National Petroleum Corporation, Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, and Petroiran Development 
Company, respectively. bbl/d and tfc are billion barrels per day and trillion cubic feet, respectively. 
 
                                                          
115 In 2004, a consortium of NIOC (25%) and Japan's INPEX (75%) signed an agreement to develop the field. INPEX 
has since halted its activities. In 2009, CNPC signed an MOU with NIOC to develop the field in 2011. In 2014, NIOC 
cancelled this contract due to project delays; the National Iranian Drilling Company will drill wells. 
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TABLE 6N6: SOUTH PARS NATURAL GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT 
Phase Natural gas 
capacity (bcf/d) 
Condensate 
capacity (bbl/d) 
Developer 
 
Start Year 
1 1 40,000  PetroPars, Petronas  2004 
2 2 80,000 Total, Petronas, 
Gazprom  
2002 
3 
4 2 80,000  
 
ENI, PetroPars, 
NaftIran  
2004 
5 
6 3.9 156,000  Statoil, PetroPars  2009 
7 
8 
9 2 80,000  PetroPars 
 
2011 
10 
11 2 80,000  PetroPars  2020+ 
12 3 120,000  POGC, NIOC, 
PDVSA 
2014 
13 2 80,000  
 
Mapna, Sadra,Pedro 
Pidar  
2020+ 
14 2 77,000  
 
IDRO, IEOCC, 
NIDC  
2017 
15 2 80,000  POGC, ISOICO 2015 
16 
17 2 80,000 PetroPars, OIEC, 
IOEC   
2016 
18 
19 2 77,000  PetroPars, IOEC 2018 
20 2 75,000  
 
OIEC  
 
2017 
21 
22 2 77,000  
 
Petro Sina Arian, 
Sadra  
2016 
23 
24 
Source: US EIA, 2014, p.26.  Notes: POGC,  PDVSA, IDRO, NIDC, ISOICO, OIEC, IOEC refer to Pars Oil 
and Gas Company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran, 
National Iranian Drilling Company, Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore Industries Complex Company, Oil 
Industries Engineering Construction Company, Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, 
respectively. Total, ENI, and Statoil are currently not participating in South Pars. 
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APPENDIX O: THE SERVICE SECTOR 
TABLE 6O1: SERVICES VALUE-ADDED AND OUTPUT  
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic 
Time-series Data-base); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
Year
Electrici
ty, gas 
and 
water
 Constru
ction 
 Transport
ation and 
communic
ations 
 Real 
estate
Electrici
ty, gas 
and wate
 Constru
ction 
 Transpo
rtation 
Commun
ications 
 Real 
estate
1970 177 5188 4931 2981 296.4175 17731.2 7427.981 178.7232 910.6841
1971 264 5688 5571 3366 421.7499 19579.81 8800.511 238.2556 1070.059
1972 331 6072 8104 3832 532.3346 20904.35 12088.5 391.2702 934.4178
1973 450 8250 9591 4574 696.7141 25032.17 13640.8 559.6468 1195.325
1974 582 8983 12817 6024 940.1247 30339.11 18233.66 489.9416 1767.026
1975 611 10027 15593 9074 1113.926 34433.88 21662.72 581.2915 3458.303
1976 631 17180 16490 10731 1092.788 59131.24 23118.91 634.1745 2480.043
1977 682 13963 16640 11980 1143.7 48175.18 22177.75 788.6767 2474.607
1978 683 17408 15479 10963 1051.31 60629.6 21053.42 813.7404 1822.942
1979 726 13384 16954 10364 1100.67 43711.52 21816.54 755.6244 987.9021
1980 640 13088 17191 12304 1010.094 43483.11 22629.99 714.7954 830.3111
1981 734 10607 14004 14426 1057.113 35081.27 19687.9 659.6904 720.9173
1982 875 11807 14648 15800 1323.575 39402.21 20437.17 768.2319 883.2262
1983 911 14476 16930 18306 1335.57 48213.5 23297.29 818.6142 1075.231
1984 1023 11710 17247 20590 1942.14 38882.04 23664.4 830.0081 854.4047
1985 1119 10785 17259 21290 2128.998 36728.89 23784.45 861.3525 655.0569
1986 1200 12250 14948 18993 2154.691 43388.56 21591.99 779.0865 613.1789
1987 1336 11564 12234 18582 2228.439 40522.55 19763.64 708.8261 454.9531
1988 1288 7596 11412 18167 3059.318 26896.61 17560.84 901.9113 480.668
1989 1436 7409 12582 19626 3413.697 25958.06 19018.07 935.6138 488.798
1990 1608 9200 13753 24183 3786.42 27972.67 20923.83 1002.55 1004.035
1991 1748 11866 13952 28694 4085.939 34556.69 20846.29 1117.888 950.631
1992 1842 12883 14327 30524 4316.181 36690.93 21306.16 1348.134 969.039
1993 2077 14193 16735 31637 4858.933 42414.49 24533.2 1574.785 1055.751
1994 2302 13089 18458 33531 5344.502 38312.34 27283.53 1770.649 1249.145
1995 2476 12301 20330 36463 5696.3 35750.46 29623.12 2028.318 1048.637
1996 2673 13978 23476 37568 6124.435 39993.89 34230.73 2315.92 1476.587
1997 2833 13262 24033 40027 6510.95 38712.07 34902 2580.209 1297.159
1998 3011 12477 24737 41631 6877.035 37288.21 35376.04 2921.027 1271.12
1999 3211 14054 28115 44246 7336.816 40911.18 40032.35 3293.353 1556.726
2000 3396 15122 29647 44278 7782.652 42834.91 41992.3 3669.364 1531.632
2001 3591 15863 31291 46942 8246.192 45391.07 44368.53 4247.418 1382.325
2002 3887 18689 33855 49530 8908.509 52734.31 47947.72 5022.074 2455.033
2003 4228 18869 37187 49863 9658.173 56351.41 51478.68 6467.303 2540.194
2004 4608 19012 41484 52059 10474.94 57309.26 56445.25 8030.483 4003.59
2005 4899.2 20140.1 46182.5 53558.4 11122.3 65217.44 60958.46 10950.24 2982.927
2006 5331 20776.4 54027 55352.3 12077.15 67539.34 67859.23 15896.64 4149.512
2007 5725 23245.5 61910 56758 2967 38999 49954 18340 5555
2008 6019.3 27267.5 71744.4 56064.8 3333 55353 63314 19974 6896
2009 6060.9 25921 75128.9 55815.4 3153 53891 63700 22172 7572
2010 6348.2 27802.3 78575.9 55838.8 3747 62650 63611 23790 8215
OutputValue-added
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TABLE 6O2: SERVICES GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. Source: Central Bank of Iran (Economic 
Time-series Data-base); Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
Year
Electricity, gas 
and water
 Construction  Transportation Communications  Real estate
1970 2936.137279 2048.133504 4386.527241 1172.816707 7607.256499
1971 4191.186177 2593.153463 4953.060694 2187.254284 7432.150733
1972 5562.032456 3147.02154 5886.402914 2673.865062 8241.191565
1973 5118.545636 3635.278034 5685.469693 2816.7899 9125.462501
1974 5436.680537 3310.853047 7691.218219 2966.007741 12528.00548
1975 9222.816483 7695.924588 10549.27033 3390.603412 14274.88725
1976 14901.85122 5132.537356 11985.87775 4330.393641 23423.5617
1977 17040.91105 2091.67236 9911.30616 4523.175078 19353.63131
1978 10533.58351 986.8517339 8681.718795 4183.326812 23642.36484
1979 4560.114616 636.369034 5495.840425 944.6425809 21907.55123
1980 4755.537546 1182.237398 6566.791532 1554.044748 22676.34096
1981 6616.550356 2006.667446 6071.667175 1225.918077 17477.6201
1982 7285.639491 3070.062727 6387.369366 1440.141874 18962.95099
1983 9095.802573 3891.369135 9914.722832 1900.365282 28162.31958
1984 9007.330921 3829.042153 11120.58675 2550.535186 23134.91956
1985 6503.897359 3030.423298 9030.521859 1952.378589 22942.84491
1986 4718.54185 885.4896436 4704.667212 1316.337214 25288.48463
1987 4906.376738 731.415888 5398.543456 1482.178906 23289.68279
1988 4864.895153 731.6689993 5031.954898 499.9847829 14712.02441
1989 5980.229781 923.030937 6197.191594 671.9973257 14410.52046
1990 6916.49816 1023.615216 6172.172589 637.0770627 13325.99614
1991 9579.279591 3147.467451 10388.44049 1380.134993 17609.14501
1992 7688.179507 2109.700021 10611.70848 1287.888289 16980.4319
1993 11310.86646 989.9679044 8027.938672 786.638489 15325.96889
1994 8925.805392 469.8799837 7554.618875 647.9797982 13522.58171
1995 8523.163696 555.5522247 6416.429926 1035.675308 13063.30234
1996 8061.384828 1030.810461 8509.693734 1002.032321 14195.7151
1997 8737.780441 1034.416552 11102.03573 2479.242339 14122.42112
1998 6354.912064 523.0827922 13329.0699 3704.977825 13413.24858
1999 5654.661038 560.5986395 14539.32699 2601.007119 14093.70651
2000 5916.054221 581.0360439 15748.38196 2673.37229 15029.95596
2001 6320.227171 762.3899961 19970.05968 4039.196728 16859.9173
2002 7687.945794 769.1823637 26933.58537 3022.715632 19108.80884
2003 8014.994992 1377.199032 34810.25201 3352.094623 20109.9269
2004 7812.134342 2000.919083 35892.43086 4097.535 20714.85896
2005 10347.73957 2144.243889 37662.9069 4687.720276 22893.18351
2006 9603.656284 2052.973745 39635.53118 5089.422834 22539.18768
2007 10083.8391 2155.622432 43995.43961 5343.893976 37415.05155
2008 10588.03105 2263.403554 53674.43633 5611.088675 58367.48042
2009 10905.67198 2331.30566 86952.58685 5779.421335 84632.84661
2010 11450.95558 2517.810113 133906.9837 6068.392402 130334.5838
 At constant 1997 prices (billion Rials)
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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TABLE 6O3: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS ISSUED BY MUNICIPALITIES IN URBAN 
AREAS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years); Statistical Centre of Iran (various 
years). 
Tehran 
Other 
large 
cities
Other 
Urban 
Areas 
All urban 
areas Tehran 
Other 
large 
cities
Other 
Urban 
Areas 
All urban 
areas
Year Items Items Items Items
(Thousan
d square 
meters)
(Thousan
d square 
meters)
(Thousan
d square 
meters)
(Thousan
d square 
meters)
1975 10803 23243 35541 69587 7615 4728.9 5035.7 17379.6
1976 12428 32116 53471 98015 8534.6 7468.5 8264.9 24268
1977 10078 20140 38304 68522 5093.2 5276.3 6231.3 16600.8
1978 10831 22632 38174 71637 5057.3 5119.3 6349 16525.6
1979 15073 38052 60896 114021 4598.4 8017.3 10177.1 22792.8
1980 13073 47054 91993 152120 4215.3 10049.7 14869.3 29134.3
1981 10198 50639 94706 155543 3221.2 9854.7 15619.3 28695.2
1982 11519 32943 72323 116785 3837.8 6854.4 12419 23111.2
1983 14437 37715 88674 140826 4955.1 8040.6 14136 27131.7
1984 12883 45652 89998 148533 4699.2 9308.5 15126.8 29134.5
1985 14939 40748 73983 129670 7815.1 8917.5 13847.9 30580.5
1986 11633 29576 71907 113116 6483.9 7074.5 13746.8 27305.2
1987 7098 33094 66935 107127 4554.7 8107.1 13010.2 25672
1988 7790 27672 57883 93345 5081.5 7244.2 11979.6 24305.3
1989 12801 36056 69659 118516 7986.5 9222.9 14733.7 31943.1
1990 10759 35698 59026 105483 5824.2 10133.6 12054.8 28012.6
1991 9294 35959 60103 105356 5126.3 10472.1 13081.9 28680.3
1992 8360 25637 60863 94860 5453.3 7995.9 12770.7 26219.9
1993 7469 27398 74012 108879 5236.4 7947.2 14719.6 27903.2
1994 8544 38811 75881 123236 6977.1 10296.4 15551.6 32825.1
1995 12028 44412 78975 135415 10378.2 12588.6 16273.3 39240.1
1996 13961 42666 82018 138645 12238.6 13418.2 16157.1 41813.9
1997 8209 39682 82619 130510 7443.7 11818.7 17044 36306.4
1998 6997 38243 87654 132894 5334.5 12354.3 18518.1 36206.9
1999 12119 40644 86080 138843 10120.4 15141.7 18861.5 44123.6
2000 21234 38487 76586 136307 17198 15312.6 17826.9 50337.5
2001 24215 45776 76042 146033 20867.7 19512.6 18174.2 58554.5
2002 20477 53002 87854 161333 15265.7 26776.4 23040.1 65082.2
2003 10876 49188 88877 148941 9531 29093.7 26790.9 65415.2
2004 12570 34681 88722 135973 11620.9 20084.4 29852.9 61558.2
2005 10833 31685 87211 129729 9968 17943.8 30014.1 57926
2006 14642 34914 123046 172602 13435.6 19528.2 37126.5 70090.3
2007 24930 50972 133020 208922 23397.2 30068 51740.8 105206
2008 20588 40427 115668 176683 20515 25770.8 53024.8 99310.6
2009 11964 30950 96544 139458 15406.6 22514.1 45676 83596.7
2010 19767 39839 121388 180994 27125.4 28252.9 58799.8 114178.1
Number Total floor-space
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TABLE 6O4: RESIDENTIAL UNITS COMPLETED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN 
URBAN AREAS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
  
Number Total floor-space
Year Units
(Thousand 
square meters)
1975 96120 13553
1976 101686 14439
1977 119172 16803
1978 150059 19057
1979 163779 21946
1980 180094 25754
1981 130598 19458
1982 131337 16681
1983 104698 14763
1984 149985 20998
1985 158834 23825
1986 145816 21726
1987 144840 22305
1988 128731 19824
1989 114638 17769
1990 93313 14650
1991 148636 22295
1992 182173 26233
1993 193716 26539
1994 201303 27579
1995 209853 29379
1996 204688 26609
1997 193641 24012
1998 210994 27218
1999 291046 36090
2000 339659 41438
2001 370736 44118
2002 445974 53071
2003 463127 55575
2004 402524 49510
2005 479153 57978
2006 448242 55582
2007 491385 60932
2008 601280 73356
2009 663307 82913
2010 550777 71050
 314 
 
TABLE 6O5: CONSTRUCTION SERVICE INDEX 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year
 Daily 
Wage of 
Bricklayer 
 Daily 
Wage of 
Unskilled 
Constructi
on Worker 
 Wage 
Paid for 
Painting 
 Wage 
Paid for 
Roof 
Asphalting 
 Wage 
Paid for 
Well 
Digging 
1990 6.5 6.7 10.8 8.4 6.2
1991 8.4 8.1 11.3 10 7.2
1992 11.2 10.1 13.1 11.7 8.8
1993 13.5 12.3 15 13.8 11.1
1994 16.3 14.6 18.9 17.4 13.5
1995 21.3 19.6 27.3 24.1 18.1
1996 27 26.2 34 35.9 27.2
1997 31.8 30.3 40.5 42.4 30.9
1998 37.7 33.7 44.8 46.1 36.3
1999 43.9 38.1 51.1 49.6 43.3
2000 48.6 42 56.1 54.6 48
2001 53.7 46.5 62.3 57.7 51.3
2002 62.5 57.5 71.1 67.5 61
2003 78.8 77.3 83.4 80 79.1
2004 100 100 100 100 100
2005 116.9 116.6 117.9 118.6 118.7
2006 136.8 135.5 140.9 137.1 140.3
2007 181.9 193.8 184.1 178.2 187.1
2008 242.2 256.7 247.8 229.6 278.4
2009 259.3 265.5 275.7 241.2 309.9
2010 281.8 284 310 265.2 327.2
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TABLE 6O6: TRANSPORT SECTOR PERFORMANCE 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
 
 
  
Land Road Rail Air Sea Land Road Rail Air Sea
Year
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
Million 
persons 
1978 - - 5.4 3.6 - - - 6.9 0.05 15.5
1979 - - 6.1 2.6 - - - 6.1 0.06 9.6
1980 - - 4.9 2.4 - - - 5.7 0.03 10.5
1981 - - 4.3 1.8 - - - 6.8 0.02 11.4
1982 - - 6.4 2.6 - - - 7.9 0.04 12.4
1983 - - 6.4 4 - - - 10 0.07 17.3
1984 - - 7.2 4.3 - - - 10.9 0.05 12.9
1985 - - 7 3.7 - - - 11.6 0.06 13.1
1986 - - 6.3 4.8 - - - 12.7 0.08 13.2
1987 - - 5.3 5.3 - - - 14.8 0.1 16.6
1988 - - 6.8 5.1 - - - 13 0.08 13.7
1989 - - 6.7 5.9 - - - 12.3 0.06 17.6
1990 - - 7.8 6.4 - - - 14.9 0.07 20.6
1991 - - 8.1 6.6 - - - 17 0.07 23.6
1992 - - 8.2 7.6 - - - 17.7 0.07 25.1
1993 - - 9.2 8.3 - - - 19.8 0.07 27.6
1994 - - 9.1 9.3 - - - 21.4 0.06 28.6
1995 - - 9.7 10 - - - 21.4 0.05 31.6
1996 647.1 638.2 8.9 10.2 - 188.8 166.1 22.7 0.07 52.6
1997 655.9 646.4 9.5 11.6 - 215.9 191.5 24.4 0.07 60.3
1998 652.5 642.9 9.6 10.4 - 221.1 199.5 21.6 0.07 55.9
1999 667.7 657 10.7 11 - 249.4 226.4 23 0.07 75.4
2000 671.1 659.4 11.7 10.7 2.4 272 247 25 0.08 74.7
2001 660 646.9 13.1 11.6 2.4 294.9 268.5 26.4 0.08 75.3
2002 656.7 642.4 14.3 11.9 2.5 324.5 298 26.5 0.09 77
2003 669.1 653 16.1 13.2 3.7 376.9 348.1 28.8 0.1 85.6
2004 743.9 726.5 17.4 14.2 4.6 418.4 388.9 29.5 0.09 93.4
2005 781 761.6 19.4 15.6 3.9 437.1 406.8 30.3 0.13 97.5
2006 807.5 786.2 21.4 18.1 3.7 470.6 437.6 33 0.17 110.2
2007 819 794.5 24.5 19.6 3.9 516 485 31 0.16 107
2008 872 845.8 26.2 20.1 5.4 544.5 511.5 33 0.12 113.9
2009 925.7 898 27.7 21.8 6.3 548.5 515.7 32.8 0.12 130.9
2010 924.8 896 28.8 24 8.8 574.5 541 33.5 0.14 140.1
Passengers Goods
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TABLE 6O7: COMMUNICATION SECTOR PERFORMANCE 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Years Installed In use
Operating 
postal unit
Mails 
received and 
dispatched 
within the 
country 
(1000)
Mails 
dispatched 
abroad (1000)
Mails 
received and 
dispatched 
within cities 
(1000)
Overseas 
mail 
received 
(1000)
1986 - - - - - -
1991 2902350 2456437 3909 58327 181558 21126 26067
1996 6690549 5824968 3240 47866 97094 10368 16716
2001 12170413 10896572 4629 227407 106791 7007 10357
2006 27143632 12934416 7641 764624 160481 2569 10785
Radio 
station
Radio main 
transmitter TV station
TV main 
transmitter F.M. station
F.M. main 
transmitter
1986 - - - - - -
1991 70 90 713 942 62 64
1996 77 99 1611 2302 87 121
2001 93 124 3546 7509 639 926
2006 93 128 4612 10845 778 2163
Inter-city 
automatic 
channels 
Microwave 
transmissi
on 
channels Outgoing Ingoing 
1986 11986 28864 670 1569
1991 37878 74846 1854 2356
1996 155254 240107 4277 7021
2001 376618 471749 6289 9084
2006 529940 1371712 11226 8182
Total telephone Post
Medium wave radio, television and F.M. stations and transmitters
Inter-city International channels
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TABLE 6O8: EXTENDED FACILITIES TO CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING SECTOR 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (various years). 
 
Number
Year
Thousand 
items)
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
Nominal 
(billion 
Rials)
Real 
(billion 
Rials)
1978 21.7 37.6 1652.58937 - -
1979 43.1 49.5 1712.32594 - -
1980 117.3 103.1 2916.10742 - -
1981 126.6 117 2602.19371 - -
1982 111.9 150.2 2856.57366 - -
1983 119.4 185.1 3168.09902 - -
1984 82.4 217.4 3343.38662 - -
1985 45 143.7 2119.04688 - -
1986 33.4 116.3 1532.88151 - -
1987 30.7 96.6 1031.04259 - -
1988 92.9 177 1584.43124 - -
1989 118.7 360.4 2751.96213 - -
1990 126.1 646 4091.39246 - -
1991 108.7 736.1 3724.54223 - -
1992 56.6 610.4 2411.46656 - -
1993 68.1 617.6 1595.13899 - -
1994 107.3 989.4 1951.27046 - -
1995 134.3 1872.6 2662.20149 - -
1996 147.9 2882.8 3286.14807 - -
1997 175.7 3994.7 3994.70078 - -
1998 285.8 6489.1 5928.4836 - -
1999 258.2 9452.7 6635.86495 40656.2 28540.952
2000 217 10445.6 5799.39511 51949.4 28842.297
2001 239.5 12456.6 6195.58867 64959.7 32309.264
2002 372 15748.8 6164.00817 84084.4 32910.249
2003 334.8 14488.6 4970.53513 108068.8 37074.649
2004 208.8 17584.3 4957.85583 135670.3 38251.951
2005 299.4 43446.8 10281.2739 182559.4 43200.954
2006 432.4 73143.5 15140.7173 251951.8 52154.067
2007 393.3 69444.8 11916.3414 308274.6 52898.207
2008 334.1 65885.5 9657.74407 359179 52649.807
2009 477.6 107886 15442.4672 433654.5 62071.959
2010 909.5 325535 40781.5942 685164.3 85834.372
Amount Amount
By other banks and 
credit institutions
By Maskan Bank
 318 
 
TABLE 6O9: GOVERNMENT CREDITS FOR ACQUISITION OF NON-FINANCIAL 
ASSETS IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR (BILLION RIALS) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
TABLE 6O10: REAL INVESTMENT (CHANGES IN CAPITAL GOODS) IN 
MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 10 OF MORE WORKERS BY TYPE OF 
CAPITAL GOODS AND SIZE (MILLION RIALS) 
 
Source: SCI, Annual Statistical Yearbook (2007). Data for year 1996 also includes figures related to manufacturing 
establishments with less than 10 workers. 
 
Nominal 
(billion Rials)
Real (billion 
Rials)
2003 9491.3 3256.135172
2004 9411.4 2653.52413
2005 14075.9 3330.928478
2006 12248.4 2535.420944
2007 13590.7 2332.088532
2008 16634.1 2438.28886
2009 27068 3874.42952
2010 26492.3 3318.838918
Year and size of 
establishment
Total Machinery 
Office 
equipment
Vehicles Building 
Computer 
software
1996 392880053 300389383.7 12481909.4 18172090.48 104997867 0
2001 220303317 148180004.3 11078181.8 11202406.24 52164636.2 3204889.73
2002 301040272 199458570.2 10565684.9 9888135.917 89689699.3 1231015.55
2003 349946477 210968462.9 8852107.17 10541935.95 125627412 1085136.64
2004 387310819 259591842.7 13479191.6 20866424.88 97158921.8 1283328.28
2005 390141692 236832097.9 10346997.3 10922462.7 149238029 1207310.14
2006 580530868 293115087.7 12106452.5 13281882.07 272514339 1894460.35
10-49 workers 3853713 2685705 69117 179938 909008 9946
50-99 workers 1907238 1124551 57067 74719 644472 6429
100 and more workers 33606883 16066906 694796 646034 16087050 112096
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TABLE 6O11: SELECTED INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING PRODUCTS 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Economic Reports and Balance Sheets (various years). 
 
  
Year
 Steel 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Petrochemi
cal 
Products 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Cement 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Automobile 
(unit) 
Year  Steel 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Petrochemi
cal 
Products 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Cement 
(thousand 
tons) 
 Automobile 
(unit) 
1981 470.1 211 9231 - 1996 5896 10374 17806 94400
1982 711.8 234 10224 49966 1997 6059.4 10817 19376 133900
1983 768.1 182 10912 53573 1998 5625.1 11140 20149 157000
1984 865.7 314 11767 57790 1999 6304.3 11001 22080 187800
1985 830.8 375 12357 29644 2000 6614.1 11809 23889 249100
1986 826.1 515 12439 22947 2001 6930.9 12543 26645 321300
1987 895.9 677 12661 14850 2002 7506 13109 28433 462000
1988 1003.6 884 12203 13673 2003 7991 13969 29783 660900
1989 1148 2421 12869 11200 2004 8990 15070 32199 791900
1990 1583.6 3005 15055 19700 2005 9604 15757 32633.7 841100
1991 2409.4 4342 15152 48800 2006 9990 17994 35268.2 919375
1992 3215.7 5701 15142 33200 2007 10144 23869 39975 943396
1993 3961.1 5428 16260 39500 2008 10903 30040 44397 1057633
1994 4708.1 7467 16836 52800 2009 11126.9 34434 52093 1187732
1995 4581 8723 17491 79500 2010 12728 40175 61619 1354257
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APPENDIX 6P: SECTOR LEVEL DATA  
APPENDIX 6P1: DATA FOR THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. 
  
t
Investment  
(Constant 
2004/2005 
Prices - 
Billion 
Rials) 
Natural 
Log 
Investment
Capital 
stock  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital 
(kt-Kt-
1)/kt-1
Capital 
Stock 
Depreciation 
(δ = (It  – (Kt 
– Kt-1)) / Kt-
1)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital 
+ δ
Natural 
Log 
(Growth 
Rate of 
Capital 
+ δ)
GDP at 
Basic 
Prices  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Natural 
Log 
GDP at 
Basic 
Prices 
Average 
Rates of 
Return 
on 
Facilitie
s /100
User 
Cost of 
Capital
1974/75 10777,1892 9,28518707 48207 0,041237075 49909,421 10,818 0,08 -0,3274
1975/76 10798,9845 9,28720738 57281 0,18823 0,035782863 0,22401 -1,49605 55449,054 10,9232 0,08 -0,0085
1976/77 11593,2316 9,35817672 66844 0,16695 0,035443369 0,20239 -1,59755 66483,502 11,1047 0,08 -0,0227
1977/78 8594,03524 9,05882367 73117 0,09385 0,034723165 0,12857 -2,05129 61330,374 11,024 0,085 -0,072
1978/79 7485,99879 8,92078973 78046 0,06741 0,034971331 0,10238 -2,27903 61488,012 11,0266 0,085 0,01476
1979/80 6714,91695 8,81208674 82077 0,05165 0,034388911 0,08604 -2,45297 63970,772 11,0662 0,08 -0,1476
1980/81 7201,36289 8,88202558 85585 0,04274 0,044998756 0,08774 -2,43339 66586,643 11,1063 0,08 -0,1707
1981/82 7212,27962 8,88354036 88769 0,0372 0,047067589 0,08427 -2,47372 67616,103 11,1216 0,08 -0,0926
1982/83 6365,83867 8,75870127 88151 -0,007 0,078674297 0,07171 -2,63509 75182,261 11,2277 0,08 0,08145
1983/84 8335,79441 9,0283141 88735 0,00662 0,08793768 0,09456 -2,35849 83792,006 11,3361 0,08 0,02258
1984/85 5388,96722 8,59210903 89114 0,00427 0,056459877 0,06073 -2,8013 85760,219 11,3593 0,08 -0,0244
1985/86 5874,60439 8,678394 87934 -0,0132 0,079163817 0,06592 -2,71928 92896,194 11,4392 0,08 0,1034
1986/87 5802,28565 8,6660072 81691 -0,071 0,136980982 0,06598 -2,71833 94472,727 11,4561 0,08 0,07934
1987/88 6329,47267 8,75297221 81671 -0,0002 0,077725486 0,07748 -2,55773 101438,89 11,5272 0,08 -0,0309
1988/89 5324,60306 8,58009344 80668 -0,0123 0,077476743 0,0652 -2,73036 101773,83 11,5305 0,08 -0,0207
1989/90 6138,19573 8,72228612 84069 0,04216 0,033931618 0,07609 -2,57581 106323,95 11,5742 0,08 -0,0397
1990/91 7322,72181 8,89873737 80906 -0,0376 0,124727567 0,0871 -2,44066 118247,45 11,6805 0,075 -0,0051
1991/92 10365,1078 9,24620043 88594 0,09502 0,033089114 0,12811 -2,05484 125105,32 11,7369 0,075 -0,1066
1992/93 8315,84569 9,02591809 94055 0,06164 0,032223917 0,09386 -2,3659 138065,4 11,8355 0,09 -0,1173
1993/94 8707,54134 9,07194475 99809 0,06118 0,031402279 0,09258 -2,37969 140302,36 11,8516 0,14 -0,2149
1994/95 7052,75817 8,86117405 103857 0,04056 0,030105082 0,07066 -2,64984 143516,36 11,8742 0,14 -0,112
1995/96 6450,88807 8,77197309 107258 0,03275 0,029366225 0,06211 -2,7788 148760,4 11,9101 0,145 -0,1356
1996/97 9045,16769 9,10998594 113148 0,05491 0,029416619 0,08433 -2,47301 152608,51 11,9356 0,145 -0,0715
1997/98 8564,30609 9,05535839 118418 0,04658 0,029115018 0,07569 -2,58109 154552,56 11,9483 0,145 0,0265
1998/99 7733,50718 8,95331775 122691 0,03608 0,029222814 0,06531 -2,72866 169581,75 12,0411 0,145 0,07206
1999/00 13578,1599 9,51621789 132669 0,08133 0,029343309 0,11067 -2,20121 157670,38 11,9683 0,145 -0,0901
2000/01 11921,6288 9,38610958 140722 0,0607 0,029160006 0,08986 -2,4095 161831,53 11,9943 0,145 -0,0432
2001/02 14209,2936 9,56165151 150716 0,07102 0,029954759 0,10097 -2,29289 161844,02 11,9944 0,145 0,03325
2002/03 15829,3001 9,66961794 161914 0,0743 0,030728656 0,10503 -2,25353 182154,93 12,1126 0,135 -0,0747
2003/04 16387,8155 9,70429338 173301 0,07033 0,030885627 0,10121 -2,29053 192392,29 12,1673 0 -0,0835
2004/05 19886,7704 9,89780998 187444 0,08161 0,033143319 0,11475 -2,16498 194994,47 12,1807 0 -0,138
2005/06 23272,4393 10,0550251 204347 0,09018 0,033980492 0,12416 -2,08621 211550,37 12,2622 0,16 0,01313
2006/07 21455,8154 9,973751 218736 0,07041 0,034582428 0,105 -2,25382 221432,69 12,3079 0,14 0,03683
2007/08 22762,4594 10,0328679 233741 0,0686 0,035464941 0,10406 -2,26275 226115,98 12,3288 0,12 -0,0284
2008/09 27058,0638 10,2057403 252052 0,07834 0,037422035 0,11576 -2,15623 176172,02 12,0792 0,12 -0,0095
2009/10 26193,8862 10,1732813 268932 0,06697 0,036952241 0,10392 -2,26411 194594,83 12,1787 0,12 0,09533
2010/11 26732,9861 10,1936535 285721 0,06243 0,036975838 0,0994 -2,30856 203391,11 12,2229 0,13 0,02814
2011/12 30955,9745 10,3403213 305883 0,07057 0,037778023 0,10834 -2,22245 200496,84 12,2086 0,145 -0,0435
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APPENDIX 6P2: DATA FOR THE MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices.  
t
Investment  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials) 
Natural 
Log 
Investment
Capital 
stock  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital (kt-
Kt-1)/kt-1
Capital 
Stock 
Depreciati
on (δ = (It  
– (Kt – Kt-
1)) / Kt-1)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital + δ
Natural 
Log 
(Growth 
Rate of 
Capital + 
δ)
GDP at 
Basic 
Prices  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Natural 
Log GDP 
at Basic 
Prices 
Average 
Rates of 
Return on 
Facilities 
/100
User Cost 
of Capital
1973/74 22567,68 10,024274 0,0412371 101622,01 11,529015 0,095 -0,1440821
1974/75 26880,058 10,19914 143399 0,0412371 123382,61 11,723045 0,095 -0,3128644
1975/76 51022,527 10,840023 185510 0,2936631 0,062145 0,3558081 -1,0333637 129164,34 11,768841 0,095 0,0298521
1976/77 66851,382 11,110227 241227 0,300345 0,0600204 0,3603654 -1,0206368 156257,74 11,959262 0,1 0,0187699
1977/78 52044,441 10,859853 279087 0,1569476 0,0588012 0,2157488 -1,5336404 170631,22 12,04726 0,105 -0,0314419
1978/79 33831,517 10,429148 296529 0,0624966 0,0587255 0,1212221 -2,1101307 152540,08 11,935183 0,105 0,0530421
1979/80 18764,165 9,8397042 297847 0,0044448 0,0588346 0,0632794 -2,7601961 128512,3 11,76378 0,08 -0,1252471
1980/81 17158,321 9,7502385 294840 -0,0100958 0,0677036 0,0576078 -2,8540967 133859,99 11,80455 0,08 -0,1487779
1981/82 13811,946 9,5332891 287681 -0,024281 0,0711265 0,0468456 -3,060899 145355,07 11,886935 0,08 -0,0715925
1982/83 13983,95 9,5456655 273467 -0,0494089 0,0980181 0,0486092 -3,023942 139585 11,846429 0,08 0,0994511
1983/84 24626,828 10,111592 268081 -0,0196952 0,1097494 0,0900541 -2,4073445 157003,09 11,964021 0,08 0,0427576
1984/85 25918,15 10,162699 270431 0,008766 0,0879143 0,0966803 -2,3363457 175810,84 12,077164 0,09 0,0131528
1985/86 15177,726 9,6275843 256334 -0,0521279 0,1082521 0,0561242 -2,880188 172467,99 12,057967 0,09 0,1372421
1986/87 13226,779 9,4899987 228054 -0,1103248 0,1619246 0,0515998 -2,9642378 161769,89 11,99393 0,09 0,1066345
1987/88 14132,941 9,5562636 215203 -0,0563507 0,1183226 0,0619719 -2,7810741 181289,05 12,107848 0,09 0,0110098
1988/89 16815,548 9,7300592 205246 -0,0462679 0,124406 0,0781381 -2,5492779 179831,18 12,099774 0,09 0,0255027
1989/90 17415,074 9,7650914 204586 -0,0032157 0,0880654 0,0848498 -2,4668731 194110,95 12,176185 0,09 0,0175851
1990/91 23472,353 10,063579 205803 0,0059486 0,1087824 0,114731 -2,1651652 224563,33 12,321913 0,12 0,0213578
1991/92 45320,663 10,721518 232139 0,127967 0,0922468 0,2202138 -1,5131563 230753,59 12,349106 0,12 -0,014054
1992/93 46023,817 10,736914 257770 0,1104123 0,0878474 0,1982597 -1,6181773 231812,63 12,353685 0,13 -0,0342626
1993/94 33798,709 10,428178 269883 0,0469915 0,0841281 0,1311196 -2,0316451 222647,76 12,313346 0,17 -0,1387387
1994/95 23922,552 10,082577 271607 0,006388 0,0822525 0,0886405 -2,4231669 233652,16 12,361589 0,17 -0,0366331
1995/96 21966,708 9,9972833 271475 -0,000486 0,0813628 0,0808768 -2,5148281 243201,18 12,401644 0,18 -0,0554895
1996/97 27103,897 10,207433 277704 0,022945 0,0768944 0,0998394 -2,3041925 279595,55 12,541099 0,18 0,003209
1997/98 34890,237 10,459962 293206 0,055822 0,0698162 0,1256382 -2,0743487 311068,38 12,647768 0,18 0,0938771
1998/99 48735,977 10,794173 322991 0,1015839 0,0646337 0,1662175 -1,7944579 310252,98 12,645143 0,18 0,1320653
1999/00 45102,034 10,716683 347915 0,0771662 0,0624724 0,1396387 -1,9686971 340407,97 12,7379 0,18 -0,0293577
2000/01 49890,303 10,817582 376029 0,0808071 0,0625909 0,143398 -1,9421315 368578,12 12,817408 0,18 0,017853
2001/02 67395,799 11,118338 419967 0,1168474 0,062383 0,1792303 -1,7190836 422851,82 12,954777 0,17 0,0850153
2002/03 72051,281 11,185133 465553 0,1085466 0,0630175 0,1715641 -1,762798 478267,64 13,077926 0,16 -0,0233224
2003/04 76741,861 11,248203 512383 0,1005901 0,0642502 0,1648402 -1,8027786 560642,93 13,236839 0,16 0,090943
2004/05 89799,347 11,405333 568923 0,1103471 0,0649111 0,1752582 -1,7414947 607684,49 13,317411 0,15 0,0252034
2005/06 88624,78 11,392167 620680 0,0909736 0,0648028 0,1557764 -1,8593336 668004,46 13,41205 0,16 0,0388225
2006/07 87427,788 11,378568 666982 0,0745988 0,0662592 0,1408581 -1,9600025 723642,77 13,492053 0,14 0,0629302
2007/08 82481,086 11,320324 703562 0,0548441 0,0688191 0,1236631 -2,0901941 789767,55 13,579494 0,12 -0,0015394
2008/09 84434,665 11,343733 737926 0,0488429 0,0711674 0,1200103 -2,120178 825399,3 13,623623 0,12 0,0170342
2009/10 88270,047 11,388156 772514 0,0468719 0,0727472 0,1196191 -2,1234427 905766,94 13,716537 0,12 0,1215437
2010/11 96656,543 11,478919 811997 0,0511098 0,0740097 0,1251195 -2,0784862 1022775,4 13,838031 0,13 0,0599139
2011/12 99142,326 11,504312 850349 0,0472317 0,0748652 0,1220969 -2,1029402 1115941,9 13,925209 0,145 -0,0116563
2011/12 1390 99142,326 11,504312 850349 0,0472317 -3,05269 0,0748652 0,1220969 -2,1029402 1115941,9 13,925209
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APPENDIX 6P3: DATA FOR THE OIL AND GAS SECTORS 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. 
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Investment  
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Billion 
Rials) 
Natural 
Log 
Investment
Capital 
stock  
(Constant 
2004/200
5 Prices - 
Billion 
Rials)
Growth 
Rate of 
Capital (kt-
Kt-1)/kt-1
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Billion 
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Average 
Rates of 
Return on 
Facilities 
/100
User Cost 
of Capital
1973/74 9918,5188 9,2021589 0,0412371 0,1204674 -0,1201927
1974/75 12511,529 9,4344058 95401 0,0412371 613793,61 13,327414 0,1052767 -0,3029186
1975/76 14375,536 9,5732831 104828 0,0988145 0,0518709 0,1506854 -1,8925612 624338,47 13,344448 0,1045212 0,0291532
1976/77 42081,986 10,647375 141417 0,3490384 0,0524 0,4014384 -0,9127011 547098,9 13,212385 0,105783 0,0170615
1977/78 26120,693 10,170483 161457 0,1417086 0,0429983 0,1847069 -1,6889851 623080,73 13,342431 0,1106311 -0,0408126
1978/79 21801,498 9,989734 175819 0,0889525 0,0460773 0,1350298 -2,0022602 571436,42 13,255909 0,1101542 0,0464859
1979/80 12505,68 9,4339382 180327 0,02564 0,0454881 0,0711281 -2,6432721 403767,52 12,908595 0,0895444 -0,1287293
1980/81 7261,5759 8,8903521 174241 -0,0337498 0,0740187 0,0402689 -3,212175 306662,93 12,633504 0,086562 -0,1363465
1981/82 9067,7197 9,1124761 174037 -0,0011708 0,053212 0,0520413 -2,9557186 96743,812 11,479822 0,0853322 -0,0825569
1982/83 14552,982 9,5855512 175430 0,008004 0,075616 0,08362 -2,481472 107606,67 11,586238 0,0876061 0,0856836
1983/84 18603,013 9,8310788 183758 0,0474719 0,0585704 0,1060424 -2,2439165 251292,25 12,434372 0,0861164 0,0010792
1984/85 15941,572 9,6766856 189124 0,0292014 0,0575516 0,0867531 -2,4446894 254628,52 12,447561 0,0959378 -0,0089536
1985/86 7562,9764 8,9310201 175669 -0,0711438 0,1111333 0,0399895 -3,2191381 199522,86 12,203684 0,0958837 0,1448311
1986/87 6649,2554 8,8022602 166204 -0,0538797 0,0917308 0,037851 -3,2740967 203988,87 12,225821 0,095534 0,0561201
1987/88 3882,9346 8,2643465 151415 -0,088981 0,1123435 0,0233625 -3,7566247 177321,61 12,08572 0,0951181 0,0102972
1988/89 3384,5593 8,126979 145286 -0,0404782 0,062831 0,0223529 -3,8008007 203533,07 12,223584 0,0948564 -0,0205407
1989/90 2439,5441 7,7995665 140359 -0,0339124 0,0507037 0,0167913 -4,086893 220048,73 12,301604 0,0948455 -0,0114476
1990/91 5474,3807 8,6078344 138690 -0,0118909 0,0508936 0,0390027 -3,2441243 232659,18 12,35733 0,1382541 -0,0147894
1991/92 7344,836 8,9017528 139152 0,0033312 0,0496275 0,0529587 -2,9382437 276415,93 12,529662 0,1428034 -0,0316561
1992/93 4696,348 8,4545405 137030 -0,0152495 0,0489993 0,0337498 -3,3887817 309995,71 12,644314 0,1461078 -0,0540184
1993/94 4764,5301 8,4689542 135366 -0,0121433 0,0469133 0,03477 -3,359001 313737,07 12,656311 0,1680412 -0,1748153
1994/95 7199,1891 8,8817237 136158 0,0058508 0,0473323 0,0531831 -2,9340138 325817,03 12,694091 0,1699072 -0,0687747
1995/96 7178,0176 8,8787785 137229 0,0078659 0,0448524 0,0527183 -2,9427927 303702,58 12,623804 0,1787226 -0,0902814
1996/97 16385,083 9,7041266 147200 0,0726596 0,04674 0,1193996 -2,1252797 304697,75 12,627076 0,1781718 -0,0257622
1997/98 15611,904 9,655789 156044 0,0600815 0,0459776 0,1060591 -2,2437585 304450,26 12,626263 0,177018 0,0700051
1998/99 15577,526 9,6535845 164490 0,0541258 0,045702 0,0998278 -2,3043088 282864,76 12,552724 0,1762365 0,1127235
1999/00 23553,045 10,06701 181015 0,100462 0,0427263 0,1431883 -1,9435947 283887,63 12,556334 0,176145 -0,0503899
2000/01 23518,434 10,06554 197321 0,0900809 0,0398444 0,1299253 -2,0407953 256522,02 12,45497 0,1765126 -0,005549
2001/02 29580,931 10,294885 217988 0,104738 0,0451748 0,1499127 -1,8977019 287828,09 12,570119 0,1711825 0,0705697
2002/03 23198,549 10,051845 230491 0,0573564 0,0490649 0,1064212 -2,2403503 258649,66 12,46323 0,1600491 -0,0357821
2003/04 25441,875 10,144152 243732 0,0574469 0,0529343 0,1103812 -2,2038154 258251,07 12,461688 0,1405762 0,0632165
2004/05 32719,253 10,395719 263142 0,0796367 0,0546061 0,1342427 -2,0081056 299387 12,609492 0,1358639 0,0032569
2005/06 37281,456 10,526251 286071 0,0871355 0,0545426 0,1416781 -1,9541978 298959,24 12,608063 0,1568385 0,0276326
2006/07 31756,878 10,365865 302228 0,056479 0,0545315 0,1110105 -2,1981307 299517,43 12,609928 0,1367772 0,0506113
2007/08 36614,759 10,508207 322509 0,067105 0,0540445 0,1211495 -2,1107303 301107,64 12,615223 0,1166519 -0,0161137
2008/09 37757,675 10,538944 342772 0,0628293 0,0542455 0,1170748 -2,1449423 304768,1 12,627306 0,1167689 0,0012026
2009/10 41312,175 10,628913 365276 0,065653 0,0548708 0,1205238 -2,1159082 304858,9 12,627604 0,1167894 0,1060998
2010/11 20315,467 9,9191378 365335 0,0001615 0,0554552 0,0556168 -2,8892707 280739,46 12,545182 0,1283853 0,04261
2011/12 7432,6376 8,9136361 351457 -0,0379871 0,0583318 0,0203447 -3,8949339 287582,67 12,569266 0,1400388 -0,0301054
2011/12 1390 7432,6376 8,9136361 351457 -0,0379871 #NUM! 0,0583318 0,0203447 -3,8949339 287582,67 12,569266
 287 
 
APPENDIX 6P4: DATA FOR THE SERVICES 
Note: Constructed based on data in billion Rials at constant 2004/05 prices. 
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1973/74 99520,978 11,508124 0,0412371 182513,81 12,114581 0,13 -0,1112508
1974/75 127419,47 11,75524 842727 0,0412371 228857,75 12,340856 0,11 -0,2983474
1975/76 165623,55 12,017473 976875 0,1591832 0,0373496 0,1965329 -1,6269256 270917,45 12,509569 0,11 0,0207583
1976/77 243956,44 12,404745 1184308 0,2123434 0,037388 0,2497315 -1,387369 398207,77 12,894729 0,11 0,0070242
1977/78 208789,33 12,249081 1351329 0,1410283 0,0352681 0,1762965 -1,7355882 351684,77 12,770491 0,115 -0,0439092
1978/79 212333,42 12,265913 1515366 0,1213894 0,0357399 0,1571293 -1,850686 402958,8 12,90659 0,115 0,0416817
1979/80 154667,62 11,949034 1617374 0,0673158 0,0347504 0,1020662 -2,2821339 325491,09 12,69309 0,1 -0,1289876
1980/81 165260,28 12,015277 1724274 0,0660948 0,0360834 0,1021781 -2,2810374 329624,68 12,70571 0,1 -0,1599959
1981/82 141541,31 11,860347 1803302 0,0458326 0,0362549 0,0820875 -2,4999697 290023,02 12,577716 0,1 -0,0845519
1982/83 157618,84 11,967935 1889451 0,0477729 0,0396328 0,0874057 -2,437195 320861,44 12,678765 0,1 0,0637338
1983/84 220643,37 12,304303 2034058 0,0765339 0,0402426 0,1167764 -2,1474939 381163,43 12,850984 0,1 -0,0030313
1984/85 195833,5 12,18502 2154207 0,0590686 0,0372086 0,0962772 -2,3405233 348070,07 12,760159 0,1 -0,0236889
1985/86 179235,85 12,096458 2248474 0,0437595 0,0394432 0,0832027 -2,4864754 341243 12,74035 0,1 0,086323
1986/87 172119,55 12,055945 2322643 0,0329864 0,0435631 0,0765495 -2,5698178 359817,46 12,793352 0,1 0,0219789
1987/88 163007,54 12,001552 2394437 0,0309105 0,0392714 0,0701819 -2,6566646 336957,05 12,727711 0,1 -0,0461359
1988/89 111715,18 11,623708 2411335 0,0070572 0,0395989 0,0466561 -3,0649508 269028,18 12,502571 0,1 -0,0352247
1989/90 121542,77 11,708021 2441228 0,0123969 0,0380079 0,0504048 -2,9876696 279339,26 12,540182 0,1 -0,018181
1990/91 110242,99 11,610442 2406839 -0,0140868 0,0592456 0,0451588 -3,0975695 303260,61 12,622348 0,18 0,0309004
1991/92 167891,07 12,031071 2479030 0,0299941 0,0397617 0,0697558 -2,6627542 349696,24 12,76482 0,18 -0,0073786
1992/93 154592,27 11,948546 2536427 0,023153 0,039207 0,06236 -2,7748315 365661,84 12,809464 0,18 -0,0330815
1993/94 138000,46 11,835012 2574583 0,0150432 0,0393642 0,0544074 -2,9112547 392076,44 12,879212 0,195 -0,1569401
1994/95 125099,46 11,736864 2598082 0,0091273 0,0394629 0,0485902 -3,0243337 405047,77 12,91176 0,195 -0,0529638
1995/96 116336,89 11,664245 2611785 0,0052743 0,0395037 0,044778 -3,1060386 410702,67 12,925625 0,2075 -0,0687102
1996/97 133273,35 11,800158 2641390 0,0113352 0,0396925 0,0510277 -2,9753869 458574,27 13,035878 0,2075 -0,0055794
1997/98 142352,18 11,866059 2678871 0,0141899 0,039703 0,0538929 -2,9207564 455488,56 13,029126 0,2075 0,0915512
1998/99 138773,24 11,840596 2710572 0,0118337 0,0399692 0,0518029 -2,9603095 455884,15 13,029994 0,2075 0,1344818
1999/00 140246,45 11,851157 2741131 0,011274 0,0404665 0,0517405 -2,9615137 498712,98 13,119786 0,2075 -0,0244616
2000/01 153373,88 11,940634 2782742 0,0151802 0,0407725 0,0559528 -2,8832473 519508,43 13,160638 0,2075 0,0229214
2001/02 197114,34 12,191539 2866267 0,0300154 0,0408192 0,0708346 -2,6474081 560863,7 13,237233 0,205 0,0971268
2002/03 217204,19 12,288593 2966893 0,035107 0,0406725 0,0757795 -2,5799279 626714,14 13,348246 0,195 -0,0119818
2003/04 235650,71 12,370106 3081432 0,0386057 0,0408211 0,0794268 -2,5329199 671539,03 13,417327 0,18 0,08785
2004/05 243556,57 12,403105 3198094 0,0378597 0,0411804 0,0790401 -2,5378004 701392,6 13,460823 0,175 0,0263432
2005/06 256381,06 12,45442 3321627 0,0386271 0,0415398 0,0801668 -2,5236454 764763,12 13,547321 0,16 0,0194276
2006/07 247812,94 12,420429 3430177 0,0326798 0,0419261 0,0746059 -2,5955358 828215,18 13,627028 0,14 0,0428803
2007/08 288938,78 12,57397 3572551 0,0415063 0,0427281 0,0842344 -2,4741523 977572,97 13,792828 0,12 -0,0225219
2008/09 323722,72 12,687643 3744193 0,0480447 0,0425692 0,0906139 -2,4011478 1065001 13,878486 0,12 -0,0054317
2009/10 334510,1 12,720422 3919428 0,0468018 0,0425392 0,089341 -2,4152943 1110290,6 13,920132 0,12 0,0994197
2010/11 356244,16 12,783372 4108762 0,0483065 0,0425853 0,0908919 -2,3980847 1176210,4 13,977808 0,13 0,0329537
2011/12 374209,03 12,83257 4307056 0,0482613 0,0428146 0,0910759 -2,3960625 1253865,5 14,041742 0,145 -0,0391657
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